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THE FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL:
A NEW MILLENNIUM
Constantine N. Katsoris*
INTRODUCTION
First published in 1972, the Fordham Urban Law Journal (the
"Journal") is the second oldest legal publication at the Fordham
University School of Law.' When the Journal was first published,
it was originally intended to supplement the Fordham Law Review
by providing a forum for scholars and students to publish legal
literature addressing urban issues facing New York City. Through
the tireless efforts of its editorial staff, faculty advisors, and mem-
bers, the Journal has expanded into a nationally recognized schol-
arly publication that has issued over 20,000 pages of articles, essays,
reports, notes, and comments-far exceeding the visions and ex-
pectations of its founding student members, faculty advisor, and
financial supporters. This evolution of excellence continues into
the new millennium, with the Journal now available electronically
on both Lexis2 and Westlaw,3 and the entire archive of the Journal
soon to be available on Hein-on-Line.4
In 1992, the Journal celebrated its twentieth anniversary. In rec-
ognition of that milestone, a special article entitled, The Fordham
Urban Law Journal: Twenty Years of Progress,5 traced the historical
development of the Journal since its inaugural article, which was
* Wilkinson Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., Ford-
ham University, 1953; J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1957; LL.M., New
York University School of Law, 1963; Public Member of Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration since its inception in 1977; Public Member of National Arbitra-
tion Committee of the NASD, 1975-81; Public Arbitrator at the NASD (since 1968)
and NYSE (since 1971); Arbitrator Trainer at NASD and NYSE (since 1994); Media-
tor at the NASD and NYSE (since 1997). Special thanks and appreciation is extended
to Kevin Bucknor and Erica Hicks who assisted in the compilation and preparation of
this Article.
1. Besides the Fordham Law Review and the Fordham Urban Law Journal, there
are four additional journals presently being published at the Fordham University
School of Law: the Fordham International Law Journal; the Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal; the Fordham Environmental Law
Journal; and the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law.
2. The LexisNexis Research System Homepage, at http://www.lexis.com.
3. The Westlaw Homepage, at http://www.westlaw.com.
4. The Hein-on-Line website, at http://www.heinonline.org.
5. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Fordham Urban Law Journal: Twenty Years of
Progress, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 915 (1992).
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written by then New York State Attorney General Louis J. Lefko-
witz, discussing the unique environmental problem's of New York
City's Jamaica Bay.6
This year the Journal celebrates another milestone in its develop-
ment-its Thirtieth Anniversary-and this Article seeks to provide
a historical reflection on the Journal's proud history and success in
addressing various local, national, and international urban issues
over the course of the last ten years.
I. CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW
Since its first publication in 1972, the Journal has expanded its
coverage from primarily highlighting urban issues affecting New
York City, to a broader coverage of related national and interna-
tional issues. Besides the publication of scholarly articles, essays,
reports, notes, and comments, the Journal expanded its coverage
by becoming more involved in planning, organizing, and sponsor-
ing numerous symposia and conferences, gathering together the
collective thoughts of acknowledged experts on various problems
and issues.
In the spring of 1992, the Journal began to publish an annual
symposium issue in conjunction with the Louis Stein Center for
Ethics and Public Interest Law.7 In 2001, the William and Burton
Cooper Chair on Urban Legal Issues began to co-sponsor the an-
nual symposium issue. This annual issue explores various urban
challenges facing New York City and typically includes several arti-
cles written by various legal scholars and practitioners. Subsequent
issues have addressed such topics as environmental justice,8 welfare
reform,9 urban bioethics,'0 the changing role of the federal prose-
cutor, 11 forgiveness and the law,'2 privatization, 3 problem-solving
6. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Jamaica Bay: An Urban Marshland in Transition, 1 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1 (1972).
7. Symposium, First Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges: Big Cities, Big Problems: Solutions for the 1990s, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
567 (1992).
8. Symposium, Third Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges: Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425 (1994) [herein-
after Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice].
9. Symposium, Fourth Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges: Urban Welfare Reform, 22 FOROHAM URB. L.J. 857 (1995).
10. Symposium, Sixth Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges: Urban Bioethics: A Symposium on Health Care, Poverty, and Autonomy,
24 FORDHAM URI3. L.J. 663 (1997).
11. Symposium, Eighth Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges: The Changing Role of the Federal Prosecutor. In Memory of William
Tendy, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999).
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courts, 14 and the post-incarceration consequences of criminal
convictions.15
As for significant public events and reports, Volume 20 included
several reports drafted by the committee on Professional Responsi-
bility of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The
reports focused on various ethical issues relating to attorney cost
allocation in class action suits,16 plaintiff incentive awards in class
actions,'7 attorney disclosure of client confidences in situations
where clients use the attorney's services in committing fraudulent
or criminal acts,18 restrictions on attorney speech, 9 and the ethical
issues which might arise when a lawyer leaves a firm.20 One of the
reports, Financial Arrangements in Class Action, and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which was cited by the Ninth Circuit in
Boccardo v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,21 also made several
recommendations to amend the American Bar Association's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.22 Some
of the Committee's recommendations were adopted by the Ameri-
can Bar Association when it drafted Disciplinary Rule 5-103 (b)
and Model Rule 1.8(b).
12. Symposium, Ninth Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges: The Role of Forgiveness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1347 (2000)
[hereinafter Symposium, Forgiveness in the Law].
13. Symposium, Tenth Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges:
Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatiza-
tion, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1303 (2001) [hereinafter Symposium, Privatization].
14. Symposium, Eleventh Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban Chal-
lenges: Problem Solving Courts: From Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurispru-
dence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1751 (2002).
15. Symposium, Twelfth Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges:
Beyond the Sentence: Post-Incarceration Legal, Social, and Economic Consequences of
Criminal Convictions, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
16. Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Financial
Arrangements in Class Action, and the Code of Professional Responsibility, 20 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 831 (1993).
17. Id.
18. Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Report
on the Debate Over Whether There Should Be an Exception to Confidentiality for Rec-
tifying a Crime or Fraud, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857 (1993).
19. Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The
Need for Fair Trials Does Not Justify a Disciplinary Rule that Broadly Restricts an
Attroney's Speech, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 881 (1993).
20. Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Ethical
Issues Arising When a Lawyer Leaves a Firm: Restrictions on Practice, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 897 (1993).
21. 56 F.3d 1016, 101.9 (9th Cir. 1995).
22. Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, supra note 16, at 848.
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Volume 20 also featured an article entitled Jails and Prisons-
Reservoirs of TB Disease: Should Defendants with HIV Infection
(Who Cannot Swim) Be Thrown Into The Reservoir?,23 which ar-
gued for a reevaluation of and a departure from the mandatory
sentencing laws in cases where the defendant is HIV-infected. 24
The article opposed the restrictions placed on plea bargaining, stat-
ing that the safety and welfare of the community is not enhanced
by the compulsory dumping of HIV-infected people into prisons, 25
and was cited by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in a dissenting opinion by Judge William R. Wilson, United
States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas sitting by
designation in United States v. Rabins. 6
In addition, Volume 20 also contained articles, essays, and notes
covering the First Amendment and employment, copyright, hous-
ing, banking, and family law. The Volume also featured the second
annual Stein Symposium Issue, which focused on fairness at all
stages of the urban criminal justice system, 27 and included several
essays by judges, bar and civic leaders, prosecutors, criminal de-
fense lawyers, and academics.
Volume 21 contained the works from the third annual Stein
Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges, 28 and in-
cluded several pieces focused on the environmental challenges fac-
ing poor urban communities, as well as articles addressing gay and
lesbian issues. In addition, it contained a report by the Temporary
State Commission on Local Government Ethics,29 which was writ-
ten in response to the Feerick Report issued by the Commission on
Government Integrity.3"
In Volume 22, the Journal published a number of significant arti-
cles including a discussion of the proposal to add rules 413 to 415 to
23. Faith Colangelo & Mariana Hogan, Jails and Prisons-Reservoirs of TB Dis-
ease: Should Defendants with HIV Infection (Who Cannot Swim) Be Thrown Into The
Reservoir?, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 467 (1993).
24. Id. at 469-70.
25. Id.
26. 63 F.3d 721, 742 n.6, 743 n.8, 744 n.10 (8th Cir. 1995) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
27. Symposium, Second Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges: Urban Challenges: Urban Criminal Justice: Is it Fair? Does it Appear Fair?,
20 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 377 (1993).
28. Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice, supra note 8, at 425.
29. Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics: Final Report, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1995).
30. N.Y. State Comm'n on Gov't Ethics, Municipal Ethical Standards: The Need
for a New Approach, in GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990's: THE COL-
LECrEID REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEG-
RITY 618 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991).
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the Federal Rules of Evidence,31 as well as a timely report entitled
Report of The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration and
Representation of Parties in Arbitration by Non Attorneys. 32
Evidencing the Journal's increased diversity of coverage, Volume
23 contained several articles discussing civil rights, welfare reform,
the death penalty, professional responsibility, criminal law, sexual
harassment, banking, and antitrust issues. In addition, this volume
included the publication of several articles from a symposium spon-
sored by the Journal in conjunction with the Stein Center and the
New York Commission on Human Rights, as well as a commemo-
ration of the fortieth anniversary of the New York Commission on
Human Rights.33
Book One of Volume 24 was dedicated to the memory of Louis
Stein.34 This volume featured a number of articles and essays dis-
cussing various issues relating to health care reform,35 commercial
31. Norman M. Garland, Some Thoughts on the Sexual Misconduct Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 22 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 355 (1995); Edward J. Im-
winkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence Pro-
hibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285 (1995); David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (1995); Roger C. Park, The
Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About
Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271 (1995); Myrna S. Raeder, Ameri-
can Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1995).
32. Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration on Representation
of Parties in Arbitration by Non-Attorneys, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 524 (1995).
The report, drafted by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA"),
addressed serious concerns with the quality and adequacy of representation by non-
attorneys in the resolution of securities disputes. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Fore-
word to Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration on Representation
of Parties in Arbitration by Non Attorneys, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503, 503-06 (1995).
This report was widely circulated, and was sent to each attorney general and each
state bar association in the country.
33. Rolando T. Acosta, A Response to Burt Neuborne, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1165 (1996); Victor A. Bolden, Where Does New York City Go From Here: Chaos or
Community?, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1031 (1996); Victor M. Goode, Some Thoughts
and Reflections on the Fortieth Anniversary of the New York City Human Rights Com-
mission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053 (1996); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Na-
tives, Newcomers and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the 21st Century, 23
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1075 (1996); Burt Neuborne, Who's Afraid of the Human Rights
Commission?, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1139 (1996); Michael H. Schill, Local Enforce-
ment of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing: The New York City Human
Rights Coalition, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991 (1996); Marta B. Varela, The First Forty
Years of the Commission on Human Rights, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 983 (1996).
34. 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. vii (1997). The initial funding for the Fordham Urban
Law Journal came from Louis Stein, Class of 1926. Katsoris, supra note 5, at 917.
35. Tricia Asaro & Lewis D. Solomon, Community-Based Health Care: A Legal
and Policy Analysis, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 235 (1997); Robert J. Brent, Profits, Pov-
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zoning in New York City, immigration, securities arbitration, drug
policy reform, the Fifth Amendment, and intellectual property.
Volume 25 commemorated the Journal's Twenty-Fifth Anniver-
sary and exceeded nine hundred pages. It included two symposia
publications and a special report commissioned by Thomas V.
Ognibene, Minority Leader of the New York City Council,36 that
examined the compensation package of executive directors of not
for profit organizations doing business in New York City.37
Volume 25 also included, for the first time in the Journal's his-
tory, a CD-Rom supplement. The CD-Rom entitled So Goes a Na-
tion: Lawyers and Communities was a reproduction of an
inspirational video by the same name. The Louis Stein Center for
Ethics and Public Interest Law at the Fordham University School
of Law collaborated with New York Lawyers for the Public Inter-
est and the Fordham Urban Law Journal to produce So Goes a
Nation: Lawyers and Communities, a documentary video highlight-
ing three innovative approaches to community lawyering. The CD-
Rom included narratives by actors Sam Waterson and Jimmy Smits
and highlighted the perspective of contemporary law students on
lawyering for the poor. This innovative multimedia format was in-
cluded as a supplement to the various articles and notes discussing
the topic of community lawyering.
Volume 26 was dedicated to John D. Feerick, the legendary
Dean of the Fordham University School of Law from 1982 until
2002. 38 With Volume 26, the number of books published per vol-
ume increased from four to six. Book Five of Volume 26 was par-
ticularly noteworthy because it included the color publication of a
selection of several of the posters from Civil Disturbance: Battles
for Justice in New York City,3 9 a public artwork exhibition, which
resulted from the collaboration between various artist and lawyers,
and memorialized the legal achievements and the continued strug-
erty, and Health Care: An Examination of the Ethical Base of Economics, 24 FORD-
HAM UzB. L.J. 667 (1997); Lewis R. Goldfrank, The Public Hospital, 24 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 703 (1997); Robert L. Hubbard, Toward a Competitive Health Care System,
24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 683 (1997); Maria O'Brien Hylton, Some Preliminary
Thoughts on the Deregulation of Insurance to Advantage the Working Poor, 24 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 683 (1997).
36. Council of the City of N.Y., To Profit or Not-to-Profit: An Examination of
Executive Compensation in Not-For-Profit Organizations Contracting with New York
City: A Staff Report to Hon. Thomas V. Ognibe, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 471.
37. Id. at 472-73.
38. 26 FORDHAM URB L.J. vii-viii (1998).
39. Collection, Civil Disturbance: Battles for Justice in New York City, 25 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1299 (1999).
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gle for social justice in New York City. Also included in this spe-
cial publication were a number of essays discussing some of the
cases depicted by the posters.
Book Six of Volume 27 was dedicated to the Cooper Family, rec-
ognizing the great generosity of the family in endowing the Ford-
ham University School of Law with the William and Burton
Cooper Chair in Urban Legal Issues.4" Volume 27 further exempli-
fied the Journal's increased sponsorship and coverage of important
symposia and conferences. In addition to the publication of the
ninth annual Stein Symposium Issue, it included works from a sym-
posium on domestic violence and a special publications issue of a
symposium entitled Civil Rights Law in Transition: The Forty-Fifth
Anniversary of the New York City Commission on Human Rights.41
This symposium was organized in conjunction with the New York
City Commission on Human Rights and featured articles focusing
on domestic violence, disability law, sexual harassment, and hate
crimes legislation.
Volume 27 also published a thought-provoking article by Mar-
garet Colgate Love entitled Of Pardons, Politics and Collar But-
tons: Reflections on the President's Duty to be Merciful.42 The
article provided an insightful analysis of the President's power to
pardon, and was reported in the National Law Journal43 and widely
cited by news publications including: the New York Times,44 the
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,45 the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,46 and the
Plain Dealer.47
Volume 28 included two special issues, "The Drug Policy De-
bate" and "The Challenge of Urban Policing." The other four
books in this volume contained articles and conference publica-
40. Dedication, 27 FORDHAM URB L.J. 1735 (2000).
41. Symposium, Civil Rights Law in Transition: The Forty-Fifth Anniversary of the
New York City Commission on Human Rights, 27 FORDHAM URB L.J. 1105 (2000)
[hereinafter Symposium, Civil Rights Law in Transition].
42. Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections
on the President's Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2000).
43. Michael D. Goldhaber, And Now, for the Rest of Clinton's Clemency Story,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 14, 2000, at Al.
44. William Safire, Pardon Me, But..., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2000, at A27.
45. William Safire, Don't Bet Clinton Will Be Doing Time, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-
SENTINEL, Aug. 25, 2000, at 23A.
46. William Satire, No Beg Your Pardon Is Necessary; Let the Independent Counsel
and Grand Jury Lay Out Detailed Charges, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZET'E, Aug. 25,
2000, at A21.
47. William Satire, Gore Dodges the Pardon Issue; How do We Uphold the Law
When Most of the Country Wants to 'Move On'?, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
Aug. 25, 2000, at lB.
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tions addressing such topics as welfare reform, alternative dispute
resolution, the professional responsibility of lawyers, Asian Ameri-
can voting rights, and fair housing for the handicapped among
other topics. Volume 28 also published the proceedings of the
Tenth Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges,
entitled Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democ-
racy in the Era of Privatization.48
Volume 29 was dedicated to the memory of William J. Moore,
the Dean of Admissions at the Fordham University School of Law
from 1970 to 2000.19 Volume 29 featured the first series of articles
from the William and Burton Cooper Chair in Urban Legal Issues
on the legal implications of the census. It also contained a special
issue entitled "Education Law and Policy," and two special series,
"New Urbanism and Smart Growth" and "Judicial Independence."
Volume 30 published a series of articles from a conference enti-
tled "Religious Values and Legal Dilemmas in Bioethics" as well as
an address from Avery Cardinal Dulles on the inauguration of the
Catholic Lawyers' Program of the Institute of Religion, Law and
Lawyer's Work at the Fordham University School of Law. Volume
30 also included articles on topics such as drug policy, law enforce-
ment, criminal offenders, increasing Latino representation in law
schools, and homelessness.
No single legal theme has dominated the Journal's agenda during
the past ten years, as is evident from the above chronological re-
cap. Its focus has been diverse and broad, and has included such
wide-ranging issues as criminal law, environmental law, ethics, fam-
ily law, housing, constitutional law, professional responsibility,
health law, zoning, the First Amendment, dispute resolution, taxa-
tion, securities regulation, the death penalty, domestic violence, the
drug policy debate, and civil rights, to name just a few.
II. TOPICAL REVIEW
A. Drug Policy
In October of 2000 the Journal published, in Book One of Vol-
ume 28, a special issue focused on the effectiveness of the United
States drug policy and also included the proceedings from an inter-
disciplinary conference that explored the topic in detail. The publi-
cation additionally contained several articles addressing key legal,
medical, and scientific issues related to drug policy. In Volume 30,
48. Symposium, Privatization, supra note 13, at 1303.
49. 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2001).
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the Journal published a debate on the efficacy of United States
drug policy held at the Fordham University School of Law between
Graham Boyd of the American Civil Liberties Union and Asa
Hutchison, then Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency.5 °
B. Domestic Violence
The Journal's commitment to the coverage of issues relating to
domestic violence is evidenced by the publication of numerous arti-
cles, notes, and comments on that topic. Volume 27, for example,
published a symposium issue entitled Women, Children and Do-
mestic Violence: Current Tensions and Emerging Issues,51 which fo-
cused on the legal encounters of mothers who are victims of
domestic violence. This issue also contained several articles that
detailed the experiences of mothers who, while seeking orders of
protection in New York City's Family Court, contemporaneously
found themselves the subject of child neglect proceedings. In Vol-
ume 29, the Journal published the proceedings from another do-
mestic violence conference, Revolutions Within Communities,52
which focused on mainstream legal responses to domestic violence,
immigrant victims of domestic violence and the unique social and
legal problems that gay and lesbian victims of domestic violence
encounter.
C. The Death Penalty
The Journal has sponsored and covered numerous programs con-
cerning the death penalty, including symposia entitled Are Execu-
tions in New York Inevitable?,53 sponsored by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, and Politics and the Death Pen-
alty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived
Political Pressure? ,5 sponsored by the American Bar Association
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities. In the winter of
1998, it published an article entitled Constitutional Challenges to
50. The Fordham Law Drug Policy Reform Project: America's Oldest War: The
Efficacy of United States Drug Policy-A Debate Between Graham Boyd, ACLU and
Asa Hutchinson, DEA, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 401 (2003).
51. Symposium, Women, Children and Domestic Violence: Current Tensions and
Emerging Issues, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 565 (2000).
52. Conference, Revolutions Within Communities: The Fifth Annual Domestic Vio-
lence Conference, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13 (2001).
53. Symposium, Are Executions in New York Inevitable?, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
557 (1995).
54. Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due
Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239 (1994).
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New York State's Death Penalty Statute,55 which argued that the
New York Death Penalty Statute is constitutionally flawed, dis-
cussed the numerous constitutional infirmities of the New York
Statute, and recommended guidelines to assist in the capital selec-
tion process. 6
D. Civil Rights
The Journal has also published articles, notes, and comments on
various aspects of civil rights, including numerous student notes ad-
dressing issues such as hate crimes legislation, 57 affirmative action
jurisprudence, 58 and the Violence Against Women Civil Rights
Act. 59 Additionally the Journal has hosted and sponsored various
conferences focused on civil rights.60
E. Securities Regulation
Moreover, during the last ten years, the Journal has continued its
in-depth coverage regarding the resolution of securities disputes.6
In Volume 22, the Journal published the widely disseminated Re-
port of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
("SICA") on the representation of parties in arbitration by non-
55. John M. Shields, Constitutional Challenges to New York State's Death Penalty
Statute, 25 FORDHAM URB. L,J. 255 (1998).
56. Id. at 255-78.
57. Kevin N. Ainsworth, Targeting Conduct: A Constitutional Method of Penaliz-
ing Hate Crimes, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 669 (1992).
58. John J. Sullivan, The Constitutionality of New York State's Affirmative Action
Law, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107 (1994).
59. Renee L. Jarusinsky, Gender Difference in Perceiving Violence and Its Implica-
tion for the VAWA's Civil Rights Remedy, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 965 (2000).
60. Conference, IS Our Drug Policy Effective? Are there Alternatives?, 28 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 20 (2000); Symposium, A Perspective on "Temper in the Court": A
Forum on Judicial Civility, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709 (1996); Symposium, Are Ex-
ecutions in New York Inevitable?, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 557 (1995); Symposium,
Civil Rights Law in Transition, supra note 41, at 11.05; Symposium, Queer Law 1999:
Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Law, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 279 (1999); Symposium, Forgiveness in the Law, supra note 12, at 1347; Sympo-
sium, The Seventh Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban Chal-
lenges: Lawyering For Poor Communities in The Twenty-First Century, 25 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 673 (1998); Symposium, Towards a Compassionate and Cost-Effective Drug
Policy: A Forum on the Impact of Drug Policy on the Justice System and Human
Rights, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315 (1997); Symposium, Women, Children and Domes-
tic Violence: Current Tensions and Emerging Issues, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 565
(2000); Remarks, From the Ground Up: Local Lessons for National Reform, 27 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1 (1999); Roundtable Discussion, Law and Disorder: Is Effective Law
Enforcement Inconsistent with Good Public Community Relations?, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 363 (2000).
61. See Katsoris, supra note 5, at 933-36.
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attorneys.62 In Volume 23, it published SICA: The First Twenty
Years,63 which traced SICA's twenty-year history and was widely
cited not only in American periodicals, but also translated into the
Russian language and distributed at the International Conference
on Arbitration co-sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange and
the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange in April 2000.64 Vol-
ume 24 included The Betrayal of McMahon,65 which was not only
widely cited, but also was republished in its entirety by the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association in its book, ADR and the Law,66 co-
published with the Fordham Urban Law Journal and the Fordham
International Law Journal. Volume 25 contained yet another
highly circulated article on securities dispute resolution, Securities
Arbitration : A Clinical Experiment,67 which discussed the creation
of a clinic at the Fordham University School of Law (at the urging
of then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt) to assist injured investors
who could not obtain representation.
CONCLUSION
The tireless efforts of the Journal's editorial staff, faculty advi-
sors, and members have not gone unnoticed. Over its thirty-year
history, the Journal has been cited frequently in state and federal
court decisions, 68 other law reviews, scholarly publications, periodi-
62. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
63. Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 483 (1996).
64. See Dream Team Visits Moscow, Exchange, Aug. 2000, at 5.
65. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Betrayal of McMahon, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
221 (1997).
66. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Betrayal of McMahon, 1997 ADR & THF LAW:
DEVELOPMENTS IN ADR: 1994-1996, at 24.
67. Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration : A Clinical Experiment, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 193 (1998).
68. 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 349 n.5, 372-80 (1999). noted in Jones v. United
States, 527 U.S. 373, 408 (1999); 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 749, 754 n.17 (1982), noted in
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 (1999); 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 945
n.423 (1987), noted in Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A, 511 U.S. 164,
185 (1994); 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 914 (1995), noted in Ca. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2003); 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 769
(1996), noted in United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
261 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2001); 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 757 (2000), noted in
Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2001); 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 461, 461
(1995), noted in Brown v. Samson Resources Co., No. 99-6344, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
22389, at *11 (10th Cir. 2000); 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 369 n. 46 (1995), noted in
Sal Tinnerello & Son, Inc. v. Town of Stonington, 141 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1998); 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621, 623-25 (1993), noted in Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d
1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 1996); 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 285-86 (1995), noted in United
States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 875,
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875 (1992), noted in Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 1996); 22 FORD-
HAM URn. L.J. 361, 366 n.33 (1995), noted in Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of
Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 791 (3d Cir. 1995); 22 FORDHAM URB. L. 361, 369 n.46 (1995),
noted in SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1995); 22 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 361, 404 (1995), noted in USA Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d
1272, 1291 (2d Cir. 1995); 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 467, 467 (1993), noted in United
States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 740 (8th Cir. 1995); 20 FORDHAM URB. L. 831, 848
(1993), noted in Boccardo v. Comm'r, 56 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1995); 15 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 709, 709 (1987), noted in Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 60 (D.C. Cir.
1994); 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 366-68 (1999), noted in United States v. Fell, 217 F.
Supp. 2d. 469, 475 (D. Vt. 2002); 27 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 849, 871 (2000), noted in
Nicholas v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347,
357 n.36 (1999), noted in United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 312
(D.P.R. 2000); 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 349 (1999), noted in United States v. Fur-
row, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2000); 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209, 221
(1998), noted in Clark v. Pena, No. 99 Civ. 277, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6660, *27
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2000); 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 421 (1999), noted in United
States v. Lee, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1035 (E.D. Ark. 2000); 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1267, 1290 (1999), noted in Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1105
(S.D. Ind. 1999); 15 FORDHAM URB. L. 1, 1 (1986), noted in Ericson v. Syracuse
Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 22 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 81, 81-103
(1994), noted in Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 23
F. Supp. 2d 771, 784 (N.D. Ohio 1998); 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 87,87 (1991), noted in
Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 676 (D.R.I. 1998); 24 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 165, 185-95 (1996), noted in Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799, 809 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); 14 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 685, 685 (1985/1986), noted in Glidden Co. v. Jan-
dernoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 478 (W.D. Mich. 1997); 6 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 333, 333
(1978), noted in McCoy v. Johnson, 176 F.R.D. 676, 681 (N.D. Ga. 1997); 19 FORD-
HAM UR3. L.J. 969, 969 (1992), noted in Rivera v. Periodicos Todo Bayamon, 1997
WL 43202, at *3 (D.P.R. Jan. 23, 1997); 22 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1255, 1256 (1995),
noted in Concerned Residents of Taylor-Wythe v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 1996 WL
452432, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,1996); 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 797, 814-15 (1996), noted
in Hernandez v. Wangen, 938 F. Supp. 1052, 1064 (D.P.R. 1996); 12 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 459, 477 (1984), noted in Rosado v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 927 F. Supp. 917,
935 (E.D. Va. 1996); 23 FORDHAM URU. L. 377, 377 (1996), noted in Escalera v.
N.Y. Hous. Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1123, 1123 (1995), noted in Bothwell v. Republic Robacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221,
'1230 (D. Neb. 1995); 9 FOROHAM URB. L.J. 113, 154-57 (1985), noted in Braune v.
Abbott Lab, 895 F. Supp. 530, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 286-
87 (1995), noted in United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1995);
15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 738-52 (1987), noted in Overall v. Klotz, 846 F. Supp 297,
301 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 16 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 577, 577 (1988), noted in Suss v. Am.
Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 823 F. Supp 181, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
19 FOROHAM URB. L.J. 111, 111 (1991), noted in Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bouy,
Hall & Howard & Assocs., 208 B.R. 737, 742 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga. 1995); 17 FORDHAM
URn. L.J. 323, 331, 349 (1989), noted in United States v. Diaz, No. 92-00955, 1995
CCA LEXIS 428, at *15-*16 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. June 19, 1995) (unpublished); 22
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 271, 272 (1995), noted in Hess v. State, 20 P.3d 1121, 1124
(Alaska 2001); 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 927 n.294, 932 (1986), noted in Kamen v.
Lindly, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 127, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); 28 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1435,
1439 (2001), noted in Frank v. City of Akron, 303 F.3d 752, 753 (6th Cir. 2002); 23
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 781, 786-78 (1996), noted in State v. Donahue 742 A.2d 775, 783
(Conn. 1999); 26 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 347, 490 (1999), noted in State v. Cobb, 743
A.2d 1, 144, 147 (Conn. 1999); 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 747, 748 (1992), noted in Doe
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cals, and various news publications.69 A recent survey of the most-
v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1333 (Conn. 1998); 14 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 283, 296 (1986),
noted in Ass'n of Apt. Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co., 58 P.3d 608, 642
(Haw. 2002); 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 356-57 (1997), noted in Richardson v. State,
717 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1999); 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 356-57 (1997), noted in
Thomas v. State, 764 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
361, 361 (1995), noted in Water Dist. No. 1 v. Mission Hills Country Club, 960 P.2d
239, 246 (Kan. 1998); 12 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 625, 630, 631, 635 (1984), noted in Pat-
ton v. Hutchison Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299 1311, 1313, 1314 (Kan. 1993); 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 849 (2000), noted in State ex rel. C.J.K., 774 So. 2d 107, 116
(La. 2000); 7 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 55, 63 (1978), noted in Abadie v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 784 So. 2d 46, 89 (La. Ct. App. 2001); 17 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 89, 99 (1989), noted
in People v. Hendrickson, 586 N.W.2d 906, 911 (Mich. 1998); 12 FORDHAM URn. L.J.
625, 630-38 (1984), noted in Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Mich.
1995); 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 461, 464-66 (1995), noted in Kennedy v. Dawson, 989
P.2d 390, 397 (Mont. 1999); 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141, 1145 (1995), noted in Bren-
nan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667, 676 (N.J. 1996); 18 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 3, 34-42 (1990),
noted in McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 626 A.2d 425, 433 (N.J.
1993); 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 242 (1977), noted in Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Sch.
Dist. No. 29 v. Fernandez, 618 N.E.2d 89, 92 (N.Y. 1993); 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283,
307, 308 (1997), noted in Aiello v. Adar, 750 N.Y.S.2d 457, 464, 465 (Sup. Ct. 2002); 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1985, 1987 (2000), noted in People v. Heber, 745 N.Y.S.2d 835,
840 (Sup. Ct. 2002); 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1981), noted in Starishevsky v.
Hofstra Univ., 612 N.Y.S.2d 794, 805 (Sup. Ct. 1994); 6 FORDHAM URn L.J. 333, 333
n.2 (1978), noted in State v. Mathis, 509 S.E.2d 155, 159 (N.C. 1998); 12 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 625, 625 (1984), noted in Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521
N.W.2d 401, 408 (N.D. 1994); 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 749, 756 (1982), noted in Akron
v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ohio 1993); 10 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1, 51-52 (1981),
noted in Tersigni v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); 17
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 325-26 (1989), noted in State v. Lyons, 924 P.2d 802, 807
(Or. 1996); 16 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 127, 151 n.73 (1988), noted in Bortz v. Noon, 729
A.2d 555,562 (Pa. 1999); 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1731, 1731 (2001), noted in Memphis
Publ. Co v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 76 (Tenn. 2002);
15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 709 (1987), noted in Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1349
(Utah 1993); 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 923, 927-38 (1996), noted in State v. McClendon,
935 P.2d 1334, 1350 (Wash. 1997); 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 695, 698-701 (1991), noted
in Clean v. State, 928 P.2d 1054, 1082 (Wash. 1996); 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 15, 16
(1986), noted in Metzner v. Metzner, 446 S.E.2d 165, 176 (W. Va. 1994).
69. For example, the Fordham Urban Law Journal has been cited at least once in
each of the following law reviews, texts, journals, and periodicals: AKRON L. REV.;
ALA. L. REV.; ALB. L. REV.; AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.; AM. BANKR. L.J.; AM. Bus.
L. REV.; AM. CRIM. L. REV.; AM. INDIAN L. REV.; AM. J. COMP. L.; AM. J. CRIM. L.;
AM. J.L. & MED.; AM. REV. INT'L ARB.; AM. U. INT'L L. REV.; AM. U. J.GENDER &
L.; AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.; AM. U. L. REV.; ANN. SURV. AM. L.; AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci.; ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.; ARIZ. ST. L.J.; ARIZ.
L. REV.; ARK. L. REV.; ARMY LAW.; ASIAN L.J.; B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.; B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV.; B.C. L. REV.; B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.; B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L.; B.U. L. REV.; B.U. PuB. INT. L.J.; BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.; BERKELEY TECH.
L.J.; BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.; BRANDEIS L.J.; BROOK. J. INT'L L.; BROOK. L. REV.;
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.; BUFF. ENVTL L.J.; BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.; BUFF. L. REV.;
BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J.; BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J.; BYU L. REV.; BYU J. PUB. L.; CAL. L.
REV.; CAL. W. INT'L L.J.; CAL. W. L. REV.; CAMPBELL L. REV.; CAP. U. L. REV.;
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J; CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L.; CARDOZO L. REV.;
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CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL.; CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT.; CARDOZO WO-
MEN'S L.J.; CASE W. RES. J.L. MED.; CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.; CASE W. RES. L.
REV.; CATH. U. J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y; CATH. U. L. REV.; CATH. LAW.;
CHI.-KENT L. REV.; CHICANO-LATINO L. REV.; CLEV. ST. L. REV.; CLINICAL L. REV.;
COLUM. Bus. L. REV.; COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.; COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.; COLUM. J.
GENDER & L.; COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.; COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.; COLUM. L.
REV.; CONN. INS. L.J.; CONN. J. INT'L L.; CONN. L. REV.; CONST. COMMENT.; COOLEY
L. REV.; CORNELL INT'L L.J.; CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y; CORNELL L. REV.;
CREIGHTON L. REV.; CRIME & JUST.; CUMB. L. REV.; DEL. J. CORP. L.; DEL. L. REV.;
DENV. U. L. REV.; DEPAUL Bus. L.J.; DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.; DEPAUL L.
REV.; DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y; DET. C.L. REV.; DICK. J. ENVTL. L.
POL.; DICK. J. INT'L L.; DICK. L. REV.; DRAKE. L. REV.; DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.;
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y; DUKE L.J.; DUO. L. REV.; ECOLOGY L.Q.; ELDER L.J.;
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.; EMORY INT'L L. REV.; EMORY L.J.; EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J.; ENVTL. L.; FED. COMM. L.J.; FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y; FLA. L. REV.; FLA. ST.
J. TRANSNAT'L L.& PoL'Y; FLA. ST. U. L. REV.; FLA. TAX REV.; FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J.; FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.; FORDHAM INT'L L.J.; FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L.; FORDHAM L. REV.; FORDHAM URB. L.J.; GA. L. REV.; GA. ST. U.L.
REV.; GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.; GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY; GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS; GEO.
J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y; GEO. L.J.; GEO. MASON L. REV.; GEO. WASH. L. REV.;
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.; GONZ. L. REV.; GREEN BAG INC.; HAMLINE L. REV.;
HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J.; HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.; HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.; HARV.
INT'L L.J.; HARV. J. ON LEGIS.; HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y; HARV. J.L. & TECH.;
HARV. L. REV.; HARV. LATINO L. REV.; HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.; HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J.; HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.; HASTINGS L.J.; HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y; HAWAII L. REV.; HEALTH MATRIX; HOFSTRA L. REV.; HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J.: Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y; Hous. J. INT'L. L.; Hous. L. REV.; How. L.J.;
HOW. SCROLL Soc. J. REV.; IDAHO L. REV.; IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.; IND. L.
REV.; IND. L.J.; INT'L TRADE L.J.; IOWA L. REV.; ISSUES L. & MED.; J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L.; J. MARSHALL L. REV.; J. Am. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW; J. CON-
TEMP. L.; J. CONTEMP. L. & FAM. STUDS.; J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y; J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY; J. DISP. RESOL.; J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.; J. FAM. L.; J. GENDER
RACE & JusT.; J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y; J. HIGH TECH. L.; J. INST. STUD. LEGAL
ETHICS; J. INTELL. PROP. L.; J. INT'L LEGAL STUD.; J.L. & COM.; J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L.; J. LEGAL PROF.; J. LEGAL STUD.; J. LEGAL WRITING INST.; J. LEGIS.; J.
MAR. L. & COM.; J.L. & EDUC.; J.L. & HEALTH; J.L. & POL.; J.L. & POL'Y; J.L.
Soc'Y; KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y; KAN. L. REV.; KY. L.J.; LA RAZA L.J.; LA. L. REV.;
LAND & WATER L. REV.; LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.; LAW & INEQUALITY J.; LAW &
SEXUALITY; LAW & Soc. INQUIRY; LAW & Soc'Y REV.; LAW LIBR. J.; LEGAL STUD.
F.; LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST.; LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.; LoY. L. REV.;
LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.; LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.; LoY. L.A. L. REV.; LoY.
U. CHI. INST. HEAL-Tii L. ANNALS HEALTH L.; LoY. U. CHI. L.J.; MARO. L. REV.;
MARO. SPIOR-s L.J.; McGEORGE L. REV.; MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES; MD. L.
REV.; MERCER L. REV.; MICH. J. GENDER & L.; MICH. J. INT'L L.; MICH. J. RACE &
L.; MICii. L. & POL'Y REV.; MICH. L. REV.; MICH. ST. L. REV.; MIL. L. REV.; MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE; MINN. L. REV.; MISS. L.J.; Mo. L. REV.; MONT. L. REV.; N.D. L.
REV.; N. ILL. U. L. REV.; N. KY. L. REV.; N.C. BANKING INST.; N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG.; N.C. L. REV.; N.D. L. REV.; N. ILL.U. L. REV.; N. Ky. L. REV.; N.M. L.
REV.; N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.; N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.; N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.; N.Y.U. J.
INT'L. L. & POL.; N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y; N.Y.U. L. REV.; N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE; NAT'L ITALIAN AM. B. ASS'N DIG.; NEB. L. REV.; NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT; NEW ENG. L. REV.; NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y; NOTRE DAME L. REV.; NOVA L. REV.; Nw. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY; Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus.; Nw. LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL. L.; Nw. U. L. REV.; OHIO N.U. L.
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cited American legal periodicals found that the Fordham Urban
Law Journal is the seventh most-cited specialty journal, and the
second most-cited law and policy journal.7 ° Indeed, in 1999 the
United States Supreme Court cited two Journal articles. In City of
REV.; OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.; OHIO ST. L.J.; OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.; OKLA. L.
REV.; OR. L. REV.; OSGOODE HALL. L.J.; PAC. L.J.; PACE ENVTL L. REV.; PACE L.
REV.; PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J.; PEPP. L. REV.; PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.; QUIN-
NIPIAC HEALTH L.J.; QUINNIPIAC L. REV.; REGENT U. L. REV.; REV. JUR. U.P.R.;
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.; RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.; RUTGERS L. REV.;
RUTGERS L.J.; RUTGERS RACE & L. REV.; S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J.; S. CAL. L. REV.;
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.; S. TEX. L. REV.; S.C. L. REV.; S.D. L. REV.; S.U.
L. REV.; SAN DIEGO JUST. J.; SAN DIEGO L. REV.; SAN FRANCISCO L. REV.; SANTA
CLARA L. REV.; SCHOLAR; S.C. ENVTL. L.J.; SEATTLE U. L. REV.; SETON HALL
CONST. L.J.; SETON HALL J. SPORT L.; SETON HALL L. REV.; SETON HALL LEGIS. J.;
SMU L. REV.; SPORTS LAW. J.; ST LOUIS U. L.J.; ST MARY'S L.J.; ST MARY'S L. REV.
ON MINORITY ISSUES; ST. JOHN'S J. L. COMMENT.; ST. JOHN'S L. REV.; ST. Louis U.
L.J.; ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV.; ST. THOMAS L. REV.; STAN. ENVTL. L.J.; STAN. J. L.
Bus. & FIN.; STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.; STAN. L. REV.; STETSON L. REV.; SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV.; SUFFOLK U. L. REV.; SUP. CT. REV.; Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.;
Sw. U. L. REV.; SYRACUSE L. REV.; TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.; TEMP. L. REV.;
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.; TENN. L. REV.; TEX. AM. J. CRIM. L.; TEX. F. ON
C.L. & C.R.; TEX. HIsp. J.L. & POL'Y; TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.; TEX. INT'L L.J.; TEX.
L. REV.; TEX. REV. L. & POL.; TEX. TECH L. REV.; T. JEFFERSON L. REV.; T.M.
COOLEY L. REV.; T. MARSHALL L. REV.; TOURO L. REV.; TRANSNAT'L LAW.; TUL.
ENVTL. L.J.; TUL. L. REV.; TULSA L.J.; U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.; U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV.; U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L.; U. BALT. L. REV.; U. CHI. L. REV.; U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE; U. CHI. LEGAL F.; U. CIN. L. REV.; U. COLO. L. REV.; U. DAY-
TON L. REV.; U. DET. MERCY L. REV.; U. ILL. L. REV.; U. MD. MARGINS; U. MEM. L.
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Chicago v. Morales,7 the Court quoted the note, Homelessness in a
Modern Urban Setting.7 2 Later that same year, in Jones v. United
States,73 the article The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some
Thought About the Department of Justice's Role7" was cited in a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and
Justice Stephen G. Breyer.
Clearly a brief historical recap cannot fully explore the depth
and diversity of the Journal's works, evidenced by the massive ar-
ray of articles, essays, reports, symposia, book reviews, notes, and
comments which it has published over the last thirty years. Ac-
cordingly attached hereto is an Appendix that provides a detailed
listing of the articles, notes, comments and reports that the Journal
has published just over the last decade.
As we enter the new millennium, many new challenges and is-
sues must be addressed. The Fordham Urban Law Journal expects
to remain viable and flexible so as to continue to serve the needs of
a changing world and society by addressing critical issues in a frank
and articulate manner. Congratulations to the ULJ on its Thirtieth
Anniversary and-as stated at its Twentieth Anniversary-"may
the future reflect the excellence of its past."76
71. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
72. Id. at 54 n.20 (quoting Mark Malone, Note, Homelessness in a Modern Urban
Setting, 10 FORDI-IAM URB. L.J. 749, 754 n.17).
73. 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
74. Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thought About
the Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999).
75. Jones, 527 U.S. at 407 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Little, supra note
74, at 349 n.5, 372-80).
76. Katsoris, supra note 5, at 942 (emphasis added).
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Closing Courts to Felonious Plaintiffs Who Are
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Baldacci, Paris R. Our Families: Protecting Lesbian and Gay XXI 973Families from Their Homes-Braschi's
Functional Definition of "Family" and Beyond
Balestra, Dominic J Toward Epistemic Justice: A Response to XXX 47Professor Goldberg
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Bandes,__Susan _Vengeance and the Role of Government
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Barry, Margaret Martin Access to Justice: On Dialogues with the XXIX 1089Judiciary
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Baskin, Deborah The Political Economy of Female Violent XX 401Street Crime
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Berger, James E. Needs: The Statutory and Constitutional XX 911Validity of Urban Housing Impact Fees in New
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Zoning Adult Establishments in New York: A
Berger, James E. Defense of the Adult-Use Zoning Text XXIV 105
Amendments of 1995
Berman, Greg Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York XXVIII 277Drug Court Story
A Precept of Managerial Responsibility:
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Reform Litigation
Bertran, Michele Judiciary Ombudsman: Solving Problems in the XXIX 2099Courts
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Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and
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Bleich, J. David Is There a Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide? XXIV 795
Bleich, J. David The Physician as a Conscientious Objector XXX 245
Bolden, Victor A. Where Does New York City Go From Here: XXIII 1031
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The Duty of Fair Representation Under the
Bonventre, Vincent Taylor Law: Supreme Court Development, New XX 1
Martin York State Adoption and a Call for
Independence
Boudreaux, Paul An Individual Preference Approach to XXVII 533Suburban Racial Desegregation
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Courts: A Case Study
Arrested Adults Awaiting Arraignment: Mental
Broner, Nahama Health, Substance Abuse, and Criminal Justice XXX 663
Characteristics and Needs
Brosnon, Michael Diversity Efforts in Independent Schools XXIX 467
Bunzel, John H. The Diversity Dialogues in Higher Education XXIX 489
Butts, Margo D. Urban Welfare Reform: A Community-Based XXII 897Butts,__MargoD. _Perspective
Campbell, Honorable Urban Holism: The Empowerment Zone and XXVI 1411
William Economic Development in Atlanta
Cariello, Dennis M. Forgiveness and the Criminal Law: Forgiveness XXVII 1607
Through Medicinal Punishment
Carlton, Jr., Alfred P. Preserving Judicial Independence-An Exegesis XXIX 835
Privatized Communities and the "Secession of
Cashin, Sheryll D. the Successful": Democracy and Fairness XXVIII 1675
Beyond the Gate
Champagne, Anthony The Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a XXIX 907
Case Study
Beyond Uncompromising Positions: Hate
David Crimes Legislation an the Common Ground XXI 1097
Chang, David Between Conservative Republicans and Gay
Rights Advocates
Mandatory Testing of Pregnant Women and XXIV 749
Chavkin, Wendy Newborns: HIV, Drug Use, and Welfare Policy
Cheek, Kyle The Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a XXIX 907Case Study
Chenoweth, Kathryn Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim XXI 343Courts: A Case Study
Protestant Perspectives on Informed Consent
Childress, James F. (Particularly in Research Involving Human XXX 187
Participants)
Sorting Out Federal and State Judicial Roles in
Christensen, Robert K. State Institutional Reform: Abstention's XXIX 387
Potential Role
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Clark, Michael Needed: A Community Experiment in XX 431Problem-Oriented Justice
Cohen, Cynthia B. Protestant Perspectives on the Uses of the New XXX 135Reproductive Technologies
Cohen, Jonathan R. Apology and Organizations: Exploring an XXVII 1447Example from Medical Practice
Jails and Prisons-Reservoirs of TB Disease:
Colangelo, Faith Should Defendants With HIV Infection (Who XX 467
Cannot Swim) Be Thrown Into the Reservoir?
Cole, Luke W. Environmental Justice Litigation: Another XXI 523Stone in David's Sling
Coleman, Carl H. Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the XXX 57
Constitution
Conboy, Kenneth The Race Factor and Trial by Jury XX 551
Cooper, Elizabeth B. Urban Bioethics XXIV 663
Cooper, Elizabeth B. Introduction XXIV 719
Couch, Jim F. Crime, Gun Control, and the BATF: The XXX 617Political Economy of Law Enforcement
Coughlin, O.F.M., Natural Law, Marriage, and the Thought of XXVIII 1771
Rev. John J. Karol Wojtyla
Changing Positions and Entrenched Polemics:
Crawford, Colin A Brief History of the Association to Benefit XXIV 729Children's Views on Pediatric HIV Testing,
Counseling, and Care
Curtin, Honorable John Drug Policy Alternatives-A Response From XXVIII 263
T. the Bench
Davies, Garth Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, XXVIII 457
and Disorder in New York City
Davies, Mark Keeping the Faith: A Model Local Ethics XXI 61Law-Content and Commentary
Davis, Kenneth R. A Model for Arbitration: Autonomy, XXVI 167Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power
Davis, Martha F. Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face of XXII 1141Violence
Davis, Timothy The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence XXI 615
of Racism in College Athletics
Dean, William The Role of the Private Bar XXV 865
Degnan, S.J., Daniel A. Counseling the Client: An Administrator'sView XXVIII 1787
County Powers and Assisted Housing
Programs: The Constitutional Limits in New XX 109
York
The Failures of Litigation as a Tool for the
Development of Social Welfare Policy
Forgiveness as a Problem-Solving Tool in the
Courts: A Brief Response to the Panel on XXVII 1613
Forgiveness in Criminal Law
Considering Lead Poisoning As a Criminal
Defense XX 377
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Essay on the Current Status and the Stakes
Dotts, Ted The Profession of Religion and Law XXVI 1195
Draimin, Barbara Attorneys and Social Workers Collaborating in XXIV 533
Hermie HIV Care: Breaking New Ground
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2003] A NEW MILLENNIUM
AUTHOR TrrLE VOL. PG.
Macchiarola, Frank J. The Judicial System and Equality in Schooling XXIII 567
Asian American Voting Rights and
Magpantay, Glenn D. Representation: A Perspective from the XXVIII 739
Northeast
The Application of Civil Rights Laws to
Maldonado, Rosemarie Housing Cooperatives: Are Co-ops Bastions of XXIII 1245Discriminatory Exclusion or Self-Selecting
Models of Community-Based Living?
Trying to Fit Square Pegs Into Round Holes:
Mandelbaum, Randi The Need For a New Funding Scheme for XXII 907
Kinship Caregivers
The Price of Landlord's "Free" Exercise of
Markey, Maureen E. Religion: Tenant's Right to Discrimination-Free XXII 699
Housing and Privacy
Florida's Donwtowns: The Key to Smart
Marshall, John T. Growth, Urban Revitalization, and Green XXIX 1509
Space Preservation
Marsico, Richard A Guide to Enforcing the Community XX 165Reinvestment Act
Shedding Some Light On Lending: The Effect
of Expanded Disclosure Laws on Home
Marsico, Richard D. Mortgage Marketing, Lending and XXVII 481
Discrimination in the New York Metropolitan
Area
Masehino, Mary F. Strong, Smart, and Bold Girls: The Girls XXIX 561
Incorporated® Approach to Education
Matthews-Giba, F. Religious Dimensions of Mediation XXVII 1695
Mayersohn, Nettie The "Baby AIDS" Bill XXIV 721
Confronting Same-Sex, Student-to-Student
Mayes, Thomas A. Sexual Harassment: Recommendations for XXIX 641
Educators and Policy Makers
Arrested Adults Awaiting Arraignment: Mental
Mayrl, Damon W. Health, Substance Abuse, and Criminal Justice XXX 663
Characteristics and Needs
McCoy, Alfred W. From Free Trade to Prohibition: A Critical XXVIII 307
History of the Modern Asian Opium Trade
McCoy, Patricia A. The CRA Implications of Predatory Lending XXIX 1571
McDermott, Charles J. Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice XXI 689
S.P. v. Sullivan: The Effort to Broaden the
McGovern, Theresa M. Social Security Administration's Definition of XXI 1083
AIDS
Meisel, Alan Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Common Law XXIV 817Roadmap for State Courts
Meyer, Linda Ross Forgiveness and Public Trust XXVII 1515
Miller, Jonathan L. Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim XXI 343Courts: A Case Study
Miller, Jr. , Melville D. Changing Legal Contexts for Affirmative XXIWelfare Reform Proposals
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Planning, Power and Politics: A Case Study of
Miller, Vernice D. the Land Use and Siting History of the North XXI 707
River Water Pollution Control Plant
Mone, Jennifer M. Catholic Social Teaching and American Legal XXX 299Practice: A Practical Response
Moskowitz, Ellen H. Mental Illness, Physical Illness, and the XXIV 781Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Moss, Kary L. The Privatizing of Public Wealth XXIII 101
Moulton, Meg Milne Why Girls' Schools? The Difference in Girl- XXIX 589Centered Education
When the Police Are in Our Bedrooms,
Mower, Robert S. Shouldn't the Courts Go in After Them?: An XXI 997
Update on the Fight Against Sodomy Laws
Murrell, Patricia . Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Cognitive XXtX 2117Complexity: An Overview
Mwaria, Cheryl Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Anthropological XXIV 859Perspective
Suburbanization and Market Failure: An
Nelson, William E. Analysis of Government Policies Promoting XXVII 197
Suburban Growth and Ethnic Assimilation
Neuborne, Burt Who's Afraid of the Human Rights XXIII 1139Commission?
Newman, Susan J. The implications of Current Welfare Reform XXII 1231Proposals for the Housing Assistance System
Nicholson, Heather Strong, Smart, and Bold Girls: The Girls XXIX 561
Johnston Incorporated® Approach to Education
Nolan, James L. To Engage in Civil Practice As a Religious XXVI tl11Lawyer
Why the New York State System for Obtaining
Novak, Suzanne a License to Carry a Concealed Weapon is XXVI 121
Unconstitutional
0' Hagan, Nancy New York Lifts Death Penalty Tax XXV 135
The Warning from Pittsburgh's Golden
Offenkrantz, Ronald J Triangle: Home of the Steelers, the Pirates and XXIII 69
the Amorphous Favored Nation Clause in the
Commercial Lease
Osborne, Jr., Allan G. Discipline of Special Education Students Under XXIX 513
the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
Page, JoAnne Urban Criminal Justice: No Fairer Than the XX 609Larger Society
Panwala, Asit S. The Failure of Local and Federal Prosecutors XXX 639to Curb Police Brutality
Pappas, Demetra M. Stopping New Yorkers' Stalkers: An Anti-Stalking Law for the Millennium XXVII 945
The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of
Park, Roger C. Character Evidence: Congress Was Right XXII 271
About Consent
2003] A NEW MILLENNIUM
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Disease Prevention as Drug Policy: A
Parts, Mark Historical Perspective on the Case for Legal XXIV 475Access to Sterile Syringes as a Means of
Reducing Drug-Related Harm
The Physician's Conscience, Conscience,
Pellegrino, Edmund D. Clauses, and Religious Belief; A Catholic XXX 221
Perspective
Petersen, Eric S. Municipal Solid Waste Flow Control in the XXII 361Post-Carbone World
Pirro, Honorable Reforming the Urban Workplace: The Legacy XXVI 1423
Jeanine Ferris of Frances Perkins
Podlas, Kimberlianne A New Sword to Slay the. Dragon: Using New XXIII 1283York Law to Combat Environmental Racism
Poindexter, Georgette Separate and Unequal: A Comment on theP e Urban Development Aspect of Browfields XXIV I
Programs
Polak, Fredrick Thinking About Drug Law Reform: Some XXVIII 351Political Dynamics of Medicalization
Pollard III, Oliver A. Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: XXIX 1529
Can We Get There from Here?
Porter Jr., Thomas W. The Spirit and the Law XXVI 1155
Environmental Justice and Sustainability: Is
Portney, Ken E. there a Critical Nexus in the Case of Waste XXI 827
Disposal or Treatment Siting?
Post, Linda Farber Bioethical Consideration of Maternal-Fetal XXIV 757Issues
Powell, John A. A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing the XXIX 1395Population in the Twenty-First Century
Selective Housing Code Enforcement and Low-
Powers Kinning, Robin Income Housing Policy: Minneapolis Case XXI 159
Study
Precht, Robert E. We Have Seen the Enemy: Scenes from a Trial XXVI 539
Puentes, Robert First Suburbs in the Northeast and Midwest: XXIX 1469Assets, Challenges, and Opportunities
Raeder, Myrna 5. American Bar Association Criminal Justice XXII 343Section Report to the House of Delegates
Ransome,Whitney Why Girls' Schools? The Difference in Girl- XXIX 589Centered Education
Raskin, Joyce M. Introduction to Conference Religious Values XXX 1
and Legal Dilemmas in Bioethics
Rasnow, Tina L. Traveling Justice: Providing Court Based ProSe Assistance to Limited Access Communities XXIX 1281
Retkin, Randye Attorneys and Social Workers Collaborating in XXIV 533HIV Care: Breaking New Ground
Reyes, Augustina H. Alternative Education: The Criminalization of XXIX 539
Student Behavior
Reza. Sadiq Religion and the Public Defender XXVI 1051
Rice, Honorable Smart Growth: A Catalyst for Public-Interest XXVI 1417
Norman B. Rice Investment
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Richardson, Christopher The Community Reinvestment Act and the XXIX 1607
A. Economics of Regulatory Policy
Richman, Daniel C. Foreword XXVI vii
Government as Administrator vs. Government
Riemer, David R. as Purchaser: Do Rules or Markets Create XXVIII 1715
Greater Accountability in Serving the Poor?
Extra! Extra! Read All About It: What A
Plaintiff "Knows or Should Know" Based on
Rivera, Jenny Officials' Statements and Media Coverage of XXVIII 505
Police Misconduct for Notice of a § 1983
Municipal Liability Claim
Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare
Romberg, Jonathan Reform and the Unconstitutional Conditions XXII 1051
Doctrine
The Application of Civil Rights Laws to
Rose, Robert D. Housing Cooperatives: Are Co-ops Bastions of XXIII 1245Discriminatory Exclusion or Self-Selecting
Models of Community-Based Living?
Reflections Upon Judicial Independence as We
Rosen, Honorable Approach the Bicentennial of Marbury V. XXIX 791
Gerald E. Madison: Safeguarding the Constitution's
"Crown Jewel"
Exploring Methods to Improve Management
Rosenbloom, Jonathan and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the XXX 305
D. Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New
York
The Psychology of Competence and Informed
Rosenfeld, Barry Consent: Understanding Decision-Making with XXX 173
Regard to Clinical Research
Russo, Charles J. Unequal Educational Opportunities for Gifted XXIX 727Students: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?
Salamon, Lester M. The New Governance and the Tools of Public XXVItI 1611
Action: An Introduction
Salkin, Patricia E. 1998 Survey of Ethics in Land-Use Planning XXVI 1393
Sammons, Jack L. A Dialogue Concerning Heresies XXVII 1541
Welfare Reform within a Changing Context: XXIII 273
Sanger, Mary Bryna Redefining the Terms of the Debate
Savas, E.S. Privatization and the New Public Management XXVIII 1731
Schafran, Lynn Hecht Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the XX 439Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist
Schecter, Cliff Extremely Motivated: The Republican Party's XXIX 1663March to the Right
Local Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting
Schill, Michael H. Discrimination in Housing: The New York City XXIII 991
Human Rights Coalition
Fighting Municipal "Tag-Team": The Federal
Schonfeld, Robert L. Fair Housing Amendments Act and Its Use in XXI 299Obtaining Access to Housing for Persons with
Disabilities
Schonfield, Robert L. 'Reasonable Accommodation" Under the XXFederal Fair Housing Amendments Act
2003] A NEW MILLENNIUM
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Schwartz, Adina "Just Take Away Their Guns:" The Hidden XXIII 317Racism of Terry v. Ohio
Discriminatory Housing Statements and Section
Schwemm, Robert G. 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act's XXIX 187
Most Intriguing Provision
Segall, Harold A An Excutive's Lesson in the Law from a XXIII 257Typical Business Encounter
Segall. Harold A Then and Now: The Commercial Practice of XXIV 567Law for Over Fifty Years
Segall, Harold A. Drafting: An Essential Skill XXX 751
Seligmann, Terry Jean An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from XXIX 759Special Education Legislation
Mainstreaming Community Development:
Shah, Daniel S. Business Strategies as Radical Approaches to XXIX 1633
Community Representation
Shepard, Peggy M. Issues of Community Empowerment XXI 739
Shepard, Randall T. Telephone Justice, Pandering, and Judges Who XXIX 811Speak Out of School
Shields, John M. Constitutional Challenges to New York State's XXV 255
Death Penalty Statute
Shilton, Mary K. The Public is Willing XXIX 1267
Sholette, Greg R' We Not Human? XXVI 1353
Shugart I1, William F. Crime, Gun Control, and the BATF: The XXX 617Political Economy of Law Enforcement
Siano. Anthony J. The Story of the Founding of the Fordham XXV vii
Urban Law Journal
Suspended Over the Abyss: A City's Quest for
Simon, Michelle S. Local Autonomy in Institutional Reform XXIII 663
Litigation
Sinclair, Daniel B. Assisted Reproduction in Jewish Law XXX 71
If The Shoe Doesn't Fit ... Reformulating
Sisak, Janine Rebellious Lawyering To Encompass XXV 873
Community Group Representation
Sklansky, David A. Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role XXVI 509
Solomon, Daniel ERAS XXIX 1439
Perspectives on Human Nature and Their
Implications for Business Organizations
Community-Based Health Care: A Legal and XXIV 235Solomon, Lewis D. Policy Analysis
Solomon, Robert Who's In Charge Anyway? A Proposal For XXV 831Community-Based Legal Services
Sommers, Ira The Political Economy of Female Violent XX 401Street Crime
Spritz, Norton Physician-Assisted Suicide: Three Crucial XXIV 869Distinctions
Stein. Gary L. Attorneys and Social Workers Collaborating in XXIV 533HIV Care: Breaking New Ground
828 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Fighting Municipal "Tag-Team": The Federal
Stein, Seth P. Fair Housing Amendments Act and Its Use in XXI 299Obtaining Access to Housing for Persons with
Disabilities
Strossen, Nadine Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice XXIV 427
Antonin Scalia
Sulmasy, Daniel P. Informed Consent Without Autonomy XXX 207
Weighing the Domestic Violence Factor in
Susser, Kim Custody Cases: Tipping the Scales in Favor of XXVII 875
Protecting Victims and Their Children
Race, Gender, Age, and Disproportionate
Swanston, Samara F. Impact: What Can We Do About the Failure to XXI 577
Protect the Most Vulnerable?
Symposium Commentary: Politics and the
Tabak, Ronald J. Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse Survive XXI 280
the Perceived Political Pressure?
Talen, Emily Making the Good Easy: The Smart Code XXIX 1445Alternative
Tarlock, A. Dan City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity XXI 461in Context
The "Failure to Protect" Charging Battered Mothers With "Failure to XXVII 849
Working Group Protect": Still Blaming the Victim
America's Oldest War: The Efficacy of United
The Fordham Law Drug States Drug Policy-A Debate Between
Policy Reform Project Graham Boyd, ACLU and Asa Hutchinson,
DEA
Thomas, Chantal International Debt Forgiveness and Global XXVII 1711Poverty Reduction
Thompson, Frances H. Access to Justice in Idaho XXIX 1313
Torres, Gerald Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice XXI 431
Treanor, William Takings Laws and The Regulatory State: A XXII 453
Michael Response to R.S. Radford
Trubek, Louise G. The Worst of Times ... and the Best of Times: XXII 1123Trubek,____Louise ___G. Lawyering for Poor Clients Today
Trubek, Louise G. Old Wine in New Bottles: Public Interest XXVIII 1739Lawyering in an Era of Privatization
How Do We Reduce Crime and Preserve
Tucker, Benjamin B. Human Decency? The Role of Leadership in XXVIII 601
Policing for a Democratic Society
Twitty, Geralding W. Protecting Endangered Communities XXI 771
If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the
Udell, David S. Courts? Some Implications for Judges When XXIX 873Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by
Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor
Implications of the Legal Services Struggle for
Udell, David S. Other Government Grants for Lawyering for XXV 895
the Poor
Uelmen, Amelia J. Can a Religious Person Be a Big Firm XXVI 1069I Litigator? I_______
2003] A NEW MILLENNIUM
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Uelmen, Amelia J. Foreword to Conference Religious Values and XXX 5Legal Dilemmas in Bioethics
Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover
Vandall, Frank J. Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease,Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and XXII 81
Alcohol
Varela, Marta B. The First Forty Years of the Commission on XXIII 983
Human Rights
Protection of Domestic Violence Victims
Varela, Marta B. Under the New York City Human Rights XXVII 1231Law's Provisions Prohibiting Discrimination on
the Basis of Disability
Risk Reduction in Office Workplace
Varela, Marta B. Encounters Between Newly-Disabled XXVII 1261Employees and Management of New York
Companies
Vilhauer, Jennice Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in XXVII 953the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Viteritti, Joseph P. Municipal Home Rule and the Conditions of XXIII 1Justifiable Secession
From "Renegade" Agency to Institution of
Vivero, Maruicio Justice: The Transformation of Legal Services XXIX 1323
Corporation
The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney
Vogelman, Lawrence King Trial and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in XX 571
the Courtroom
Wall, Tim Needed: A Community Experiment in XX 431Problem-Oriented Justice
Ward, Jennifer Snapshots: Holistic Images of FemaleOffenders in the Criminal Justice System XXX 723
Stephen H. Defending All-Male Education: A New XXIX 601
Webb, Stephen H. Cultural Moment For a Renewed Debate
Dignity and Nondiscrimination: The
Weisman, James J. Requirement of "Reasonable Accommodation" XXIII 1235
in Disability Law
Weldon, Melissa M. Honoring the Spirit in the Law: A Lawyer's XXVI 1167
Confession of Faith
Outing the Madman: Fair Housing for the
White, Frederic Mentally Handicapped and Their Right to XXVIII 783Privacy Versus the Landlord's Duty to Warn
and Protect
White, Kimberly Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim XXI 343Courts: A Case Study
White, Lawrence J. Community Reinvestment Act: GoodIntentions Headed in the Wrong Direction XX 281
White, Penny J. Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence XXIX 1053by Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations
Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How
Williams, Lucy A. Media Disclosure Informs Welfare Legislation XXII 1159
Debate
830 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
AUTHOR TI-LE VOL. PG.
Suburbanization and Market Failure: An
Williams, Norman R. Analysis of Government Policies Promoting XXVII 197
Suburban Growth and Ethnic Assimilation
Suits By Public Hospitals To Recover
Willis, Brian M. Expenditures For The Treatment of Disease, XXII 81Injury and Disability Caused By Tobacco and
Alcohol
Wink, Stephen P. A Plumber's Guide To Lawyering XXVI 1175
Giving the Devil the Benefit of Law:
Wirenius, John F. Pornographers. the Feminist Attack on Free XX 27
Speech, and the First Amendment
Sorting Out Federal and State Judicial Roles in
Wise, Charles R. State Institutional Reform: Abstention's XXIX 387
Potential Role
Wise, Paul H. Mandatory Testing of Pregnant Women and XXIV 749Newborns: HIV, Drug Use, and Welfare Policy
When the Police Are in Our Bedrooms,
Wolfson, Evan Shouldn't the Courts Go in After Them?: An XXI 997
Update on the Fight Against Sodomy Laws
Worthington Jr., Everett Is There a Place for Forgiveness in the Justice XXVII 1721
L. System?
Zalesne, Deborah Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim XXI 343Courts: A Case Study
Zeese, Kevin B. Engaging the Debate: Reform vs. More of the XXX 465Same
Zimmerman, Rae Issues of Classification in Environmental
Equity: How We Manage is How We Measure XXI 633
Zipursky, Benjamin C. Urban Bioethics XXIV 663
Zipursky, Benjamin C. Introduction XXIV 777
The UCCJEA: What Is It and How Does It
Zorza, Joan Affect Battered Women in Child-Custody XXVII 909
Disputes
2003] A NEW MILLENNIUM
B. NOTES AND COMMENTS SORTED BY AUTHOR
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Ainsworth, Kevin N. Targeting Conduct: A Constitutional Method of XX 669Penalizing Hate Crimes
Ayvas, Ming K. The Circuit Split on Title VII: Personal XXIII 797Supervisor Liability
Shooting Down the Phoenix: Shaw v. Reno and
Bachman, Elizabeth the Controversy Over Race-Conscious XXII 153
Distracting
Baldinucci, Edgardo L. The Community Reinvestment Act: New XXIII 831
Standards Provide New Hope
Conscripting Private Resources to Meet Urban
Berger. James Needs: The Statutory and Constitutional XX 911Validity of Urban Housing Impact Fess in New
York
Adding Insult to Injury: How In Re Venture
Berger, Shimon A. Mortgage Fund Exposes the Inequitable XXIX 2193
Results of New York's Usury Remedies
Freedom of Expression in New York State:
Bethel, Jeremy J. What Remains of People Ex Rel. Arcara v. XXVIII 1797
Cloud Books, Inc.
Bhatnager, Sonia HIV Name Reporting and Partner Notification XXVI 1457
in New York State
Adjourning Justice: New York State's Failure
Bonstelle, Sheri To Support Assigned Counsel Violates The XXVIII 1151Rights of Families in Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings
Mother Still Knows Best: Cancer-Related Gene
Brownrigg, Alissa Mutations, Familial Privacy, and a Physician's XXVI 247
Duty to Warn
Balancing the Scales: Limiting the Prejudicial
Buzzetta, Daniel J. Effect of Evidence Rule 404(b) through XXI 389
Stipulation
Cariello, Dennis M. Federalism for the New Millennium:Carie____o,_Dennis __M. Accounting for the Values of Federalism XXVI 1493
S.O.S. From the Womb: A Call for New York
Chan, Louise Marlene Legislation Criminalizing Drug Use During XXI 199
Pregnancy
History Repeating Itself: The (D)evolution of
Clark, Gregory, C. Recent British and American Antiterrorist XXVII 247
Legislation
Cosgrove, Robert J. Damned to the Inferno? A New Vision of XXVI 1669Cosgrove,___Robert__J. Lawyers at the Dawning of the Millennium
Newborn HIV Screening and New York
Curnin, Kevin J. Assembly Bill No. 6747-B: Privacy and Equal XXI 857
Protection of Pregnant Women
D'Amico, Suzanne Inherently Female Cases of Child Abuse and XXVIII 855
Neglect: A Gender-Neutral Analysis _XVII_ 85
Daskal, Bernard Rights of First Refusal and the Package Deal XXII 461
832 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
DeLaMothe, Cassandra Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the Marital
M. Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York's XXIII 857Penal Law
A District Attorney's Decision Whether to
DeMay, Jonathan Seek the Death Penalty: Toward an Improved XXVI 767
Process
Informed Consent to Human Subject Research:
Derrickson, Dorothy Improving the Process of Obtaining Informed XXV 143
Consent from Mentally Ill Persons
Dhanaraj, Subha Making Lawyers Good People: Possibility or XXVIII 2037Pipedream?
Charging Parties Left Out: Intervention in
Doyle, Jr., John D. Sectionl0o(j) National Labor Relations Act XXII 833
Injunction Proceedings
Dunaevsky, Yelena Don't Confuse Metatags with Initial Interest XXIX 1349Confusion
More Trees Please: Utilizing Natural Resources
Encarnation, Vivian D. in the Urban Environmental Management of XXVI 1571
New York City
United States v. O'Hagan: The Supreme Court
Fahey, Amy E. Abandons Textualism to Adopt the XXV 507
Misappropriation Theory
The Pain Relief Promotion Act: Will it Spell
Fallek, Joy Death to "Death with Dignity" or is it XXVII 1739
Unconstitutional?
Fazzolari, Maria The Brown v. Giuliani Injunction: Combating XXIII 413Bureaucratic Disentitlement
The Necessary Application of the Contact
Flinn, Heidi Flinn Clause to Cases Involving Restrictive XXVII 1793
Covenants and Group Family Day Care Homes
Linking Genes with Behavior: The Social and
Gaudet, Carol A. Legal Implications of Using Genetic Evidence XXIV 597
in Criminal Trials
"Partial Birth" Abortion and the Health
Glidewell, Gail Exception: Protecting Maternal Health or XXVIII 1089
Risking Abortion on Demand?
Examining the Lautenberg Amendment in the
Golden, Jessica A. Civilian and Military Contexts: Congressional XXIX 427Overreaching, Statutory Vagueness, Ex Post
Facto Violations, and Implementational Flaws
Multiculturalism in Medical Decisionmaking: XXIIi 1321Gordn, EysaThe Notion of Informed Waiver
Gordon, Jeffrey Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and Franchise XXVI 1201Relocation: Can a Team Move?
Gottfried, Erika Mercosur: A Tool to Further Women's Rights XXV 923In the Member Nations
The Practical Impossibility of Considering the
Greaney, Isaac S. Effect of Mitigating Measures Under the XXVI 1267
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Greisman, Israel M. The Jewish Criminal Lawyer's Dilemma XXIX 2413
20031 A NEW MILLENNIUM 833
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PC.
Grossman, Jillian The Fourth Amendment: Relaxing the Rule in XXVII 1303Child Abuse Investigations
Procreation and the Prisoner: Does the Right
Guidice Jr., Richard to Procreate Survive Incarceration and Do XXUX 2277Legitimate Penological Interests Justify
Restrictions on the Exercise of the Right
Is Coppa A Cop Out? The Child Online
Hersh, Melanie L. Privacy Protection Act as Proof That Parents, XXVIII 1831Not Government, Should Be Protecting
Children's Interests on the Internet
Hess, Eric Willaims Federal Preemption of Rent Regulation Under XX 939FIRREA
Privacy Versus Protection: Exploring the
Horn, Kimberly A. Boundaries of Electronic Surveillance in the XXIX 2233
Internet Age
Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best
Hort, Katherine A. Interest of the Child? ASFA's Guidelines for XXVIII 1879
the Termination of Parental Rights
Imbrogono, Lisa M. Can You Have Your Cake and Eat It Too? XX 311Ratification of Releases of ADEA Claims
Gender Difference in Perceiving Violence and
Jarusinsky, Renee L. its Implication for the VAWA's Civil Rights XXVII 965
Remedy
Stopping Hate Without Stifling Speech: Re-
Johnson, Catherine B. examining the Merits of Hate Speech Codes on XXVII 1821
University Campuses
Constitution Notwithstanding: The Political
Jupiter, Steven H. Illegitimacy of the Death Penalty in American XXIII 437
Democracy
The Agony of Ecstasy: Reconsidering the
Kay, Amanda Punitive Approach to United States Drug XXIX 2133
Policy
Killerlane I1, James J. Finger Imaging: A 21st Century Solution to XXII 1327Welfare, Fraud at our Fingertips
Fair Work, Not "Workfare": Examining The
Role Of Subsidized Jobs In Fulfilling States'
Lang, Kathryn Work Requirements Under The Personal XXV 959
Responsibility And Work Reconciliation Act
of 1996
The "New Body Snatchers": Analyzing the
Liddy, Maryellen Effect of Presumed Consent Organ Donation XXVIII 815
Laws on Privacy, Autonomy, and Liberty
Lifting Voices: Towards Equal Education for
Ling, Tamara S. Pregnant and Parenting Students in New York XXIX 2387
City
Loewy, Karen L. Lawyering for Social Change XXVII 1869
Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus
Lucas, Allison Brief Writing in First Amendment Litigation XXVI 1605
Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy
Matz, Robert Clause: If at First You Don't Convict, Try, Try XXIV 353
Again I_ I
834 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. Po.
Do As I Say and Not As I Do: Dickerson,
McNamee, Kevin Constitutional Common Law and the Imperial XXVIII 1239
Supreme Court
Sheff v. O'Neill: The Consequence of
Mioli. Alicic L. Educational Table-Scraps for Poor Urban XXVII 1903
Minority Schools
The Uncertain Legacy of Gihner: Mandatory
Murray, John W.R. Arbitration of Federal Employment XXVI 281
Discrimination Claims
Questioning the Admissibility of Nonscientific
Needham, Kristina L. Testimony After Daubert: The Need for XXV 541Increased Juridical Gatekeeping to Ensure the
Reliability of Expert Testimony
Automatic Stays and Governmental
Pace, IIl, Jack E. Operations: How New York State Protects the XXIV 137
Government from the Poor
Pardo, Christine E. Multiple Petty Offenses With Serious Penalties: XXIII 895A Case for the Right to Trial By Jury
"One Manner of Law": The Supreme Court,
Pettit, Anne E. Stare Decisis and the Immigration Law Plenary XXIV 165
Power Doctrine
Rackett, Christina M. Telemedicine Today and Tomorrow: Why XXV 167
"Virtual" Privacy is Not Enough
Ramirez, Carlos F. Administrative License Suspensions, Criminal XXIII 923Prosecution and the Double Jeopardy Clause
The Impact of Managed Care Payer Contracts
Rifkinson-Mann, on the Subspecialty Medical Provider: Policy XXVII 1943
Stephanie Implications that Impact on the Care of
Disabled Children
Trying to Fit an Oval Shaped Island into a
Roman, Jose D. Square Constitution: Arguments for Puerto XXIX 1681
Rican Statehood
Rose, Jessica A. Rebellious or Regnant: Police Brutality XXVIII 619Rose,____Jessica ___A. _ Lawyering in New York City
Rosen, Gayley The Rights to Future Technologies: Should XXIV 617Bourne v. Disney Change the Rules?
Rudy, Lee A Procedural Approach to Limited Public XXII 1255Forum Cases
Protecting Property Rights With Strict Scrutiny:
Russo, Daniel William An Argument For the "Specifically and XXV 575
Uniquely Attributable" Standard
Sachs. Lori September 11, 2001: The Constitution During XXIX 1715
Crisis: A New Perspective
Beyond Economically Targeted Investments:
Sauchik, Alec Redefining the Legal Framework of Pension XXVIII 1923Fund Investments in Low-to-Moderate Income
Residential Real Estate
Scher, David The Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense XX 89
2003] A NEW MILLENNIUM 835
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Adjourning Justice: New York State's Failure
Schessler, Christine To Support Assigned Counsel Violates The XXVIII 1151Rights of Families in Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings
Working Welfare Recipients: A Comparison of
Schoen, Lindsay Mara the Family Support Act and the Personal XXIV 635Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act
Schumacher II, Robert Expanding New York's DNA Database: The XXVI 1635
W. Future of Law Enforcement
Peer Harassment Under Title IX of the
Senatus, Chantal N. Education Amendments of 1972: Where's the XXIV 379
Intent?
Shaffer, Rachel Child Access Prevention Laws: Keeping Guns XXVII 1985Out of Our Children's Hands
Female Genital Mutilation: What Does theSharif, Khadijah F. New Federal Law Really Mean? XXIV 409
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Shifton, Mark D. Liability-The ALI's Cure for Prescription XXIX 2343
Drug Design Liability
Challenging the Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership
Sigal, Laura Land Ban: First Amendment and AntitrustImplications for the Interactive Information XXII 207
Highway
Simon, Rachel New York City's Restrictive Zoning of Adult XXIII 187Businesses: A Constitutional Analysis
The Hyde Amendment and Prosecutorial
Singband, Lynn R. Investigation: The Promise of Protection for XXVIII 1967
Criminal Defendants
Harnessing Payne: Controlling The Admission
Sullivan, Beth E. of Victim Impact Statements to Safeguard XXV 601Capital Sentencing Hearings From Passion and
Prejudice
Sullivan, Beth E. The High Cost of Efficiency: Mandatory XXVI 31Arbitration in the Securities Industry
Sullivan, John J The Constitutionality of New York State's XXI 1107Affirmative Action Law
The First Amendment, The Right Not to Speak
Taruschio, Anna M. and the Problem of Government Access XXVII 1001
Statutes
An Examination of the Non-Statutory Labor
Treadwell, Shawn Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, in the XXIII 955
Context of Professional Sports
From Household Bathrooms to the Workplace:
Ulgen, Argun M. Brining the Americans with Disabilities Act XXX 761Back to Where It Belongs: An Analysis of
Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams
The Criminalization of Child Welfare in New
Vreeland, Alison B. York City: Sparing the Child or Spoiling the XXVII 1053
Family?
836 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PC.
Do the Clothes Make the Man? Implications of
Ward, Jessica a Witness' Status in the Determination of XXVIII 2005
Probable Cause
White, Valerie D. Modifying the Escelara Consent Decree: A XXII1 377
Case Study on the Application of the Rufo Test
Walking A Tightrope: Redrawing Congressional
Wickline, Donovan L. District Lines After Shaw v. Reno and Its XXV 641
Progeny
Diamond Is the RTC's Best Friend: Federal
Zinman, Daniel M. Preemption and the Balance of the Term of XXII 1295Rent Regulated Leases in Resolution Trust
Corporation v. Diamond
Zwas, Maria Gottlieb Kinship Foster Care: A Relatively Permanent XX 343Solution
2003] A NEW MILLENNIUM
C. REPORTS
TITLE VOL. PG.
Ethical Issues Arising When a Lawyer Leaves a Firm: Restrictions on XX 897
Practice
Financial Arrangements in Class Actions, and the Code of Professional XX 831
Responsibility
Report of the Task Force on the Use of Criminal Sanctions to the King XXX 499
County Bar Association Board of Trustees
Report on the Debate Over Whether There Should be an Exception to XX 857
Confidentiality for Rectifying a Crime or Fraud
SICA: Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration on XXII 503
Representation of Parties in Arbitration by Non Attorneys
Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics: Final Report XXI 1
The Need for Fair Trials Does Not Justify a Disciplinary Rule That XX 881
Broadly Restricts an Attorney's Speech II
To Profit or Not-To-Profit: An Examination of Executive Compensation XXV 471
in Not-For-Profit Organizations Contracting With New York City I
838 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
D. REMARKS AND SYMPOSIA
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. Po.
REPOhistory Collection: Civil Disturbances: Battle for XXVI 1299Justice in New York City
Conference: Counseling the Client: A Natural XXVIII 1751
Law Approach
Conference: Is Our Drug Policy Effective? Are XXVIII 20
There Alternatives?
Kaye, Honorable Judith Conference: New York State Unified Court XXIX 1081
S. System Access to Justice
Lippman, Jonathan Conference: New York State Unified Court XXtX 1081System Access to Justice
Conference: Revolutions Within Communities:
The Fifth Annual Domestic Violence XXIX 13
Conference
Panel Discussion: Judicial Efficiency: Is There a
Vacancy Crisis Threatening the Nation's XXVI 33
Judicial System?
Katzenbach, Nicholas Remarks: A Rational Discussion of Current XXV 443
deB. Drug Laws
Remarks: Delivered on the Occasion of the
Presentation of the Fordham-Stein Prize to the XXII 141
Honorable Milton Pollack on October 26, 1994
Remarks: From the Ground Up: Local Lessons XXVII 1
for National Reform
Thornburgh. Dick Remarks: Junk Science-The Lawyer's Ethical XXV 449Responsibilities
Bratton, William J. Remarks: New Strategies For Combating Crime XXIII 781in New York City
Roundtable Discussion: Is There a Threat to
Judicial Independence in the United States XXVI 1
Today?
Roundtable Discussion: Law and Disorder: Is
Effective Law Enforcement Inconsistent With XXVIII 363
Good Police-Community Relations?
Roundtable Discussion: The Future of New XXVII 167
York 1898, 1998
Symposium: The Future of Legal Services:
Legal and Ethical Implications of the LSC XXV 279
Restrictions
Symposium: A Perspective on "Temper in the XXIIt 709
Court: A Forum on Judicial Civility"
Symposium: ADR and The Professional XXVIII 891
Responsibility of Lawyers
Symposium: Are Executions in New York XXII 557
Inevitable?-Introduction
Symposium: Civil Rights Law in Transition:
The Forty-Fifth Anniversary of the New York XXVII 1105
City Commission on Human Rights
A NEW MILLENNIUM
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
Symposium: Politics and the Death Penalty:
Can Rational Discourse and Due Process XXI 239
Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?
Symposium: Queer Law 1999: Current Issues in
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Law
Symposium: Rediscovering the Role of
Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those XXVI 821
They Represent
Symposium: The Regulation and Ethical XXVI 737
Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors
Symposium: Towards a Compassionate and
Cost-Effective Drug Policy: A Forum on the
Impact of Drug Policy on the Justice System
and Human Rights
Symposium: Women, Children and Domestic
Violence: Current Tensions and Emerging XXVII 565
Issues
Symposium Panel: Temper in the Court: A XXIII 721
Forum on Judicial Civility"
The Second Annual Stein Center Symposium
on Contemporary Urban Challenges: Urban XX 377
Criminal Justice: Is It Fair? Does It Appear
Fair?
The Third Annual Stein Center Symposium on
Contemporary Urban Challenges: Urban XXI 425
Environmental Justice
The Fourth Annual Stein Center Symposium
on Contemporary Urban Challenges: Is the XXII 875
Issue Welfare or Poverty
The Fifth Annual Stein Center Symposium on
Contemporary Urban Challenges: Emerging XXIII 983
Issues in Civil Rights Law Enforcement
The Sixth Annual Stein Center Symposium on
Contemporary Urban Challenges: Urban
Bioethics: A Symposium on Health Care,
Poverty, and Autonomy
The Seventh Annual Stein Center Symposium
on Contemporary Urban Challenges: XXV 673
Lawyering For Poor Communities in The
Twenty-First Century
The Eighth Annual Stein Center Symposium
on Contemporary Urban Challenges: The
Changing Role of the Federal Prosecutor in
Memory of William Tendy
The Ninth Annual Stein Center Symposium on
Contemporary Urban Challenges: The Role of XXVII 1347
Forgiveness in the Law
The Tenth Annual Stein Center Symposium on
Contemporary Urban Challenges: Redefining XXVIII 1319
the Public Sector: Accountability and
Democracy in the Error of Privatization
2003]
840 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
AUTHOR TITLE VOL. PG.
The Eleventh Annual Symposium on
Contemporary Urban Challenges: Problem
Solving Courts: From Adversarial Litigation to
Innovative Jurisprudence
Welcome and Introductory Remarks XXVI 821
A NEW MILLENNIUM
E. BOOK REVIEWS
AUTHOR TITLE
Land Use Regulation and Legal Rhetoric:
Broadening the Terms of Debate
2003]
Radford, R.S.
Honorable Israel Commercial Litigation in New York StateIn urts: Robert L. Haig, Editor
ASg
THE FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL: TWENTY
YEARS OF PROGRESS
Constantine N Katsoris*
I. Introduction
Fordham Law School was founded in 1905 and originally located
in Collins Hall on the main campus in the suburban setting at Rose
Hill.I Despite its pristine setting, it soon became apparent that a loca-
tion closer to the courts would be more practical. Thus, during its
first academic year, the school moved to downtown Manhattan
where, after an interim move,2 it settled in the landmark Woolworth
Building.' It remained there until 1943 when it relocated again just a
few blocks north to 302 Broadway4 - conveniently nestled among
the Financial District of Wall Street, the Municipal Government at
City Hall, and the Federal and State Courts at Foley Square.5 It re-
mained at this location until 1961,6 when the school moved uptown to
its present location at New York's historic Lincoln Center for the Per-
forming Arts.7
* Wilkinson Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.S. 1953,
Fordham University; J.D. 1957, Fordham University School of Law; LL.M. 1963, New
York University School of Law; Public Member of Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration since its inception in 1977.
Special thanks and appreciation is extended to Stephanie Fell, Jennifer Mone, Geoffrey
Hader and Kathleen Smith who assisted in the compilation and preparation of this
article.
1. The Campus at Rose Hill consists of approximately 85 acres and is presently
bordered by the world famous Bronx Botanical Gardens on the West and the Bronx Zoo
on the Northeast. George James, For the Bronx, A New Image is a Tough Sell, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1986, at Bl.
2. In 1906 the Law School moved to 42 Broadway, and in 1908 moved to 20 Vesey
Street - both in the downtown area of Manhattan. See BIBLIO JURIS, INC., A HISTORY
(OF) FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, at 2-4 [hereinafter LAW SCHOOL
HISTORY].
3. Id. at 6. The Woolworth Building was then the tallest building in the world, and
was granted landmark status on April 12, 1983. News Summary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
1983, at Bl.
4. This location at 302 Broadway became the home not only of the Law School, but
also the downtown divisions of the Schools of Business, Education, and Social Service.
See Sidney C. Schaer, A. Daniel Fusaro, Chief County Clerk, NEWSDAY, Feb. 10, 1988, at
41.
5. The building has since been demolished to make way for a new Federal complex.
6. See LAW SCHOOL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 16.
7. Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts consists of several square blocks in mid-
town Manhattan and houses such world famous institutions as the Metropolitan Opera,
Avery Fisher Hall, the New York State Theater and Julliard School of Music. See, Ted
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The first legal publication at the law school, the Fordham Law Re-
view, was established in 1914, only to be discontinued three years later
with the onset of World War 1.8 In 1935, however, in the midst of the
Great Depression, the Fordham Law Review was re-established, and
has published with distinction ever since.
After the move to the cultural hub at Lincoln Center, the problems
associated with our urban 9 areas began to accelerate."° It became ap-
parent that a closer focus had to be directed specifically at the urban
problems of the nation, with particular emphasis on the affairs of its
then largest city and state - New York.l I Thus, the Fordham Urban
Law Journal (ULJ or Journal) published its first issue in 1972, exactly
twenty years ago. 12
Kenney, If You're Thinking of Living in Lincoln Square, N.Y. TIMES, August 12, 1990,
§ 10, at 5. Indeed, one of the major figures in the creation of Lincoln Center for the
Performing Arts was Rev. Laurence J. McGinley, S.J., president of Fordham University
from 1949 to 1963. L.J. McGinley, Fordham Ex-President, Dies at 86, N.Y. Times, Aug.
18, 1992, at D19. It was he who brought Fordham to Lincoln Center, whose campus
principally houses the graduate schools of the University, with Rose Hill predominantly
remaining the host of the undergraduate divisions. As he then explained the relationship
between the two campuses: "[o]urs is a double educational tradition ... Fordham at
Rose Hill will continue to have a campus of elm-lined paths and ivied walls and ancient
heritage; Fordham at Lincoln Square will continue to provide the daily meeting and
mingling of town and gown." Id. Indeed, at the 25th Anniversary celebration of the law
school at Lincoln Center, Father McGinley reflected that the move to Lincoln Center
"was good for Fordham, and good for New York, that we should build here, and set our
cornerstone in the heart of this tight, little island." Rev. Laurence McGinley, S.J., Ad-
dress at the 25th Anniversary of Fordham University Law School at Lincoln Center,
Dean's Day (1986).
The Fordham campus at Lincoln Center consists of two square blocks, and the first
building constructed there was the Law School building at 140 W. 62nd Street. This
author began his teaching career at the Lincoln Center location in 1964. Shortly thereaf-
ter a twelve story building was also erected immediately south of the law school to house
the Graduate Schools of Business, Social Services, Education, and various undergraduate
schools. In addition, construction began in 1991 on a 20 story dormitory which will
house approximately 850 students of the various Fordham graduate and undergraduate
schools located at Lincoln Center.
8. See LAW SCHOOL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 6.
9. The term "urban" has been defined as "relating to, characteristic of, or taking
place in a city .... " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2520
(1986).
10. See John Herbers, Panel Sees Crime Turning The Cities Into Armed Camps, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1969, at AI; John Herbers, Backers of More Urban Aid Named Model
Cities Head, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1969, at Al; Who Speaks for the Cities?, NEWSWEEK
Apr. 7, 1969, at 48; David Danzig and John Feild, The Betrayal of the American City, 45
COMMENTARY 52 (June 1968).
11. As the Honorable Joseph M. McLaughlin (Dean, Fordham Law School 1971-
1981) wrote in the opening pages of the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL'S first volume
in 1972, "we cannot ignore the crisis which has beset our cities." Appreciation, I FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. (1972).
12. Volume 1 of the ULJ was dedicated to the Honorable William Hughes Mulligan
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In documenting the Journal's success in addressing urban issues, it
is not easy to summarize over four hundred articles, reports, notes
and comments,' 3 spanning over fifteen thousand pages, 4 which were
prepared by twenty different editorial staffs.' 5 Nevertheless, this arti-
cle will make the attempt, first from a chronological historical por-
trayal,' 6 and then from the perspective of the Journal's impact upon
specific areas of the law."7
II. Historical Development
The first article published by the Journal, written by Attorney Gen-
eral Louis J. Lefkowitz,' s discussed the unique urban environmental
problems of New York City's Jamaica Bay. It focused on and offered
suggestions regarding the dilemma of having a large body of water
which is polluted by its urban neighbors, yet also serves as an impor-
tant "breeding ground for waterfowl, fish and shellfish, [and] a way-
station for migratory birds."19 Other urban topics covered in that ini-
(Dean, Fordham Law School 1956-71) who "enthusiastically supported and assisted in
the organization and development of the law school's second student legal periodical, the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL." Dedication, I FORDHAM URB. L.J. (1972). The
initial funding for the Journal came from Louis Stein, Class of 1926. Thereafter, addi-
tional support was received from the Fordham Law School Alumni Association's Annual
Fund. Since then, the students at Fordham Law School, with the assistance of the
Alumni, commenced the publication of three additional Fordham journals, namely: The
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL; The FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
REPORT; and the FORDHAM ENTERTAINMENT, MEDIA AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW FORUM.
13. See Appendix, infra.
14. See infra note 66.
15. In addition to 20 different staffs (volume 1 took two years to publish and thus
had two different editorial boards), the ULJ has had the following Faculty Advisors:
Professor Michael R. Lanzarone; Professor Charles N. Whelan; Dean Gerald T. Mc-
Laughlin; and, Professor Daniel J. Capra.
16. See infra notes 18-67 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 68-196 and accompanying text.
18. Louis J. Lefkowitz, a graduate of Fordham Law School in 1925, was the Attorney
General of the State of New York from 1957 to 1978, serving during the administrations
of Governors Harriman, Rockefeller, Wilson, and Carey. As New York's Attorney Gen-
eral for over 20 years, he became one of the first state attorney generals to take an active
role in civil rights, environmental protection and the prevention of consumer fraud.
Moreover, in 1962 he became the first Attorney General from New York to be appointed
president of the National Association of Attorneys General. See Mary Ann Giordano,
Tell It to Louis Lefkowitz, MANHATTAN LAWYER, Jan. 1988, at 12.
In his honor, the ULJ commenced the annual presentation of the Louis J. Lejkowitz
Award to the following honorable recipients: Archibald R. Murray - 1982; John F. Kee-
nan - 1983; Robert Abrams - 1984; Robert M. Hayes - 1985; Geraldine A. Ferraro - 1986;
Stanley Fink - 1987; Andrew J. Maloney - 1988; Ross Sandler - 1989; Frederick A.O.
Schwarz - 1990; John D. Feerick - 1991; Charles L. Brieant - 1992.
19. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Jamaica Bay: An Urban Marshland In Transition, I FORD-
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tial volume included: the criminal responsibility of drug addicts; the
dangers arising from nuclear power; noise pollution; tenant remedies
for harassment; and, urban crime. Unfortunately, many of these ur-
ban problems of the early 1970s still remain with us today.2"
Volume 2 contained a report by the New York City Board of Cor-
rection entitled Pre-Sentence Report: Utility or Futility?,2 which fo-
cused on delays between a finding or plea of guilty and the sentencing
of criminal defendants. The next few volumes continued to expand
the coverage of urban issues, reporting on such areas as: fiscal cri-
ses, 22 affirmative action, 23 landmark preservation, 24 religious discrimi-
nation in employment, 25 as well as ethics in the legal community. 26
Volume 5 contained several significant pieces. One was a contro-
versial article by David I. Caplan on the constitutional right to bear
2172arms. In light of the recent riots in Los Angeles,28 this article, albeit
HAM URB. L.J. 1 (1972). The waters of Jamaica Bay, often referred to as a "tarnished
jewel," absorb sewage from city treatment plants and jet fuel from spills at Kennedy
Airport, and its air is suffused with smoke from jets entering and taking off from the
airport. Id. Nevertheless, this body of water - eight miles long and four miles wide -
sustains and nourishes a wide variety of wildlife. It serves as a feeding station on the
Atlantic Flyway, the main north-south route of migratory birds in this hemisphere. Id.
at 3.
20. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, From Riots of the 60's to Riots of the 90's, a Frustrat-
ing Search to Heal a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at A19; Chuck Freadhoff, What
Caused the Riots in LA?, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, May 4, 1992, at 1; Betsey Car-
penter & Tim Zimmermann, Don't Blame it on Rio, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May
11, 1992, at 56; Sharon Begley et al., Show Me The Way to Rio, NEWSWEEK, May 11,
1992, at 59; Jane Birnbaum et al., The Economic Crisis of Urban America, BUSINESS
WEEK, May 18, 1992, at 38; America's Cities, THE ECONOMIST, May 9, 1992, at 21; Chris
Oliver, Feds Slaughter JFK Seagulls, N.Y. POST, May 21, 1992, at 5. Indeed, many of
these problems are prevalent worldwide. See Edward Buscall, Cities Turn Tide of Urban
Decline, THE EUROPEAN, June 11-14, 1992, at 4.
21. New York City Board of Correction, Pre-Sentence Reports.: Utility or Futility?, 2
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27 (1973).
22. See John V. Connorton, The Fiscal Crisis of New York City Voluntary Hospitals, 2
FORDHAM URR. L.J. 459 (1974).
23. See Katherine M. Lordi and Paul H. Schietroma, Comment, The Infirmities of
Affirmative Action: The New York City Plan, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (1974).
24. See Mary Spearing, Note, Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the Tax Ex-
empt Owner, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 123 (1974).
25. See John D. Dadakis & Thomas M. Russo, Note, Religious Discrimination in
Employment.: The 1972 Amendment - A Perspective, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 327 (1975).
26. See William R. Meagher, A Critique of Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, 4
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 289 (1976) (reviewing MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS
IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975)).
27. David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (1976).
28. See supra note 20; see also James M. Perry, Arms, and Clashes Over the Right to
Bear Them, Turn California Politics Into a Heated Gunfight, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1992,
at AIS.
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controversial, still appears to be timely. Indeed, over five thousand
reprints were ordered in 1977 by parties interested in this area of the
law. Another piece, written by Kenneth Bond, concerned itself with
the then newly enacted municipal bankruptcy provisions. 29 Since this
article was published during the time of New York City's 1976-1977
fiscal crisis,"° numerous extra copies were distributed.
Volume 6 was significant in that it reflected an expansion in the
number of ULJ staff members, resulting in a marked increase in the
publication of student comments and notes. Moreover, this volume
further broadened the Journal's coverage of federal and national is-
sues generally, rather than principally dwelling upon New York re-
lated problems.
This expanded coverage continued in volumes 7 through 14, 3' re-
sulting in articles covering: First Amendment issues,32 the right to
privacy, 33 medical malpractice insurance, 4 the energy crisis, 35 tax ex-
emptions,3 6 access to federal courts in civil rights cases, 37 zoning,3"
29. Kenneth W. Bond, Municipal Bankruptcy Under the 1976 Amendments to Chap-
ter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1976).
30. See Constantine N. Katsoris, City's Death Tax and Its Possible Effects, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 29, 1976, at I.
31. As Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Joseph M. Perillo wrote in the opening
pages of ULJ volume 10, book IV: "[t]he Urban Law Journal is performing a vital ser-
vice by applying the research and analytical skills of the legal profession to the problems
that plague urban areas. It publishes articles and comments by scholars, practitioners
and students which focus on law as it affects the cities and their inhabitants." Joseph M.
Perillo, The Fordham Urban Law Journal: A Decade of Legal Scholarship and Commu-
nity Service, 10 FORDHAM URs. L.J. xi (1982).
32. See, e.g., Mark S. Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amendment: Divorcing the
Medium from the Message, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163 (1982); Stephen M. Watson,
Note, First Amendment Challenges to Landmark Preservation Statutes, 11 FORDHAM
URs. L.J. 115 (1982).
33. See, e.g., Carole M. Cleaver, Note, Privacy Rights in Medical Records, 13 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 165 (1985); Gretta J. Heaney, Note, The Constitutional Right of Informa-
tional Privacy: Does It Protect Children Suffering From Aids?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
927 (1986); Frederick R. Kessler, Note, A Common Law for the Statutory Era: The Right
of Publicity and New York's Right of Privacy Statute, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 951 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Mark Monaco, Note, New York's Medical Malpractice Insurance Crises -
A New Direction for Reform, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773 (1986), cited in In re Medical
Malpractice Ins. Assoc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 533 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (N.Y. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989).
35. See, e.g., Charles M. Pratt, Cogeneration: A Successful Response to the Energy
Crisis?, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483 (1981).
36. See, e.g., Deborah A. Konopko, Note, Targeting Tax Dollars More Efficiently:
Proposed Modifications to the 421-a Real Property Tax Exemption, 15 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1077 (1987); George A. King, Note, Tax Exempt Financing of Health Care Facilities
as a Component of the Market Approach to Health Care Cost Containment, 11 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 603 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Irma B. Ascher, Comment, Restrictions on Access to the Federal Courts
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juvenile offenders,39 homelessness," securities disputes,4 minorities in
employment,42 due process,43 solid waste," the New York "pothole
law,"4 anti-trust,46 torts and product liability, 47 confidentiality, 4 the
death penalty,49 executing youthful offenders,50 and a topical note on
the AIDS virus.5 Furthermore, Senator Orrin G. Hatch contributed
an article in 1979 entitled, Should the Capital Vote in Congress? A
Critical Analysis of the D.C. Representation Amendment.52
in Civil Rights Actions: The Role of Abstention and Res Judicata, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
481 (1978), cited in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Terence Kennedy, Note, New York City Zoning Resolution Section 12-
10. A Third Phase in the Evolution ofAirspace Law, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1039 (1983),
cited in Wing Ming Properties, Ltd. v. MQtt Operating Corp., 561 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1990).
39. See, e.g., Carol Bombardi, Note, Juvenile Detention Hearings. A Proposed Model
Provision to Limit Detention During the Preadjudicatory Stage, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
285 (1984).
40. See, e.g., Mark Malone, Note, Homelessness in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 749 (1982); Neil V. McKittrick, The Homeless: Judicial Intervention on
Behalf of a Politically Powerless Group, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 389 (1988).
41. See, e.g., Douglas E. Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933; "Participation" and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 877 (1987), cited in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Terry S. Sterling, Note, Court-Ordered Hiring Programs Under Title
VII. The Effects on Absentee Minorities, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147 (1981); Ellen
Zweig, Note, Challenges to Employment Testing Under Title VII: Creating "Built in
Headwinds"for the Civil Service Employer, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 749 (1984).
43. See, e.g., Peter J. O'Connor, Entrapment Versus Due Process: A Solution to the
Problem of the Criminal Conviction Obtained by Law Enforcement Misconduct, 7 FORD-
HAM URn. L.J. 35 (1978).
44. See, e.g.. Donna R. Lanza, Comment, Municipal Solid Waste Regulation: An In-
effective Solution to a National Problem, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 215 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Terri J. Frank, Note, New York City's Pothole Law: In Need of Repair,
10 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 323 (1982).
46. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Local Government Action and Antitrust Policy: An
Economic Analysis, 12 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 405 (1984); Brian J. McCarthy, Note, Devel-
oping A Consumer Right to Invoke the Boycott Exception to the Insurance Company Ex-
emption From Federal Antitrust Laws, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353 (1978).
47. See, e.g., Pamela A. Keating, Note, Municipal Liability for Requiring Unfit Police
Officers to Carry Guns, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001 (1983); Robert S. Ondrovic, Note,
Municipal Tort Liability for Criminal Attacks Against Passengers on Mass Transportation,
12 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 325 (1984).
48. See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Confidentiality, 13 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 11 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Andrea Gallo, Note, Death After Life. The Future of New York's
Mandatory Death Penalty for Murders Committed by Life-Term Prisoners, 13 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 597 (1985).
50. See, e.g., John M. Tyd, Note, Constitutional Challenges to New York's Youthful
Offender Statute, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 475 (1977); Luke M. Charde, Jr., Comment,
The Juvenile Offender-Where Can We Send Him?, 2 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 245 (1974).
51. See, e.g., Gretta J. Heaney, Note, The Constitutional Right of Informational Pri-
vacy: Does it Protect Children Suffering from Aids?, 14 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 927 (1986).
52. Orrin G. Hatch, Should the Capital Vote in Congress? A Critical Analysis of the
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Volume 15 saw a further development: the publication of signifi-
cant public reports. That volume included the Report of the New
York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 3 which set out the
problems faced by women in the court system, and included a fore-
word by the Honorable Judith S. Kaye,54 remarks by the Honorable
Sol Wachtler," and a message from the Dean of Fordham Law
School, John D. Feerick 6 This Report was widely circulated in the
legal community, in large measure because of its ready availability
through the ULJ. Because of its significance and timeliness, approxi-
mately ten thousand copies of this Report were requested. Moreover,
as a follow-up, volume 19 recently published the Five Year Report of
the New York Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts.57
Volume 18 contained several additional significant reports: the two
reports of the New York State Commission on Government Integ-
rity58 (collectively referred to as Feerick Commission or Feerick Re-
port) and the New York State Bar Association's Report of Special
Committee to Consider Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation in New York
State Courts59 (Frivolous Litigation Report).
The reception of the Feerick Report by the legal community was
enthusiastic. It documented a number of political abuses, exposed
weaknesses in the law that created opportunities for corruption, and
laid out a detailed agenda for raising governmental ethical standards
in New York State. The Report was widely disseminated, not only in
New York, but throughout the United States, and has been frequently
quoted by the media in its commentaries on governmental ethics.' In
Proposed D.C. Representation Amendment, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 479 (1979). Orrin G.
Hatch has been a United States Senator from Utah since 1976.
53. 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11 (1986).
54. Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Foreward to REPORT OF NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WO-
MEN IN THE COURTS, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1986). Judge Judith S. Kaye is a
member of the New York Court of Appeals.
55. Hon. Sol Wachtler, Remarks to REPORT OF NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WO-
MEN IN THE COURTS, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3 (1986). Judge Sol Wachtler is the Chief
Judge on the New York Court of Appeals.
56. John D. Feerick, Message to REPORT OF NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN
IN THE COURTS, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7 (1986).
57. 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313 (1992).
58. New York State Commission on Government Integrity, RESTORING THE PUBLIC
TRUST: A BLUEPRINT FOR GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 173
(1990), and INTEGRITY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS IN NEW YORK STATE GOVERN-
MENT: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 251 (1990).
59. New York State Bar Association, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO CON-
SIDER SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS MARCH
20, 1990, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3 (1990).
60. See An Ethics Panel Ends Its Work, and It's Angry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, at
22; Ned Kilkelly, Corruption Panel Slams Lawmakers in Final Report, UPI, Sept. 18,
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fact, many of the Feerick Commission's recommendations have al-
ready been enacted into legislation.6'
The Frivolous Litigation Report was prefaced with an introduction
by the Honorable Hugh R. Jones, the chair of the Committee.62 The
Report set forth several recommendations including a proposed sanc-
tions rule. Thousands of lawyers and judges were solicited for their
views on this topic, and the recommendations reflect the Committee's
consideration of "the basic principles which underlie Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 63
Recently, volume 19 published the Report of the New York State
Judicial Commission on Minorities." The New York State Judicial
Commission on Minorities was appointed by Chief Judge Sol Wach-
ter, and its Report was issued after more than three years of studying
the problems of racial bias in the state's judicial system.6"
As for physical growth, the Journal's first volume consisted of 546
pages, increasing to a peak of 1116 in volume 11.66 Its present circu-
lation has grown to approximately 3,000 copies per volume, including
720 domestic and 21 foreign subscribers. Moreover, since 1983, the
bulk of recent ULJ articles and notes are available on Westlaw.67
1990, available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, UPI file; Robert A. Jordan, Shopping for Low
Turnout, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1990, at 25; Heat on Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1988, at 26.
61. A large number of the Commission's recommendations have been incorporated
into the New York City Campaign Finance Law and the uniform guidelines issued by the
New York City Policy Procurement Board. Moreover, several New York municipalities
have adopted major parts of the Commission's proposed municipal ethics code. Most
recently in 1992, the New York State Legislature and Governor agreed to changes that
would set stricter limits on contributions that individuals and political action committees
may give to state and citywide candidates and eliminate many technical requirements
frequently used to keep candidates off the ballot. See Sarah Lyall, Voting to Untangle
Election Law, Albany Backs New Spending Caps, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1992, at Al.
62. Hugh R. Jones, Introduction to REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER
SANCTIONS FOR FRIVILOUS LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS, 18 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1 (1990). Judge Hugh R. Jones was formerly a member of the New York Court
of Appeals.
63. Id.
64. The New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181
(1992) [hereinafter MINORITIES REPORT].
65. Sol Wachtler, Introduction to MINORITIES REPORT, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 175
(1992).
66. ULJ pages per volume are as follows (volume/pages):
1/546; 2/684; 3/778; 4/654; 5/624; 6/710; 7/703; 8/963; 9/1114; 10/781; 11/1116; 12/
929; 13/972; 14/1030; 15/1110; 16/533; 17/526; 18/723; 19/1046.
67. West Publishing, 1992.
TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
III. Special Impact Articles
To truly show the depth and breadth of the Journal's articles, it is
also necessary, in addition to a historical portrayal,68 to examine them
from the perspective of their effect upon designated areas of the law.
Indeed, this impact has not gone unnoticed, as indicated by the fre-
quent listing of the Journal's articles in the "Worth Reading" column
of the National Law Journal,6 9 and the number of times the articles
have been cited in judicial opinions, publications and journals.7°
A. Criminal Law
The Journal has published over a dozen articles, comments or notes
dealing with criminal law. Moreover, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has cited several of these pieces, 71 namely: a case note in volume
5 discussing the inability of custodial criminals under indictment to
waive their right to counsel without the presence of an attorney 72 and
another case note which discussed the issue of multiple jury joint
trials.73
A recent student note proposed an "aggravated child abuse" statute
which would recognize such child abuse as an underlying felony to
support a felony murder charge, along with a similar amendment to
68. See supra notes 12-67 and accompanying text.
69. The NAT'L L.J. issue (by date) and ULJ article referred therein (volume and
page) are as follows:
3/2/92 (18 ULJ 573); 9/17/90 (17 ULJ 383); 6/11/90 (17 ULJ 303); 3/5/90 (17 ULJ
217); 11/27/89 (16 ULJ 615); 11/27/89 (16 ULJ 647); 11/27/89 (16 ULJ 703); 3/27/89
(16 ULJ 467); 3/13/89 (16 ULJ 263); 3/13/89 (16 ULJ 295); 2/27/89 (16 ULJ 487); 8/
29/88 (16 ULJ 127); 8/1/88 (16 ULJ 127); 6/20/88 (15 ULJ 951); 6/20/88 (15 ULJ
1077); 6/20/88 (15 ULJ 1049); 2/29/88 (15 ULJ 767); 10/26/87 (15 ULJ 289); 10/19/87
(15 ULJ 533); 10/12/87 (15 ULJ 359); 7/13/87 (15 ULJ 199); 7/13/87 (14 ULJ 1011);
7/6/87 (14 ULJ 927); 6/29/87 (14 ULJ 927); 2/2/87 (14 ULJ 685); 1/26/87 (14 ULJ
773); 1/19/87 (14 ULJ 773); 10/6/86 (14 ULJ 477); 6/2/86 (14 ULJ 115); 5/19/86 (14
ULJ 259)); 5/12/86 (14 ULJ 259); 1/27/86 (13 ULJ 869); 1/20/86 (13 ULJ 869); 11/4/
85 (13 ULJ 553); 10/28/85 (13 ULJ 443); 10/28/85 (13 ULJ 373); 10/28/85 (13 ULJ
395); 10/21/85 (13 ULJ 373); 1/14/85 (12 ULJ 807); 1/14/85 (12 ULJ 807); 4/18/83
(11 ULJ 51); 4/18/83 (11 ULJ 139); 4/11/83 (11 ULJ 115); 4/4/83 (11 ULJ 85); 1/31/
83 (10 ULJ 595); 1/24/83 (10 ULJ 595); 1/17/83 (10 ULJ 541).
70. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
71. People v. Ricardo B., 73 N.Y.2d 228, 234 (1989) (citing Case Note, Multiple Jury
Joint Trial - On the Joint Trial of Two Defendants, the Empanelling of Two Juries Si-
multaneously is Permissible, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (1973)); People v. Cunningham,
49 N.Y.2d 203, 208 (1979) (citing Stuart J. Feld, Case Note, Right to Counsel - Custo-
dial Criminal Defendant May Not Waive Right to Counsel in the Absence of His Court
Appointed Attorney, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 401 (1977)); People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154,
163 (1978).
72. Right to Counsel, supra note 71.
73. Multiple Jury, supra note 71.
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the current felony murder statute. 74 This suggested legislation ad-
dresses the difficulty of obtaining a conviction for intentional homi-
cide and depraved indifference to human life where child abuse is the
underlying predicate felony.75 It would simplify the task of the jury
by attributing the requisite intent of a murder conviction to one who
commits a homicide during the commission of the underlying felony
of aggravated child abuse.76 In addition, the proposed amendment
would serve to deter abuse by parents, protect the child from harm,
and satisfy society's outrage over the senseless beating of a child. 77
Another note argued that DNA fingerprinting is an invaluable tool
for prosecutors and defense attorneys, creating the necessity of estab-
lishing a national database of DNA fingerprints.7" It concluded that
the DNA test is a sensitive, accurate and accepted method of identifi-
cation that could revolutionize criminal investigations, without un-
necessarily invading individual privacy.7 9
Also noteworthy was the publication of a colloquium on Model
Rule 1.6 of the American Bar Association's 1983 Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, which debated the issue of confidentiality of the
intended crimes of clients versus the public's generally skeptical view
of legal ethics.80 One of the articles in the colloquium contends that
confidentiality must be guaranteed in all but the most drastic circum-
stances, i.e., planned murder and mayhem.8 1 Another article urges
that a balance between confidentiality and other values, such as pre-
serving the integrity of the legal system, is the better approach be-
cause it permits lawyers to divulge information about a greater range
74. Barry Bendetowies, Note, Felony Murder and Child Abuse. A Proposal for the
New York Legislature, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 383 (1991). This note discusses the Joel
Steinberg trial, which received great notoriety. Id. at 404.
75. Bendetowies, supra note 74, at 384.
76. Bendetowies, supra note 74, at 405.
77. Id.
78. JoAnn Marie Longobardi, Note, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need For a National
Data Base, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323 (1989). See, S. Raab, Cuomo Seeks Genetic Data
of Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1992, § 1 at 27. DNA, which stands for deox-
yribonucleic acid, is "the basic hereditary material, . . . [which] determines specific traits
in organisms by guiding the production of specific polypeptide chains, one or more of
which interact to form a protein molecule." J. BAKER & G. ALLEN, THE STUDY OF
BIOLOGY, 441-42 (4th ed. 1982).
79. Longobardi, supra note 78, at 357. See also Cerisse Anderson, DNA Tests Ordered
In Paternity Lawsuit, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 1992, at 1.
80. The Lawyer's Dilemma Over Model Rule 1.6 and Client Confidentiality - Con-
flicting Duties to Clients and Society, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1984).
81. Abraham Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Confidentiality, 13 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 11 (1984).
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of criminal activities than is permitted under Rule 1.6. s2
Two recent notes examined issues of the implementation of suspect
procedures against criminal defendants.8 3 One attempts to establish
an equitable standard regarding immunity for pre-trial testimony of
police officers. It takes into account the truth-seeking function of the
judicial process, while also considering the lack of procedural safe-
guards afforded the criminal defendant at ex parte pre-trial proceed-
ings. 4 The other note attempts to provide for greater consistency and
clarity in the application of the good-faith exception 5 where warrants
fail to describe with particularity the places to be searched and the
things to be seized.
A timely article appears in the current issue which calls for alterna-
tive approaches in the fight against bias or hate crimes.8 6 It discusses
existing and proposed legislation to increase the penalties for bias-re-
lated attacks. The article concludes that legislative efforts alone are
insufficient and that further, more diverse efforts such as grass-roots,
community-wide programs and educational seminars aimed at ele-
mentary schoolchildren are necessary to strike at the underlying
causes of bias crime.
B. Employment Law
Volume 10 included a leading article entitled, The Effect of the Em-
ployment-At- Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe
Benefits.87 That article has been cited in landmark decisions on the
employment-at-will rule in New York, Minnesota and Arkansas, as
well as by other federal and state courts.8 8 Moreover, it has also been
82. Deborah Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
43 (1984).
83. Jack Kaufman, Note, Section 1983: Absolute Immunity For Pretrial Police Testi-
mony, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 647 (1988); Martha Applebaum, Note, "Wrong But Rea-
sonable" The Fourth Amendment Particularity Requirement After United States v. Leon,
16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577 (1988).
84. Kaufman, supra note 83, at 702.
85. Under this, "[t]he exclusionary rule does not apply when law enforcement officers
have acted in objective reasonable reliance on a warrant subsequently found to be inva-
lid." Applebaum, supra note 83, at 578.
86. Abraham Abramovsky, Bias Crime: A Call for Alternative Responses, 19 FORD-
HAM URn. L.J. 875 (1992).
87. Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr., The Effect of the Employment-At- Will Rule on Employee
Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1981).
88. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 n.4 (3d Cir. 1983); Boniuk
v. New York Medical College, 535 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Crain Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Cass, 810 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Ark. 1991); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983); Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86,
94 n.4 (N.Y. 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 n.4 (N.Y. 1982);
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 n.10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); State Ex Rel.
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widely cited by twenty-five prestigious law journals, treatises and
other legal publications.89
In addition, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits9" referred to a ULJ note
criticizing the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980.
That note, MPPAA Withdrawal Liability Assessment: Letting the Fox
Guard the Henhouse,9' also proposes remedial legislation which
would cure the problems associated with the imposition of unreasona-
ble liability assessments upon the withdrawal from such plans.
Moreover, a note in the current issue examines the constructive dis-
charge rule in Title VII denial of promotion cases in light of recent
lower court decisions.92 It argues that in determining whether an em-
ployee has been constructively discharged as a result of the em-
ployer's discriminatory employment conditions, the court should
consider whether the employee's reasonable expectations of career ad-
vancement have been frustrated.
C. Environmental Law
The very first ULJ article dealt with the environmental problems of
Jamaica Bay. 93 Volume 7 dealt with the troublesome issue of asbes-
tos, and litigation in relation thereto,94 and volume 9 addressed the
issue of cogeneration and its dual effects on the environment and the
Roberts v. Public Finance Co., 662 P.2d 330, 332 n.1 (Or. 1983); Banas v. Matthews Int'l
Corp., 502 A.2d 637, 648 n.12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
89. See C579 ALI-ABA 367; C588 ALI-ABA 97; 1985 DUKE L.J. 196 n.1 (1985); 17
HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 209, 252 n.160 (1982); 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1158 n.42
(1990); 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 365, 368 n.17 (1989); 12 J. CORP. L. 105 n.1 (1986); 5 J. L.
& CoM. 207, 208 n.3 (1984); 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533 n.3 (1986); 12 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 437 n.1 (1988); 44 MD. L. REV. 903, 918 n.70 (1985); 64 N.C. L. REV. 840 n.5
(1986); 13 PEPP. L. REV. 607 n.l (1986); 321 PLI/Lit 15 (1987); 299 PLI/Lit 153 (1986);
8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 393 (1989); 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 396 n.I (1984); 58
TEMP. L.Q. 65 n.3 (1985); 32 UCLA L. REV. 302, 326 n.101 (1984); 61 U. DET. L. REV.
351 n.8 (1984); 51 U. AT Mo.-KANSAS CITY L. REV. 189, 191 n.14 (1983); 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 197, 200 n.18 (1990); 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 245 n.94 (1984); 48 U. PITT. L. REV.
427, 480 n.188 (1987); 60 WASH. L. REV. 209, 210 n. Il (1984).
90. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Allyn Transp. Co., 832 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir.
1987); Trustees of Col. Pipe Indus. Pension Trust v. Howard Electrical & Mechanical, Inc.,
909 F.2d 1379, 1386 (10th Cir. 1990).
91. Daniel A. Etra, Note, MPPAA Withdrawal Liability Assessment: Letting the Fox
Guard the Henhouse, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211 (1986).
92. Richard M. DeAgazio, Note, Promoting Fairness: A Proposal for a More Reason-
able Standard of Constructive Discharge in Title VII Denial of Promotion Cases, 19 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 979 (1992).
93. See supra note 19.
94. Jean A. O'Hare, Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978).
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energy crisis.9" Volume 10 focused on the growing issue of solid
waste and the problems relating to its disposal,96 while volume 11
discussed the subject of acid rain 9v and suggestions regarding its con-
trol.9 8 It was at this point that environmental articles stopped appear-
ing regularly in the ULJ. This, however, was not bad news. Instead,
it reflected the ushering in of yet another scholarly publication at
Fordham Law School - the Fordham Environmental Law Report.99
D. Ethics
The Journal has consistently made substantial contributions to the
ongoing discourse concerning legal ethics, government integrity and
professional responsibility. In volume 14, Peter Megargee Brown
presented a poignant discussion of the serious decline in the American
lawyer's professionalism in recent years, which is the result of a shift
in focus away from public service to self-serving marketing and pro-
ductivity. " Ultimately, the article challenged the legal profession to
halt this decline by returning to the historical purpose of this profes-
sion which is to serve the public interest rather than personal
interest. 101
Similarly, in the foreword to the Feerick Report, Cyrus Vance
stressed the necessity of maintaining a high level of integrity in the
legal profession and government, which translates into public trust
and confidence. 1"2 In order to preserve the highest ethical standards,
Mr. Vance put forth that lawyers must accept the responsibility of
oversight and enforcement of the rules governing professionalism, in-
cluding the unpleasant obligation of monitoring and exposing the un-
ethical behavior of fellow practitioners. 103 These comments were the
premise to many important recommendations intended to stimulate
95. Charles M. Pratt, Cogeneration: A Successful Response to the Energy Crisis?, 9
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483 (1981).
96. Donna R. Lanza, Comment, Municipal Solid Waste Regulation: An Ineffective
Solution to a National Problem, 10 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 215 (1982).
97. Acid rain is rainfall or other forms of precipitation composed in part of sulfuric or
nitric acid. Deborah J. Hartman, Alternatives for Regulatory Control of Acid Rain in the
Northeastern United States, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 455 (1983).
98. Id.
99. See supra note 12.
100. Peter Megargee Brown, The Quiet Revolution in the American Law Profession:
Remarks Before the Commission on Professionalism of the American Bar Association, 14
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 855 (1986).
101. Id. at 871-72.
102. Cyrus Vance, Foreward. Legal Ethics and Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM
URn. L. 153 (1990-1991). Cyrus Vance has had a most distinguished career, including
being the United States Secretary of State under President Jimmy Carter (1977-80).
103. Id. at 153-54.
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continued attention to the critical challenge of maintaining superior
ethical standards."o The subsequent blueprint for government integ-
rity outlined by the Feerick Commission acknowledged a vigilant
struggle against corruption, while imposing responsibility upon hon-
est government officials and private citizens to preserve clear lines of
communication. The Report called for reforms which would safe-
guard the public from future government corruption. °5
A subsequent article called for a public discourse concerning im-
portant ethical issues addressed in the 1990 version of the Lawyer's
Code of Professional Responsibility.0 6 It described the 1990 amend-
ments to the New York Code of Professional Responsibility and ex-
plained the similarities and differences between the 1990 Code and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. It concluded that the 1990
Code would provide an improved guide for the entire profession giv-
ing both high ethical aspirations and practical guidelines for the
lawyer. 0 7
Finally, two notes proposed specific improvements to the existing
professional standards. One claimed that a clear "per se" rule prohib-
iting prosecutors' involvement in criminal cases that overlap with
cases from their private practices would eliminate potential conflict of
interest, benefitting the entire criminal justice system. 0 8 The other
note asserted that pro bono work is the responsibility of every lawyer
and law student, thus creating a duty for law schools to actively pre-
pare prospective lawyers for this future responsibility.0 9
E. Family Law
The Journal has covered a wide range of domestic issues - from
child abuse and custody to battered wives. Several articles focused
specifically on the rights and protection of children. An early article
attempted to balance the public's right to know that their funds are
104. Vance, supra note 102, at 156.
105. New York State Commission on Government Integrity, Restoring the Public
Trust: A Blueprint for Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 173, 174-76 (1991).
106. Marjorie E. Gross, The Long Process of Change: The 1990 Amendments to the
New York Code of Professional Responsibility, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283 (1991).
107. Id. at 333.
108. Kara S. Donohue, Note, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Case for the Per Se Rule, 18
FORDHAM URa. L.J. 407 (1991).
109. Frederick J. Martin III, Note, Law School's Pro Bono Role: A Duty to Require
Student Public Service, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 359, 381 (1989). Whether such participa-
tion should be voluntary or mandatory is the subject of much debate. See Roger C.
Cramtan, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113 (1991). See
also Gary Spenser, Decision Delayed a Year on Mandatory Pro Bono Rule, N.Y. L.J., May
22. 1992. at 1.
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being spent in a productive and prudent manner against an institu-
tionalized minor's right to be free from unwarranted invasions of pri-
vacy.'1 o It concluded that government intervention is necessary for
oversight and to secure managerial accountability, but must not ex-
tend to derogation of the child's personality."'
ULJ notes have also examined the history and effectiveness of child
protection laws. One recognized an increase in the reporting of child
abuse and maltreatment, but cited an existing system that was incapa-
ble of adequately protecting the child or rehabilitating the family." 2
Several other notes proposed deterrents seeking the protection of
battered wives." 3 One note argued that although wife abuse is preva-
lent throughout society, it has only recently gained the proper atten-
tion, and necessitates comprehensive domestic violence legislation to
bring more batterers before the courts, ensuring that they are ade-
quately sanctioned." 4 Another note discussed the difficult challenge
of providing adequate police protection in such domestic violence
situations. '' 5
A considerable focus has also been placed upon child custody, fos-
ter care and child support. An early article discussed the importance
to the child, the natural parents, foster parents, and society of recog-
nizing the best interest and well-being of the child as the determining
factor in child custody proceedings. 1 6 The article suggested a list of
elements for the legislature to consider in providing guidance for the
judiciary on what is in the best interest of the child." 7
A recent article examined parental rights of incarcerated mothers
in New York, claiming they lacked effective access to court proceed-
ings involving their children. "8 It proposed an amendment which
would help ensure that mothers who desired meaningful relationships
110. Katherine M. Lordi, Acccountability Versus Privacy: The Plight of Institutional-
ized Emotionally Disturbed Children, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 223 (1977).
111. Id. at 223, 238.
112. Iris Ann Albstein, Note, Child Abuse and Maltreatment: The Development of
New York's Child Protection Laws, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 542-44 (1977).
113. Lisa R. Beck, Note, Protecting Battered Women: A Proposal for Comprehensive
Domestic Violence Legislation in New York, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999 (1987); Jeffrey
A. Shapiro, Note, The Inadequate Police Protection of Battered Wives: Can a City and Its
Police Be Held Liable Under the Equal Protection Clause?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417
(1986).
114. Beck, supra note 113.
115. Shapiro, supra note 113.
116. Joseph R. Carrieri & Walter Murawski, Proposing Standards For Child Custody:
The Proceedings, the Role of the Agency, and the Best Interests of the Child, 6 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 187 (1978).
117. Id. at 216.
118. Philip M. Genty, Protecting the Parental Rights of Incarcerated Mothers Whose
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with their children need not fear permanent termination of their pa-
rental rights. 19 Similarly, another note examined the issue of the ter-
mination of parental rights where the mother engages in prenatal
drug abuse. 20 It concluded that a less severe alternative than the ter-
mination of parental rights of drug-abusing mothers would be in the
best interests of the child, the parent and the state.
One note argued that the existing foster care system needs to imple-
ment transitional programs to enable foster children to live indepen-
dently and must adjust the age requirement of assistance from
eighteen to twenty-one in order to facilitate this process. 12  Another
note proposed a similar solution to the child support situation. Since
the purpose of child support is to make the parent responsible for the
proper development of a child into a productive member of society,
this note urged that support should be extended from eighteen years
of age to twenty-one, for young adults face economic and employment
difficulties during these years. 122
F. Housing
The Journal has consistently included articles and student notes on
housing, as well as zoning and land use issues. Volume 13 published
the article "Not In My Neighborhood": Legal Challenges to the Estab-
lishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New
York State, 123 which discussed the laws pertaining to the development
of group homes for mentally disabled persons. In volume 16, the
same author, Robert Schonfeld, published a sequel article entitled
"Five-Hundred Year Flood Plains" and Other Unconstitutional Chal-
lenges to the Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally
Retarded. 24
Children Are In Foster Care: Proposed Changes to New York's Termination of Parental
Rights Law, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1989).
119. Id. at 25-26.
120. Jennifer M. Mone, Note, Has Connecticut Thrown Out the Baby With the Bath
Water? Termination of Parental Rights and In re Valerie D., 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 535
(1992). This note discusses the case of In re Valerie D. which received great notoriety.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Connecticut recently ordered a new trial on the issue of
whether the mother's rights were wrongfully terminated. See Kirk Johnson, Child Abuse
Is Ruled Out In Birth Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1992, at BI.
121. Mari Brita Maloney, Note, Out of the Home Onto the Street: Foster Children
Discharged Into Independent Living, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 971 (1986).
122. Nicholas C. Dipiazza, Note, The Effect of the New Age of Majority on Preexisting
Child Support Settlements, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 365 (1977).
123. Robert L. Schonfeld, "Not In My Neighborhood": Legal Challenges to the Estab-
lishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New York State, 13
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1985).
124. Robert L. Schonfeld, "Five-Hundred Year Flood Plains" and Other Unconstitu-
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Volume 18 devoted book III to the area of housing. More specifi-
cally, that issue contained a significant article on the effects of gentrifi-
cation, 125  and the concept of an eviction-free zone.1 6  It also
published a significant piece on HUD and the housing crisis in the
1990s. 127
Additionally, the Journal published two articles covering the con-
troversial subject of regulatory "takings" affecting property.12 s It also
published an article entitled Shattering the Myth of Municipal Impo-
tence: The Authority of Local Government to Create Affordable Hous-
ing, 12 9 which argued that municipal governments have the authority
and competence to induce the development of affordable housing.
Volume 17 also contained a student note on the celebrated Yonkers
desegregation case. 130
Consistent with the Journal's "urban" tradition, these particular
subjects concerning housing continue to be explored and highlighted.
Recently, book I of volume 19 included a colloquium on affordable
housing which takes a critical look at New Jersey's renown Mount
tional Challenges to the Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Re-
tarded, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1988).
125. Gentrification, the influx of high income dwellers into low income neighborhoods,
has in the past decade become a serious cause of concern to low income tenants in older
American cities. See Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones. The Economics of
Legal Bricolage in the Fight Against Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 508
(1991).
126. Id.
127. Michael Allen Wolf, HUD and Housing in the 1990s." Crisis in Affordability and
Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545 (1991).
128. See, e.g., Ross B. Lipsaker and Rebecca L. Heldt, Regulatory Takings: A Con-
tract Approach, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195 (1988); John Martinez, Reconstructing the
Takings Doctrine By Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157
(1988). The takings problem involves an interplay of property, government and the
boundary between the two. Id. at 158. The study of the takings problem is important so
that people whose property expectations are negatively affected by governmental action
can legitimately complain in situations where the government has overstepped its bounds.
Id. See also Property Gains, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1992, at A14; Ted Gest and Lisa J.
Moore, The Tide Turns for Property Owners, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 13,
1992, at 57; David W. Dunlap, Resolving Property "Takings" Courts Tilt to Owners,
N.Y. TIMES, August 23, 1992, § 10, at 1. "I think the courts have come to place a great
value on property rights under the Constitution, says Norman Marcus, former general
counsel of the New York City Planning Department." Id.
129. John R. Nolon, Shattering the Myth of Municipal Impotence: The Authority of
Local Government to Create Affordable Housing, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 383 (1989).
130. Amy Walsh, Note, The Yonkers Case: Separation of Powers As a Yardstick For
Determining Official Immunity, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217 (1989). See also Lynda
Richardson, Yonkers Approves Housing Plan, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1992, at B1; Lynda
Richardson, U.S. Judge Lets Yonkers Try Its Housing Approach, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
1992, at B6.
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Laurel housing mandate.' 3 ' The Journal first addressed the Mount
Laurel doctrine, a rule which requires municipal land use regulations
to provide for the construction of low and moderate income housing,
in volume 16.132 Still another article dealt with the issue of the con-
version of lofts'33 into housing and discussed legislation intended to
deal with the inadequacies of loft conversion laws.'34
Finally, book III of volume 19 contains a significant article by Nor-
man Marcus on zoning which calls for the overhaul and moderniza-
tion of the almost one thousand pages of land use regulations
governing New York City. 135
G. Public Reports
As previously mentioned, the ULJ has been the proud publisher of
several noteworthy public reports.' 36 Publishing these landmark re-
ports is especially important in order to disseminate them to the legal
community.
The Report on the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts 131
remains the most requested publication of any journal at Fordham
Law School, and it is anticipated that the follow-up Report, the Five
Year Report of the New York Judicial Committee on Women in the
Courts, will be equally successful. 3 ' Indeed, a task force of judges,
attorneys, academics and lay persons - The Ninth Judicial District
Committee to Promote Gender Fairness in the Courts - recently as-
serted that "its examination 'supports the conclusion' of gender bias
found in 1986 by the State Task Force on Women in the Courts."'139
The Feerick Report "4 on ethics in government (of which several
131. Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel and the Fair Housing Act: Success or Failure?,
19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 59 (1991).
132. Rachel Fox, The Selling Out of Mount Laurel- Regional Contribution Agreements
in New Jersey's Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 535 (1988).
133. After the Second World War, many factories began to move from urban lofts to
suburban and rural areas which offered greater space, lower rents, cheaper labor and
various tax incentives. As these urban lofts became vacant, and housing needs increased,
a great interest arose in converting these lofts to residential use. See William Eckstein,
Note, An Evaluation of New York Loft Conversion Law, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 511
(1982).
134. Id.
135. Norman Marcus, New York City Zoning - 1961-1991: Turning Back The Clock
- But With an Up-to-the-Minute Social Agenda, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 707 (1992).
136. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 53.
138. See supra note 57.
139. Martin Fox, Panel Finds Gender Bias in Westchester Courts, N.Y. L.J., May 8,
1992, at 2; see also Junda Woo, Widespread Sexual Bias Found In Courts, WALL ST. J.,
August 20, 1992, at BI.
140. See supra note 58.
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thousand copies have already been distributed) serves as a standard of
future acceptable conduct in government.
The Frivolous Litigation Report addressed the troublesome issue of
abusive litigation, and suggested recommendations to curb such
abuse.'a'
Book II of volume 19 published the New York State Judicial Com-
mission's Minorities Report.'42 Chief Judge Wachtler adopted the
Commission's initial recommendation and appointed an ongoing
committee to implement the Minorities Report.'43 The impact of this
Report is already being reflected in discussion arising out of the recent
Rodney King verdict in California.'"
H. Securities Arbitration
Prior to 1977 fewer than 1,000 securities arbitration disputes per
year were being administered before the various Securities Regulatory
Organizations ("SROs") under differing procedures.' 45 In 1977 the
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA")'46 was
formed to update and consolidate such rules. SICA consisted of rep-
resentatives of various SROs, 147 the Securities Industry Association
("SIA") '" and the public.'" SICA developed a Uniform Code of
Arbitration ("SICA Code") in 1979;'"° and, the number of SRO arbi-
trations continued to grow ' ' until they reached slightly under 3,000
141. See supra note 59.
142. See supra note 64.
143. See Sol Wachtler, Introduction to MINORITIES REPORT, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
175, 178 (1992).
144. See Edward A. Adams, Debate Continues On Minorities In Court System, N.Y.
L.J., May 8, 1992, at 1 ("The report concluded there are 'two justice systems at work in
the courts of New York State, one for whites, and a very different one for minorities and
the poor.'" Id.); Race: Our Dilemma Still, NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 44.
145. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 279 (1984).
146. See FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRA-
TION 2-3 (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter FIFTH REPORT].
147. The following SROs were represented: the American, Boston, Cincinnati, Mid-
west, New York, Pacific and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the National Association of
Securities Dealers. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 146, at 3.
148. Id. The SIA is a trade association for the securities industry.
149. Id. Originally only three public members were appointed. In 1983, the number of
public members was increased to four, its present number. Id. at 3.
150. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 146, at 4.
151. Between 1980-1985, the number of SRO securities arbitrations increased each
year as follows: 830 (1980); 1,042 (1981); 1,340 (1982); 1,731 (1983); 2,449 (1984); and
2,796 (1985). See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 146, at 7.
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in 1986.52
In 1953 the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan 153 held that pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements were unenforceable as to claims based
upon the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"). 154 Most courts pre-
sumed that this Wilko prohibition also extended to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), 5 5 and thus - despite pre-dispute
arbitration agreements - refused to order arbitration for customers'
claims arising under the 1934 Act.'56 This problem was further exac-
erbated by the Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd,57 which held that when an arbitrable claim 58 is joined with a
non-arbitrable Wilko claim, the claims need not be tried together in-
voluntarily - even if they were intertwined. 159 In other words, the
two related claims could be tried separately and simultaneously -
one in arbitration and the other in court.
In volume 14 the Journal published The Securities Arbitrators'
Nightmare '60 which pointed out that the Supreme Court decision in
Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd - by permitting the automatic bifurca-
tion of similar claims - would set two separate forums on a collision
course. The article went on to point out the problems that such sepa-
rate litigations would cause to litigants and arbitrators. 16 1 Fortu-
nately, the problem was rendered moot by the Supreme Court shortly
after the publication of this article.
In 1987, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon 162 ruled that claims based upon the 1934 Act were arbitra-
ble. 163 The effect of this landmark decision was to direct many cases
152. See SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRA-
TION 4 (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter SIXTH REPORT].
153. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
156. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 299-301 (1984).
157. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
158. One based on state law, and therefore not covered by the Wilko prohibition.
159. Some courts had held that if two claims (one covered and one not covered by the
Wilko prohibition) were so intertwined that it was impractical or impossible to separate
them, then they would be ordered to be litigated together. See Constantine N. Katsoris,
The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 303-304 (1984).
160. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 3, 4 (1986); Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
161. Katsoris, supra note 160, at 9-11.
162. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
163. Id. at 238. In 1989, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), undid the Wilko exception entirely and held
that pre-dispute arbitration agreements would be upheld, even as to issues arising under
the 1933 Act.
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that were previously litigated in court to arbitration."6 Indeed, in the
year after McMahon, securities arbitrations filed with the SROs ex-
ceeded 6,000165 - more than double the number filed in the year
before McMahon. 16
6
Shortly thereafter, the Journal published Securities Arbitration Af-
ter McMahon,161 which reported on the effects of the McMahon deci-
sion on securities arbitration.' 6' Furthermore, it suggested that the
feasibility of a single independent forum be explored for the resolution
of such disputes. 169
In the very next volume, The Level Playing Field was published,'
outlining and explaining the numerous changes which were made to
the SICA Code of Arbitration following the McMahon decision. '' In
doing this, it traced the legislative history of the SICA Code, and pro-
vided invaluable insight into its provisions.'72 Moreover, it traced the
SICA Code into the individual codes of the various SROs. 1
73
More recently, volume 18 published Punitive Damages In Securities
Arbitration: The Tower of Babel Revisited. "7 It addressed the unfair-
ness of allowing punitive damages in court litigation, but denying
such relief in arbitration.
7 1
These four ULJ articles on arbitration have been widely reproduced
and distributed at seminars throughout the country7 6 and extensively
164. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 152, at 1-2.
165. Id. at 4.
166. Id. In addition, over 500 similar securities disputes were filed last year with the
American Arbitration Association. See Frank Zotto, New Record in Securities Cases,
ARBITRATION TIMES, Spring 1992, at 3.
167. Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 361 (1988).
168. Id. at 368.
169. Id. at 383-86.
170. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419
(1990).
171. Id. at 430-52.
172. Id. at 431-52.
173. Id. at 452-54.
174. Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages In Securities Arbitration: The Tower
of Babel Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (1991). This article will also be printed in
Clark Boardman's 1993 SECURITIES LAW REVIEW. (Reprint request and permission on
file in ULJ office).
175. Id. at 602-4.
176. Resolving Securities Disputes at 181-93 (PLI 1986); Securities Arbitration 1988 at
729-57 (N.Y. Institute of Finance); Broker Dealer Institute 1988 (PLI); First NASD An-
nual Securities Arbitration Seminar (1988); Securities Arbitration Update Seminar at
187-214 (Prentice Hall Law & Business 1989); Securities Arbitration 1990 at 909-98
(PLI/AAA); National Arbitration Seminar (NASD 1990); Arbitration Seminar (N.Y.
Co. Lawyers Assoc. 1991); A Practitioner's Guide to Broker Disputes (Fordham Contin-
uing Legal Education 1991); Arbitration Seminar 1992 at 187-214 (PLI/AAA); Arbitra-
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cited by courts, journals, texts, periodicals and the media.'7 7 Many of
the issues they raised were recently discussed in a report of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office ("GAO") which probed the fairness of such
SRO arbitration programs.17 8
tion Training Seminar (NASD 1992). See also 1993 SECURITIES LAW REVIEW, supra
note 174.
177. P. Hoblin, The Case For a Single Securities & Commodities Arbitration Forum,
COM. LAW LETTER, Aug. 1989, at 8; Kurt A. Peterson, Note, The Arbitrability of Claims
Under the Federal Securities Law, 12 J. CORP. L. 535, 565 n.257 (1987); Lee Applebaum,
Predispute Arbitration Agreements Between Brokers and Investors. The Extension of
Wilko to Section 10(b) Claims, 46 MD. L. REV. 338, 371-72 n.249 (1989); J. Kirkland
Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 24 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 389, 398 n.39 (1989); Patricia A. Shub, Note, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon: The Expanding Scope of Securities Arbitration, 12 NOVA L. REV. 1375, 1377
n.16 (1988); 535 PLI/Corp. 17; 621 PLI/Corp. 789; J.M. Girault, Note, Shearson/Amer-
ican Express, Inc. v. McMahon: What's Left For the Courts in Securities Litigation?, 62
TUL. L. REV. 284, 287 n.22 (1987); Laura Ginger, Managing Securities Disputes After
McMahon: A Call for Consolidation and Arbitration, 33 VILL. L. REV. 515, 516 n.6
(1988); Michael Durrer, Note, Enforcing Arbitration of Federal Securities Law Claims, 28
WM. & MARY L. REV. 335, 353 n.101 (1987); 12 TUL. MAR. L.J. 19; Constantine N.
Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 370 n.64
(1988); Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419,
426 n.45 (1990); Diana B. Henriques, When Naivete Meets Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 1989, § 3, at 1; P. HOBLIN, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES
AND CASES, Supp. No. 5 at 24 (Sept. 1990) S5-119; Janet E. Kerr, The Arbitration of
Securities Law Disputes After Rodriguez and the Impact on Investor Protection, 73 MARQ.
L. REV. 217, 243 n.199 (1989); Donald Arthur Winslow and Seth C. Anderson, A Model
for Determining the Excessive Trading Element in Churning Claims, 68 N.C. L. REV.
327, 339 n.33 (1990); C. Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeal: An Oxymoron No
Longer?, 79 Ky. L.J. 347, 348 n.4 (1991); Leslie William Moore, Rodriguez De Quias v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.: Is Securities Arbitration Finally Above Suspicion?, 78
Ky. L.J. 839, 848 n.82 (1990); Perry E. Wallace, Securities Arbitration After McMahon,
Rodriguez, and the New Rules: Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1199, 1201-2 n.9 (1990); 3 SECURITIES ARB. COM. No. 3, March 1990, at 5; Con-
stantine N. Katsoris, "I Won't Sit Without a Record", 3 SECURITIES ARB. COM. No. 9,
Sept. 1990, at 1; Diana B. Henriques, Wall Street: Who's to Settle Cross-Border Spats?,
N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 1990, at FIS; WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1990, at Cl; WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 31, 1990, at Cl; 23 SECURITIES & COMMODITIES REG. 17, Oct. 1990, at 178; David
A. Lipton, Generating Precedent in Security Industry Arbitration, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 26,
35 n.33 (1991); S. GOLDBERG, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION, Pub-
lic. Inv. Arb. Bar Assoc. Report 112 (1991); ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIVIL RICO 86
(1991); Arbitration, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at 24; Weidman v. Fuchsberg, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 18, 1991, at 21 (citing Weidman v. Fuchsberg, 576 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1st Dept.
1991); Richard Rescigno, Brokers v. Customers: The Business of Deciding Their Disputes
Is Booming, BARRON'S, March 23, 1990, at 18, 19; 4 SECURITIES ARB. COM. No. 6 (Oct.
1991) at 12-13; JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
A NUTSHELL 186 (1992).
178. GAO Report B-247464, May 11, 1992. See also Diana B. Henriques, Wall St.
Arbitration Programs Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at DI; Securities Arbitration
Doesn't Favor Broker, Study By GAO Says, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1992, at CI I; Arbitra-
tion on Wall Street Surges But Probe Questions Its Fairness, INVESTOR'S DAILY, May 13,
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I. Taxation
The Journal has also had several tax articles of note. The former
New York State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, Joseph H.
Murphy, contributed an article entitled State and Local Tax Incen-
tives for Urban Growth: A Concept Whose Time Never Was?. 79 The
article discussed the principal tax benefit programs available to pri-
vate businesses which invest in urban industrial and commercial de-
velopment and in housing construction. 180
Another tax article, appearing in volume 15, The New York State
Tax Windfall,'8' covered the sweeping effects of the 1986 Federal
Tax Reform Act upon states in general, and New York in particular.
This article was cited in the National Law Journal's "Worth Reading"
column' 82 and was distributed by a member of the New York State
Senate to the Governor of New York and to each member of that
legislature. Shortly thereafter, the New York State income tax rates
were substantially lowered in a manner reflecting many of the recom-
mendations of the article.8 3
More recently, volume 18 contained an article entitled Tax Incre-
ment Financing: A Potential Redevelopment Financing Mechanism for
New York Municipalities. 184 This article analyzed the New York Tax
Increment Financing Law and suggested using tax mechanisms as a
method of financing urban redevelopment. 85
J. Other Urban Issues and Events
The ULJ's articles dealing with miscellaneous urban problems are
too numerous to cite.'8 6 For example, the Journal has made valuable
contributions to the areas of municipal financing and economic devel-
opment, covering such topics as: tax incentives for urban growth;' 87
1992, at 20; Industry, AAA Arbitration Panels Treat Customers Similarly, GAO Finds,
WORLD ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION REPORT, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1992, at 135-36.
179. Joseph H. Murphy, States and Local Tax Incentives for Urban Growth: A Concept
Whose Time Never Was?, 6 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 455 (1978).
180. Id.
181. Constantine N. Katsoris, The New York State Tax Windfall, 15 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 199 (1986).
182. NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1987, at 25.
183. These rate cuts were implemented in installments, and unfortunately, the last of
such cuts has recently been suspended, the victim of the New York State's budget crisis.
See Chris McKenna, Taxpayers Foot $1.5B Bill in Budget Deal, N.Y. POST, April 3,
1992, at 2.
184. Gary P. Winter, Tax Increment Financing: A Potential Redevelopment Financing
Mechanism for New York Municipalities,'18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 655 (1991).
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 18-67, and infra Appendix attached hereto.
187. See supra note 179.
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fiscal emergency legislation during times of urban economic crisis;"'
and federal financing of urban economic development. 189 In volume
9, former Governor Hugh Carey contributed an article on incentives
for new business development,' 9" which recognized that each state's
and the nation's economic futures depend heavily upon the ability of
small businesses to withstand the process of rapid economic
change. 9' It discussed areas where reform would improve the busi-
ness climate, namely: tax incentives, finance initiatives, and regula-
tory reforms. 192
Book III of volume 19 marks an inaugural effort on the part of the
Journal to tap local resources for positive solutions to some of the
cities' concerns. These essays are varied and reflect the experiences of
the individual authors regarding the problems our cities face.' 9 3
Although the problems which plague America's cities are not neces-
sarily unique to urban areas, because of the concentration therein, it is
the cities that must take the lead in finding solutions to these societal
challenges. While no one advocated a sweeping federal "bail out" of
local government, many authors argued persuasively for federal
assistance - not so much fiscally, but rather in the form of coopera-
tive efforts to effectuate legislative change -in order to assist cities in
serving their citizens.'94 By far the most popular theme throughout
this issue is the revitalization of city government. Indeed, as the cur-
rent system may not be operating effectively, some contributors sug-
gested that possibilities for positive change may lie in considering
privatization of city services, restructuring existing agencies and
reevaluating mechanisms for increased efficiency or proficiency in par-
ticular government functions such as zoning, health care, the environ-
ment, and education. 95 Beyond revitalizing city government, lawyers
and members of the community in general are also called upon to
fulfill their responsibility through public service and coalition
188. Gayle Gutekunst-Roth, Comment, New York - A City In Crisis.- Fiscal Emer-
gency Legislation and the Constitutional Attacks, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 65 (1977).
189. S. William Green and Nancy W. Hunt, Federal Financing of Urban Economic
Development, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 815 (1980).
190. Hugh L. Carey, New Business Development, 9 FORDHAM UR8. L.J. 785 (1981).
191. Id. at 788.
192. Id. at 788-98.
193. This collection of essays has been arranged in conjunction with the Stein Center
for Ethics and Public Interest Law. The Stein Center sponsors an annual symposium on
current ethical issues, round table discussion among practitioners and scholars engaged in
public interest law, and the Stein Scholars Program.
194. See Introduction, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 563, 564 (1992).
195. Id. at 564-65.
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building.196
Finally, in an attempt to expand beyond the written word, the ULJ
recently created a new Board position, the Symposium Editor. This
Editor will have primary editorial responsibility for the annual sym-
posium issue which will serve as an ongoing forum for debate on the
problems of our urban centers. The responsibilities of the Symposium
Editor will also include the organization of an annual conference
which will address the issues raised in the symposium issue.
IV. Recognition/Citations
The ULJ has been cited extensively by numerous federal and state
courts,'97 including the United States Supreme Court.'98 Moreover, it
196. Id. at 565.
197. 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877 (1987) noted in 486 U.S. 622, 644 (1988); 6 FORD-
HAM URn. L.J. 481 (1978) noted in 456 U.S. 461, 487 n.2 (1982); 14 FORDHAM URn. L.J.
211 (1986) noted in 909 F.2d 1379, 1386 (10th Cir. 1990); 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 333
(1978) noted in 810 F.2d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 1987); 7 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 55 (1978) noted
in 781 F.2d 394, 416 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986); 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 429 (1980) noted in 775
F.2d 425, 438 (1st Cir. 1985); 13 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 113 (1985) noted in 771 F.2d 663,
667 (2d Cir. 1985); 10 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 469 (1982) noted in 756 F.2d 230, 241 (2d
Cir. 1985); 6 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 399 (1978) noted in 752 F.2d 694, 696 n.7 (D.C. Cir.
1985); 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (1980) noted in 737 F.2d 582, 590 n.10 (7th Cir. 1984);
10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (1981) noted in 721 F.2d 894, 896 n.4 (3d Cir. 1983); 7 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978) noted in 684 F.2d 111, 113 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 8 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 913 (1980) noted in 633 F.2d 486, 491 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980); 8 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 301 (1980) noted in 634 F.2d 19, 28 n.24 (2d Cir. 1980); 5 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 549
(1977) noted in 619 F.2d 623, 626 n.12 (7th Cir. 1980); 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 455 (1977)
noted in 612 F.2d 821, 827 n.5 (4th Cir. 1979); 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 179 (1974) noted in
559 F.2d 921, 923 n.9 (4th Cir. 1977); 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163 (1973) noted in 540
F.2d 1114, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877 (1987) noted in 749 F.
Supp. 1569, 1574 (N.D. Ala. 1990); 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877 (1987) noted in 709 F.
Supp. 95, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1988); 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 625, 632 (1984) noted in 692 F.
Supp. 629 (W.D. Va. 1988); 14 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 441 (1986) noted in 677 F. Supp.
1362, 1369 n.2 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); 14 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 685 (1986) noted in 118
F.R.D. 534, 544 (S.D. Fla. 1988); 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978) noted in 666 F. Supp.
535, 547 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978) noted in 649 F. Supp.
1340, 1343 (D. Del. 1986); 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 455 (1977) noted in 648 F. Supp. 1061,
1071 (N.D. Tex. 1986); 10 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 103 (1981) noted in 574 F. Supp. 325,
344 (E.D. La. 1983); 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1981) noted in 535 F. Supp. 1353, 1356
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978) noted in 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 n.3, n.4
(D. Minn. 1982); 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (1980) noted in 523 F. Supp. 819, 832 n.12
(N.D. Tex. 1981); 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978) noted in 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 n.3
(E.D. Tex. 1981); 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 549 (1977) noted in 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 n.8
(D. Conn. 1980); 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 546 (1976) noted in 427 F. Supp. 1175, 1180
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 179 (1974) noted in 424 F. Supp. 146, 147 n.2
(E.D. Va. 1976); 12 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 459 (1984) noted in 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1032; 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 693 (1979) noted in 20 B.R. 434, 436 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1982); 11 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 927 (1983) noted in 496 A.2d 997, 1012 n.13 (Del.
1985); 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1981) noted in 810 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Ark. 1991); 10
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 749 (1982) noted in 238 Cal. Rptr. 232, 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); 13
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has been cited and/or quoted over five hundred times by over one
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553 (1985) noted in 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 51 (1982) noted in 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 706 (Cal. 1984); 6
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 333 (1978) noted in 508 A.2d 728, 732 (Conn. 1986); 2 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 179 (1974) noted in 344 N.E.2d 279, 287 n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); 11 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 973 (1983) noted in 697 P.2d 847, 858 (Kan. 1985); 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507
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Journal."° Nor is this recognition accidental or coincidental, for the
depth, breadth and diversity of the Journal's articles are evident in the
attached Appendix of its contributing authors and articles."0°
V. Conclusion
From its initial publication - twenty years ago - the ULJ has
greatly expanded the scope and breadth of its coverage of issues. In
the process, the Fordham Urban Law Journal staff has involved prom-
inent practicing lawyers, judges, and academics to author its scholarly
articles of the past two decades. In addition, students have increas-
ingly become significant contributors. Indeed, the interest and enthu-
siasm of the outside legal community demonstrates the growing
respect and esteem which the Journal presently enjoys.202
The past, however, "is but the beginning, and all that is and has
been is but the twilight of the dawn."2 3 In a changing world such as
ours, the issues will surely vary as the needs and concerns also shift.
The ULJ expects to remain viable and flexible so that in future de-
cades and beyond it will continue to serve the needs of urban society
by presenting the issues that must be addressed in a frank and articu-
late manner. Congratulations to the ULJ on its Twentieth Anniver-
sary, and may the future reflect the excellence of its past!
200. See supra note 69.
201. The first part of the Appendix is sorted by the author of the article or essay, the
second according to title of the comment or note, and the third part by the title of the
published report.
202. See supra notes 197-200.
203. HERBERT GEORGE WELLS, THE DISCOVERY OF THE FUTURE, as quoted in
JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, 719 (Emily Morrison Beck ed.,
Little Brown & Co., 15th ed. 1980).
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Notes and Comments Sorted by Title
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A. Authors
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Abramovsky, Abraham A Case for Increased Confidentiality XIII 11
Abramovsky, Abraham Bias Crime: A Call For Alternative XIX 875
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Abrams, Douglas E. Clerking with Judge Hugh R. Jones XIV 521
Abrams, Douglas E. The Scope of Liability Under Section XV 877
12 of the Securities Act of 1933:
"Participation" and the Pertinent
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Allee, John S. Post-Sale Obligations of Product XII 625
Manufacturers
Anderson, Arvid Collective Bargaining and the Fiscal X 373
Crisis in New York City: Cooperation
For Survival
Balboni, Michael A.L. New York's Impeachment Law and the XV 567
Trial of Governor Sulzer: A Case for
Reform
Becker, Lynn Electronic Publishing: First XIII 801
Amendment Issues in the Twenty-First
Century
Beebe, Robert L. A Law in Search of a Policy: A IX 533
History of New York's Real Property
Tax Exemption for Nonprofit
Organizations
Bergman, Bruce J. Reletting the Abandoned or Defaulted III 451
Public Works Project in New York -
To Bid or Not to Bid?
Bond, Kenneth W. Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal IV 263
Services in the Central Cities
Bond, Kenneth W. Municipal Bankruptcy Under the 1976 V I
Amendments to Chapter IX of the
Bankruptcy Act
Bond, Kenneth W. Enhancing the Security Behind VI I
Municipal Obligations: Flushing and
U.S. Trust Lead the Way
Brennan, Timothy J. Local Government Action and XII 405
Antitrust Policy: An Economic
Analysis
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Brown, Peter Megargee The Quiet Revolution in the American XIV 855
Law Profession: Remarks Before the
Commission on Professionalism of the
American Bar Association
Caplan, David I. Restoring the Balance: The Second V 31
Amendment Revisited
Carey, Hugh L. New Business Development IX 785
Carrieri, Joseph R. Development and Expansion of New V 419
York's Permanent Neglect Statute
Carrieri, Joseph R. Proposing Standards for Child * VI 187
Custody: the Proceedings, the Role of
the Agency, and the Best Interests of
the Child
Connorton, John V. The Fiscal Crisis of New York City II 459
Voluntary Hospitals
Cooper, Alexander Pointing the Way to Housing Quality II I
Currier, Thomas S. Mandating Disclosure in Municipal VIII 67
Securities Issues: Proposed New York
Legislation
Daly, Mary C. Stotts' Denial of Hiring and Promotion XIV 17
Preferences for Nonvictims: Draining
the "Spirit" from Title VII
Davis, Joyce P. Taming the Technological Tyger - The I 19
Regulation of the Environmental
Effects of Nuclear Power Plants - A
Survey of Some Controversial Issues
Davis, Joyce P. The Discharge Permit Program Under II 179
the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972 - Improvement of Water
Quality Through the Regulation of
Discharges from Industrial Facilities
Day, Christian C. A Land Retrenchment Policy for X 71
Energy and Resource-Short Times: A
Modest Proposal
DeGiuseppe, Joseph, Jr. The Effect of the Employment-At-Will X I
Rule on Employee Rights to Job
Security and Fringe Benefits
DeGiuseppe, Joseph, Jr. The Recognition of Public Policy XI 721
Exceptions to the Employment-At-Will
Rule: A Legislative Function?
Diamond, Michael R. Criminal Responsibility of the Addict: I 395
Conviction by Force of Habit
Dowd, Michael Dispelling the Myths About the XIX 567
"Battered Woman's Defense":
Towards a New Understanding
Driscoll, Brian G. De Minimis Curat Lex - Small Claims II 479
Courts in New York City
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Dunne, John R. New York's Impeachment Law and the XV 567
Trial of Governor Sulzer: A Case for
Reform
Dwyer, Jeffry R. Protecting the Rights of Purchases of III 475
Condominium Units
Eaton, Sarah Domestic Violence Component of the XIX 391
New York Task Force Report on
Women in the Courts: An Evaluation
and Assessment of New York City
Courts
Elliott, Donald H. Proposed Fiscal Monitoring Legislation VIII 109
in New York: A Comparative Analysis
Facciolo, Jay Illegal Lofts in New York City: Have XIV 559
the Equities Been Balanced?
Federman, Allen Conservatorship: A Viable Alternative XIV 815
to Incompetency
Feerick, John D. Remarks Delivered on the Occasion of XIII 511
the Presentation of the Fordham-Stein
Award to Judge Edward Weinfeld,
Introduction
Feerick, John D. Report of the New York Task Force XV 7
on Women in the Courts, A Message
from the Dean
Feerick, John D. Reflections on Chairing the New York XVIII 157
State Commission on Government
Integrity
Feerick, John D. Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law XIX 585
Feldman, Daniel Lee Administrative Agencies and the Rites VII 229
of Due Process: Alternatives to
Excessive Litigation
Fippinger, Robert A. Securities Law Disclosure X 541
Requirements for the Political
Subdivision Threatened with
Bankruptcy
Flisek, Karen Making Government Work XIX 681
Fox, Rachel The Selling Out of Mount Laurel: XVI 535
Regional Contribution Agreements in
New Jersey's Fair Housing Act
Franzese, Paula A. Mount Laurel and the Fair Housing XIX 59
1 Act: Success or Failure?
Gale, Jane A. Tidal Title and the Boundaries of the IV 91
Bay: The Case of the Submerged
"High Water" Mark
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Gentile, Carolyn Speech Given at the Fordham XIV 103
University School of Law on the
Occasion of the Celebration of the Law
Revision Commission's 50th
Anniversary
Genty, Philip M. Protecting the Parental Rights of XVII 1
Incarcerated Mothers Whose Children
Are in Foster Care: Proposed Changes
to New York's Termination of Parental
Rights Law
Gilbert, Judith Tenements and Takings: Tenement XVIII 437
House Department of New York v.
Moeschen as a Counterpoint to Lochner
v. New York
Glasser, Robert J. The Discharge Permit Program Under II 179
the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972 - Improvement of Water
Quality Through the Regulation of
Discharges from Industrial Facilities
Goldman, Howard Environmental Review and Economic XIX 599
Development: A Modest Proposal
Gordon, Nicole A. The New York City Campaign Finance XIX 605
Program: A Reform That Is Working
Green, S. William Federal Financing of Urban Economic IX 815
Development
Gross, Marjorie E. The Long Process of Change: The XVIII 283
1990 Amendments to the New York
Code of Professional Responsibility
Gupta, Dipak K. The Investment Decision in the Central VII 253
City: A Consideration of a Property
Tax Abatement Law
Hack, John D. Mitchell-Lama Buyouts: Policy Issues XVII 117
and the Alternatives
Handy, Edna Wells The Dialectics of Change: The New XIX 631
York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation at a Crossroad
Hansell, David A. HIV and the Need for a Voluntarist XIX 649
Approach
Harper, Eugene W., Jr. Introductory Essay (Municipal Finance VIII I
Symposium)
Harrison, Stephen J. A Law in Search of a Policy: A IX 533
History of New York's Real Property
Tax Exemption for Nonprofit
Organizations
Hartman, Deborah J. Alternatives for Regulatory Control of XI 455
Acid Rain in the Northeastern United
States
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Hatch, Orrin G. Should the Capital Vote in Congress? VII 479
A Critical Analysis of the D.C.
Representation Amendment
Hay Group. The Making Government Work XIX 681
Heiman, Aba Nonsolicitation and Cease and Desist XV 595
Orders Against Real Estate Brokers in
New York
Heldt, Rebecca Regulatory Takings: A Contract XVI 195
Approach
Holt, Stephen D. The Federal Role in Social Ordering: XII 219
Lessons from Labor Protection in
Urban Mass Transit
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Bay: The Case of the Submerged
"High Water" Mark
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the New York Task Force Report on
Women in the Courts: An Evaluation
and Assessment of New York City
Courts
Jennings, Marianne M. Preemption and State Anti-Redlining XI 225
Regulation: The Need for Clarification
Jones, Hugh R. Arbitration From the Viewpoint of the XIV 523
Practicing Attorney: An Analysis of
Arbitration Cases Decided by the New
York State Court of Appeals from
January, 1973 to September, 1985
Jones, Hugh R. Introduction to Report of Special XVIII I
Committee to Consider Sanctions for
Frivolous Litigation in New York State
Courts March 20, 1990
Jones, David R. The Urban Crisis and The Federal XIX 665
Government's Retreat: Catalyzing
Public Policy Choices To Save Our
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Katsoris, Constantine N. The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare XIV 3
Katsoris, Constantine N. The New York State Tax Windfall XV 199
Katsoris, Constantine N. Securities Arbitration After McMahon XVI 361
Katsoris, Constantine N. The Level Playing Field XVII 419
Katsoris, Constantine N. Punitive Damages in Securities XVIII 573
Arbitration: The Tower of Babel
Revisited
Katsoris, Constantine N. The Fordham Urban Law Journal: XIX 915
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Kaye, Judith S. Report of the New York Task Force XV I
on Women in the Courts, Foreword
Kelbley, Charles A. Legal Ethics: Discretion and Utility in XIII 67
Model Rule 1.6
Kelbley, Charles Makers and Receivers: Judicial Heresy XVIII 51
and the Tempting of America
Keohane, John J. The Recodified New York Election VI 29
Law - A Small Step in the Right
Direction
Keohane, John J. The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act VIII 483
of 1979: An Unwarranted Attack on
State Sovereignty
Klein, Stuart B. Prisoners' Rights to Physical and VII I
Mental Health Care: A Modem
Expansion of the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
Kolodney, Lawrence K. Eviction Free Zones: The Economics XVIII 507
of Legal Bricolage in the Fight Against
Displacement
Kossow, Julian R. The New York Law of Intestate IV 233
Succession Compared with the
Uniform Probate Code: Where There's
No Will There's a Way
Kwartler, Michael Pointing the Way to Housing Quality II 1
Lederman, Nancy M. School Vouchers: Are Urban Students XIX 813
Surrendering Rights for Choice?
Lefkowitz, Louis J. Jamaica Bay: An Urban Marshland in I 1
Transition
Lerner, Carl M. Assignment and Subletting of Leased V 195
Premises: The Unreasonable
Withholding of Consent
Levine, Gerald M. The New York State Environmental XII
Quality Review Act of 1975: An
Analysis of the Parties' Responsibilities
in the Review/Permit Request Process
Linn, Robert W. Making Government Work XIX 681
Lipsker, Ross B. Regulatory Takings: A Contract XVI 195
Approach
London, Marjorie J. Collective Bargaining and the Fiscal X 373
Crisis in New York City: Cooperation
For Survival
Lordi, Katherine M. Accountability vs. Privacy: The Plight V 223
of Institutionalized Emotionally
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Macchiarola, Frank J. Lawyers in the Public Service and the XIX 695
Role of Law Schools
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Marsh, J. Langdon The Protection of Historic Resources X 411
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Urban Growth: A Concept Whose
Time Never Was?
Nadel, Mark S. A Unified Theory of the First XI 163
Amendment: Divorcing the Medium
from the Message
Nicoson, William Institutional Innovation in New Towns: IV 65
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Nolon, John R. Shattering the Myth of Municipal XVII 383
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Criminal Conviction Obtained By Law
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878 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Author Title Vol. PA.
O'Keefe, Edward P. Economically Motivated Relocations, XI 795
of Work and an Employer's Duties
Under Section 8(d) of the National
Labor Relations Act: A Three-Step
Analysis
Perlin, Michael L. Ten Years After: Evolving Mental XV 335
Health Advocacy and Judicial Trends
Phillips, Earl Revolution and Counterrevolution: III I
The Supreme Court on Creditors'
Remedies
Piro, Amy R. Condominium Renovation III 33
Post, Libby The Question of Family: Lesbians and XIX 747
Gay Men Reflecting A Redefined
Society
Powell, E. Wayne The Effects of Hensley v. Eckerhart on XIII 527
the Award of Attorney's Fees
Pratt, Charles M. Cogeneration: A Successful Response IX 483
to the Energy Crisis?
Ramsey, Sarah H. A Piece in the Puzzle of Providing XVIII 605
Adequate Housing: Court Effectiveness
in Code Enforcement
Ray, Jeanne Cullinan Tax Aspects of the Pension Reform III 161
Act of 1974
Rea, Louis M. The Investment Decision in the Central VII 253
City: A Consideration of a Property
Tax Abatement Law
Reed, Judith Of Boroughs, Boundaries and Bull- XIX 759
winkles: The Limitations of Single-
Member Districts in a Multiracial
Context
Reese, George B. Cy Pres Powers of the Federal V 435
Bankruptcy Courts - New Hope For
Financially Distressed Charities?
Reiss, Charles Pointing the Way to Housing Quality II 1
Reynolds, Osborne M., Jr. "Green River Ordinances": Where XI 427
does the Burden Belong?
Reynolds, A. David The Mechanics of Institutional Reform VIII 695
Litigation
Robertson, Archibald F. A Legal History of Expense Budgeting IV I
in New York City
Robins, Eva Unfair Dismissal: Emerging Issues in XII 437
the Use of Arbitration as a Dispute
Resolution Alternative for the Non
Union Workforce
Robinson, Nicholas A. Urban Environmental Law: Emergent
Citizen Rights for the Aesthetic, the
Spiritual, and the Spacious
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
Author Title Vol. Pg.
Rose, I. Nelson The Legalization and Control of VIII 245
Casino Gambling
Ross, Stephen Converting Nonpayment to Holdover XV 289
Summary Proceedings: The New York
Experience With Conditional
Limitations Based Upon Nonpayment
of Rent
Savas, E. S. It's Time to Privatize XIX 781
Scanlon, Joseph Lawyers in the Public Service and the XIX 695
Role of Law Schools
Schonfeld, Robert L. "Not in My Neighborhood:" Legal XIII 281
Challenges to the Establishment of
Community Residences for the
Mentally Disabled in New York State
Schonfeld, Robert L. "Five-Hundred-Year Flood Plains" and XVI I
Other Unconstitutional Challenges to
the Establishment of Community
Residences for the Mentally Retarded
Shilling, Dana Securities Funding of Long-Term Care: XIX I
A Step Toward A Private Sector
Solution
Sigal, Richard L. The Proposed Constitutional VIII 29
Amendments to the Local Finance
Article: A Critical Analysis
Simon, Judith Green The Protection of Historic Resources X 411
in New York State: An Overview of
Federal, State, and Local Laws
Smarrito, William A Modest Proposal to End Gun XIX 795
Running in America
Spirer, Julian H. The Ocean Dumping Deadline: Easing XI I
the Mandate Millstone
Sussna, Stephen Residential Densities: A Patchwork I 127
Placebo
Sweet, David J. Mitchell-Lama Buyouts: Policy Issues XVII 117
and Alternatives
Telias, Bradley S. Horse Racing and the Law: A IX 253
Legislative Proposal to Harness Race-
Fixing
Thain, Gerald J. Advertising Regulation: The I 349
Contemporary FTC Approach
Thel, Steve Closing a Loophole: Insider Trading in XVI 573
Standardized Options
Todres, Jacob L. Assignment and Subletting of Leased V 195
Premises: The Unreasonable
Withholding of Consent
880 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Author Title Vol. Pg.
Travis, Jeremy A Modest Proposal to End Gun XIX 795
Running in America
Tucker, Gordon The Confidentiality Rule: A XIII 99
Philosophical Perspective with
Reference to Jewish Law and Ethics
Tuohey, Seamus M. Economically Motivated Relocations of XI 795
Work and an Employer's Duties Under
Section 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act: A Three-Step Analysis
Vaccari, Michael A. The Recodified Nlew York Election VI 29
Law: A Small Step in the Right
Direction
Vaccari, Michael A. Governmental Misconduct and the IX 279
Right of Liberty
Vance, Cyrus Foreword: Legal Ethics and XVIII 153
Government Integrity
Vecchio, Lucian A. A Legal History of Expense Budgeting IV I
in New York City
Wachtler, Sol Report of the New York Task Force XV 3
on Women in the Courts, The Lady in
the Harbor and the Lady in Albany-
Two Symbols of Freedom
Wagner, Hyla Pottharst The New York City Campaign Finance XIX 605
Program: A Reform that is Working
Weinberg, Philip Cargo of Fire: A Call for Stricter IV 495
Regulation of Liquefied Natural Gas
Shipment and Storage
Weinfeld, Edward Remarks Delivered on the Occasion of XIII 515
the Presentation of the Fordham-Stein
Award to Judge Edward Weinfeld,
Address
Weitzman, Phillip Neighborhood Preservation in New III 425
York City
Willis, Mark A. Tax Certiorari Proceedings and the IX 591
Present Real Property Tax System in
New York City
Winter, Gary P. Tax Increment Financing: A Potential XVIII 655
Redevelopment Financing Mechanism
for New York Municipalities
Wolf, Michael Allan HUD and Housing in the 1990s: XVIII 545
Crises in Affordability and
Accountability
Woods, John P. For Every Weapon, A Counterweapon: XIV 283
The Revival of Rule 68
Woods, John P. New York's Juvenile Offender Law: IX I
An Overview and Analysis
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
Author Title Vol. Pg.
Ziegler, Carol L. School Vouchers: Are Urban Students XIX 813
Surrendering Rights for Choice?
Zolna, Fredrick A Piece in the Puzzle of Providing XVIII 605
Adequate Housing: Court Effectiveness
in Code Enforcement
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
B. Notes & Comments
Title Vol. Pg.
Accommodation of Reputational Interests and Free Press: A Call XI 401
for a Strict Interpretation of Gertz
Actuarial Liability: ERISA, Malpractice and the Equity Funding VI 251
Fraud
After Albemarle: Class-Wide Recovery of Back Pay Under Title IV 369
VII
Alternative Approaches to Municipal Antitrust Liability XI 51
An Analysis of the Fair Credit Reporting Act I 48
Application of Internal Revenue Code Section 103(c) to Variable XV 407
Rate Demand Bonds: Purging the Profiteering Potential
Application of the New York Driving While Intoxicated Statute VIII 939
Arbitration - A Viable Alternative? III 53
Architectural Malpractice: Toward an Equitable Rule for XVI 509
Determining When the Statute of Limitations Begins to Run
Arson Fraud: Criminal Prosecution and Insurance Law VII 541
Art Investment Contract: Application of Securities Law to Art IX 385
Purchases, The
Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle VII 55
Automatic Teller Machine Robberies: Theories of Liability XIV 171
Availability of a New York Class Action for Railroad Commuters: XII 841
David v. Goliath
Bank Certificates of Deposit: Notes not in Tune with Securities X 469
Regulation
Bank Mergers: Agency Review and the Changing Line of X1 307
Commerce
Beyond the Taking Issue: Emerging Procedural Due Process Issues X 441
in Local Landmark Preservation Programs
Bilingual Education-A Problem of "Substantial" Numbers? V 561
Blaming the Victim: The Admissibility of Sexual History in XVI 263
Homicides
Bringing a Title VII Action: Which Test Regarding Standing to XVIII 95
Sue is the Most Applicable?
Broker-Dealer Responsibility in Regulation D Transactions XVII 27
Can Punitive Damages Withstand a Due Process Challenge After XVIII 121
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw and Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal?
Challenge to Employment Testing Under Title VII: Creating XII 749
"Built in Headwinds" for the Civil Service Employer 
__I
Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent Federal and IV 147
State Court Approaches
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS 883
Title Vol. Pg.
Challenging New York Grand Jury Composition: The Barrier of VI 317
the "Systematic and Intentional Exclusion" Requirement
Child Abuse and Maltreatment: The Development of New York's V 533
Child Protection Laws
Civil Claims of Adults Molested as Children: Maturation of Harm XV 709
and the Statute of Limitations Hurdle
Civil RICO: A Call for a Uniform Statute of Limitations XIII 205
Clearing the Air on Radon Testing: The Duty of Real Estate XV 767
Brokers to Protect Prospective Homebuyers
Closure Orders: Safeguard of Fair Trial or Prior Restraint? VII 163
Common Law for the Statutory Era: The Right of Publicity and XV 951
New York's Right of Privacy Statute, A
Comparison of Impasse Procedures: The New York City Collective IX 1039
Bargaining Law and the New York State Taylor Law
Compatibility of a Federal Magistrate's Final Judgment with XV 211
Nonmutual Issue Preclusion, The
Computer Abuse: The Emerging Crime and the Need for XII 73
Legislation
Con Edison: The Crisis of the Investor Owned Utility III 545
Confrontation in the Electoral Forum Between Compelled VI 505
Disclosure and Freedom of Association: Recent Developments
Concerning Vital Rights
"Consecutive" Chapter 11 Filings: Use or Abuse? XIX Ill
Constitutional Challenges to New York's Youthful Offender Statute V 475
Constitutional Debt Limit and New York City, The VIII 185
Constitutional Right of Informational Privacy: Does It Protect XIV 927
Children Suffering from AIDS?, The
Constitutionality of Local Anti-Pollution Ordinances, The I 208
Constitutionality of Public School Financing Laws: Judicial and VIII 673
Legislative Interaction, The
Constitutionality of State and Local Governments' Response to XIII 763
Apartheid: Divestment Legislation, The
Constitutionality of Taking a Sports Franchise by Eminent Domain XIII 553
and the Need for Federal Legislation to Restrict Franchise
Relocation, The
Consumerism's Forgotten Man 1 226
Court-Awarded "Reasonable" Fees: Forcing a Segregated Public VII 399
Interest Bar?
Court-Ordered Hiring Programs Under Title VII: The Effects on X 147
Absentee Minorities
Crime Victims' Compensation - Title I of the Proposed Victims of I 421
Crime Act of 1973: An Analysis
Criminal Discovery in New York: The Effect of the New Article VIII 731
240
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Title Vol. P
Current Tax Trends Affecting Historic Rehabilitation: Catalyst or XIII 231
Obstacle to the Preservation of Our Nation's History?
De Novo Review Under the Food Stamp Act: Interpreting VI 389
"Administrative Action"
Dealer Location Clauses and the Per Se Rule: From Schwinn to V 103
GTE Sylvania
Death After Life: The Future of New York's Mandatory Death XIII 597
Penalty for Murders Committed by Life-Term Prisoners
Debt-Equity Financing Guidelines: Capital Problems for Closely IX 1019
Held Businesses
Deceptive Practices in the Marketplace: Consumer Protection by III 491
New York Government Agencies
Deregulation of Commercial Television, The XlII 373
Derivative Suits: Director Demand Under Rule 23.1 and Section IV 565
36(b) of the Investment Company Act
Desegregation: The Times They Are A-Changin' III 245
Designing and Executing a Fair Revlon Auction XVII 163
Developing a Consumer Right to Invoke the Boycott Exception to VI 353
the Insurance Company Exemption from Federal Antitrust Laws
Disbursement of Insurance Money Covering an Insured's Legal XVI 467
Expenses as Incurred
Discretionarily Enhanced Sentences Based upon Suspected Perjury VII 441
at Trial
Disenfranchisement of the College Student Vote: When a Resident XI 489
is Not a Resident
Dispute Resolution in Commodities Futures XII 175
DNA Fingerprinting and the Need for a National Data Base XVII 323
Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel in Parole Revocation, The IV 609
Economic Tipping: An Approach to a Balanced Neighborhood IV 167
Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue? VII 117
Effect of Collective Bargaining on the Baseball Antitrust XII 807
Exemption, The
Effects of External Pressures on Sentencing Judges, The XI 263
Effect of Legislation on the Reverse Annuity Mortgage as a Means XIII 869
of Home Equity Conversion
Effect of Recent Medicaid Decisions on a Constitutional Right: VI 687
Abortions Only for the Rich?, The
Effect of the New Age of Majority on Preexisting Child Support V 365
Settlements, The
Effect of the New SEC Rules on the Constitutionality of State VIII 913
Takeover Statutes, The
Effect of Title I of the 1949 Federal Housing Act on New York XIlI 723
City Cooperative and Condominium Conversion Plans, The
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
Title Vol. Pg.
Effective Assistance of Counsel: Chance or Guarantee?, The XI 85
Electronic Fund Transfers, Branch Banks, and Potential Abuse of VI 571
Privacy
Eligibility of the Unborn Child Under AFDC, The III 109
Elimination of Arbitrary Automobile Stops: Theory and Practice IV 327
Emergency Tenant Protection in New York: Ten Years of Rent VII 305
Stabilization
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and Union XII 151
Influence in Pension Fund Investment Decisions, The
Employers' Garnishment Policies - Do They Engender Racial V 321
Discrimination in Violation of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of
1866?
Ending Discrimination Against the Handicapped or Creating New VI 399
Problems? The HEW Rules and Regulations Implementing Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Enforcing Transportation Control Plans: The Environmental VI 553
Protection Agency Versus The States
Environmental Consideration in Urban Highway Development: VII 145
Westway - A Case in Point
Environmental Impact Statements: Instruments for Environmental XI 527
Protection or Endless Litigation?
Environmental Law: A Re-evaluation of Federal Pre-emption and VII 649
the Commerce Clause
ERISA and the Preemption of State Law VI 599
Essential Governmental Function After National League of Cities: IX 149
Impact of an Essentiality Test on Commuter Rail Transportation,
The
Ethical Dilemma of Campaigning for Judicial Office: A Proposed XIV 353
Solution, The
Evaluation of New York Loft Conversion Law, An X 511
Examining Cooperative Conversion: An Analysis of Recent New XI 1089
York Legislation
Executing Youthful Offenders: The Unanswered Question in XIII 471
Eddings v. Oklahoma
Expanding Right to Counsel in New York, The X 351
Fair Plan: History, Holtzman and the Arson-For-Profit Hazard VII 617
Fairness Doctrine: Time for the Graveyard?, The II 563
FCC Broadcast Standards for Ascertaining Community Needs V 55
Federal Collection of State Individual Income Taxes, The III 579
Federal Common Law Remedies for the Abatement of Water V 549
Pollution
Federal False Claims Act: A Potential Deterrent to Medicaid V 493
Fraud and Abuse, The
386 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Title Vol. Pg.
Federal Legislative Proposals for the Protection of Privacy VIII 773
Federal Magistrates and the Implications of Consensual References IV 129
Felony Murder and Child Abuse: A Proposal for the New York XVIII 383
Legislature
Fiduciary Standards as Applied Under ERISA VII 377
Fire Insurance Recovery Rights of the Foreclosing Mortgagee: Is VIII 857
His Lien Lost in the Ashes?
First Amendment Challenges to Landmark Preservation Statutes XI 115
Forfeiture Proceedings - In Need of Due Process III 347
Free Exercise and the Attorney/Priest: The Clerical Collar in the IX 51
Courtroom
From Plows to Pliers - Urban Homesteading in America I1 273
GNMA Securities Market: An Analysis of Proposals for a IX 457
Regulatory Scheme, The
Going Public with Private Discriminating Clubs III 289
Good Faith Reliance upon Federal Reserve Board Staff Opinion V 303
Letters: The Circuits Converge
Handicapped and Mass Transportation: The Effectiveness of IX 895
Section 504 in Implementing Equal Access, The
Has Connecticut Thrown Out the Baby with the Bath Water? XIX 535
Termination of Parental Rights and In Re Valerie D.
Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976: A New V 279
Prescription?, The
Hindering the Progress of Science: The Use of the Patent System XVI 441
to Regulate Research on Genetically Altered Animals
Home Audio Recording Act: An Inappropriate Response to the XV 435
Home Taping Question, The
Homelessness in a Modem Urban Setting X 749
How Much Does That $8.00 Yankee Ticket Really Cost? An XVIII 695
Analysis of Local Governments' Expenditure of Public Funds to
Maintain, Improve or Acquire an Athletic Stadium for the Use of
Professional Sports Teams
Hunters and the Hunted: Rights and Liabilities of Bailbondsmen, VI 333
The
Imposition of New York City's Water and Sewer Rents on Non- IX 697
Profit Institutions, The
Inadequate Police Protection of Battered Wives: Can a City and XIV 417
Its Police Be Held Liable Under the Equal Protection Clause?, The
Incompetent Individual's Right to Die, An XVII 303
Industrial Development Bond Financing After the Deficit XIII 443
Reduction Act of 1984: The Final Chapter?
Infirmities of Affirmative Action: The New York City Plan, The II 305
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
Title Vol. Pg.
Informericals, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade XIX 853
Commission
In Re Kaiser Steel Corporation: Does Section 546(2) of the XIX 37
Bankruptcy Code Apply to a Fraudulent Conveyance Made in the
Form of an LBO?
Insider Loans: How Restricted is the Banker? IX 431
Insiders, Options and the Fiduciary Principle: A Rule lOb-5 XVI 295
Loophole
Institutional Posture: A Measurement for Good Faith in an IRS IX 215
Summons Enforcement Proceeding
Insulating Incumbent Judges from the Vicissitudes of the Political XV 743
Arena: Retention Elections as a Viable Alternative
Involuntary Retirement Under the Age Discrimination in V 509
Employment Act: The Bona Fide Employee Benefit Plan Exception
IRS's Application of Arbitrage Provisions: Overregulation of X 659
Municipal Finance, The
Judicial Selection in New York: A Need for Change III 605
Juvenile Detention Hearings: A Proposed Model Provision to XII 285
Limit Discretion During the Preadiudicatory Stage
Juvenile Offender - Where Can We Send Him?, The II 245
Juvenile Privacy: A Minor's Right of Access to Contraceptives VI 371
Kemp-Garcia Enterprise Zone Bill: A New, Less Costly Approach IX 659
to Urban Redevelopment, The
Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the Tax-Exempt Owner III 123
Law School's Pro Bono Role: A Duty to Require Student Public XVII 359
Service
Leasehold Unconscionability: Caveat Lessor VII 337
Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaintiff: Is There A Limit? VI 217
Legality of Staten Island's Attempt to Secede from New York City, XIX 147
The
Legality of the Rozelle Rule and Related Practices in the National IV 581
Football League, The
Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, and Going Private XIV 685
Corporate Control Transactions: Insider Trading or Efficient
Market Economics?
Limited Partnerships in Diversity: The Effects of Rule 17(b) on VI 271
Federal Jurisdiction
Limits of State Intervention in a Municipal Fiscal Crisis, The IV 545
Local Finance: A Brief Constitutional History VIII 135
Loss of Use Damages for Injuries to Interests in Commercial XV 235
Chattels
Maintenance and Repairs of Cooperative Apartments: Rights and VIII 345
Remedies of Tenant-Shareholders
888 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Title Vol. Pg.
Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse: A Cheap But Ineffective XIV 723
Solution to the Problem
Manifest Intent and Copyrightability: The Destiny of Joint XVII 257
Authorship
Medical Malpractice Damage Awards: The Need for a Dual XI 973
Approach
Minneapolis Anti-Pornography Ordinance: A Valid Assertion of XIII 909
Civil Rights?, The
Miner's Canary: Tribal Control of American Indian Education and XIX 1019
the First Amendment, The
Misappropriation Theory: Rule lOb-5 Insider Liability for XV 1049
Nonfiduciary Breach, The
Model for Small Business Financing: The Canada Development IX 1001
Corporation, A
Modifying the New York State Public School Financing Formula XI 949
after Levittown
MPPAA Withdrawal Liability Assessment: Letting the Fox Guard XIV 211
the Henhouse
Municipal Hospital Closings Under Title VI: A Requirement of IX 943
Reasonable Justifications
Municipal Liability for Requiring Unfit Police Officers to Carry XI 1001
Guns
Municipal Liability for Torts Committed by Volunteer Anticrime X 595
Groups
Municipal Solid Waste Regulation: An Ineffective Solution to a X 215
National Problem
Municipal Tort Liability for Criminal Attacks Against Passengers XII 325
on Mass Transportation
National League of Cities and the Parker Doctrine: The Status of VIII 301
State Sovereignty under the Commerce Clause
National School Lunch Act: An Unfulfilled Mandate, The IV 531
Necessity for Shelter: States Must Prohibit Discrimination Against XV 481
Children in Housing
Negotiability of Parity Agreements in Public Sector Collective XI 139
Bargaining, The
New Equal Protection-Substantive Due Process Resurrected III 311
Under a New Name?, The
New Federal Statute of Limitations for Section 301/Fair XII 591
Representation Claims: Should It Have Retroactive Application?,
A
New Judical Approaches to Maintaining Housing Quality in the IV 403
Cities
New York City Housing Part: New Remedy for an Old Dilemma, Ill 267
The
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
Title Vol. Pg.
New York City Housing Receivership and Community III 637
Management Programs, The
New York City Noise Control Code: Not With A Bang, But A I 446
Whisper, The
New York City School Decentralization: The Respective Powers of V 239
the City Board of Education and the Community School Boards
New York City Zoning Resolution Section 12-10: A Third Phase XI 1039
in the Evolution of Airspace Law
New York City's J-51 Program: Controversy and Revision XII 103
New York City's Locally Based Enterprise Set-Aside: Legitimate XII 703
Exercise of Mayoral Power or Unconstitutional Quota in Disguise?
New York City's Pothole Law: In Need of Repair X 323
New York Debates Commercial Rent Control: Designer Ice Cream XV 657
Stores Versus the Corner Grocer
New York General Municipal Law Section 50-e(5): Ameliorating XII 563
the Harshness of New York's Notice of Claim Requirements
New York Heart Bills: Presumptions Governing Police and X 247
Firefighters' Cardiac Disabilities
New York State's Designating Petition Process XIV 1011
New York's Medical Malpractice Insurance Crises - A New XIV 773
Direction for Reform
New York's Plain English Law VIII 451
New York's System of Indeterminate Sentencing and Parole: XIII 395
Should It Be Abolished?
New York's Tax and Debt Limits and Classified Property Tax IX 627
Assessments: Time for a Constitutional Amendment?
New York - A City In Crisis: Fiscal Emergency Legislation and VI 65
the Constitutional Attacks
1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations V 351
Act: Jurisdictional Standards and Appropriate Bargaining Units,
The
Nonemergency Municipal Curfew Ordinances and the Liberty XII 513
Interests of Minors
Nonproliferation Mandate and the Appropriate Legal Standard in XI 663
Health Care Bargaining Unit Determinations, The
Notice Requirements: Federal Preemption of State and Local Plant XIII 333
Closing Statutes
Nuclear Accidents: Judicial Review of the NRC's Duty to Issue a IX 353
Health Warning
NYRPL § 226-b: No Right to Sublease Without Consent IX 753
Omission and Nondisclosure Under SEC Rule lOb-5: A Distinction VII 423
In Search of a Difference
OSHA Inspections and the Fourth Amendment: Balancing Private VI 101
Rights and Public Need
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Title Vol. Pg.
Out of the Home onto the Street: Foster Children Discharged into XIV 971
Independent Living
Outsider Looks at Insider Trading: Chiarella, Dirks and the Duty XII 777
to Disclose Material Nonpublic Information, An
Overview of Promissory Notes Under the Federal Securities Laws, VI 529
An
Over-stuffing the Envelope: The Problems With Creative Transfer XVI 43
of Development Rights
Partaker or Prey? Futures Commission Merchants Under Civil XVI 69
RICO and the Commodity Exchange Act
Peculiar Collective Bargaining Status of Hospital Housestaff, The VI 295
Pendent Party Jurisdiction and Section 1983: When Has Congress XIV 873
"By Implication Negated" Jurisdiction?
Penn Central v. City of New York: A Landmark Landmark Case VI 667
Potential Liability for Misrepresentations in Residential Real Estate XVI 127
Transactions: Let the Broker Beware
Privacy Rights in Medical Records XIII 165
Private Clubs and Employment Discrimination: Does Federal Law XVI 615
Apply?
Probable Cause Based on Inaccurate Computer Information: X 497
Taking Judicial Notice of NCIC Operating Policies and Procedures
Proposal for Determinate Sentencing in New York: The Effect on VIII 629
an Offender's Due Process Rights
Proposal to Use a "Knowing and Voluntary" Standard to Evaluate XVI 703
the "Voluntariness" of Early Retirement Incentives, A
Proposed Federal Securities Code: Time to Recognize that IX 719
Financial Information Becomes Stale, The
Prosecutorial Ethics: The Case for the Per Se Rule XVIII 407
Protecting Battered Women: A Proposal for Comprehensive XV 999
Domestic Violence Legislation in New York
Proving Qualification in a University Setting: McDonnell Douglas XII 459
and the Tenure Cases
Public School Drug Searches: Toward Redefining Fourth XIV 629
Amendment "Reasonableness" to Include Invidualized Suspicion
Recovery Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability X 285
Rediscovering the Individual in Federal Election Law XI 1057
Redlining, Disinvestment and the Role of Mutual Savings Banks: IX 89
A Survey of Solutions
Redlining: Remedies For Victims of Urban Disinvestment V 83
Referral Fee and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: XV 801
Should States Adopt Model Rule 1.5(e)?, The
Regulation of Advertising and Promotional Practices of Public VIII 373
Utilities under the First Amendment
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
Title Vol. pg.
Regulation of Rental Apartment Conversions, The VIII 507
Regulatory Approaches to Television Network Control of the VIII 563
Program Procurement Process: An Historical Perspective
Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment - III 327
A Perspective
Rent Stabilization: New C.A.B. Rent Overcharge Procedures XI 693
Representational Rights of Security Guards Under the National XII 657
Labor Relations Act: The Need for a Balancing of Interests
Repurchase Agreement Transactions in Securities Investor XV 359
Protection Act Proceedings
Res Gestae, The Present Sense Impression Exception and Extrinsic XVII 89
Corroboration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and its State
Counterparts
Restrictions on Access to the Federal Courts in Civil Rights Cases: VI 481
The Role of Abstention and Res Judicata
Retribution: New York's Answer to the Multiple Felony Offender XII 897
Right of the Federal Government to Regulate State Employment V 521
Practices, The
Right of Undocumented Aliens Against Their Employers, The X 683
Right to Democratic Participation in Labor Unions and the Use of XVII 189
the Hobbs Act to Combat Organized Crime, The
Right to Disclosure of NLRB Documents Under the Freedom of V 119
Information Act, The
Right to Financial Privacy Act: New Protection for Financial VIII 597
Records, The
Rights of Probationary Federal Employee Whistleblowers Since the XI 567
Enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, The
Rights of Unmarried Cohabiting Couples to Housing in New York, XI 381
The
Role of the Federal Judiciary in the Prevention of Communicable XII 873
Diseases in State Prisons, The
Royalty Financing as a Tool for Economic Development IX 979
Rule 10b-5: Birth of the Concept of Market Insider and its VIII 467
Application in a Criminal Case- United States v. Chiarella
Sale-Leaseback Transactions by Tax-Exempt Entities and the Need XII 349
for Congressional Guidelines
Section 106 of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act XIII 681
of 1984 and the Need for Overriding State Legislation
Section 1983 Actions by Family Members Based on Deprivation of XIV 441
the Constitutional Right to "Family Association" Resulting From
Wrongful Death: Who Has Standing?
Section 1983: Absolute Immunity for Pretrial Police Testimony XVI 647
Secured Creditors in Wage Earner Proceedings: Interpreting The VI 119
Validity of Bankruptcy Rule 13-307(d)
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Title Vol. Pg.
Security Deposits in New York: How Safe is Your Money? III 79
Selecting a Remedy for Private Racial Discrimination: Statutes in IV 303
Search of Scope
Selective Use of the Executive Immunity Power: A Denial of Due VIII 879
Process?
Shipowner Liability Under Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's IX 323
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: A Proposed Standard of
Care
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 and Venture IX 865
Capital Financing, The
Small Tax Case Procedure: How It Works - Does It Work?, The IV 385
Solar Rights and Restrictive Covenant: A Microeconomic Analysis VII 283
Speedy Trials: Recent Developments Concerning a Vital Right IV 351
Standard of Employer Liability For Conduct of Supervisory VI 627
Personnel Under The Occupational Safety and Health Act, The
Standard of Proof in At-Large Vote Dilution Discrimination Cases X 103
after City of Mobile v. Bolden
Standing Under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of VIII 405
1934: May a Tender Offeror Sue for Injunctive Relief?
State Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements for IV 597
Federally Aided Highway Programs
State Prohibitions on Employment Opportunities for Resident X 699
Aliens: Legislative Recommendations
State Taxation of Federal Instrumentalities: Application to Federal IX 1089
Loan & Equity Programs
State Taxation of Unitary Businesses VIII 819
Stop and Frisk in New York: Fleeing Suspects and Anonymous XII 383
Tips
Stough v. Crenshaw County Board of Education: Parental Rights XIII 947
and Segregation Academies
Successor Employer's Obligation to Bargain: Current Problems in VIII 429
the Presumption of a Union's Majority Status, The
Survey of Constitutional Challenges to Municipal Regulation of XI 845
Religious Solicitation and a Suggested Legislative Compromise, A
Systematic Exclusion of Cognizable Groups by Use of Peremptory XI 927
Challenges
Targeting Tax Dollars More Efficiently: Proposed Modifications to XV 1077
the 421-a Real Property Tax Exemption
Tax Exempt Financing of Health Care Facilities as a Component of XI 603
the Market Approach to Health Care Cost Containment
Tax Shelter as a Security: The Use of Tax Returns in a lOb-5 XIV 259
Action
Teacher Collective Bargaining - Who Runs the Schools? II 505
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
Title Vol. Pig.
Tenant Remedies for a Denial of Essential Services and for I 66
Harassment - The New York Approach
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics - Federal Regulation of X 633
Management's Prerogative
Terminating Social Security Disability Benefits: Another Burden XII 195
for the Disabled?
Third Party Suits Under Section 3612 of the Fair Housing Act of V 337
1968
Third Party Taxpayer Challenges Under the New York Real XI 341
Property Tax Law
Timesharing and Realty Interests Under the Martin Act: XVII 505
Consumer or Investor Protection?
To Die or Not to Die: The New York Legislature Ponders a XIII 639
Natural Death Act
Promoting Fairness: A Proposal for a More Reasonable Standard XIX 979
of Constructive Discharge in Title VII Denial of Promotion Cases
Toward a Time-of-Discovery Rule for the Statute of Limitations in XIII 113
Latent Injury Cases in New York State
Towards a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Matrimonial IV 515
Litigation
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984: A Sensible Legislative XIV 115
Response to the Ills of Commercial Counterfeiting
Transportation Controls: Time to Clear the Air X 725
Unanimous Acquittal Instruction: A Rational Approach to XVI 331
Instructing Jurors on Lesser Included Offenses, The
Uniform Commercial Code as Federal Law: United States v. VIII 659
Kimball Foods, Inc., The
Unjust Dismissal of Employees at Will: Are Disclaimers an XV 533
Effective Solution?
Unleashing Cable T.V., Leashing the FCC: Constitutional VI 647
Limitations on Government Regulation of Pay Television
Unsafe at Any Rate: The New York Motor Vehicle Retail II 57
Installment Sales Act
Using Consitutional Zoning to Neutralize Adult Entertainment - V 455
Detroit to New York
Warrantless Arrests in Homes: Another Crisis for the Fourth VII 93
Amendment
Warrantless Container Searches Under the Automobile and Search IX 185
Incident Exceptions
"Warranty of Security" in New York: A Landlord's Duty to XVI 487
Provide Security Precautions in Residential Buildings Under the
Implied Warranty of Habitability
Weisner Revisited: A Reappraisal of a Co-op's Power to XIV 477
Arbitrarily Prohibit the Transfer of its Shares
894 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Title Vol. Pg.
What Do You Mean My Partnership Bas Been Petitioned Into XIX 833
Bankruptcy?
Whose Child is it Anyway? Awarding Joint Custody Over the XV 625
Objection of One Parent
Wildcat Strikes: The Affirmative Duty of the Parent Union to IX 1059
Intervene
Will the "Sunset" on the American Dream? Two Years of XI 881
Experience Under the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act
"Wrong But Reasonable": The Fourth Amendment Particularity XVI 577
Requirement After United States v. Leon
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions Arising From Negligent XVII 27
Genetic Counseling: The Need for Legislation Supporting
Reproductive Choice
Yonkers Case: Separation of Powers as a Yardstick for XVII 217
Determining Official Immunity, The
Zoning New York City to Provide Low and Moderate Income XII 491
Housing - Can Commercial Developers Be Made to Help?
2003] TWENTY YEARS OF PROGRESS
C. Reports
Title Vol. Pg.
Pre-Sentence Reports: Utility or Futility II 27
Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, XV I
Foreword
Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, The XV 3
Lady in the Harbor and the Lady in Albany- Two Symbols of
Freedom
Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, A XV 7
Message from the Dean
Report of Special Committee to Consider Sanctions for Frivolous XVIII 3
Litigation in New York State Courts
Restoring the Public Trust: A Blueprint for Government Integrity XVIII 173
Integrity and Ethical Standards in New York State Government: XVIII 251
Final Report to the Governor
Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities XIX 171
Five Year Report of the New York Judicial Committee on Women XIX 313
in the Courts
l !
THEORIZING COMMUNITY JUSTICE
THROUGH COMMUNITY COURTSt
Jeffrey Fagan*
and Victoria Malkin**
INTRODUCTION
Community justice practitioners argue that the justice system has
long ignored its biggest clients-citizens and neighborhoods that
suffer the everyday consequences of high crime levels.' One re-
sponse from legal elites has been a package of court innovations
and new practices known as "community justice," part of a broader
appeal to "community" and "partnership" common now in modern
discourse on crime control.2 This concept incorporates several con-
temporary visions and expressions of justice within the popular and
legal literatures: problem-solving courts (such as drug courts,
mental health courts, domestic violence courts, gun courts, and, of
course, juvenile courts); the inclusion of victims and communities
in the sanction process; community policing; partnerships between
citizens and legal institutions; and alternative models of dispute
resolution.'
t This research was supported by from the National Institute of Justice. All
opinions and errors are those of the Authors. We are very grateful to the Center for
Court Innovation for its generosity and cooperation in all aspects of the research, and
to the residents of Red Hook for their honesty and accessibility over the two years of
our research. Thanks to Michael Dorf and Greg Berman for helpful comments on
earlier drafts, and to the editors for their contributions to the Article.
* Professor of Law and Public Health, Columbia University.
** Staff Associate, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, and
Information Officer, Wennergren Foundation.
1. For a general overview, see TODD CLEAR & DAVID KARP, THE COMMUNITY
JUSTICE IDEAL: PREVENTING CRIME AND ACHIEVING JUSTICE (1999). For a discus-
sion on bringing the courts back into the community, see David B. Rottman, Commu-
nity Courts: Prospects and Limits, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1996, at 46; see also John
Feinblatt & Greg Berman, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Responding to the Community: Prin-
ciples for Planning and Creating a Community Court, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE
BULL., Nov. 1997, at 1-9, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/bja/185986.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
2. See ADAM CRAWFORD, THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF CRIME: APPEALS TO
COMMUNITY AND PARTNERSHIPS 4-7 (1997).
3. See COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 327, 330 (David Karp ed.,
1998); see alsoERic LEE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY JUSTICE SERIES No. 2,
COMMUNITY COURTS: AN EVOLVING MODEL 3-4 (2000), available at http://
www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/communitycourts-evolving-model.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2002).
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For court reformers, the conceptual ground and animating
thought for problem-solving courts is that the system is broken,
overloaded, and ineffective.' Community justice projects go be-
yond the problem-solving court model to create legal institutions
that bring citizens closer to legal processes.5 What separates com-
munity justice from the recent creation of specialized parts is the
prospect of mutual accountability between courts and community,
and the importance of local space in defining the types of problems
that present themselves for socio-legal solution.6
Unlike treatment courts or problem-solving courts, community
courts seek to fix problems in the courts by developing legal fo-
rums that are unique in three ways. First, these institutions bring
citizens and defendants closer in a jurisprudential process that is
both therapeutic and accountable. Legal responses to families and
individuals with multiple legal problems are coordinated, and ide-
ally, unified. Some community courts are multi-jurisdictional
courts that link typically separate court parts into one location and
under one administrative umbrella. Second, community justice
centers and community courts link service providers to the court
and, in turn, to families in a way that is responsive to their per-
ceived needs. It brings the court closer-both physically and ad-
ministratively-to the social and behavioral origins of the problems
that it seeks to address, and it seeks to bring services to bear on
these problems under the administrative aegis of the court. Third,
these justice centers bring the courts and their service adjuncts into
a community with limited access to both public and private ser-
vices. The physical presence of the court in a community signals
that the relationships of citizens and communities to courts differ
in meaning, tone, and content. These courts are relatively new, and
4. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DISPENSING
JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMU-
NITY COURTI.-2 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
disp.just.loc.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
5. Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community
Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 63, 83-92 (2002).
6. "Community courts are neighborhood-based courts that use the power of the
justice system to solve local problems. These courts seek to play an active role in the
life of their neighborhoods, galvanizing local resources, and creating new partnerships
with community groups, government agencies, and social service providers." John
Feinblatt et al., Neighborhood Justice at the Midtown Community Court, in CRIME
AND PLACE: PLENARY PAPERS OF THE 1997 CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-
SEARCH AND EVALUATION 81 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice ed., 1998).
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until now, have received neither research attention, nor jurispru-
dential analysis7
This Article reports on research on a community court that is
part of the Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New
York. Red Hook is a neighborhood in Brooklyn with a long and
rich history of both fortune and misfortune. 9 The neighborhood
today is an area in transition, challenged by social deficits such as
crime and drugs.' 0 Red Hook also is a neighborhood with weak
services and economic institutions, which are further strained by
competing claims for primacy and attention.1' Furthermore, Red
Hook's physical location isolates it socially from other parts of
Brooklyn and New York City.' 2
One of the recurring crises in Red Hook, and many socially and
economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, is the low rating by
citizens of the legitimacy of law and legal institutions. 3 Problems
in both distributive and procedural justice, plus the failure of courts
and other government programs to provide public safety and mate-
rial well-being, have created a breach between citizens and govern-
ment that is reflected in citizens' reactions to legal institutions. In
Red Hook, the police and the courts historically have not been citi-
zens' allies in their struggle for safety."
7. Thompson, supra note 5, at 92-99. The most comprehensive community court
research examined the Midtown Community Court. See SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra
note 4, at 1-2.
8. The term "community court" is used to refer to the legal processing of cases
that occurs within the RHCJC, and to the "community justice center" when referring
to its community development activities. See, e.g., Alex Calabrese, "Team Red Hook"
Addresses Wide Range of Community Needs, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J., June 2000, at 14, availa-
ble at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Attorney-Resources/Shop/
BarJournal/calabreese.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
9. See Philip Kasinitz & Jan Rosenburg, Missing The Connection: Social Isolation
and Employment on the Brooklyn Waterfront, 43 Soc. PROBS. 180,183-84 (1996); see
also Aaron Donovan, If You're Thinking of Living in Red Hook: Isolated Brooklyn
Area Starts to Awaken, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2001, § 11, at 7.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See Kasinitz & Rosenburg, supra note 9, at 182-86.
12. See Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7; see also N.Y. City Dep't of City Plan-
ning, Community District Profiles, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/
lucds/bk6lu.html#data (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
13. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Ho, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 108-11 (2002); Robert J. Sampson &
Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance:
The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 LAW & Soc'y REV. 777, 799
(1998).
14. Christopher Ketcham, Roach Motel, SALON, Oct. 17, 2002, at http://
archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2002/10/17/jail-time/indexnp.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2003). This article describes a man the author met in his cell block as:
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Accordingly, the Red Hook Community Justice Center
("RHCJC" or "the Court") focused its attention on the role of law
and legal institutions in public safety.' 5 The creation of a court
physically closer to the community, more responsive to the
problems that give rise to crime, and accountable to the community
to reduce crime and deliver remedial services, offers the Court a
transformative role that will involve citizens in the processes of so-
cial regulation and control that are essential to crime prevention
and justice. 16 This is the theoretical challenge for problem-solving
courts generally, and decentralized community-based courts in
particular.
This Article theorizes the structure and process of community
justice, focusing on the model offered by community courts. We
examine how the Red Hook Community Justice Center's develop-
ment and implementation are the products of its immersion in the
intersection of social, spatial, and political dynamics within the Red
Hook neighborhood. Its creation was also influenced by the
broader context of court innovation in New York, and local crime
policies and problems in the city. The development of various
forms of community justice has been under-theorized, despite the
rapid expansion of community justice experiments and the broader
acceptance of a new role for courts to attack specific manifesta-
tions of crime. Theory matters in this context, offering a causal
story about the underlying dynamics of change, and identifying po-
tentially enduring and generalizable lessons that help us predict
whether the practices that are promising in one place would be
equally effective in another.
This Article begins by reviewing the sociological perspectives
that converge in the historical development of "community jus-
tice.""7 Community justice developed not just as a response to the
concerns about legitimacy facing contemporary legal institutions,
but also as part of a changing narrative of social control in areas
undergoing rapid social structural change.' 8 We set forth a frame-
Rousted on a spurious charge-misdemeanor possession-and now the
creep was off the streets of my hometown neighborhood of Red Hook, in
Brooklyn, lodged safely here in the cinderblock ugliness that is the 76th Pre-
cinct of the NYPD, and toiled over by cops and clerks and DAs who know, if
they have a conscience, that driving a man like chattel just because he carries
a syringe doesn't make sense.
Id.
15. See LEE, supra note 3, at 18.
16. See infra Part lt.D.
17. See infra Parts I.A & I.B.
18. See infra Part ll.D.
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work of social regulation and control that shapes the internal work-
ings of these new legal institutions, and also influences their
relations with the communities that host them. 19 Next, we identify
challenges facing community justice centers and community courts
in their efforts to reconcile a complex vector of institutional, social,
and political dynamics.2" The Article concludes by revisiting the
conceptual frames of these courts, and locating their historical de-
velopment in broader themes of the role of legal institutions in rap-
idly changing social contexts.21
I. THEORIZING COMMUNITY JUSTICE
The dissatisfaction of individuals who suffer the consequences of
rising crime levels and/or social disorder, which makes their every-
day lives unsafe, created a crisis of legitimacy for legal institutions.
Much of this discontent centered on the courts.22 This pressure
motivated reformers to create more accessible and effective judi-
cial forums with the aim of solving local problems.23 Although
public dissatisfaction put policy makers and local government on
alert, the movement towards a community justice model as the so-
lution originated among leaders within the criminal justice system.
These practitioners, especially judges, now see themselves as the
champions behind these new legal experiments bracketed under a
"community justice model" as they aim to improve the "quality of
justice" delivered by the system. 4
Community justice practitioners justify these changes through
their real experience of a "crisis in the court system. This crisis
is defined by a system that is overloaded and unable to respond
efficiently or thoughtfully to its caseloads. Practitioners point to
their daily caseloads to infer that the system no longer works. They
19. See infra Part I.C.
20. See infra Parts I.C & I.D.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer,
23 LAW & POL'Y 125, 128 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
prob solvcourts.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
23. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION
46-47, 91 (2002); see also Leena Kurki, Incorporating Restorative and Community Jus-
tice into American Sentencing and Corrections, in SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS:
ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1-2 (U.S. Dep't of Justice ed., 1999).
24. CLEAR & KARP, supra note 1, at 5; see JAMES F. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING
JUSTICE, THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 5, 108-10 (2001); Greg Berman,
What is a Traditional Judge Anyway? Problem Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICA-
TURE 78, 80 (2000); Sarah Glazer, Community Prosecution: Should Prosecutors Try to
Solve Local Problems, 10 CQ RESEARCHER 1009, 1009-32 (2000).
25. See Berman, supra note 24, at 80.
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highlight the high levels of recidivism, the "revolving door," and
the increasing levels of incarceration to assert that the "system is
broken."26 The reorganization of the justice system toward a com-
munity justice ideal has been animated, therefore, by both the ex-
ternal pressures coming from citizens who want a more accessible
and effective legal form, and by internal pressure and dissatisfac-
tion brewing within the courts. Each of these sources of discontent
contributed to a crisis of legitimacy, motivating judges, local gov-
ernments, and other agencies to become more receptive to experi-
mentation within the court system. These circumstances and
changes are discussed further below.
A. Crime, Courts, and Legitimacy
Over the past two decades, economic, political, and social
changes have led the courts onto the frontline of managing policy
issues-such as the war on drugs, the crisis of gun violence, and
quality of life campaigns-in ways that the legal system has not
previously experienced.27 At the same time, structural issues of
size, management, and bureaucracy have affected the system, caus-
ing increased inefficiency and inflexibility.28 This growth occurred
in an era when local and national cost cutting have left both courts
and police departments badly equipped.29 Finally, criminal courts
are faced with high numbers of offenders who have been adversely
affected by social service cuts, such as the mentally ill, the home-
less, and those addicted to drugs."
Community justice reconceptualizes the judicial branch. It is no
longer an impartial arbiter of state power, but instead seeks to
serve a victimized community that is in need of repair. The judicial
branch now becomes an activist pressing for social transformation
and neighborhood healing. It pushes for the mobilization of social
services under the auspices of the court, and for new forms of de-
26. Id.; see NOLAN, supra note 24, at 108-10; John Feinblatt et al., The Future of
Problem-Solving Courts, 15 CT. MaR. 28, 29 (1999).
27. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL OR-
DER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 193-205 (2000).
28. See id. at 87-89.
29. See id. at 81-82. Investments in criminal justice services in New York State,
however, have grown in the past decade. The New York State Office of Court Ad-
ministration budget has grown each year for the past seven years. See Division of
Financial Management: Budget and Fiscal Operations, New York State Unified Court
System, Judiciary Budget, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/Budget/
Budget-docs.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). The New York City Police Department
budget doubled in size, after adjusting for inflation, from 1994-2000.
30. See GARLAND, supra note 27, at 75-76.
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liberative democracy where transparent information becomes an
engine for reshaping power relations between citizens and courts.31
From the outside, much of the "community justice model" from
drug courts and mental health courts to restorative justice and the
new "sanctioning circles ' 32 can be read as an attempt by the crimi-
nal justice system to respond to these challenges. The courts are
now asked to manage the outcome of different social policies.
These policies range from social services cuts that lead to increases
in the numbers of homeless and mentally ill people on the street, to
increased arrests that put these same individuals in the courts'
charge while leaving the court with limited tools to do anything but
incarcerate or release them. These challenges have led judicial
leaders and criminal justice officials to integrate legal and social
services under the umbrella of community justice, even as they are
faced with challenges to their own legitimacy.
Advocates for community justice state that their responses are
motivated by real issues and less by theoretical debates, the real
issue being that something is not working and needs to be fixed.
But the underlying reasons for this inefficiency are more complex
than an organizational malfunction-something implicitly alluded
to by community justice advocates who argue that this model "aims
to fix underlying problems." The idea of a broken system, a system
that relies on increasing levels of coercion without a corresponding
reduction in crime,33 suggests that it is not the court system alone
that is the problem. Indeed, the very growth in arrest numbers,
many for small nonviolent crimes, and the push for quality-of-life
arrests suggests that the system requires these explicit demonstra-
tions of force and coercion to maintain social order. That is, crime
31. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles E. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 832-38 (2000).
32. Proponents of restorative community justice contend that the community, like
the state and the victim, has a stake in justice that should be acknowledged and nur-
tured. The restorative justice model calls for both individual and community restitu-
tion to pay back the victims of crime and restore the community. BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 22, at 10-12. This model calls for victim impact panels to educate offenders
about the effects of their actions on victims and communities. Id. at 47-50. Further-
more, it supports family group conferencing to resolve issues that might otherwise
come before courts. Id. at 66. The restorative justice model also suggests rehabilita-
tion programs, in order to help offenders reconstruct their lives. Id. at 95-96; see
Seamus Miller & John Blackler, Restorative Justice: Retribution, Confession, and
Shame, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 77, 77 (John Braithwaite
& Heather Strang eds., 2000).
33. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Policing Guns: Order, Maintenance and Crime
Control in New York, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Bernard Har-
court ed., forthcoming May 2003) (manuscript at 6-7, on file with authors).
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is being controlled through formal, as opposed to informal, social
control.
While formal social control may be one mechanism for enforce-
ment, the ideal is that compliance will be voluntary, something that
is more likely when individuals consider the law and its accompa-
nying legal institutions to be fair, effective and legitimate. 34 Exces-
sive noncompliance suggests that the law or its enforcers may be
seen as illegitimate, something that is ultimately counterproductive
at the social and economic level:
[L]egitimacy is significant not only for the maintenance of order,
but also for the degree of co-operation and quality of perform-
ance that the powerful can secure from the subordinate; it is im-
portant not only for whether they remain in power but for what
their power can be used to achieve .... In effect, the advantage
of legitimacy is that a legitimate system can accrue enhanced
order, stability, and effectiveness. While order, stability, and ef-
fectiveness can be achieved through other means, such as coer-
cion alongside effective organizational capacity, legitimacy
allows for the legitimatization of power through moral forces
and affects the attitudes and behaviors of the agents as moral
agents. 35
In other words, a legitimate system in the long run is not only
more cost effective and efficient (in market terms), but also at the
level of social organization, it enables the powerless to be moral
agents who are instrumental in the system's survival. This is quite
different from the logic of the traditional hierarchical courts, where
the powerless are imagined as responding in their own self-interest,
to which the system responds in turn by imposing its own vision of
a greater good. In the realm of legal institutions and the criminal
justice system, the system is at its most stable when its power is
utilized for a "public" good, while simultaneously engendering its
own legitimacy. In this dynamic, the criminal justice system not
only remains a positive representative of the state and its power,
but also it leverages and promotes informal social control as indi-
viduals increasingly comply with the law, even in the face of laws
with which they do not agree. 36 Furthermore, it becomes increas-
ingly clear that without legitimacy, the system relies on increased
34. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 22-30 (1990). Tyler finds that
people are more likely to obey the law, even if they may not agree with a particular
law, if they have had a positive experience with the law and they perceive the law to
be legitimate. Id.
35. DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 29, 33 (1991).
36. TYLER, supra note 34, at 27-30.
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law enforcement, sanctions, and incarceration, all of which become
more costly, time consuming, and inefficient in terms of overall sys-
tem stability. Such a system is not sustainable over time.
This reading of the "crisis" in the system highlights that outside
of the ethical imperatives underlying the community justice move-
ment (such as helping addicts, mentally ill, and others who have
ended up under their jurisdiction and/or restoring community), the
impetus to reorganize stems from a current "crisis" that challenges
the very legitimacy of the courts. 37 The community justice model,
in trying to fix the system, is trying to ensure that legal institutions
remain legitimate as they maintain social order and public safety
by reaching a systemic equilibrium of reciprocal and mutually rein-
forcing social controls.
B. Community Justice and the Search for Collective Action
and Accountability
The application of community justice inside the judicial process,
as opposed to the correctional system or policing, sees the court as
more than an institution that uses the adversarial system to guaran-
tee an individual's right against the power of the state.38 The
courts and individuals no longer act alone, as the community jus-
tice model adds a third component-the community.39 Courts now
refocus their vision onto the communities whose members restrict
their daily practices because of crime levels (real or perceived). In
this theoretical perspective, the courts are present within a larger
network, comprised of the court, civil society, and residents who
will work towards the common good of the community.4" Commu-
37. CLEAR & KARP, supra note 1, at 1-2.
38. Id. at 20-21.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 75. There is no rigorous definition of the term "community" and its
limits, or the idea of "community" definitions within the community justice model.
Clear and Karp use it to cover anything from an occupational group, ethnic affiliation,
or voluntary associations alongside neighborhoods. Id. at 59-60. This Article does
not address this issue, but it is worth asking why all these different groupings and
networks are being classified as a "community," and whether putting any particular
group into a community is a sound basis for classifying it as community justice. See
Gordon Bazemore, Issues, Themes, and Questions for the New Neighborhood Sanc-
tioning Models, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD, supra note 3, at 342-
44. Professor Bazemore discusses four different "community justice" models and
shows how, in each one, the project has defined community according to its scope-
from immediate victim, to victim and her family, to community leader, and finally to
residents of a local space. Id. at 344-47, 351, 356-57. Bazemore also does not question
this as one of the problematic issues within the community justice movement. Id. at
353-54. He does, however, point out that not all communities necessarily aspire or
2003]
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nity courts are an important facet of the community justice move-
ment, and are springing up throughout the United States.4 At the
practical level, the community court proposes several ways in
which it can benefit a neighborhood. It brings the court and its
service adjuncts into a community with limited access to public and
private services. By placing the court into the neighborhood, it
brings the court closer-physically and administratively-to the so-
cial and behavioral origins of the problems that it seeks to ad-
dress.42 It aims to bring services to bear on these problems under
the administrative aegis of the court. Meanwhile, the physical
presence of the court in a community signals that the relationships
of citizens to courts and communities to courts differ in meaning,
tone, and content.43
Community courts have introduced a variety of mechanisms to
respond to both theoretical and practical challenges they face, as
they aim to create and augment their legitimacy:
1. Individualized Justice
Community courts focus at the level of the individual to counter-
act some of the social sources of crime-such as low levels of
human capital, addiction problems, and other medical and social
needs.44 This is done by linking up individuals to different social
services from treatment programs to employment training. They
cater their sanctions to individuals and their needs and in this way
hope to reduce the motivation or propensity for criminal behavior.
2. Restorative Justice
Alongside personalized sanctions, the new courts work to apply
restorative justice. This means devising sanctions and processes
that help both the victim's and the community's needs.45 In many
cases, the victim is understood to be the entire community, which
may now gain material help, such as community service crews to
undertake neighborhood projects-from park clean-ups to graffiti
idealize their participatory role in crime control, and that this can vary according to
social, economic, and cultural factors. Id.
41. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OVERCOMING
OBSTACLES TO COMMUNITY COURTS: A SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS III
(1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/173400.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2003); see also LEE, supra note 3, at iii; Thompson, supra note 5, at 63.
42. See LEE, supra note 3, at 3.
43. See id. at 7.
44. See CLEAR & KARP, supra note 1, at 167-71; see also LEE, supra note 3, at 6.
45. See Bazemore, supra note 40, at 336.
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removal. The victim could also be an individual whose interests
are taken into account when a judge imposes a sanction (such as in
assault and domestic violence cases).
3. Moral Communication
The physical existence of a problem-solving court or community
court sends a signal to the community and/or the offenders that
certain illegal and antisocial behaviors are not acceptable and that
the law and legal institutions are working to prevent these
behaviors.46
4. Creating Partnerships
The courts, working in conjunction with social service agencies,
community groups, schools, parent-teacher associations, churches,
and other organizations, can create partnerships that will work to
strengthen the community and advance the broader goals of the
agencies or the community groups. 47 In this way, the legal institu-
tion is no longer separate and alienated from the communities with
which it works. These partnerships are seen as a way to enhance
the flexibility of the court system and its ability to respond to the
particular needs of both individuals and neighborhoods. 48  The
community is envisioned as an integral part of the process. Ideally,
the "community" should also see itself as having "ownership" over
the legal institution.49 Furthermore, the creation of partnerships
with the community, either through formal mechanisms (commu-
nity groups and other social service agencies, and advisory boards)
or informal mechanisms (individual relationships) integrate the
court into the community's social networks, and ensure that the
court remains more accountable to its clients.5 °
Community courts aim to ensure that there is an accretion of
positive experiences for those individuals who encounter the
courts.5' This includes both the offender population that benefits
from this new form of "therapeutic jurisprudence" and other
groups working in partnership with the courts.52 These processes
and their positive outcomes are communicated to the community
46. See id. at 336-37.
47. See, e.g., Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 23, at 4-5.
48. See Bazemore, supra note 40, at 337.
49. See LEE, supra note 3, at 7.
50. See Bazemore, supra note 40, at 337.
51. See LEE, supra note 3, at 7.
52. See CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 119-23; see also Berman & Feinblatt, supra
note 23, at 136-37.
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at large through both direct and vicarious processes of social trans-
mission or contagion that spread across social networks.53
C. Community Courts and Social Regulation
To address the second dimension of legitimacy-compliance and
embracing of the social norms of the law-community courts must
address the quality of justice that comes with this new judicial fo-
rum. Community justice centers become desirable options only if
they are truly more than just an efficient mechanism to deliver so-
cial services to a needy population and/or supply different social
service projects to different neighborhoods. If this is their sole
achievement, then one could advocate providing services without
the court, thus avoiding the major overhaul and cost of reorganiz-
ing the legal system. Not only is this cheaper, but it may also bene-
fit the community more, as those people who are reluctant to enter
a court to seek help may prefer to seek help through service agen-
cies that are free standing.
Community courts have to provide new forms of justice, both
through the courtroom and other court initiatives. Both should be
visible and available for the community. At the theoretical level,
community courts should render the court accountable to local in-
dividuals and groups. Even when crime is the result of macro-level
determinants (such as poverty or poverty housing) the community
court model assumes that these problems will be differentially dis-
tributed and manifested in different ways across a local social, eco-
nomic, and political space. The local space determines the types of
problems that present themselves for a socio-legal solution and
specific solutions are usually perceived at the local social and polit-
ical level. Community courts can address localized crime and other
local problems, such as drinking in a specific park, drugs in a spe-
cific building, or prostitution on a specific street.54 Unlike treat-
ment courts and other problem-solving courts, community courts
seek to fix problems in the courts and in the outside community by
developing legal forums that are uniquely configured towards its
particular crimes and social problems.55 Accountability takes place
53. See, e.g., JACK BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE 90-96 (1997); AARON LYNCH,
THOUGHT CONrAGION 1-16 (1996); see also Ronald Burt, Social Contagion and Inno-
vation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. Soc. 1287, 1288-89 (1987).
54. See, e.g., CLEAR & KARP, supra note 1, at 169-70 (describing how Bryant Park
in Manhattan, formerly a haven for drug-dealers, was successfully transformed physi-
cally as a result of community initiatives).
55. See, e.g., Rottman, supra note 1, at 48-50 (describing different models for com-
munity-focused courts); Thompson, supra note 5, at 88-92.
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as the court's focus and outcomes are determined by the space in
which the court operates.
On the flip side of this new triad of court-community-service
providers is the assumption that the people whose quality of life is
affected by crime can be mobilized in such a way that their partici-
pation will enhance and complement the role of the criminal justice
system. That is, community justice centers assume that many peo-
ple who commit crimes of particularized concern in the court's lo-
cal space can be rehabilitated, and that once rehabilitated, those
people who are residents or victims can exert a form of informal
social control that will ultimately reduce crime. 56
This assumption stems from the fact that fear of the legal system
does not promote compliance in neighborhoods with high crime
rates.57 Social ties among citizens and their dynamic expressions of
social control contribute in separate and different ways from legal
control to produce lower crime rates. 58 While participation and
partnerships with local communities can vary-from using them to
help enforcement (as when you ask the residents to inform the po-
lice and the courts about "hot spots"), to determining sanctions-
the ideal is that community courts can bring citizens and defend-
ants closer in a jurisprudential process that is at once therapeutic
and accountable.
D. Local Problems, Community Justice, and Legitimation
Through their creation, community courts can address problems
that centralized courts cannot. For example, some community
courts and community justice centers can link typically separate
court parts (such as family courts, housing courts, and criminal
courts) into one location and under one administrative umbrella. 59
In this way, legal responses to families and individuals with multi-
ple legal problems are coordinated and, ideally, unified. Also,
community courts can respond to community "problems" that are
56. See, e.g., N.Y. Ass'n of Pretrial Serv. Agencies, Red Hook Community Justice
Center (stating that through community restitution, the Justice Center will make jus-
tice more visible and tangible to local inhabitants), at http://www.nyapsa.orgl
red-hookcommunity-justicecenter.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
57. See, e.g., ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS
AND CRIME 1 (1993); Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A
Multilevel Model of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918-24 (1997), available at
http://www.sactaqc.org/Resources/Literature/NeighborhoodVitality/Neighbor-
hoods-andViolentCrime.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
58. Sampson et al., supra note 57, at 1-2.
59. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 3, at 18.
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normally considered as nuisances or "victimless" crimes-such as
loud noise, graffiti, illegal vending, prostitution, and public urina-
tion-problems that typically do not command the attention of
centralized courts. These are crimes that affect specific neighbor-
hoods and that have specific consequences.6" Ideally, community
courts redefine these crimes as problems for the community, an
evaluation that is quite different from its scale within a formal legal
framework.61
These practical strategies, such as providing new services and re-
sponding to local problems, are one part of the community court's
response to the crisis of legitimacy of both the law and the legal
system at the local level. These localized courts can now seek to
both reestablish their legitimacy, and through this, encourage the
informal mechanisms of social control that will reduce crime and
improve a community's quality of life. The larger goal of en-
gendering legitimacy is one of the few ways that a court can cement
its role in improving public safety within a local space without
resorting to increased use of coercive force and social control.
For a court to take on this new role, it has to create new partner-
ships; it cannot control crime alone. But the court is in a double
bind; that is, the partnerships with the community can only emerge
if the groups (or "partners") within the community perceive the
legal actors and the court to be a legitimate institution. If not, the
groups will at least have to see the partnership as being to their
benefit for some other reason-the community court could be used
as an access to resources that citizens lack.62 Community courts
60. See WESLEY SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 168-69 (1990) (explaining how
the lack of organized community participation in disorderly neighborhoods further
impairs the capacity of residents to help themselves); RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING
AWAY iFROM BROKEN WINDOWS 136-37 (1998) (criticizing the shift within the court
system from focusing on community rights to individual rights of the "homeless, pan-
handlers, and others"); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic
Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighbor-
hoods, 105 AM. J. Soc. 603, 612-13 (2000).
61. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 3, at 9-18 (describing various community courts and
what they share in practice). While writers such as Lee see these courts as focusing on
quality-of-life issues that nag communities and invite more serious crime, this is a
limited perspective that fails to establish a comparative advantage for community
courts. To truly depart from regular court parts, drug treatment courts, or other spe-
cialized parts, community courts have to be focused on a specific location and guided
by the partnerships formed with individuals and groups in this space.
62. See BEETHAM, supra note 35, at 29-32. Beetham argues that for power to be
maintained, it has to gain the consensus of those who are ruled. Id. In many cases
this is obtained by getting active consent from various strategic representatives, as
most often this consent will give the subordinate access to resources they lack or other
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need to consider this bind as they enter into neighborhoods and
form partnerships. This is a major challenge facing the court in its
quest to transform itself into a legitimate social actor.
The above discussion highlights the underlying goals that are es-
sential for both the community justice ideal in general and commu-
nity courts in particular. While different legal experiments may
envision different or multiple paths to legitimacy, their shared final
goal is to be seen as legitimate actors who can enlist and enable a
community in their own practices that encourage informal social
control. Now, empirical evidence is necessary to assess whether
courts can accomplish this end. Such evidence should be consid-
ered through two vantage points. The first is what are the suc-
cesses and challenges in the implementation of the practical
strategies that are part of the community court as an operating
model (for example, designing an efficient and effective treatment
program, creating a multi-jurisdictional courtroom, and choosing
partners and working with them). Second, and more importantly,
is whether those practical strategies adopted by a community court,
even when successful within the specific parameters of a court's
goal, are the practical strategies necessary to engender legitimacy
within a particular community, and thus achieve the broader goals
that underlie the community justice model in general, and the com-
munity court in particular.
II. LEGITIMACY AND COURT INNOVATION: THE RED HOOK
COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER
The research for this Article was designed to describe and ex-
plain how the Red Hook Community Justice Center faced its orga-
nizational, political, and legal challenges. While the Article
acknowledges most of the practical or operational problems that
could hinder the function of the Court as a social institution, it fo-
cuses on several theoretical assumptions and practical problems
that challenge the role of this Court as an institution that can en-
gender legitimacy in a community. This Article illustrates some of
the obstacles to legitimacy faced by the RHCJC both before and
after its arrival in Red Hook.
benefits. Id. Without this consent, it is impossible for power to be seen as legitimate.
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A. Research Methodology
The research for this Article took place from October 2000 to
December 2001. The principle method was ethnographic study
that included several elements: participant observation in the
courts and the surrounding neighborhoods, regular attendance at
community meetings, interviews with defendants, court employees,
other representatives of the criminal justice system both inside and
outside of the court, and community residents. One of the Authors
(Malkin) attended operations meetings of the RHCJC "team."
These meetings were organized in the court to monitor defendants
and court cases, as well as other matters related to court opera-
tions. She went to several sanctions groups, such as the marijuana
groups and the quality of life groups, as well as the job training and
treatment readiness programs, so that she could become familiar
with their content and observe the defendants' responses. She also
regularly attended the Red Hook public housing tenant association
meetings for Red Hook Houses, Red Hook Civic Association
Meetings, meetings at the Seventy-Sixth police precinct, and other
community meetings as they arose. She had frequent informal in-
terviews with large numbers of court employees, visitors, and de-
fendants in the courts, and neighborhood residents. These events
were recorded during the research period through ongoing field
notes.
Malkin also conducted open-ended formal interviews, which
were taped and transcribed with fifty-nine individuals and thirteen
community service crews in the courts. These individuals represent
a variety of perspectives and experiences in the neighborhood and
inside the court. Interviews ranged in length from thirty to ninety
minutes. Most individuals were interviewed after Malkin had met
the individual several times through her regular presence in the
neighborhood and court. While the set of interviews may not be a
representative sample, the ethnographer's prior knowledge of the
neighborhood, the context, and the individual (in some, but not all
cases) allowed for a great deal of openness and frankness. In each
interview a series of general themes were discussed; for individuals
involved with the court (as employees, defendants, or voluntary
users), respondents discussed the idea of the court, its function, and
performance. Interviews then went on to discuss more general
ideas about the police, crime, and problem solving. For neighbor-
hood residents, interviews asked about neighborhood history, law
and order, police activity, and attitudes towards crime and problem
solving.
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For this period of participant observation, field notes were kept
and observations were recorded. At the end of the field period,
the taped interviews were all coded in a qualitative database and
analyzed according to the various themes that emerged. This eth-
nographic method builds on the deductive experience of spending
long periods of time in a field site, and conclusions are based on
empirical observations. While the interviews cannot be seen to re-
present a sample population, they capture a wide range of different
views within the community. What this method sacrifices in terms
of sample and quantitative method, it gains through the ongoing
presence of the researchers and their presence at specific events,
moments and conflicts which can then be followed over time.
This qualitative methodology has a long history in anthropology,
sociology, and other social sciences, and follows a rich tradition of
community studies.63 More recently, legal anthropologists have
used these methods to explain the interactions of individuals with
legal actors and institutions, to identify the meanings and catego-
ries that citizens use to evaluate these interactions, and to under-
stand how law as an institution behaves toward individuals. For
example, Professors Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey studied the
transactions of ordinary citizens with civil, criminal, and adminis-
trative components of law.64 Similarly, Professors John Conley and
William Barr,65 Sally Merry,66 and Laura Nader67 have all used
qualitative research and variations of the ethnographic method to
understand how legal institutions and the law are actually under-
stood and received by those who use the law. This ethnographic
method is essential for the study of a court within a community
that seeks to address community issues and integrate into the social
relations of a community. The conclusions reached in this Article
are based on this long, cumulative process, much of this a method
of "being there." This is a recognized method required to reach
reliable, in-depth understandings of processes and social relations
that are often missed in quantitative research.
63. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED
ESSAYS (1973).
64. See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
65. See generally JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RE-
LATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990).
66. See generally SALLY MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE, GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CON-
SCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS (1990).
67. See generally LAURA NADER, No ACCESS To LAW (1980).
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B. Origins of the Red Hook Community Court
Red Hook is a geographically and socially isolated community of
low-income families.68 It is cut off from other nearby Brooklyn
neighborhoods by a large expressway, whose construction decades
ago was contested by community residents who foresaw the ad-
verse consequences of cleaving the area from its residential sur-
roundings.69 Surrounded by water on its other three sides, the Red
Hook population fell from more than 22,000 people in the 1950s, to
an estimated 11,000 in 1990.70 According to the 2000 Census, the
median household income in the four census tracts comprising Red
Hook was $27,777,71 well below the New York City median of
$38,293.72 More than seventy-eight percent of the children in Red
Hook live in households lacking one or both natural parents;73 29.2
percent fall below the poverty level, 4 compared to 21.2 percent
citywide. 75 Fewer than half the persons over twenty-five years of
age are high school graduates,76 and fewer than ten percent of this
same population group have college degrees;77 nearly thirty per-
cent of the working-age men in Red Hook are unemployed. 78 Ap-
proximately 8,000 of Red Hook's 11,000 residents (approximately
seventy percent) live in the Red Hook Houses,79 one of New
York's largest and oldest public housing projects in the city.
Once a busy waterfront neighborhood, the decline in the ship-
ping industry in New York City meant that Red Hook suffered the
68. See generally KENNETH JACKSON & JOHN MANBECK, THE NEIGHBORHOODS
OF BROOKLYN (1998). See also Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7; Kasinitz & Rosen-
burg, supra note 9, at 182.
69. Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7.
70. See Kasinitiz & Rosenburg, supra note 9, at 182.
71. Red Hook is a neighborhood comprised of four census tracts: 0055, 0057, 0059,
0085. See N.Y. City Dep't of City Planning, Political and Administrative Districts,
Census Tracts, at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dcp/html/bytes/dwndistricts.html#cbt
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003). Social and economic indicia for Red Hook from 2000
U.S. Census data for each of the constituent census tracts. See U.S. Census Bureau,
2000 Census Pub. L. No. 94-171 File & STFI Files; see also N.Y. City Dep't of City
Planning, Population Division, Demographic Tables [hereinafter N.Y. City Dep't of
City Planning, Demographic Tables] (providing tables for the 2000 Census Tables for
New York City), available at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dcp/html/census/popt-
able.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
72. N.Y. City Dep't of City Planning, Demographic Tables, supra note 71.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Kasinitz & Rosenburg, supra note 9, at 183.
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consequences of deindustrialization and job losses that were the
mainstay of much of the neighborhood.8" It is a mixed-use neigh-
borhood whose older private houses are leading the way towards a
(contested) transition into a residential neighborhood.81 The ma-
jority of its residents, however, live in New York's oldest and larg-
est housing project, which was begun in 1939.82 Red Hook has
been challenged by high crime rates and suffered drug gang wars in
the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the accidental shooting of the
highly regarded local elementary school principal Patrick Daly on
December 17, 1992.83 This shooting was one of the galvanizing
events in the establishment of the Red Hook Community Justice
Center.84 The District Attorney's office, along with the Center for
Court Innovation ("CCI"), an organization that had established a
community court in Manhattan's busy Midtown area,85 focused on
Red Hook as the ideal spot to establish a community court.86 The
Executive Director of CCI explained why Red Hook offered
unique advantages to host this experimental court:
CCI: I think what was of interest to us was testing [a community
court] in a more residential or stable area or community. Cer-
tainly we were attracted to Red Hook because of its physical
isolation.., but also it seemed like a very interesting place to be
able to test because it is small and it is sort of like other Ameri-
can places, oddly enough even because it is so different. In so
many ways what we were aware of is that people come to Red
Hook from around the country actually can find that they can
80. See id. at 182-83.
81. Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7; see Tara Bahrampour, Warehouse is an Em-
blem of Newest Waterfront Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, § 14, at 8.
82. Kasinitz & Rosenburg, supra note 9, at 183.
83. See David Gonzalez, A Man Who Won Trust and Offered a Way Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at B12; see also Seth Stern, A Court of Second Chances, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 22, 2002, at 11.
84. See Stern, supra note 83, at 11; see also Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7 ("The
movement to create the center began after Patrick Daly, a beloved principal at P.S. 15
on Sullivan Street, was killed in a drug-related gunfight in December 1992 as he
searched the Houses for a nine-year-old boy who had left school crying after a
fight.").
85. The Center for Court Innovation is a not-for-profit organization that works in
partnership with the New York State Unified Court System to establish new public
and private initiatives. For more information, see the Center for Court Innovation
website, at http://www.courtinnovation.org/center.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
86. CCI had established one community court in Midtown Manhattan prior to
planning the RHCJC. The opportunity to work in Red Hook was in part motivated
by the fact that the Midtown Community Court ("MCC") was functioning in a neigh-
borhood with no clear residential population and whose interests were arguably more
defined by business interests.
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often relate to Red Hook more easily that they can relate to
midtown Manhattan in terms of an isolated community. So I
think that what we really wanted to do was to see the extent to
which the court can act as convener and test the extent to which
the court could welcome through its front door and its back
door, so that people can come into the court using its ser-
vices.., and see the extent to which the court could either spon-
sor, or encourage, or be a place where it could provide diverse
activities within the community that would promote things as
diverse as youth leadership and things like Youth Court and Ed-
ucation to things like GED sponsorship .... 87
Red Hook is exactly the type of neighborhood that a community
court model hopes to benefit. The RHCJC was located in the mid-
dle of a residential community that had a series of public safety
issues, which also resonated with the Court's aspirations to legiti-
mize law, legal institutions, and the legal process. The neighbor-
hood is challenged by the concentration of social deficits, including
crime.,8 When Red Hook enters the public consciousness in New
York, it is rarely in a positive context. In 1988, Life magazine la-
beled Red Hook one of the most crack-infested communities in the
nation. 9 Yet, there are distinct community building blocks. Red
Hook possesses a network of community groups, including tenant
associations, a local Beacon school,9" youth organizations, local de-
velopment corporations, and churches.9' Red Hook also has sev-
eral natural assets, including open spaces for recreational use, and
87. Dr. Malkin conducted these interviews in Red Hook and its surrounding
neighborhoods in Brooklyn between October 2000 and December 2001. Federal reg-
ulations for human subjects research require that interview participants are guaran-
teed privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity. See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1991); see also
Donna Shalala, Protecting Research Subjects-What Must Be Done?, 343 NEw ENC. J.
MED. 808 (2000). Copies of the interviews, redacted to exclude individual identifiers,
are on file with the Authors.
88. Cf. Amy Waldman, Neighborhood Report: Red Hook; At Housing Project,
Drugs Linger but the Killing Fields Go, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, § 14, at 8.
89. Edward Barnes & George Howe Colt, Crack: Downfall of a Neighborhood,
LIFE, July 1988, at 92.
90. The Red Hook Beacon Community Center is an after-school program run by
Good Shepard Services of Brooklyn at PS 15, an elementary school at 71 Sullivan
Street, in Red Hook. For the location and further information on the Red Hook
Beacon Community Center, see the Good Shephards Services website, athttp:l/good-
shepherds.org/sub-programs-services/ps-programlocations.html#rhl3 (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003).
91. Daniel McGillis, Beacons of Hope: New York City's School-Based Community
Centers, NAT'L INsT. JUST. J., Jan. 1996, at 2-15.
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waterfront property with spectacular views of downtown Manhat-
tan and the Statue of Liberty.92
It is, however, also a neighborhood that has weak services and
economic institutions. In common with many other low-income
neighborhoods, it has experienced a decrease in the resources and
services that help fight some of the social effects of poverty.93 Fur-
thermore, it has a sense of abandonment: abandonment of the eco-
nomic sectors that sustained the neighborhood, such as the
waterfront industry and the related manufacturing businesses;
94
abandonment by the government who not only reduced the levels
of resources and services the community, but also by local charita-
ble groups that suffer cutbacks and come and go;95 and, most im-
portant for this discussion, abandonment by the law enforcement
community whom the community holds partly responsible for the
rampant growth in the drug gangs and related violence due to its
(perceived or real) inability to provide effective enforcement and
to deploy enough patrols to protect the neighborhood from the
drugs and violence that hamper everyday life.96
The community court in Red Hook was opened in April 2000,
after a long planning period that began in the early 1990s.97 By the
time the court opened, the neighborhood was already in transition.
In the research interviews, different groups, including newer home-
owners, older residents and the large numbers of residents in pub-
lic housing had contested views of the neighborhood. Each of
these groups had particularized visions of the neighborhood's bet-
ter future, but each imagined the improvement happening in differ-
ent ways. Newer arrivals, gentrifiers, and older residents who live
in the private houses at one end of Red Hook are mobilized mainly
through their aspirations to transform the neighborhood into one
more "Brooklyn residential brownstone" neighborhood. 98 In con-
trast, the residents of public housing (which comprise the neighbor-
hood's majority) are more concerned with maintaining the public
92. Kasinitz & Rosenburg, supra note 9, at 182.
93. See The Red Hook Civil Association website, at http://www.redhook-brook-
lyn.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
94. Kasinitz & Rosenburg, supra note 9, at 182.
95. Id.
96. See Waldman, supra note 88, at 8; see also Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7.
97. See N.Y. Ass'n of Pretrial Serv. Agencies, supra note 56; see also GREG
BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, RED HOOK DIARY: PLANNING A COMMU-
NITY COURT 1-8 (3d prtg. 2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
redhookdiary.pdf (visited Mar. 15, 2003).
98. Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7.
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housing projects, and the creation of new opportunities, such as
jobs and after-school programs.99
In spite of these differences, all residents share the desire for a
safe environment. Furthermore, many residents have memories of
previous decades when threats to personal safety were much higher
and crime was a major problem. Public housing residents still ex-
perience these problems-albeit at a lesser level-and a subse-
quent deterioration of their quality of life. Throughout Red Hook,
however, residents coincide in their desire for the neighborhood to
be a space where families, businesses, and residents can all thrive
and enjoy a quality of life they observe daily in neighboring areas,
some of which contain very expensive property. 00
B. The Red Hook Community Justice Center As an Operating
Model for a Community Court
After an extended period of consultation with different commu-
nity leaders within Red Hook, and representatives for the neigh-
borhood whose work involved other domains of public life in New
York City (for example, Community Board leaders), CCI designed
an operating model that had the court working as a multi-jurisdic-
tional court, combining criminal, family, and housing in one court-
room presided over by one judge.' ° CCI and community
representatives toured eight possible locations. They selected an
abandoned school that lies between the public housing sites and
the older waterfront area, and with the support of public and pri-
vate funds, CCI converted this school into the Red Hook Commu-
nity Justice Center.10 2
They planned for the RHCJC to provide social services for de-
fendants and residents either through its own staff, or by enlisting
partner agencies to work in the building.0 3 Community service
would provide work groups that could address neighborhood con-
cerns. Other preventative programs were also solicited, including a
GED class, a youth court, an AmeriCorps program for local re-
sidents, a mentoring program, a victim advocate program, various
group therapies and counseling, a mediation program, and job-
training and job development programs. 104
99. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
100. Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7.
101. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 3, at 18.
102. BERMAN, supra note 97, at 7-8.
103. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 3, at 18.
104. Id. at 18-19; see also Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7.
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CCI established an AmeriCorps program in the neighborhood in
November 1995, more than three years before the court opened.
1 15
Today, AmeriCorps members complete a mandatory number of
weekly work hours in different institutions (from the police pre-
cinct, to the housing office, to the schools). AmeriCorps members
participate in community events, such as arts and cultural programs
and neighborhood days. Among their activities, AmeriCorps
members also organize a baseball "little league" every summer and
an annual block party outside of the Justice Center, run a Christ-
mas coat drive for charity, and participate in "park clean up days"
organized by the Court. AmeriCorps members escort defendants
to drug treatment, they supervise children in day care at the Court,
and help defendants meet community service mandates.
CCI conceived of operating model that had the Court working as
a multi-jurisdictional court combining criminal, family, and housing
in one courtroom presided over by one judge. The courtroom is
open five days a week, from Monday to Friday. The criminal court
hears misdemeanor cases and low felony cases (D and E) everyday.
All summons (the majority of these are quality-of-life violations,
such as open alcohol containers or public urination) are heard on
Tuesdays. Family court, which hears juvenile delinquency and fam-
ily offense matters, is held on Tuesday afternoons. The Justice
Center has a district attorney's office and Legal Aid (indigent de-
fense service) office on site. The New York City Criminal Justice
Agency, the city's pretrial services agency for bail screening, also
has offices in the Justice Center, as does the New York City Proba-
tion Department.
At the end of the research period, a housing part ("HP") was
poised to open to hear cases one day a week. This was only to
serve New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") residents,
and was to deal with hold-over (eviction) cases brought against re-
sidents by the NYCHA, as well as non-payment actions against te-
nants for delinquent rent. These cases often are the result of
disputes between tenants and the NYCHA over tenant claims that
their apartments are in disrepair. Tenants can initiate claims in
housing court, seeking a court order directing the NYCHA to
make needed repairs to an apartment. In our interviews, NYCHA
tenants complained of long-standing problems involving no heat,
hot water holes in walls, and broken windows. Addressing these
claims is part of the HP jurisprudence of settling these cases.t0 6
105. See N.Y. Ass'n of Pretrial Serv. Agencies, supra note 56.
106. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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The Court has responded to tenant's concerns by efficiently reduc-
ing the backlog of housing repair "tickets." The RHCJC Judge has
been a driving force in resolving the longstanding tensions between
NYCHA and public housing residents. In a recent case, the Judge
personally visited a building to verify that there was no hot
water.10 7
The criminal courtroom hears cases from three police precincts,
the Seventy-Sixth, which encompasses Red Hook, the Seventy-Sec-
ond, and the Seventy-Eighth. These three precincts actually take
in a variety of surrounding neighborhoods, from the exclusive Park
Slope brownstones, to the staid garden apartments of Carroll Gar-
dens, to the adjacent Cobble Hill neighborhood of newly reno-
vated brownstones and upscale shops, to the heavily immigrant
area of Sunset Park." 8 While the Court's physical presence imme-
diately affects Red Hook, and is far more accessible for these re-
sidents, the services and courtroom are open for anyone arrested in
these precincts, while the voluntary uptake of the services is availa-
ble for anyone.
The courtroom is on the main floor when you enter the building.
The first floor also has a mock courtroom, a childcare center, Legal
Aid offices, and other social services; other programs and services
are located throughout the building. Some of these are run by CCI
staff, and others are operated by partner agencies enlisted by CCI,
and ready to devote their resources (in most cases the cost of plac-
ing a member of staff in the Justice Center). The Court also pro-
vides sanctions in the forms of community service crews, which
would be able to address neighborhood concerns.
Thus, the RHCJC houses a diverse collection of agencies under
one roof. Appendix A shows the social and legal services in
RHCJC as of December 2002. In the clinic upstairs, there are
three to four CCI social workers and counselors, one youth worker
from Good Shepherd Services, staff from Phoenix House (a total
abstinence treatment program), and probation officers. Counsel-
ors from the Counseling Service of the Eastern District of New
York 1°9 come in twice a week to give marijuana counseling groups.
A staff member from Park Slope Safe Homes had also recently
107. Modon v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 20010 (N.Y. Hous. Ct. Mar. 19, 2003).
108. See Donovan, supra note 9, § 11, at 7.
109. The Counseling Service of the Eastern District of New York ("CSEDNY") is a
social service agency in Brooklyn that provides counseling to persons referred from
numerous private and public agencies in the New York metropolitan area. CSEDNY
specializes in substance abuse treatment for persons referred from the criminal justice
system, youth services programs, and private employers.
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begun to make weekly visits to the Justice Center to offer counsel-
ing for domestic violence issues. This collection of agencies allows
defendants and residents to attend different therapeutic groups on-
site, or to be referred to agencies around the city.
In addition to these more therapeutic services, the Justice Center
has established other types of programs. A victim services is on
site to work with victims of assault and other crimes. There is a
GED program held every morning during the school year and
twice a week in the evenings on the top floor. There is a mediation
program staffed by CCI and others trained in mediation who pro-
vide sessions twice a week to try to resolve criminal cases as well as
other disputes. There is also a Housing Resource Center. Before
the housing part opened, its main use was to refer disputes to the
mediation center and provide people with information about gov-
ernment housing programs. After the court opened its Housing
Resource Center, it also instructed individuals who were being
summoned for hearings at the NYCHA administrative offices for
eviction and nonpayment about where to go and what to do. The
Housing Resource Center staff works with NYCHA to ensure that
repairs are completed for heat, hot water, plumbing, and electric-
ity. There also is representative of the Human Resources Adminis-
tration (the city's public assistance agency) onsite to help tenants to
meet rent payments.I 10
Also on the main floor of the building is the Youth Court, where
teens conduct non-binding simulated court hearings two evenings a
week in a mock courtroom using a "teen court" or peer adjudica-
tion process.' Tucked away at the back of the basement is a part-
time staff member of the Fifth Avenue Committee who directs job-
seekers to programs, helps them with their resumes, and, when
possible, sends people for job interviews.
CCI also began a mentoring and internship program in 2001 to
place youth court members in community service and other activi-
ties. The AmeriCorps program, detailed above, is managed from
the building and runs the Red Hook Public Safety Corps. This pro-
gram was begun by CCI (in partnership with the district attorney
and the city's victim services agency) in 1995, nearly five years
before the Justice Center opened. This program recruits individu-
110. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Butts & Janeen Buck, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delin-
quency Prevention, Teen Courts: A Focus on Research, OJJDP Juv. JUST. BULL.,
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/jjbul2000 10_2/contents.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003).
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als from Red Hook and Brooklyn each year and features a large
number of individuals who have grown up in the neighborhood or
surrounding areas.
Eighteen months after hearing its first case, the RHCJC also be-
gan a program, Operation Toolkit,"12 where they solicited commu-
nity members to identify local problems of crime and disorder.
The RHCJC, along with other concerned groups and individuals,
could then consider the ways their varied groups and contacts (dis-
trict attorney's office, police, defense lawyers, social workers, and
court staff) could help to solve these problems. They also created a
Community Advisory Board, which included different members of
the criminal justice system, court staff, community leaders, commu-
nity board members, community group leaders, school principals,
police precinct captains, and a few other notable local residents.
The board meets once every three to four months. At these meet-
ings, the court gives the audience an update on their progress,
hears complaints from residents about neighborhood conditions or
services, and solicits ideas about community services and projects
that might be undertaken by the Justice Center to improve the
neighborhood (under Operation Toolkit). While the RHCJC be-
gan with a criminal court in April 2000, the family court cases ar-
rived about one year later in May 2001; two years after the criminal
part first opened, the Housing Part opened." 3 The Justice Center
could finally claim to be a multi-jurisdictional court (although it
has encountered less overlap between cases in the different courts
than its initial conception envisioned).
At the end of the research period, the Justice Center could be
seen as running closer to the way it had envisioned in its initial
proposals. As an organizational challenge, CCI managed to nego-
tiate much of the bureaucratic inertia that grows over time in some
organizations. In addition to persuading criminal justice agencies
such as Probation and Legal Aid to provide staff on-site, they con-
vinced the New York City Department of Correction to provide a
112. Operation Toolkit aims to deal with community problems by combining both
RHCJC resources and those of outside partners (the police, the district attorney, the
community, and the church) to see if there are new and innovative ways to solve
community problems. See GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, REPORT
TO THE NEw YORK FOUNDATION: OPERATION TOOLKIT 5, 6 (2002).
113. See Community Board Six General Board Meeting, Minutes (Sept. 11, 2002)
(representing the Red Hook Community Justice Center, Kelli Moore, reported that
since beginning in May 2002, the Housing Court component of the Justice Center had
already heard more than 300 cases), available at http://www.brooklyncb6.org/Commit-
tees/Committee_3/CBM200209.doc (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
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bus to pick up defendants twice a day. The RHCHC recruited
partner agencies and they tirelessly engaged in fund raising so as to
establish and sustain programs (for example, the mentoring pro-
gram that was introduced in 2001). They monitor and track de-
fendants effectively and have better-than-average rates for short-
term sanctions.114 Warrants are issued for defendants who do not
show up for their sanctions, and they frequently are returned to the
court by police.
For the most part, individuals who have visited the court are im-
pressed by the clean new building, and the courteous way in which
they are treated. Many of these defendants and visitors have had
experiences with courts downtown and are aware that the RHCJC
is a more pleasant and less antagonistic environment in compari-
son. They are greeted by court officers who are polite and friendly,
some of whom even participate in the little league in Red Hook,
and others who help the neighborhood children with their home-
work when they are on evening duty. From our interviews, even
the defendants who remained skeptical of the programs and are
less than enthusiastic about their mandates to therapeutic groups
or community service usually preferred to have been processed
through the Red Hook Court over the sprawling criminal court in
downtown Brooklyn.'15 Many are brought in more than once. The
intimate scale and organization of the Court means that many are
familiar with the staff. In fact, a major goal of the RHCJC is that
this familiarity will ultimately lead the defendants back to the
Court voluntarily when they are looking for help. 16 Although this
is a rare occurrence, voluntary usage of the Justice Center's thera-
peutic services such as drug treatment does happen occasionally.
C. Practical and Conceptual Challenges
At this operational level, the RHCJC could be seen to be rela-
tively successful. The courtroom works efficiently; the staff is, for
the most part, extremely pleasant (especially in relation to down-
town courts). The RHCJC has created partnerships with different
social service agencies that are in the buildings; it launched pro-
grams to address local disorder problems such as cleaning up a
park. RHCJC provides case processing that mandates defendants
114. A quantitative assessment on the case processing and sanctions cannot be pro-
vided in this Article due to space limitations, but such assessments will be provided in
future publications.
115. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
116. See LEE, supra note 3, at 18.
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into different social services; and since 1995, it has had an Amer-
iCorps program." 7 The judge and other CCI staff attend commu-
nity meetings, participate in local social events and recreational
activities, and listen to community complaints about crime, hous-
ing, and disorder problems. While this model sounds ideal in terms
of fulfilling the new role envisioned for a community court, as well
as a pathway to legitimize its role in the community, some major
fault lines have or are beginning to emerge that could impede this
goal are outlined below.
1. Social Needs Versus Legal Needs
A community court is driven by an agenda that responds to local
needs. At the same time, residents' social norms have to coincide
with the needs of the law. Sometimes these are not easily recon-
ciled: the Court remains a court and is limited by the fact that it
operates within a legal field. For example, even if residents asked
for marijuana to be legalized, the Court could not change its legal
mandates. The Red Hook Court tries to balance its pursuit of pub-
lic safety with its concerns for fair treatment and therapeutic
sentences.'18 Both dimensions of the Court contribute to its per-
ceived legitimacy." 9 When the needs of the community and the
legal institution coincide, this will work; however, if they clash, this
threatens to destabilize the model.
In Red Hook, community leaders were consulted in the RHCJC
planning stages.2 " The Justice Center was the culmination of six
years of community needs assessments and planning that included
focus groups, surveys, and town hall meetings.' 2' Leaders made it
clear that their main concern was to provide the neighborhood
with prevention programs and new social services, in addition to a
court that would provide individualized justice laden with thera-
peutic content. Craig Hammerman, the district manager of Com-
munity Board 6 in 2001, when the interviews were conducted, was
involved in this process. Community Board 6 is the district that
includes Red Hook along with other very different neighborhoods.
117. See, e.g., id.; see also Donovan, supra note 9, § 1H, at 7.
118. See LEE, supra note 3, at 18.
119. See TYLER & Huo, supra note 13, at 1101-08. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999).
120. See LEE, supra note 3, at 18; see also BERMAN, supra note 97, at 3-4.
121. JOAN JACOBY & E. RATLEDGE, Focus GROUP REPORT: COMMUNITY EXPEC-
TATIONS OF THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER 8 (1994) (on file with
authors).
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CB6 Leader: We tried to bring everyone together, just to start
talking about the kinds of things the neighborhood felt they
needed. And certain themes started to emerge. Employment
training and assistance was generally at the top of everyone's
list. And, lock-step with that was educational assistance-tutor-
ing, mentoring programs, counseling programs, drug prevention,
family planning. All of these kinds of themes just emerged from
so many different sources that it was clear to all that these were
really what the essential needs of the community were, that they
felt were not being met. And so, the whole non-offending popu-
lation of Red Hook services started to take shape and form over
the course of these discussions .... Initially, it was a difficult
project because it was presented as a concept, and a lot of con-
cepts come to us, but very few of them actually reach fruition.
They did not have a fully thought-out plan, they certainly did
not have a site for this. We wanted to try to lend some practical
assistance where we could, in bringing people together, to talk
about the problems-one of them being what this non-offending
population would be, another one being, what kinds of services
this facility would offer.122
Planners included social services in the RHCJC that were availa-
ble for anyone on a walk-in basis. During the planning process,
community leaders stressed education, job training, and youth de-
velopment as major categories of services they required. Commu-
nity leaders also were sold by planners on the idea of community
service crews as part of a restorative justice model that would work
throughout the neighborhood. 123
The RHCJC opened with a selection of these programs and ser-
vices on site. The Court caseloads were dominated, however, by
drug arrests made from trespass sweeps taking place in Red Hook
public housing and elsewhere (for example, Operation Condor). 24
122. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
123. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 22, at 67 (discussing a study that showed that
completing community service resulted in a greater commitment to the community
and feelings of citizenship).
124. Operation Condor was an initiative of the New York City Police Department
that used overtime pay to motivate police officers to make "buy-and-bust" arrests for
drug offenses. The program produced thousands of arrests across New York City, but
its tactics raised complaints from minority citizens about its racial disproportionality,
and the excessive use of a full criminal justice process (including the use of pretrial
detention rather than summons) for low-level drug offenders whose crimes were
mostly non-violent and who posed a minimal public safety threat. The death of Pat-
rick Dorismond, an unarmed citizen who was approached by police officers who tried
to sell him marijuana during an Operation Condor arrest, heightened racial tensions
between minority citizens and the police. See Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force: Why
Patrick Dorismond Didn't Have to Die, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000, at 26; see also
20031
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Large numbers of individuals were brought in on drug charges
ranging from misdemeanor marijuana possession, to possession of
controlled substances (powder cocaine, crack, or heroin). During
the planning stages of RHCJC, residents identified drugs and seri-
ous violence as chronic problems they hoped the Court would ad-
dress.'25 But the Court had not anticipated such high numbers of
drug arrests over its first eighteen months. Nor did the Court plan
for its criminal courtroom to be so dominated by drug charges. As
a solution and by necessity, the Court adopted a drug treatment
court model. Treatment schedules were devised and weekly up-
dates to monitor defendants' (now clients) progress were institu-
tionalized. The Court professionalized its drug treatment program
and its contacts with treatment providers throughout the city as it
referred defendants into short- and long-term treatment.
In the meantime, one of the two job-training courses run by
outside agencies left the Justice Center due to both funding
problems and low participation rates. A second provider, a job de-
velopment program of the Fifth Avenue Committee, remained ac-
tive. Also, the nurse supplied by community health network left
after a long wait for the Court to obtain the certification of the
health suite as a clinic licensed for testing and other medical ser-
vices. Only the GED program, AmeriCorps, child care, victim ad-
vocacy, the Housing Resource Center, and Youth Court programs
remained. While community service crews occasionally went to fix
things around the neighborhood, they were focused mainly inside
the courthouse, cleaning the facilities. The courtroom was more
concerned with placing defendants into therapeutic groups than on
concentrating on the way community service crews and other pro-
grams could be used as a form of restorative justice. It was not
until 2002 that the Justice Center restructured these programs to
launch clean-up projects in locations within the Red Hook neigh-
borhood. Many of these were efforts designed under Operation
Toolkit. 26
This move to therapeutic jurisprudence focused on drug cases
took place as lawyers, judges, and most specifically, the district at-
torney's office advocated drug treatment for defendants, even for
William Rashbaum, Police Suspend Extra Patrols for 10 Days, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2000, at B.
125. BERMAN, supra note 97, at 2-3.
126. See supra notes 87 & 112 and accompanying text; see also BERMAN, supra note
112, at 5-6.
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those who did not come in on drug arrests. 27 The high prevalence
of drug cases on the criminal court's docket seemed to attenuate
the creativity and innovation in sanctions that were central to the
Court's original vision. 128 Instead, the Court shifted toward a so-
cial service agency that efficiently allocated defendants to thera-
peutic programs writ large. Community residents' expectations
that a wide range of services would be available on site became
increasingly less of a reality as the Court drifted towards a struc-
tural and jurisprudential model already established in other treat-
ment courts. 129 One of the important goals of the concentration of
services within the Court-the ability to obtain services on-site-
remained only partially realized. Although housing services flour-
ished with the opening of the Housing Part, several other core ser-
vices such as job counseling moved out or lost funding.
Defendants still travel to get many of services they need, especially
drug treatment. As a referral service, however, the treatment clinic
functions well, catering to individual addicts and their needs.
This organization of the RHCJC is a logical conclusion to man-
aging caseloads produced by police enforcement priorities, and it
meets the requirement of law and the district attorney's policy
preferences for court-centered treatment of drug cases. This, how-
ever, was not necessarily the idea that community leaders had in
mind in the planning stages for the Court. During Community Ad-
visory Board meetings, community leaders are presented informa-
tion about the number of people given sanctions, the number of
people sent to treatment, and the number of people who do com-
munity service, but the leaders are not aware that the Court pro-
vides a narrower range of services on site than they imagined or
expected. The RHCJC evolution and responsiveness has been
driven more by the explicit need of prosecution of drug arrests, in
the context of the Red Hook community's interest in drug treat-
ment as one of a large number of sanctions and interventions.
The inability of the RHCJC to position itself outside of the more
traditional courts as it responds to the needs and pressures within
127. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitation-
ism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Danger-
ous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2068 n.22 (2002).
128. Although we observed other types of sanctions, such as alcohol evaluations in
drunk driving cases, or treatment interventions in domestic violence cases, the heavy
load of drug cases on the criminal court's dockets dominated thinking and planning
about sanctions, and the location of providers to deliver them. See supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
129. See NOLAN, supra note 24, at 189-93.
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the legal system-such as prosecutor's need for a flow of cases into
drug treatment-is reflected by the limited uptake by Red Hook
residents of the localized services and other RHCJC outreach ef-
forts. Participation varies across the several programs in RHCJC,
from strong participation in AmeriCorps to low participation in
Youth Court. 130 Implicit in the RHCJC's vision were a large num-
ber of voluntary users of the Court's services. Some residents have
walked in asking for help such as mediation services or sports pro-
grams and they have benefited from those services. 131 Most re-
sidents, while acknowledging the presence of the RHCJC in the
annual AmeriCorps survey, still have not branded the RHCJC as
anything more than a court, and their lives remain untouched by its
presence. 132
2. Procedural Justice
The Court exists in a community where many of the individuals
have had experiences with several courts-family, criminal, and
housing. In several cases, residents described these experiences as
more negative than positive, and individuals may have been left
more skeptical of the courts and their exercise of power. More
than a few regarded the courts as contributing to crime problems,
not ameliorating them, due to inefficient case processing, unfair
judgments, and lack of protection against the state's power to pun-
ish. 33 So, an alternative vision to the RHCJC model exists in Red
Hook, one that exists in tension with the demands from the com-
munity to address crime and drug problems. This alternative vision
is a more traditional vision of criminal justice, within an adversarial
model: more efficient case processing coupled with fair
judgments.' 34
For some, the trade-off of due process rights for treatment, im-
plicit in the therapeutic court model, is seen as a threat to delegi-
timize the new Court. 35 This is a tension in many drug courts,
130. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also infra note 149 and accompa-
nying text.
134. See N.Y. Ass'n of Pretrial Serv. Agencies, supra note 56.
135. Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1479 n.166
(2000); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Side am I On, Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender
About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 42-43
(2000); see NOLAN, supra note 24, at 71-72. But see Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement. Revolutionizing the
Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE
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where defendants receive treatment in lieu of jail time. But some
defendants may agree to treatment, which they define as a sanc-
tion, even while protesting their innocence. 36 Professor Malcolm
Feeley, for example, links the expansion of "alternatives" to the
traditional court process in the name of efficiency as an en-
trepreneurial expansion of social control, rather than a substitute
for ineffective methods. 37 The benefit to the common good to
which community courts aspire may be compromised by the loss of
other traditional roles that the Court and its players are meant to
fulfill.
This tension emerges in Red Hook when one compares drug
cases with other cases. The Court has directed most of its energy
towards providing effective treatment of drug addicts. These cases
take up a large amount of the Court's attention. Defendants
treated for this may accrue positive experiences if they feel the
Court has given them an opportunity. Nevertheless, the real num-
bers of individuals in long-term treatment and under case manage-
ment are much smaller than the number of individuals brought in
on quality-of-life crimes and other minor issues. Many defendants
in these quality-of-life cases regard these charges as arbitrary and
unfair.1 38 The Court does little to "hear" these defendants. Thus,
they are not allowing them the "expressive voice" found to play an
important role in allowing individuals to have a positive court ex-
perience.139 It is the expressive voice that helps them feel acknowl-
edged in terms of procedural justice. 40 Indeed, while the drug-
addicted are encouraged to have an "expressive voice" to the
judge, and in many ways "express" their guilt in public in front of a
DAME L. REV. 439, 459-62 (1999) (describing how drug arrests have outpaced other
criminal arrests since 1980). See generally Colloquy, The Drugging of the Courts: How
Sick is the Patient and What is the Treatment?, 73 JUDICATURE 314 passim (1990). See
also infra note 202.
136. Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts: Clients Get Needed
Treatment Rather Than Jail Time, but Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers Alike Worry
about Compromising their Roles as Advocates, 89 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2003, at 36 (2003);
Quinn, supra note 135, at 59.
137. Malcolm M. Feeley, Entrepreneurs of Punishment: The Legacy of Privatiza-
tion, 43 PUNISHMENT & Soc'y 321, 334 (2002).
138. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
139. See TYLER, supra note 34, at 116-17. Professor Tom Tyler found that even
individuals who felt that their legal experience had not had the outcome they desired
could feel that they were given a fair hearing. Id. For many, the idea of fairness
included this idea of being listened to, or having the chance to express ones circum-
stances-this is what Tyler calls the expressive voice. Id.
140. Id.
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judge who now cures them, 4 ' other defendants are sent to commu-
nity service which, most commonly, results in cleaning the court-
house. Indeed, many defendants when asked what they thought
community court meant, thought this was a Court where you had
to do community service. 142
3. Crime Control
The RHCJC has defined its role in large part as addressing crime
and quality-of-life crimes in Red Hook. 4 3 This is only one of sev-
eral roles that the community has asked the Justice Center to take
on. Indeed, the community may see the Justice Center's role to be
about fair procedural and distributive justice, or about service de-
livery, or about repair of disorder conditions, or mediation with the
Housing Authority. 44 Though concerned about crime, Red Hook
residents were not expecting the Court to solve crime. 45 Why,
then, pursue crime reduction as an institutional goal, when so many
of the forces that contribute to crime are beyond the control or
influence of the Court and the service reach of the Justice Center?
By creating a more responsive Court built on individualized justice
and provision of social services, the Court hoped that Red Hook
citizens would attribute to the RHCHC a high level of legitimacy.
The Court hoped that this legitimacy would motivate citizens to
actively participate in social regulation and informal social control,
thereby reducing crime rates. Accordingly, the expectation of
lower crime rates was an explicit goal of the Court's planners.
Crime reduction may not be the sine qua non of the RHCJC, but
it is an inescapable expectation that attaches both to the arguments
in favor of its creation, and to the external views of the Court by
the community and court system that accommodate and host it.
Crime reduction is the justifying narrative for the therapeutic juris-
prudence of the Court-the elimination of returning cases through
treatment intervention. By leveraging its legitimacy into greater
motivation by neighborhood residents to engage in social control
efforts, the Court further embedded the expectation of lower crime
rates into its justifying narrative. But if the Court justified itself as
simply a path to treatment, it could be accused of being "soft on
141. NOLAN, supra note 24, at 111-12.
142. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
143. Yael Scahcher, Red Hook Center to be 'Model' Community Court, N.Y. L.J.,
June 2, 2000, at 1.
144. See supra Part II.B.2; see also Berman, supra note 97, at 2-3.
145. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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crime." Furthermore, the theories of physical and social disorder,
which animate the Court's focus on quality-of-life crimes, are also
part of a crime reduction narrative in popular understandings of
law and order.'14 6
4. Policing
One of the major paradoxes of the community court model is
that within this triad of community, court, and services, the police
remain somewhat attached by a separate strand. The police, while
an important presence in the community court, attending meetings
and working both with the judge and district attorney, remain
outside of the Court's administrative control and political influ-
ence, and their practices remain unaffected by the Court. In a
community like Red Hook, the police are the major player in terms
of law enforcement. Residents in Red Hook report that most peo-
ple have had direct experience with the police, good or bad, and
the community still sees crime-solving to be the responsibility of
the police.' 47 Indeed, at public meetings, they still accuse the po-
lice of either a lack of enforcement or unfair enforcement that
leads to arrests of people for what they understand to be circum-
stantial or unfair reasons. 48
At Red Hook Tenants Association meetings, for example, which
the police captain and police community liaison regularly attend,
residents usually call for better and more policing. Although re-
sidents are not always clear about exactly what they want the po-
lice to do, or what tactics the police should use, residents
consistently point to the low levels of patrol or law enforcement
that leave drug dealers visibly doing business, even as police arrest
what residents see as "the wrong people."'' 49 In interviews, re-
sidents frequently complained of the way they or people they knew
have been "disrespected" by the police.
146. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 193-205 (2000); John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing
Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 281-82
(2000).
147. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
149. For example, Ketcham quotes a Red Hook attorney about policing in the
neighborhood: "Let me tell you, for the record," she says, "Community policing in
places like Red Hook consists of little more than rousting the residents on a day-in,
day-out basis. How come they're not busting people with glasses of Chablis in the
park after the Philharmonic? Open containers! Why stick with the 40s in the
projects?" See Ketcham, supra note 14.
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Even those people who are trying to exercise informal mecha-
nisms of social control-for example through tenants' patrol or
through running youth groups-feel they can do nothing without
the cooperation of the police. For example, at Tenant Patrol meet-
ings and Red Hook Tenant Association meetings, tenant patrol
leaders frequently complained about police absence when they
were sitting on patrol. 150 The absence of police finally caused one
tenant leader to resign when she was threatened by local youths
who sold drugs; she felt that her attempt to work for the commu-
nity was not partnered by the police. 15'
Tenant Patrol Leader: You see the problem is that we are so
distrustful of the police around here ... there is [sic] always eyes
and ears you know, that just going to find out what the tenants
are saying, so they could go back and tell the people who
shouldn't be hearing all that. So we are in a situation where we
don't trust the police and we don't trust our neighbors.
Interviewer: What would make you trust them?
Tenant Patrol Leader: If they would do some of the things that
they are supposed to do. You call . . . you call. OK say the
Quality-of-Life thing that they have, the Quality of Life that
they have is that we are guaranteed to have a secure place
where we live at, we are not supposed to be scared to go outside,
or even to the mail box, because there are people in the hallway.
When we go to the police and tell them, first thing they ask "do
they live in the building?" If they lived in the building, we
wouldn't be calling them. You see they tell us don't call 911 for
certain things; when we call the Quality of Life number we still
don't get any response. We are so tired of the police not caring
about what is going on. Then the Justice Center was supposed
to be designed specifically for this area to deal with what is go-
ing on. Every arrest they make in Red Hook was supposed to
have these people doing community service in the community.
They are not doing it. I haven't seen anybody convicted of a
crime doing community service in the community. You know
and it is like the Justice Center, we never really hear anything
about that. 152
The RHCJC has actively sought the support of the police, but it
has yet to address the issues of police-citizen interactions, or the
responses of police-to-citizen reports of crime. At the same time,
150. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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the police tend to blame the Court's "revolving door"' 5 3 for the
intractability of quality-of-life problems and other crimes in re-
sponse to residents' complaints about the police during community
meetings. It was not uncommon to hear police say that they can
make an arrest, but they had little control once the person is in
court. 54 The RHCJC, in its need for legitimacy within the commu-
nity, sits in the crossfire between citizens and the police. The
RHCJC needs the police to support the Justice Center's daily oper-
ations, and the police similarly need the Justice Center's help in
identifying and punishing serious offenders. 155 The police will refer
residents and complaints to the Court if it trusts the Court to man-
age these problems. Informal interviews with the police, and ob-
servations of court-police interactions show that while the RHCJC
has been successful in gaining the support of the police, it has been
less successful in responding to residents' concerns and acting as a
mediator between the police and the community. Although
smoothing police-citizen relationships was not an explicit goal of
RHCJC, one informal role of the AmeriCorps volunteers has been
to hear citizen complaints about police. This is quite different from
creating a formal or direct channel for residents to directly convey
their concerns about the police, or raising these issues directly in
their interactions with police. Citizens' evaluations of the legiti-
macy of the law and legal institutions are greatly influenced by
their subjective ratings of procedural fairness in their interactions
with police, and many RHCJC residents rated the police poorly in
both interaction quality and crime control. 156 Indeed, a common
informal comment by RHCJC staff recorded after community
meetings was to note that the police could not win; one moment
the neighborhood residents were asking for more enforcement, and
the next complaining that there were too many arrests. 57
This unofficial attitude of the court staff to the contradictions of
the police is conveyed in formal ways to defendants and residents.
For example, individuals who receive summons from the police
often are mandated to attend "quality of life groups."'' 58 When
153. SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 6.
154. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
155. For example, the informal relationships between the court staff and police
mean that the police can alert the prosecutors to known persistent offenders who are
coming in front of the judge and ask for maximum sentences.
156. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
158. RHCJC created "quality-of-life groups" as an alternative to the traditional
system of imposing fines for summons offenses that adheres in the centralized crimi-
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participants express complaints about the validity of their treat-
ment by police, court staff members most frequently respond, in
the groups we observed, that they already had the moment to say
this in front of the judge, but that they are now in these groups to
discuss community problems and why police are giving these tick-
ets. "'59 Court staff focus the group content on how participants in
the groups can ensure that they either avoid another summons or
arrest. Participants' complaints are usually deflected even though
many have not in fact seen the judge because when they arrive for
their summons, they are advised that they can go straight to a
"quality-of life group" and forego seeing the judge if they wish, and
this will mean they can dispense with the ticket more quickly. Re-
sidents obviously appreciate the chance to dispense with their tick-
ets quickly, especially when their court appearance often means
losing pay, however, this format means they are denied any forum
to express their discontent.
Group participants were also not given information about police
precinct meetings where they could voice these complaints at any
of the groups attended by the Authors. 160 Although this service
was not part of the Justice Center's work, residents consistently
identified policing as one of the community conditions that was
problematic for them and that affected their quality of life.16 1 In
one group, residents complained about summonses they had re-
ceived for public urination in a park, and asked why there were no
public toilets in their park. 162 No one took this opportunity to ad-
vise them on how to petition their local politicians to obtain the
types of improved services that could eliminate this low-level crime
problem. 163 Instead, respondents were told that these quality of
nal courts. Each group session lasts about forty minutes. RHCJC staff explain the
impacts of minor infractions-such as an open alcohol container or a dog off a
leash-on the surrounding community. Participation is voluntary, and defendants can
reject the group and ask for an appearance before a judge. Although they are un-
likely to receive a criminal conviction for these types of offenses, defendants face a
tradeoff of a quick and instant disposition with the possibility of a fine for a longer
process that avoids monetary costs. For poor people in neighborhoods like Red
Hook, the choice is obvious. In this dynamic, defendants rarely have a chance to
object to the validity of the summons or to their treatment by the police.
159. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
163. Such problem-solving tactics are a routine part of the "new policing" that
blends targeted enforcement with strategies to address social and other public ser-
vices. See, e.g., David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW &
Soc'y RFv. 765. 765-77 (2001).
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life disturbances are bad for the neighborhood's reputation. In this
case, the opportunity for residents to express questions of fair
treatment by police and distributive justice in a legal or political
forum is exchanged for efficient case processing that gets defend-
ants through the Court and disposes of their summons ticket as
quickly as possible. For residents, it seems that efficient case
processing is exchanged for the opportunity to express questions of
fair treatment by police and distributive justice in a legal or politi-
cal forum. 164
The Court has included the police in discussions about commu-
nity issues. As part of Operation Toolkit, the Court invited police
captains and tenant association leaders to discuss problems in the
local park, and find strategies for its improvement. While these
problem-solving forums are productive, they have neither enabled
"public" discussions that could make the average community mem-
ber feel that the Court was bridging a gap between the police and
the community, nor empowered the community in their relation-
ship with the police. Furthermore, the tenants' association leaders
and other community group leaders have had access to the precinct
captains for some time before the arrival of the RHCJC as the po-
lice captain has tried to attend a variety of community group meet-
ings around the neighborhood as part of his own community
strategy. The RHCJC has yet to provide access to the police for
those who have consistently lacked this access.
So far, the Court has been unable to create a political space
where discussions can take place between the police and commu-
nity residents. While some community members suggested at
Community Advisory Board meetings that the police could hold
workshops for young people in the Court, this was never taken up.
Indeed, when one community member at the Community Advisory
Board meeting began to complain about police activity, and point
out that many young people were still afraid of the police, the
judge got up afterwards to thank the police and remind people
about the work they had done for Red Hook.165
The Court is limited in is ability to influence police strategy and
tactics; these decisions are made at the local precinct level and by
police officials at the highest levels of the police department. Yet,
the Court's work is shaped and strongly influenced by local police
tactics. The Court also has no jurisdiction or influence on citizen-
police interactions, but in the long term, these interactions contrib-
164. See Davis, supra note 136, at 36; Thompson, supra note 5, at 80.
165. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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ute to individuals' overall experience of the law and willingness to
participate in social control or cooperate with police. 166 If re-
sidents remain closed off from venues to express evaluations of po-
licing, the positive experiences they have had with the Justice
Center could be neutralized. It is not enough for the Court to
claim they have no control over the police. There are numerous
examples of new ways that the community and the police can work
together outside of just encouraging residents to turn in drug deal-
ers or spotting signs of disorder.'67 The RHCJC has created many
points of contact with the police, such as police involvement in
Youth Court training. But these structured activities are qualita-
tively different from establishing a democratic and transparent fo-
rum where citizens can dialogue with police on a range of topics,
such as the Beat meetings in Chicago. 168 If the Court could create
such a new forum for productive and cooperative interactions be-
tween police and community, it would then be making real inroads
into changing common sense perceptions among all the stakehold-
ers about law, power, and legitimacy.
5. "Just Another Government Program"
The RHCJC faces a history of poor government in the neighbor-
hood. The relationship between the community and the govern-
ment is one characterized mostly by disillusionment and
disempowerment.169 The RHCJC works within this legacy and has
to battle to overcome it. This is no small task when this concept
has been reinforced in a myriad of legal and quasi-legal interac-
tions, from housing, welfare, and education to other everyday legal
demands. 170
166. Mark H. Moore, The Bottom Line of Policing: What Citizens Should Value
(and Measure!) in Police Performance (Police Executive Research Forum, Washing-
ton, D.C.) (2002). Of course, it is possible that a positive experience in the court
might influence a citizen's perception and evaluation of the police, but contacts with
the police tend to be far more common for most citizens than are contacts with the
courts. See PATRICK LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN
POLICE AND THE PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (2001),
available at http://www.policeforum.org/BJS %20Contacts.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2003).
167. See, e.g., WESLEY SKOGAN & SUSAN HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHI.
CAGO STYLE 5-9 (1997); Jeffrey Fagan, Policing Guns and Youth Violence, FUTURE OF
CHILDREN, Summer/Fall 2002, at 133, available at http:// www.futureofchildren.org/
usr doc/tfoc_.12-2j.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
168. SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 167, at 113-37.
169. See, e.g., Kasinitz & Rosenburg, supra note 9, at 183-84; infra note 149 and
accompanying text.
170. EWiCK & SILBEY, supra note 64, at 144-64.
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The mere presence of the Court is not enough to generate its
own legitimacy or reassure the community about "government."
In Red Hook, the community is accustomed to failure of govern-
ment projects, and as displayed in our interviews, they seem to an-
ticipate these failures.17 The few recent government initiatives
(such as proposals to establish a waste transfer station and another
to start a methadone clinic in the neighborhood) were viewed by
neighborhood residents as threatening to its health and econ-
omy.' 72 The RHCJC is well aware of this challenge. In interviews,
the senior court officials stressed that the RHCJC's existence and
its responsiveness will be a way to restore people's faith in the
courts, other government agencies, and ultimately, government
itself.
Court Administrator: Our position is "Here is a problem, let's
talk agency to agency; how can we fix it?".... So in some ways it
is providing this kind of agency for governmental support for the
community to address issues, which if they were just operating
as a community organization, they may have difficulty.
Interviewer: So it is a little leveraging...
Court Administrator: It's leveraging the authority of the
court.... I would say that part of what we are trying to do [is]
increasing public confidence in the justice system .... You need
to understand that that is what it is being driven by .... You
could make an argument that it is important to remember that
this is really about trying to figure out ways to make the courts
improve, and if it so happens that by putting it out in the com-
munity you are doing a slightly better job that is good. But it is
not only about increasing public confidence in the justice sys-
tem; it is actually increasing confidence in governmental systems
in the way these systems operate.... Six months down the road
people won't remember that there was a time when we didn't do
housing, but everyone will always remember if we do a really
crappy job of dealing with our treatment cases.... tThat] cre-
ates a reputation for lack of integrity in what you are doing. I
am not sure what we will find when we look at how many people
are succeeding in the long term treatment, but I feel very com-
fortable that it is a very rigorous program that we have in place
of tracking defendants on a weekly basis, reporting to the whole
system, bringing people into the court periodically. I guess if
171. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
172. Id. The community's instinctual suspicion of government is activated not only
for potentially harmful initiatives, such as the waste transfer station, but also for more
benign proposals such as the plan to create a business improvement district for Red
Hook. See BERMAN, supra note 97, at 3-4.
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you are going to bite something off you have to show that you
are doing it well, or show that you are making an improvement
over the previous system. 173
Court directors hope this new faith emerges through the Court's
case processing, which is highly individualized and responsive: peo-
ple get the services they need, compliance is rigidly monitored, and
the Court does not encourage a "revolving door" attitude to jus-
tice. The Court is also efficient and services are delivered quickly.
Furthermore, the Court is accountable because it can respond to
complaints from both individuals and community groups. Finally,
as the Court canvasses the neighborhood for problems it can solve,
and as it addresses these problems in new ways, it will also show
the community that the government works for them.
While this may sound reasonable, the Justice Center may be op-
timistic in its assumption of just how far they have to go, even to
prove to neighborhood residents that the Court has arrived for the
good of the community alone. The annual AmeriCorps survey
shows that over seventy percent of Red Hook residents know
about RHCJC, and those who are aware of it generally approve of
what it does. 174 They rarely see the Court as "harmful" to the com-
munity. But the most common assumption that defendants and re-
sidents articulated in the interviews when questioned about why
the Court is in Red Hook, is that the downtown courts are over-
loaded, not that the Court's primary motivating factor is Red
Hook's public good. 175 Furthermore, even those community lead-
ers who have given the RHCJC its full support, such as this Pastor
at a local church, are not without their own interpretations:
Pastor: I think it was for other people's benefit as well as for the
people in Red Hook. But kind of more beneficial for, you know
people got new jobs and big promotions, and you know, they did
a whole building. Some people [in Red Hook] got jobs but far
from what others should have got you know. AmeriCorps, this
that . . . we had new state lawyers, you know the much less
stressful [work] but getting paid the same money....
You use what you got, to get what you need. Some people will
not benefit [from the Court]. It is like any other thing. So if this
is how it has to be done, in order to get the money to support
programs .... They have the wonderful mentoring program....
173. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also KELLI MOORE, CTR. FOR
COURT INNOVATION, RED HOOK PUBLIC SAFETY CORPS: OPERATION DATA 2001
(2003).
175. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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The good, the bad the ugly and the beautiful, it is all there. We
pick out what we can use and what we can't use, and we don't
use it. And we have learned how to do that very skillfully, us
black people, we can pretend like it is not there. We have been
disappointed a lot; we don't trust a lot of people.
176
Others hold a more cynical view, seeing a deception, both in
terms of the ability of the court to live up to its word, and its ability
to share resources. For example, one young man, Edward, who
also runs a youth program said:
Edward: People always write about what they are going to do,
they get these proposals, these grants, and for me it is just
money-making. Yet the residents and the young people, they
are not getting anything out if it. And I think that some people
tend to shy away from the focus of the problem out here, they
can say we are going to fight drugs, we are going to do this, we
are going that, but it is just words, cause you can't fight drugs,
cause drugs is controlled by the government.
Researcher: Very defeatist ... cause you are saying you can't do
anything, how could you fight it?
Edward: The way for people to fight it is to just try to continue
to encourage people, you know trying to provide more preven-
tive programs out here, cause the drugs is not going anywhere, it
has been around for many years and it's not going anywhere.
They know it is a serious drug problem out here and this is
where crime is at ... where drugs is at you need some sort of a
court system to deal with the crime, to keep it on the hush, but
you are not going to eliminate drugs, cause if you eliminate
drugs there is no need for a justice center. 177
Edward's comments suggest that, for some residents, the Court
is being judged on its ability to keep its promise that it is there for
the public good and to improve safety. This was how the Court's
founders gained consensus among different community leaders.
One way that the RHCJC hopes to go beyond the impacts of the
courtroom alone is through Operation Toolkit initiative, discussed
above. 178 This is the Justice Center's major vehicle to help reduce
disorder and engage community residents in the co-production of
security. The RHCJC advocates Operation Toolkit as another way
to restore public confidence in government. Residents bring ideas
for Toolkit projects to RHCJC, and some of these ideas are then
translated into projects designed to rid the community of health,
176. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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safety, and public safety problems. RHCJC then mobilizes public
agencies and residents to work collectively to resolve these
problems.
The idea is promising and innovative, but the early stages of
Toolkit's implementation have been limited. 179 By the end of the
research period, the Court had two projects within Red Hook (and
others in surrounding neighborhoods discussed later). One was to
adopt and clean up the park closest to the courthouse, and to help
establish a "Friends of Coffey Park" and other activities that would
revitalize it. The Justice Center sent community service crews to
the park over the summer to pick up trash. They also organized
clean up drives twice a year with AmeriCorps members, and have
earned commitments from the Parks Department for improved
lighting and groundskeeping. This was one example of a project
that could use the different resources of the Justice Center for a
positive and productive solution. Friends of Coffey Park was
honored as "Park Group of the Year" in 2002 by the New York
City Partnership for the Parks. 8 ' The other project was to clear
cars out of an alley directly opposite the RHCJC building, a prob-
lem that residents complained about directly to the Court. The
project was funded by raising money from RHCJC staff and local
residents to hire a tow truck to remove the cars. Residents were
pleased with the result (reported in a survey conducted by the
court after this project). 8' This project, however, did not achieve
the goals of community building or innovative problem solving.
Community-building would involve the creation of a lasting set of
sustainable programs, rearranged institutional relationships, or the
contribution of tangible assets or structures. This one-time project
to remove abandoned cars had the salutary effect of prettifying the
neighborhood and providing a context for NYCHA residents and
private homeowners to interact productively. But we were unable
179. The research period ended a few months after Operation Toolkit was
launched. The discussion of its implementation should be read as preliminary.
180. BERMAN, supra note 11.2, at 4.
181. The Court's two Outreach Officers distributed a brief, one-page survey to re-
sidents on the block where the cars were removed, to gauge resident satisfaction with
this action. The survey reported a reduction from eighty-five percent to seventy-six
percent in the number of residents who thought that abandoned cars were a problem
in the neighborhood, more than eighty percent credited the Justice Center with taking
effective measures to fix this problem. The survey was conducted for the Court's
internal Lme, and the survey results are stored at the administrative offices of the
RHCHC.
THEORIZING COMMUNITY JUSTICE
to discern changes in social interactions or lasting contributions
from this activity. 182
Finally, and most importantly, the selection by the Justice Center
of which problems to solve has repercussions on the building of the
residents' faith in government. If the Justice Center can focus only
on smaller "problems," such as clearing out abandoned cars, with-
out taking on larger problems at the same time-such as drug sell-
ing and serious violence-it is less likely to restore faith in
government, even though it may be commendable at an organiza-
tional scale. The Justice Center assumes that these smaller, man-
ageable projects will strengthen its relationship with residents and
build legitimacy by addressing small disorder problems that may
grow into bigger crime problems. In this way, the Justice Center
follows the "Broken Windows" theory that these improvements
contribute to public safety. 183
Meanwhile, residents continue to demand more police presence
and better enforcement that targets drug dealers. The RHCJC has
limited scope and resources and must make a strategic decision as
to where to focus its resources in order to be considered a repre-
sentative of government that works both in partnership with the
community and for its public good.184 While many individuals in
the RHCJC are motivated by their concern for Red Hook, it is not
clear if the Justice Center will restore faith in government or
whether the Court is just more of the same-a well-meaning gov-
ernment program that fails to deliver what the neighborhood really
needs. Currently, Red Hook residents continue to attribute many
of their problems to unsatisfactory responses by government agen-
cies, agencies that residents feel could have made an immediate
difference, most poignantly the police and the housing authority.
Residents in Red Hook have welcomed the RHCJC as a new
government program, but its presence alone does not guarantee its
182. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
183. See GEORGE KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RE-
STORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 19-20 (1996); see also
James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken
Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38 (arguing that unchecked crime
leads to multiple crimes by signally that no one cares about the neighborhood; there-
fore, by treating small crimes seriously, serious crimes will be less likely to occur).
But see BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BRO-
KEN WINDOWS POLICING 88-89 (2001).
184. See Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: From Adversarial Litigation to Inno-
vative Jurisprudence: Eleventh Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban Chal-
lenges-The Changing Face of Justice: What Works and What Does Not, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1929, 1953-57 (2002).
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legitimacy. People used to failure and broken promises will judge
the RHCJC on results. If the Court fails to deliver on its promises
to reduce crime, it will be lumped into this local history of failures.
Failure will not necessarily generate a protest against the Court,
but is more likely to produce anomie and inaction on the part of
residents in their decisions to participate in the Court and in the
dynamics of informal social control. In this context, case process-
ing and therapeutic programs will continue. But the danger is that
the RHCJC could remain a symbol of how government fails to act
on residents' articulated needs as opposed to their perceived needs,
ultimately turning the Court into what one (cynical) resident
renamed it-"a ghetto court"-and defeating its larger goals to the
creation of a dynamic that will engage residents in social regulation
and control. To sustain community involvement and accrue legiti-
macy, the Justice Center will have to address the reinforcing cyni-
cism of the neighborhood's unmet expectations.
6. Conflicting Laws and Policies
The concept of a multi-jurisdictional court was advocated in the
first place as a way that one judge, presiding over three courts,
could come to see the same people and provide a more holistic
solution. i5 The standard example was of a parent in court with a
drug problem, in family court because of a problem with her child,
and in housing court due to an inability to pay the rent. These
cases have been very rare in the Court's first two years. The con-
fluence of cases within single families, however, raises the risk of
conflicting claims on the family's resources and legal status. For
example, the Court will have to face the fact that individuals who
accept pleas on drug cases may become eligible for eviction from
public housing projects, which will bring them into housing court.
These problems are cropping up in courts across the country, and
the benefit of the doubt in drug-related eviction orders rests with
the public housing authorities, as decided by the United States Su-
preme Court decision in HUD v Rucker. 8 6 While these issues
185. See Scahcher, supra note 143, at 1.
186. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v Rucker, 535 U.S. 125,136 (2002) (holding that
the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (1994), requires lease terms
that give local public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a
tenant when a member of the household or a guest engaged in drug-related activity,
regardless of whether tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-related activ-
ity). In New York, public housing officials have similar discretion to evict tenants
following conviction of co-residents on drug charges. See Escalera v. N.Y. Hous.
Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323, 1343-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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have yet to unfold in the Court, they could force the judge to mod-
ify his rulings, or could promote community dissatisfaction focused
on the judge and the Court. This is just one example of many that
shows how competing interests reflected in law and various layers
of the criminal justice system can work against each other in the
development of legitimacy. These externalities can impede-if not
defeat-efforts of the Court to bring citizens into a closer relation-
ship with the law.
7. Social Organization and Political Power
In interviews with senior managers, the RHCJC highlights its
community partners and its contribution to the creation of a new
generation of leaders within Red Hook. The RHCJC has em-
ployed eight former members of AmeriCorps all of whom work in
the Justice Center: the AmeriCorps Project Director, the two
AmeriCorps team leaders, the mediation director, the Operation
Toolkit coordinator, the housing resource center coordinator, and
the two community service supervisors. At this level, the Court
may be helping individuals and building individual leadership, al-
though the degree of power these individuals have in the running
of the Court is limited.
The RHCJC confronted a more complicated situation as it tried
to strengthen and create community groups (as opposed to devel-
oping individual leadership skills in a few select residents). As the
RHCJC became part of the social organization of Red Hook and
worked with community leaders, it risked reproducing the same
political and social hierarchy that currently exists within and
around the neighborhood. These local leaders and groups do not
always speak for the majority of Red Hook's residents. For exam-
ple, we often observed disagreements over re-zoning at local com-
munity meetings, where small numbers of well-organized private
landlords were pitted against large numbers of other local re-
sidents. Although Red Hook is a well-defined geographic neigh-
borhood, this area shares resource with other neighborhoods in
Brooklyn. The police precincts, community board, and political
districts that include Red Hook in their jurisdictions also encom-
pass wealthier neighborhoods with vocal leaders and demanding
residents and businesses (Such as Cobble Hill and Park Slope).
This debilitates Red Hook in its most basic struggles for more re-
sources, better services, and improved infrastructure. Red Hook
often is forced to compete with wealthier, better-organized com-
munities that possess the social, cultural, and political capital to get
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what they need. The RHCJC must beware against reproducing
these same fault lines by cooperating mainly with those groups that
recognize established interests in the Red Hook neighborhood,
thereby marginalizing the broader neighborhood's needs. The
RHCJC will have to move well beyond its town hall meetings, in-
frequent Community Advisory Board meetings, and its annual
AmeriCorps survey, to create a sustainable and vibrant forum for
democratic participation of local residents in charting the Court's
future. If such fault lines persist, these divisions are likely to stand
in the way of a full realization of the RHCJC's goals.
One example of the tensions faced by the Justice Center is evi-
dent in the way it has had to resolve the issues of the demands
between those groups in Red Hook who represent the "gentrify-
ing" class and the majority of the Red Hook residents in the public
housing development.8 7 The gentrifiers have often come to Com-
munity Advisory Board meetings and publicly pressured the Court
to help them in their attempts to have traffic laws enforced and to
limit the number of trucks coming into the neighborhood.'88 While
the Court may be less specifically interested in these issues, these
neighborhood groups are well-organized, active at various other
community meetings, and vocal in the local press. Accordingly,
they cannot be ignored by the Justice Center, and, indeed, have the
political skills and access to highjack the Justice Center's limited
resources. While the Justice Center tries to ensure that this does
not happen, it also faces the fact that a wide range of groups can
claim the "community" label to ask for the Justice Center's help.
The RHCJC was designed at the outset to serve Red Hook. 89
But its costs and resources could only be justified if its caseload
were larger than what was generated from Red Hook proper. CCI
thus expanded the Court's jurisdiction to include cases from
throughout the three police precincts that patrol Red Hook: the
Seventy-Second, Seventy-Sixth, and Seventy-Eighth precincts.
Red Hook cases alone were not sufficient in number to fill the
187. Tara Bahrampour, Warehouse is an Emblem of Newest Waterfront Battles, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at CY8.
188. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
189. Planning documents for the RHCJC emphasized its embedment in the specific
problems of Red Hook. For example, one of its grant applications states, "The Red
Hook Community Justice Center, a multi-jurisdictional community-based courthouse,
will apply lessons from Midtown to a self-contained, inner-city neighborhood, bur-
dened with problems common in dense, low-income urban neighborhoods throughout
the country." Ctr. for Court Innovation, Grant Application to the State Justice Insti-
tute (Nov. 1.998) (on file with authors). "Justice Center services will be available to
anyone who lives in Red Hook-victims, defendants and residents alike." Id.
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courtroom and justify the transfer of a Legal Aid office, a district
attorney's office, court officers, and other personnel. Although the
RHCJC is well aware that it serves three very different communi-
ties, it still focuses primarily on Red Hook. CCI's first Executive
Director explained the rationale:
[Diecentralization is not [a] perfect thing .... you can't spend
the money on decentralization and not take a larger area than
you would probably like to take. That is just life. You probably
could do it, and there are some experiments. I want to do but
they are much cheaper experiments many ways but if you are
going to do something like what we did in Red Hook .... You
are going to find that the impacts are different depending on
where it is, and that the focused impact is going to be in Red
Hook, particularly on the community end. You are going have a
more diffuse impact beyond it, and you know that's OK, that is
just how it is going to be. That is not to say that you are going to
ignore your central core, but I think that you are going to have
to be realistic about what you can deliver in Red Hook and what
you can deliver in Smith Street in [Carroll Gardens.] 9 °
Although designed to impact Red Hook, the RHCJC was soon
accountable to two additional neighborhoods, including the
wealthier Carroll Gardens and Cobble Hill neighborhoods, and
Sunset Park, a working class neighborhood with a strong concen-
tration of Latino families in single-family dwellings.19 This was an
artifact of the expansion of the RHCJC catchement area to include
all three police precincts that have patrol sectors in Red Hook. 192
Senior staff members try to go to community meetings throughout
the three areas The inclusion of these other neighborhoods, how-
ever, each with stronger political and social capital, may disadvan-
tage Red Hook in its fight for social and economic resources. At
the least, for those in the community who were told that this is the
"Red Hook Community Justice Center," it has seemed either con-
fusing, or representative of the way Red Hook is always left behind
in reality. One of the leaders of the public housing tenant patrols
noted:
190. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
191. N.Y. City Dep't of City Planning, Demographic Tables, supra note 71.
192. The Executive Director explained that while the socially and geographically
isolated Red Hook neighborhood was the focus of the planning efforts leading to the
creation of RHCJC, the low volume of cases from Red Hook alone necessitated an
expansion of the catchement area to include all the neighborhoods patrolled by the
three police precincts that patrol Red Hook. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
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Tenant Patrol Leader: At the time it seemed like a good idea
because it was focusing on crime. These people in the project
know that if they commit a crime they [are] going to go right
here in the back where they have jails and judges. It was only
supposed to be the second one in the country, and it was only
supposed to be for Red Hook residents. Now I found out that it
is for Red Hook, Gowanus, it is for all over the place. And I
haven't even heard of anybody being sent back there doing
community service in the projects; they are supposed to be do-
ing community service in the projects.' 93
While Red Hook residents may begin to wonder why they are
sharing their precious resources with residents in the other neigh-
borhoods when they were finally promised something to help
them, some of the interviews still show Red Hook residents asking
why Red Hook has received this Court and what good it does
them.'94 At the same time, the situation can be confusing for other
residents in the precincts processed at the RHCJC. One young
man from Gowanus Housing in Cobble Hill was arrested on a tres-
pass charge in the housing development and mandated to a treat-
ment readiness group. He was impressed with the fact he could get
acupuncture and attend this group therapy, but lamented that he
had to come to Red Hook for this, and asked what good that was
for him living elsewhere. 9 5 As administrative lines draw the
boundaries that define these programs and new institutions, these
boundaries can conflict with local understandings of neighbor-
hoods in need.
Red Hook suffers not only from the fact that it has a small num-
ber of active community leaders who maintain a rigid hold on local
power and resources,1 96 but also because the community has lacked
the numbers and the political voice to command the resources it
needs. The RHCJC inadvertently continues this tradition by
broadening its focus to the surrounding neighborhoods. For exam-
ple, when soliciting at the Community Advisory Board meeting for
"problems" to solve through Operation Toolkit, both community
leaders from Red Hook and other interested parties from the sur-
rounding neighborhoods offered suggestions and voiced their con-
cerns. One was a member of a local economic development
corporation who discussed the noise problem being created by up-
193. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
196. Kasinitz & Rosenburg. supra note 9, at 182-84
946
THEORIZING COMMUNITY JUSTICE
scale restaurants and bars in Smith Street in Cobble Hill.'97 This
street is now one of the most fashionable Brooklyn streets, and has
little to do with Red Hook. RHCJC staff offered their services to
help mediate between the businesses, talk to residents, work with
cab companies, the police, and mediation services. 98 While these
are all solutions, this diverts resources and attention that might
otherwise be focused on Red Hook. Another member of the local
economic development group who was also the head of the Police-
Community Precinct Council, asked for a community service pro-
ject to (re)paint the iron work in a local park in Cobble Hill. 199
This park lies amongst million dollar homes. A crew was immedi-
ately dispatched in days and local newspapers came to photograph
defendants "cleaning up the community." Even though the bulk of
the community restitution projects have targeted the Red Hook
neighborhood, none have generated this type of media attention.
These developments created contradictions for the RHCJC be-
tween the political and social organization of Red Hook, the inher-
ent tensions between components of the criminal justice system,
and the theoretical foundations of therapeutic jurisprudence, indi-
vidualized justice, and problem solving that are intrinsic to commu-
nity courts and community justice centers.z° These concepts
connect community and defendant in their shared concerns and so-
cial norms. In the end, the Court's pursuit of legitimacy could suf-
fer as defendants lose sight of these connections and as the Court
stretches its philosophy to accommodate dynamics launched from
the political economy of a "contested" community.20 ' These devel-
opments threaten to compromise the moral communication com-
ponent of the Court's unique form of sanction. As it tries to "heal"
the problems of crime, drugs, and social disorder in Red Hook,
other groups have made claims on the Justice Center, all in the
name of "community." How the Court decides to use its limited
resources, whose problems will be solved and how, are questions
that will have repercussions on the Court's role in each of the com-
munities that claim it as their own.
197. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
200. Thompson, supra note 5, at 83-92.
201. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 148-64.
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CONCLUSION
The RHCJC has created a new court and a new organizational
form for the integration of justice and social services. It has ex-
panded the power of the judge in ways that might be understood
by many to work for the public good-despite the objections of
some defendants and the defense bar.202 Although beneficial and
admirable in many ways, the example of the RHCJC suggests that
efficiency and partnerships with service providers and community
leaders does not necessarily generate a legitimate social institution.
Community courts offer an alternative to the inefficient downtown
court systems and a balance on the alienating power of the uncar-
ing judges. Yet these courts face complex social histories and polit-
ical dynamics that are far more complex than those faced by
traditional centralized courts. Thus, these new courts take on a
huge responsibility. Their broad agenda and inclusiveness raise ex-
pectations among local residents who may be difficult to reach. In
struggling to reach these goals, community courts risk forgetting
their obligations for due process, fairness, and results.
The RHCJC was designed to help rehabilitate a troubled neigh-
borhood by enhancing its capacity for social control. The Commu-
nity Justice Center approach to crimes of "incivility" and
"disorder" was constructed as a promising strategy for not only re-
habilitating low-level offenders, but also for revitalizing the neigh-
borhood itself.20 3 The community justice model conceptualizes
sanctioning as part of a healing process-one where the commu-
nity, the victim, and finally the offender, are simultaneously healed.
Sanctions are part of a larger process of restorative justice and are
fashioned according to their ability to do this, as opposed to being
cast within the rehabilitative or punitive ideal. Although originally
designed to provide a creative and rich mix of social and rehabilita-
tive services to citizens with a variety of legal entanglements and
social problems living in a disadvantaged neighborhood the Red
202. Davis, supra note 136, at 36. The tension derives from the fact that the attor-
ney-client privilege is not suspended in problem-solving courts. The risk is that the
drug court "team" members may see a client or her lawyer as uncooperative if coun-
sel fails to disclose client confidences that can be disclosed only under a waiver of the
protections of 42 C.F.R. Such disclosures are routine in treatment, but not necessarily
in court. See Caroline S. Cooper, Letter to the Editor, 89 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2003, at 12-
14. The National Association of Drug Court Professionals also stated that there is no
dilution of the ethical zealousness of a defense attorney in a problem-solving court,
noting that a guilty plea has no particular therapeutic value. The National Legal Aid
and Defender Association has endorsed this stance. See H. Scott Wallace, Letter to
the Editor, 89 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2003, at 12-14.
203. SVIRiOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 12-14.
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Hook Community Justice Center relies heavily on drug treatment
to address residents' complex personal problems that do not easily
fall into a simplified medical treatment paradigm. Despite its nota-
ble achievements-Operation Toolkit, the integration of Amer-
iCorps volunteers into the neighborhood, efforts to intervene in
the recurring housing tensions between the NYCHA and Red
Hook's poor, the pursuit of individualized justice and remedial in-
terventions for defendants-the Justice Center remains focused on
milling the neighborhood's "disorderly"-the loiterers, the publicly
intoxicated-into drug treatment of uncertain effectiveness.2"4
Still, it produces more than "enough justice"-what Rawls terms
"the good"-to affirm its founding principles.
20 5
The early history of the Court reveals the challenges that are the
product both of unforeseen and distant externalities in policy and
political economy, and internal struggles to adapt to the supply of
cases that arrive at its door. In responding to these challenges, the
Justice Center created its own forms of sanctions and social con-
trol. These new forms of punishment are designed to take place in
a context of "community empowerment," where arrest, prosecu-
tion, and punishment of offenders are designed to rid the commu-
nities of their social problems and to engage citizens in the
dynamics of social control and regulation. Here the goal is to in-
crease "community" participation in crime fighting, with a residual
goal being to improve relations with the residents in the neighbor-
hood in which formal control operates.2 °6 Enlisting the community
in the process of social control has been difficult for the Justice
Center, however, as it often is in poor neighborhoods such as Red
204. See, e.g., D. Dwayne Simpson et al., A National Evaluation of Treatment Out-
comes for Cocaine Dependence, 56 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 507, 507 (1999)
(showing that treatment effectiveness is greater in inpatient treatment compared to
outpatient counseling of the type offered to most of RHCJC's treatment refer-
rals); see also STEVEN BELENKO, NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE
AT COLUMBIA UNIV., RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2001 UP-
DATE 5-7 (2001) (showing that the research designs used in most drug court research
are insufficient to claim that there are significant reductions in drug use or crime
among drug court defendants compared to similarly situated defendants in other
courts or to voluntary drug treatment participants), available at http://
www.casacolumbia.org/usr-doc/researchondrug.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: BETTER DOJ DATA COLLECTION
AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED TO MEASURE IMPACT OF DRUG COURT PRO-
GRAMS, GAO-02-434, at 2-3 (2002) (stating that the available data is insufficient to
claim that court-ordered drug treatment is effective), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02434.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
205. RAWLS, supra note 119, at 393-97.
206. Kurki, supra note 22, at 1.
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Hook.2 °7 The Justice Center's efforts to enlist Red Hook residents
in active forms of social control is challenged by Red Hook's social
exclusion and concentrated poverty, and is likely to remain an elu-
sive goal until these larger structural conditions change. The rea-
sons speak to the complexities of creating a new legal institution in
a neighborhood operating with strong deficits of social capital, so-
cial cohesion, and collective efficacy, the threads of the fabric of
community that are essential to social control.20 8 The danger is
that the Court will simply use the Red Hook community as sym-
bolic partners,20 9 thus reinforcing the legacy of broken promises
that characterizes Red Hook's relations with the government over
decades. For now, the RHCJC remains caught in the laudable and
ambitious nature of its goals
The Red Hook Community Justice Center illustrates the chal-
lenges that community justice centers face in their attempts to cre-
ate unique institutions to re-legitimate legal institutions at the local
level. The therapeutic ethos of the Court offers a source of legiti-
mation, reinforcing traditional codes of moral communication and
understanding. 21° The Justice Center enjoys a strong comparative
advantage in procedural justice-justice as felt and experienced-
over the large, fractured, and impersonal centralized courts, and
reaps yet another quantum of legitimacy. The partnership with
community and solving local problems of crime and disorder also is
an engine for legitimacy. This legitimacy is central to the concept
207. See, e.g., Sampson et al., supra note 57, at 918-24 (showing how concentrated
poverty can undermine the active participation of neighborhood residents in the so-
cial regulation of antisocial behavior); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A
Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 364, 406 (2001); see also
BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 57, at 35-38 (discussing the roles of neighborhood
residents in a systemic theory of social control that integrates formal legal and infor-
mal social control of delinquent behavior)
208. See BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 57, at 15-18, 150-57; Sampson et al.,
supra note 57, at 918-24.
209. See Kurki, supra note 22, at 3 (arguing that that challenge for government will
be to encourage and support the new initiatives without stifling the spontaneity, crea-
tivity, and grassroots ties that are their strengths).
210. See NOLAN, supra note 24, at 58. Nolan cites Judith Kaye, Chief Judge of the
New York State Court of Appeals: "Courts today face a public that, by and large, is
cynical and distrustful of all government, including the judicial system." Judith S.
Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). The engine for
generating legitimacy, according to Nolan, is the appeal to dominant cultural values.
See NOLAN, supra note 24, at 15. Whether those values are individually responsible
for one's crimes, or the beneficence of the court and its continued embrace of rehabil-
itation and redemption for minor offenders, depends on which culture and which val-
ues. The dominant culture on crime is anything but homogeneous. See GARLAND,
supra note 27, at 139-93.
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of leveraging felt justice into social control, and to engaging citi-
zens in partnership with police to enforce social norms and laws.
The gamble in this design is that citizens will see this arrangement
as promoting a model of common good over simple fairness and
efficiency in the courts. Residents are most likely to comply in this
arrangement when they see the Court as a legitimate institution
that works for the good of the community, not simply as a structure
to repair problems of inefficiency in the court system. In the con-
text of a community court, social control is a problem of both col-
lective action and systems of mutual accountability. 21I The Justice
Center will be challenged to engender new forms of social control
without this legitimacy.
211. For discussions of collective action and police-citizen interactions, see Dan
Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1513, 1524-25, 1529 (2002); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107,
11.68-69 (2000).
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APPENDIX A
Table 1
Social and Legal Services at the Red Hook Community Justice Center
Social Services
Partners/Services Role/Function Description Onsite Presence
Clinic (CCI) Counselors Drug treatment, social service Clinic onsite
and Social and mental health referrals;
Worker batterers' programs; case
management; counseling ses-
sions; anger management clas-
ses
Phoenix House Total Absti- Treatment Readiness pro- Three counselors
nence Drug gram; referrals to Phoenix onsite
Treatment House inpatient treatment;
youth development and drug
education group
Board Of Educa- Teacher Morning classes and two eve- Teacher and assis-
tion ning classes; college scholar- tant is onsite morn-
ship help ings; guidance
counselor one day
per week
E.D.N.Y. Addiction Three hour marijuana class, Employee comes in
Counseling twice a week twice a week to give
group
Victim Services Victim Assis- Advise victims; housing refer- Staff member onsite
tance rals; security assistance; assist
with obtaining restitution
CCI Staff/Victim Mediation Mediation services to resolve Day and evening
Services disputes schedule
Youth Court Youth Devel- "Peer" judging in the form of Two evenings a
(CCI) opment & a court, for teens week, full-time
Crime Preven- onsite staff
tion
AmeriCorps Youth Volun- Youth volunteers are placed Office onsite
(CCI) teer Program around South Brooklyn
Fifth Avenue Community Job placement and training Office in Basement
Committee Organization referrals; resum6 advice
Good Shepherd Youth Social Counseling to advise youth of One full time staff
Services Worker Good Shepherd and other onsite
services
Health Education Health Educa- Weekly groups for prostitutes Group twice per
tion Counselor and another for "johns" used week
as a court mandate
Housing Resource CCI employee Housing information; legal Office onsite, one
and General advice and referrals; advocate staff person
Information for needed repairs
(CCI)
Day Care Center Staffed by Available to defendants using Weekdays
(CCI) AmeriCorps RHCJC services
and Safe Hori-
zon
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Park Slope Safe Counselor Domestic Violence Counsel- Twice a week
Homes ing and Advice (Started December
2001)
Community Health Clinic Left RHCJC December 2001 N/A
Health Network
Center for Job Readiness Left RHCJC December 2001 3 mornings a week
Employment Course until departure
Opportunities
H.R.A. Public Assis- Assistance with TANF, SSI, 2 days per week
tance Screen- other income support, and
ing and human resources
Enrollment
Mentoring (CCI) Youth Devel- Mentoring program for local Office onsite
opment high school and middle school
students
Criminal Justice Services
Agency Role/Function Description Onsite Presence
Legal Aide Defense In Court Office onsite
District Attor- Prosecution In Court Office onsite
ney's Office
Probation Officers Sees defendants from court, 3 staff persons onsite
and also monitors juvenile
cases
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DUE PROCESS AND PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURTS
Eric Lane*
INTRODUCTION
The rapid proliferation of "problem-solving courts," particularly
of drug courts, occasions this Article. These progeny of the 1989
Dade County, Florida drug court' can be found throughout the
country. According to one report, there are approximately 500
drug courts operating nationwide, with several hundred more com-
ing on line.2 From these drug courts, a number of other courts
have evolved, all under the problem-solving handle. In New York,
for example, in addition to drug courts, there are community courts
and domestic violence courts.' In the State of Washington there is
a mental health court.4 While disparate in their focus, their "prob-
lem solving" characterization appears to result from a shared, ur-
gent common goal of judicially addressing problems deemed,
usually by the court, as not adequately addressed through the quo-
tidian mills of, at least, the overloaded urban criminal justice sys-
tem. Chief Justice Kathleen A. Blatz of the Supreme Court of the
State of Minnesota has forged a palpable description of this prob-
lem-solving stimulus:
I think the innovation that we're seeing now is the result of
judges processing cases like a vegetable factory. Instead of cans
of peas, you've got cases. You just move 'em, move 'em, move
'em. One of my colleagues on the bench said: "You know, I feel
* Eric J. Schmertz Distinguished Professor of Public Law and Public Service,
Hofstra Law School.
1. For a general discussion of the rise of problem-solving courts, see GRr'G
BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS: A BRIEF PRIMER (2000). For the edited transcripts of two discussions on
problem-solving courts, sponsored by the Department of Justice and the Center for
Court Innovation, see Colloquium, What is a Traditional Judge Anyway? Problem
Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78 (2000) [hereinafter Problem Solving in
the State Courts]; Colloquium, What Does it Take to be a Good Lawyer? Prosecutors,
Defenders and Problem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206 (2001) [hereinafter Pros-
ecutors, Defenders and Problem-Solving Courts]. The Author moderated the first dis-
cussion and observed the second.
2. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 1, at 4.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id.
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like I work for McJustice: we sure aren't good for you, but we
are fast." 5
This emergence of problem-solving courts as an alternative to
"McJustice" has begun to engender debate over the three founda-
tional premises on which problem-solving courts rest: first, courts
are appropriate institutions for solving the undertaken problems;
second, the resources commanded for this problem-solving do not
shortchange the resolution of more important but more complex
problems; and third, the problem-solving protocols employed by
these courts are effective.6
While the outcome of this debate is of enormous importance to
the continued existence of problem-solving courts, there is another
important question. That question is whether problem-solving
courts can be effectively maintained without damage to the individ-
ual protections afforded defendants under the due process mantle
of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and under similar provisions found in state
constitutions.
This question arises primarily in a theoretical and speculative
context because little empirical work has been done on the subject.
There have been few reported cases challenging problem-solving
courts' jurisdiction or procedure, and there is no consistent picture
of the procedures necessary for the operation of a problem-solving
court generally or for a particular type. The question is engen-
dered by the sense expressed by both advocates and critics that
problem-solving courts require a different role for judges, and per-
haps lawyers, than that required by traditional courts. This differ-
ence is sharply expressed in the following remarks of Judge Cindy
Lederman, the first judge in the Dade County drug court, and Pro-
fessor Richard Cappalli, at the December 3, 1999 forum on prob-
lem-solving courts:
Hon. Cindy Lederman: If we as judges accept this challenge,
we're no longer the referee or the spectator. We're a participant
in the process. We're not just looking at the offense any more.
We're looking more and more at the best interests, not just of
5. Problem Solving in the State Courts, supra note 1, at 80; see id. at 82 (quoting
Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals, "[Judges] are excited
about this not because they are re-engineering the world, but because they feel they
are exercising a meaningful role as a judge."). See generally BERMAN & FEINBLATr,
supra note 1.
6. John Feinblatt et al., Judicial Innovation at the Crossroads: The Future of Prob-
lem-Solving Courts, 15 CT. MANAGER 28, 28 (2001).
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the defendant, but of the defendant's family and the community
as well.
7
Cappalli: When judges move out of the box of the law and into
working with individual defendants, transforming them from
law-breaking citizens into law-abiding citizens, we have to
worry. Because what has always protected the bench has been
the law.... If we take the mantle of the law's protections off of
the judges and put them into these new roles, we have to worry
about judicial neutrality, independence, and impartiality.8
The broad question then for this Article is whether Judge Leder-
man's proactive problem-solving judge can judge in a manner con-
sistent with the protection of a defendant's due process rights, or
whether there is something in this problem-solving rendering of a
judge's function that must undermine those protections.
As noted earlier, there is little evidence on which to form a full,
realistic picture of the practices of problem-solving courts. Hence,
the analysis and conclusions will be hypothetical. The "facts" for
this Article include: first, three case studies, The Stanford Drug
Treatment Court ("Drug Court"), The Brownsberg Community
Court ("Community Court"), and The West Jackson Domestic Vio-
lence Court ("Domestic Violence Court"), each containing several
illustrations of typical issues that each court addresses, prepared by
the Center for Court Innovation 9 as the "factual" basis for two dis-
cussion groups convened by the United States Department of Jus-
tice to discuss problem-solving courts; second, the edited,
published transcripts of these discussions; 10 and third, the occa-
sional literature on problem-solving courts. As for the case studies,
they were not intended to provide a full picture of what was hap-
pening in each of the courts from which they were drawn." The
goal of each was to highlight and invite discussion on some aspect
of each court's procedure, which the Center judged might be con-
7. Problem Solving in the State Courts, supra note 1, at 80.
8. Id. at 82.
9. The Center for Court Innovation is an independent research and development
entity of the New York Court System and was responsible for the planning and imple-
mentation of numerous problem-solving courts. The case studies were prepared by
the Center's staff in consultation with a number of problem-solving court participants.
A number of staff members and outside readers also reviewed the studies. The Au-
thor served as one of those readers.
10. Problem Solving in the State Courts, supra note 1; Prosecutors, Defenders and
Problem-Solving Courts, supra note 1.
11. See CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, CASE STUDY: STANFORD DRUG TREAT-
MENT COURT 1 n.1 (1999) [hereinafter DRUG COURT]. The Case Study is reprinted in
Appendix 1 with permission from the Center for Court Innovation.
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sidered unique or of concern. 12 Their goal was to provoke a critical
exploration "before they enter the mainstream" of whether "prob-
lem-solving courts [are] any less protective of individual rights than
the typical state court?"'' 3
After reviewing this material, this Article takes the view that,
with certain cautions, problem-solving judging and lawyering, as
described by the case studies and other available material, need not
be in conflict with due process standards. The cautions relate to
the level of judicial activism pictured in each of the case studies,
particularly the ones describing the community court and the do-
mestic violence court. If such level of engagement needs to be
maintained for the continuation of these courts, it could raise seri-
ous questions about judicial independence and impartiality. Of
particular concern is the community advisory board, which seems
intended to establish a judicial bias. Also problematic is the re-
quirement that domestic violence defendants attend batterer's pro-
grams. Arguably, this is punishment that cannot be
constitutionally justified.
1. AN EXCURSUS FOR COMPARISON
As noted earlier, the spark that charges this due process inquiry
results, at least in part, from the rub between Judge Lederman's
and Professor Cappalli's competing judicial portraits. Such a com-
parison casts an unfavorable shadow on problem-solving courts be-
cause of the inherent suggestion that, whatever they are, they are
lesser judicial institutions than are traditional courts. This, of
course, could negatively influence any study of the due process af-
forded by problem-solving courts. But such a comparison misses
the mark. Problem-solving courts should not be measured against
the standards of the "traditional" courts, but against the backdrop
of Judge Blatz's McJustice courts.
The Sisyphusian goal of these traditional courts is to clear the
chronically over-clogged calendars of urban criminal courts by
trading lighter sentences for guilty pleas in a vast number of cases.
And these calendars have continued to grow.
[T]he caseload increase in the state courts has been staggering.
Take domestic violence, for example. From 1984 to 1997, the
number of domestic violence cases in state courts increased by
77 percent. Or look at drugs: national research reveals that as
12. Id.
13. See Feinblatt et al., supra note 6, at 28.
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many as three out of every four defendants in major cities test
positive for drugs at the time of arrest. The story is no different
for quality-of-life crime. In New York City, for example, over
the past decade the number of misdemeanor cases has increased
by 85 percent.' 4
Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York State Court of Ap-
peals describes the judicial role in New York's urban criminal
courts as "pleading cases at arraignment,"' 15 a portrait confirmed by
Judge Legrome Davis who described how, in one year, he "had
5,000 felony defendants plead in front of me and get sentenced. 16
The image is of a revolving door in which a large percentage of
offenders continuously spend a part of their time offending and
part of their time in jail, apparently waiting to offend again. As
Chief Judge Kaye has noted, "[W]e're recycling the same people
through the system. And things get worse. We know from experi-
ence that a drug possession or an assault today could be something
considerably worse tomorrow."' 17
The goal of the problem-solving courts is to provide an alterna-
tive to this revolving door, assembly line approach to "justice."' 18
In the case of the drug court, the defendant is offered a treatment
program instead of incarceration. 9 The goal is to rid the offender
of her addiction.2 ' In the case of the community court, the defen-
dant is punished for low-level crimes that usually fly below the
criminal justice radar screen. The punishment is usually some form
of community service. The goal is to restore a sense of order to the
community, and secondarily, through selected social programs, to
restore a sense of order to the offender. In the case of domestic
violence courts, the defendant is constantly monitored prior to the
case's disposition. The goal of this monitoring is to provide safe
harbor to the victim and make an offender accountable for her
conduct.
In each case, the defendant can refuse the alternative treatment.
A defendant in a drug court can refuse the treatment, thus subject-
ing herself to the McJustice system. Similarly, a community court
defendant can choose to be processed by the regular system. Fi-
nally, a domestic violence court defendant can refuse the monitor-
14. Id. at 29.
15. Problem Solving in the State Courts, supra note 1, at 82.
16. Id. at 80.
17. Id.
18. See BERMAN & FEINBLAT-1, supra note 1, at 6.
19. Id. at 4.
20. See id. at 3.
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ing program, which most likely will subject him to pre-trial
detention or high bail. This is not to deny the pitfalls of such a
step, including long pre-trial incarceration, but only to state that
what is thought of as the "traditional court" remains available to
defendants.
The questions then become whether any of the procedures em-
ployed by the problem-solving courts are unique (vis-A-vis the
McJustice courts), and, if so, what due process concerns such pro-
cedures implicate. Finally, if such procedures raise serious due
process concerns, whether they constitute bad practices, subject to
remedy, or whether they are an essential element for maintenance
of problem-solving courts.
I!. DUE PROCESS IN THE PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
The following Sections discuss the due process issues raised by
problem-solving courts, as presented by the case studies. For the
most part, these issues are procedural, raising the question of
whether a particular procedure undermines the state's obligation
to guard against an erroneous deprivation of defendant's liberty."
The Domestic Violence Court Case Study also raises a substantive
due process question, namely whether the required predisposition
attendance at a batterer's program is in fact punishment.22
The questions arise from two, perhaps unique, characteristics of
problem-solving courts, at least as described in the case studies.
The first is the reliance that problem-solving courts, at least the
drug and community courts, apparently place on collaborative ap-
proaches to the problems they were created to address. In the
Drug Court Case Study the term used is the "teamwork" ap-
proach. 3 Such an approach raises questions concerning the role of
the defense lawyer in the required plea bargaining and in subse-
quent proceedings. It also raises questions concerning the imparti-
ality and independence of the judge in the acceptance of any such
21. See People v. David W., 95 N.Y.2d 130, 136 (2000) (citing Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). As should be noted from these cases, this Article
applies the reigning instrumentalist approach to due process. In other words, the
question is whether on balance and contextually the procedures requested reduce the
possibility of an erroneous deprivation, and not whether or not the procedures are
fair.
22. "So-called 'substantive due process' prevents the government from engaging
in conduct that 'shocks the conscience,' or interferes with rights 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty."' United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (citations
omitted).
23. The subject will be discussed infra Part III.
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plea and the imposition of sentence. What is the impact of the col-
laborative approach on a defendant's right to effective counsel,24 or
on a defendant's right to have an impartial judge weighing the vol-
untariness and intelligence of the plea? 25
The second characteristic is the active judicial role that all prob-
lem-solving courts envision for their judges.2 6 Judge Cindy Leder-
man, a founder of the groundbreaking Dade County Florida drug
court, has emphasized (and perhaps overemphasized) this role:
"Well, one thing, I'm not sitting back and watching the parties and
ruling. I'm making comments. I'm encouraging. I'm making judg-
ment calls. I'm getting very involved with families. I'm making
clinical decisions to some extent, with the advice of experts. 27
In the case studies, this activism translates into different forms of
judicial conduct. In the drug court study, the question is whether
the judge can be impartial; in the community court study, the ques-
tion is whether the judge can be independent; and in the domestic
violence study, the question is how far the judge can go to protect
the complainant. The case studies contain common issues. For ex-
ample, the concern surrounding the right to effective assistance of
counsel raised in the drug court also could be raised in the commu-
nity court. Unless the analysis would lead to a different conclusion,
these issues are not discussed in any detail more than once.
III. THE DRUG COURT
A. Description
An explosion of drug-related crimes and high recidivism rates
pushed Stanford's Judge Frank Smith to reexamine his judicial
role. "If addiction was driving the majority of his caseload,
shouldn't the court be doing something about it?" 28 The result of
this reexamination was the establishment of a drug treatment
court. The Stanford model drug court uses a "teamwork" ap-
proach; the team consists of the judge, the prosecutor, defense
counsel, court social workers, and off-site treatment providers.29
24. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) ("An error by counsel,
even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.").
25. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (holding that the standard
for the validity of plea bargains is a voluntary and intelligent choice among defen-
dant's alternatives).
26. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 1, at 8-9.
27. Problem Solving in the State Courts, supra note 1, at 82.
28. DRUG COURT, supra note 11, at 2.
29. Id. at 3.
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Prosecutors are the gatekeepers to the drug court, using eligibility
guidelines that basically reduce drug-related charges to nonviolent
charges.3 ' Once a defendant is routed to a drug court, she is ini-
tially assessed by a court-retained social worker, who makes treat-
ment recommendations. 31 The information gathered by the social
worker is then subject to a waiver "allowing for a limited disclosure
of information. '32 Counsel does not participate in defendant's de-
cision to sign the waiver: The treatment providers chosen by the
court employ both in- and out-patient treatment methodologies,
which can last for several years.34 Considerable information passes
between the program administrators and the courts concerning
court-sentenced patients .3  A determination of eligibility is trans-
lated to a plea offer in which the defendant is offered drug treat-
ment in return for a guilty plea to some specified offense.36 The
plea is conditioned upon a "backup" sentence in the event that the
treatment is not successfully completed, or a dismissal of the
charge if the treatment is successfully completed.3 7 The plea is re-
duced to an agreement that contains the sanctions for noncompli-
ance, which include, as a last resort, sentencing for the pled-to
crime and several interim sanctions that "run the gamut from writ-
ing essays to sitting in the courtroom all day to spending a week in
jail. "38
B. A Teamwork Approach to Plea and Sanction 39
The defendant, Rogers, has been charged with distributing co-
caine and faces a maximum of twenty-five years if he is convicted
of the top count in the indictment. Defense Counsel Simkins in-
forms Rogers of a treatment diversion offer made by the prosecu-
tor. Under its terms, Rogers would plead guilty to a lesser felony
count, and enter an eighteen-month in-patient drug treatment pro-
gram. If Rogers successfully completes the program the charges
against him would be dismissed. If he fails to complete the pro-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The following scenario was taken from CASE STUDY: STANFORD DRUG
TREATMENT COURT. See App. 1.
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gram, he would serve thirty-six months incarceration. As part of
the discussion of the plea, the following exchange occurs:
Rogers: Look, I know they found twelve rocks in my shoe when
they searched me. But I thought you said you could try to get
the case thrown out.
Simkins: Well, nothing is certain, but you do have a pretty good
Fourth Amendment issue. If the judge agrees that the police
didn't have the right to stop you. . . . But . . . you would be
taking a real risk by going forward on a motion to suppress. If
the judge didn't throw out the evidence, you'd be back where
you are now, except the amount of time you'd be facing would
probably be more.... Right now, even though under the statute
you can get up to ten years in jail for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, the government has agreed that your "back
up" time would only be 36 months .... That's if you take the
deal today .... Let me be clear: you can always ask for treat-
ment in this court, but the longer you wait, the more time you
would likely face if you don't follow through with your program.
Rogers: Can they do that? Try and force me to get
treatment?...
Rogers: Well, what do you think I should do? . . . You're my
lawyer.
Simkins: The ultimate decision has to be yours Mr. Rogers.... I
think you have a really good suppression issue-not a slam-
dunk, but good. Aside from the legal questions, though, you
should ask yourself what you think is best for you. Even if we
got this charge dismissed, where would you be? You told me
you thought you needed to clean up. Here you have been given
the chance to get off the street for a while. I'm not saying it
would be easy-you'd have to come back to court every two
weeks, do drug tests all the time, and lose your freedom for a
while. It's a good deal, though, if you can make it through.
Rogers: So, if I test dirty, then I've gotta do the time?
Simkins: No, you won't fail out with a few dirties; but you will
face sanctions. ...
Rogers: Man, I don't know what to do.... A year and a half in a
program is a long time, especially if I still might wind up doing
time anyway. But, I do want to start cleaning up ....
Simkins: Well, think about it. Your case won't be called for
about another fifteen minutes or so.40
Rogers then agrees to the plea. There is no reference to the
Judge's conduct in accepting the plea. The decision to take a plea,
40. Id. at 5-6.
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even in return for a lesser sentence or a treatment alternative, is a
grave decision in our criminal justice system, the "most important
single decision in any criminal case."41 As the Supreme Court has
written:
That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only
with care and discernment has long been recognized. Central to
the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the
defendant is the defendant's admission in open court that he
committed the acts charged in the indictment [or to lesser
charges]. He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is
shielded by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do
so-hence the minimum requirement that his plea be the volun-
tary expression of his own choice. But the plea is more than an
admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that
judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial-a
waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.42
In the plea bargaining process, the role of the defense counsel is
to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances,
pleadings, and laws involved, and then to offer his informed opin-
ion as to what plea should be entered.43
Simkins' eagerness for Rogers to accept the treatment model
borders on the aggressive, raising the ethical question of whether
the lawyer is making the plea decision for the client.4 But, in and
of itself, this exchange between lawyer and client raises no due pro-
cess questions unique to drug courts. Any lawyer may push a de-
fendant, even too hard, in a particular direction. A defendant can
later challenge that effort as ineffective assistance of counsel,
41. I1 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMI-
NAL CASES § 201, at 339 (1988).
42. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (citations omitted).
43. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1992) (stating that a defense lawyer in a criminal
case has the duty to advise her client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge
appears to be desirable); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assis-
tance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REv. 841, 841-49 (1998) (arguing
that defense counsel must provide an informed opinion, but that this standard is
loosely enforced by the courts); discussion infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
44. See MODEL RULES OI PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1998) (requiring a lawyer
to abide by client's plea decision after consultation); see also N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (noting the absence of any prohibition on lawyers seeking
treatment for a client as part of plea bargaining, but further noting that nothing
should compel defendant to plead guilty).
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claiming that the defense counsel did not simply offer an opinion,
but rather coerced the defendant into accepting it.45 Success in
such challenges is unlikely. As one court has written, "[a]dvice-
even strong urging by counsel-does not invalidate a guilty plea."46
And well it should not, if the McJustice system, which depends
upon pleas, is to continue. A lesser standard would lead toward
the chaotic. As the Supreme Court has described:
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney per-
formance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would en-
courage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal
trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly
come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's un-
successful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness
to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of coun-
sel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could
dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense
counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and under-
mine the trust between attorney and client.4"
What is of concern here, though, is not the pressure commonly
applied by a defense counsel to secure a plea that, hopefully, she
thinks is appropriate, but the avowed "teamwork" overlay on that
pressure. This raises the more fundamental question of the defense
counsel's independence.
In the representation of a defendant, "counsel owes the client a
duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest."48 If such a
teamwork approach, in fact, requires a defense counsel to push a
defendant towards treatment, regardless of facts underlying the
charges, such a standard cannot be satisfied. The term "in fact" is
used to recognize that under the reigning effective counsel doc-
trine, the primary question is whether there has been "actual inef-
fective assistance of counsel."4 9 In other words, even assuming an
45. A defendant's chances of succeeding in such a claim are very limited. The
courts have given lawyers wide latitude. See United States v. Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747,
753 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that allegations of ineffective counsel were not sustainable
solely because of the defendant's claim of coercion to decline plea offer); see also
Zeidman, supra note 43, at 869-70 (discussing the courts' treatment of the defendant's
claim of ineffective counsel because of coercion).
46. Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 933 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Lunz v. Hender-
son, 533 F.2d 1322, 1327 (2d Cir. 1976)).
47. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
48. Id. at 688.
49. Id. at 684. The test in Strickland is twofold: first, the defendant must identify
the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reason-
able professional judgment. Id. The court must then determine whether, in light of
all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
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actual oath of fealty to the teams and its goal of drug treatment, it
would seem that, under Strickland, the defendant would have to
establish that the defense counsel obeyed such an oath, or other-
wise acted as an agent of the team in that particular case.
Of course, it is doubtful that such team allegiances and efforts
are so sharply cast. Few within the criminal justice system would
abide by such palpably violative conduct. More likely, the team
approach signifies a common understanding of how to resolve cer-
tain types of cases, once the defense counsel fulfills her role of ex-
ploring the merits of the charge and its defenses. Such a common
understanding no doubt forms part of the underpinnings of the
everyday workings of the present criminal justice system. In a set-
ting in which the defense counsel (legal aid, appointed counsel,
counsel from law school clinics), the prosecutor, and the judge are
all "regulars," in that they work together daily in the same court-
room, they develop shared goals, attitudes, and rules of conduct
that allow the system to work and the participants to work to-
gether. While this "shared" approach raises some troubling ques-
tions concerning the role of counsel and judge, it does not itself
raise unique problems for the problem-solving courts.5 ° From this
perspective, it easy to understand Judge Kluger's conclusion in
What is a Traditional Judge Anyway? Problem Solving in the State
Courts, that "if we are going to have to apply that kind of pressure,
isn't it better that the pressure is in a life-changing direction...
?" Judge Kluger's comment invites exploration of the role of the
drug court judge. That role is to accept a plea, impose a sanction,
and then monitor the sanction. 2 Does a judge's perception that
the treatment alternative may be "life-changing" undermine the ju-
dicial obligation to assure that a plea "represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to
professionally competent assistance. Id. In making that determination, the court
should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional
norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. Id. At
the same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of rea-
sonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. Second, any deficiencies in counsel's per-
formance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance under the Constitution. Id. at 692.
50. For an early study of the bureaucratic allegiances of defense counsel, see
Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, I LAw & Soc'y REV. 15 (1967).
51. Problem Solving in the State Courts, supra note 1, at 210.
52. See DRUG COURT, supra note 11, at 4.
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the defendant? '5 3 To determine the voluntary and intelligent
choice, states require that a plea can only be accepted "after the
trial court fully and fairly apprised [the defendant] of its conse-
quences and ascertained by appropriate questioning that he had in
fact committed the crimes to which he was pleading and that the
plea was freely and voluntarily made."
54
Can Judge Smith assure that this standard is fulfilled? He has
led the effort to create the hypothetical Stanford Drug Treatment
Court, for which:
The goal . . . would be not only to adjudicate the facts of the
case, but also to address the problem that brought the defendant
to court in the first place: namely, addiction. The idea was
straight-forward-the court should actively try to solve the un-
derlying problem of addiction. . . . It would use its coercive
power to achieve the concrete goal of moving defendants from
addiction to sobriety.55
Does this commitment to treatment for addiction result in deaf-
ness to the possibility that the addicted defendant did not commit
the charged crime? The answer must be that it is possible in a
given case that the court might rush to treatment, but that the com-
mitment to a treatment alternative for addicted defendants does
not disqualify judges from accepting pleas in drug courts.
C. The Judge as Monitor: Ex Parte Communications
The acceptance of the plea and imposition of the sentence does
not end the court's role in the defendant's life. Central to the alter-
native drug treatment model is the role of the judge in monitoring
the progress of each defendant through "extensive communication
between the court and the community-based programs; the court
informs the treatment programs of each defendant's compliance
conditions, and the programs keep the court informed as to de-
fendants' progress. '"56
Illustrations Two and Three provide examples of extensive court
involvement. In Illustration Two, the defendant, Laura McManna,
is before Judge Smith on an update appearance. She has been
clean for three months after an early relapse resulted in the court-
53. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
54. People v. Burgos, 451 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890-91 (App. Div. 1982).
55. See DRUG COURT, supra note 11, at 2.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 6.
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room observation sanction.5 8 Attorney Simkins announces that
McManna is in the process of preparing for her GED exam. 9
Judge Smith then proceeds to present McManna with a reward, a
leather-bound journal for keeping track of her progress.6"
Simkins next steps forward to request that McManna be permit-
ted to complete her treatment at an out-patient program.61 Judge
Smith is hesitant to grant the relief and informs Simkins that he
will discuss the matter with the court's clinical director during the
lunch break.
Closing down the court for lunch recess, Judge Smith stops by
the office of the drug court's clinical director .... Mr. Brown
supervises the court's social workers, and he is recognized to be
the court's authority on the various community-based treatment
programs used by the court. In speaking to Mr. Brown, Judge
Smith learns that 90% of those defendants who are able to suc-
cessfully complete the first phase of the court's treatment com-
ponent-remaining clean for four months-have either
successfully graduated from the program or are still active in
treatment after two years.... With regard to Ms. McManna, Mr.
Brown believes it would be best for her to remain in the in-
patient program, at least until she makes it past the four month
threshold.62
Following lunch, Judge Smith announces "Ms. McManna, I have
given your request a good deal of thought and have spoken with
our clinical director, who is an expert on drug addiction. At this
time I think you should continue at Pine Hills [the in-patient
center]. "63
Illustration Three provides a somewhat different scenario. In
this case, Frank Granada is alleged to have absconded from his in-
patient treatment program, been found sleeping on a bus, and has
tested positive for cocaine.64 This is Mr. Granada's second absence
from the program, and according to his agreement, he will receive
a sanction of between fifteen and twenty-eight days in jail.65 A
third absence would result in his termination from the program.
When given a chance to speak, Granada tells the courts "I left New
58. Id. at 6-7.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7-8.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Horizons but I was going to go back. I only left to visit my aunt.
She's real sick. And, I didn't use cocaine .... I took one of my
aunt's painkillers for this back injury I have .... I swear it."' 67 To
which the Judge Smith replies: "I simply don't believe you"' 68 and
sentences him to fifteen days. During this proceeding Mr. Simkins
attempts to speak on behalf of Mr. Granada but is cut off by Judge
Smith.69 "Counsel, I am talking to Mr. Granada. I want to hear
what he has to say for himself."7
Two possible problems arise from these exchanges. The first is
the communication between Judge Smith and Brown. They speak
both generally about drug rehabilitation, and specifically about
McManna's case.71 On the basis of this conversation, Judge Smith
rejects McManna's request.7 2 Does this ex parte exchange between
Judge Smith and Brown regarding McManna's case violate any due
process tenet? The answer is no for two reasons. First, in order for
McManna to even complain of the communication, she must have
a constitutionally protected interest that might be restricted by the
exchange. Does McManna have a constitutional right to out-pa-
tient treatment when her sentence was in-patient treatment?
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex73
would seem to answer this question in the negative, at least under
the Constitution. In Greenholtz, the Court made clear that a con-
victed party had no constitutional right to release before the expi-
ration of a valid sentence. 4 State courts have announced similar
rulings.
Even if a constitutional right existed, it is doubtful that the ex
parte communication between Judge Smith and Mr. Brown, at the
post-disposition time, would violate due process. Under the doc-
trine announced in Williams v. New York,76 a sentencing court is
entitled to a broad range of information that would be:
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
74. Id. at 16.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1340 n.44 (D.C. 1981) (stat-
ing that "unquestionably, there is no right to post-conviction bail."); Gilmore v. Kan-
sas Parole Bd., 756 P.2d 410, 415 (Kan. 1988) (holding that the state's parole statute
did not create a liberty interest in parole).
76. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
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[U]navailable if information was restricted to that given in an
open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination .... The
type and extent of this information make totally impractical if
not impossible, such open court testimony with cross-examina-
tion. Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal adminis-
tration in a retrial of collateral issues. 7
Again, state courts have adopted similar reasoning. 78 While
McManna, of course, is not actually being sentenced in this in-
stance, effectively her request for a reduced sentence is part of the
ongoing sentencing process and governed by the same rules.
Illustration Three, on the other hand, may present a different
and more problematic situation. Assuming that the incarceration
is a loss of liberty, the court is obliged to balance the individual
interest, the state's interest, and the value of any advocated proce-
dures for avoiding an erroneous deprivation.7 On that basis,
should Granada be able to contradict the positive cocaine test and
establish the truth of the excuse for his absence? For example,
should he be able to call witnesses? If the question is whether Gra-
nada was absent from the treatment center for whatever reason,
and whether such an absence can trigger an incarceration under
the terms of the sentencing agreement, then no serious due process
question arises, unless Granada were to contest his absence. If, on
the other hand, the incarceration is dependent upon determining
the truth of Granada's excuses, the process due will depend mostly
on how severe a loss of freedom the incarceration is judged to be.
If the loss is analogized to a prison discipline restriction, such as
solitary confinement or the loss of good time, less than full adver-
sarial rights are required. The Supreme Court has found that due
process is satisfied when the prisoner is afforded the following: ad-
equate notice of the claimed violation; the written statements of
evidence that are relied on; and an opportunity to call witnesses
and present evidence in defense, as long as such efforts would not
unduly jeopardize prison safety. 0 If, on the other hand, the loss is
analogized to parole and probation violations, more procedural
rights attach. For example, the Supreme Court has held that, in
such cases, procedural protection includes the opportunity "to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evi-
77. Id. at 250.
78. See, e.g., People v. Peace, 219 N.E.2d 419, 421 (N.Y. 1966); Buchea v. Sullivan,
497 P.2d 1169, 1.174 (Or. 1972).
79. See Mathews v. Elderidge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
80. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 (1974).
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dence [and] the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses."'" There would also likely be the right to counsel, although
the Supreme Court has determined that the need should be as-
sessed on a case-by-case basis.82 Here, even if your view of Gra-
nada's liberty interest is that it is tantamount to that of a prisoner
subject to discipline, Judge Smith acted too summarily in response
to Granada's defense. Assuming again that the defense could have
an impact on the fact or time of incarceration, Mr. Granada should
have had the opportunity to offer proof that, for example, the drug
he had taken was a pain killer.
IV. THE COMMUNITY COURT
A. Description
The Brownsberg Community Court was established to address
low-level criminal activity, such as "prostitution, drug dealing, pub-
lic drinking and vandalism" that was beginning to overrun the
downtown section of the community.83 In effect, the central court
system had basically ignored these crimes, sentencing almost all of
those who pled guilty (seventy-five percent at arraignment) to time
served, the time locked up waiting for arraignment.84 There was no
real distinction between those found guilty and those whose cases
were dismissed. This led to a downward spiral in police attention
to such cases.8 Why should they bother if the courts were simply
going to release offenders without punishment? Additionally, such
a system did nothing to address the problems underlying the com-
mission of such crimes.86
The community court is actually a misdemeanor arraignment fa-
cility where police bring defendants charged with the above-de-
scribed crimes instead of the normal centralized arraignment
court.8 7 At the court, an attempt is made to create a profile of the
defendant, including information on the defendant's employment
status, criminal record, drug use, health, and housing situation.88
This information is added to the court's computer database, which
81. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
82. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
83. See CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, CASE STUDY: BROWNSBERG COMMUNITY
COURT 1 (1999) [hereinafter COMMUNITY COURT]. The Case Study is reprinted in
Appendix 2 with permission from the Center for Court Innovation.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id.
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allows the judge to have a readily available profile of the defendant
at the time of arraignment.8 9 Based on the alleged crime and the
background material, a plea offer is extended to the defendant at
arraignment.90 If the plea is rejected, defendants are returned to
the central court for further proceedings. 9' If the plea is accepted,
the sentence is immediately imposed.92 The sentence is almost
never time served. 93 "Almost all defendants are required to per-
form community service in order to pay back the neighborhood
they have harmed. These projects, supervised by a community ser-
vice coordinator employed by the court, include graffiti removal,
improvement of park gardens, or office assistance for local non-
profit organizations. "94 As part of their sentences, many defend-
ants must also participate in treatment programs (for example,
drug treatment), which are offered at the court facility. These pro-
grams remain available on a voluntary basis after the sentence has
been served.
The court maintains a continuous dialogue with the public de-
fenders, prosecutors, social service staff, and the community over
new sentencing options and the effectiveness of the existing
sentences.9 Additionally "every month Judge Green convenes a
panel of community members and police officers to hear about
concerns and changes in the community." 96
B. The Community Advisory Board
Illustrations One and Two highlight the unique role the commu-
nity court judge plays in formally soliciting and considering com-
munity viewpoints. These illustrations also establish a context in
which to evaluate the proceedings that occur in Illustrations Three
and Four. In Illustration One, Judge Green is in her chambers
meeting with her community advisory board, a group of people
representing various segments of the neighborhood. 97 Also pre-
sent are law enforcement representatives and court personnel.98
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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The head of a block association informs the court of growing con-
cern about prostitution, which is disrupting the neighborhood. 99
The corner of Park and Main has been awful lately-nothing
but prostitutes, 'johns,' and noise. The same cars-filled with
guys looking to buy sex-drive around and around all night
long. They shout and honk their car horns until the early hours
of the morning. I can't get any sleep. Everyone in our building
is sick and tired of it. 100
At one point in the conversation, a local parent suggests that the
sentence for "johns" should be a car honking in their neighbor-
hood until the early morning.' This comment fosters in Judge
Green the thought of confronting defendant "johns" with the com-
munity impact of their crimes, which will be discussed below. 10 2
Concurrently, law enforcement representatives inform the group
that they have received a number of similar complaints, and are
planning an undercover sweep on that particular corner.103 As the
meeting ends, a number of business owners inform the judge that
their stores have been the target of a graffiti spree.0 4 Judge Green
tells them that she will consider using a community service team to
remove the spray paint. 10 5 To the business owners this response
seems eminently sensible.'06 "That would be terrific. Let the
group who made the mess clean it up for a change." 107
Illustration Two opens a window on a meeting of Judge Green
and her community court staff, which include the court's mediation
expert, its community service coordinator, and the court's clinical
psychologist.10 8 They are discussing the community meeting which
all attended. 09 The community service coordinator agrees to send
a clean up crew to the graffiti-hit business area."" They then turn
to a conversation about the prostitution problem. ' The psycholo-
gist reports on research supporting facilitated meetings between of-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 6.
102. See infra Part IV.C.
103. COMMUNITY COURT, supra note 83, at 6.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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fenders and victims.11 2 "[I]t helps offenders to realize that their
acts have harmed the community, and it allows the community to
play a role in the criminal justice process."' 13 The import of this
observation later impacts the sentence Judge Green imposes on a
"john. 1 114
Both of these illustrations present a picture of a proactive judge,
set to use her coercive powers to remedy immediate "community"
problems learned about through her community communications
system.
Such judicial proactivity has raised questions of judicial imparti-
ality. At the first of the Justice Department discussions, Judge
Lederman described criticism she apparently experienced as a
problem-solving judge:
You need a lot more courage as well, because you will be subject
to tremendous criticism from your colleagues. "Are you being
impartial? Do you know too much so that you can no longer be
impartial?" I can't tell you how many times I have heard that.
Which leads me to one of my favorite quotes, which is "The ju-
diciary is the only profession that exalts ignorance."1"5
Too much knowledge, itself, is probably not the basis of the criti-
cism noted by Judge Lederman. No one really expects or wants a
lawyer, upon becoming a judge, to self-exile herself to a judicial
monastery. Even describing the concern as over-impartiality, at
least in the most narrow due process sense, seems too narrow.
There the question would be whether the presiding judge can im-
partially review the defendant's guilty plea or whether she can pre-
side impartially over any post-conviction "monitoring" hearings.
In other words, the judge does not participate in the processes
through which a defendant's guilt is determined.
What is unsettling about these Illustrations, specifically Illustra-
tion One, is the film of Judge Green presiding over an apparently
formal and regular meeting of both law enforcement officials and
community representatives, assembled to discuss "community"
problems and community-suggested remedies. The broad question
raised by this scene is whether the community court has moved
from a more central posting on the balance between political insti-
tutions (the legislature, the executive) and the individual toward a
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Problem Solving in the State Courts, supra note 1, at 80.
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more political role as policy formulator and enforcer. 1 6 If so, the
move raises a challenge to the traditional notion of the court as an
independent institution, having "neither force or will, but merely
judgment. " 7
Looking more specifically at the described meeting, the presence
of law enforcement officials reporting to Judge Green on the types
of complaints they have been receiving casts Judge Green almost
as a magistrate in the European inquisitorial model, ready to serve
the state. Such a setting may violate Canon 4(C) of the 1990
American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct,118
which prohibits judges from consulting with an "executive... offi-
cial except on matter's concerning the law. .... "119 Aside from the
canon, the broad due process concerns are evident, given judicial
responsibility for protecting the rights of defendants from the over-
reaching of law enforcement and in providing impartial judgments.
The presence of community representatives also could challenge
Judge Green's judicial independence, or the public sense of such
independence, by creating an expectation in the community repre-
sentatives that the judge would act on their suggestions. Even
worse, such a meeting might engender a sense of obligation to act
on these suggestions or worse, a commitment to a jointly estab-
lished agenda. Even the appearance of such an obligation would
run counter to Canon 1, which declares that "an independent and
honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society,"' 120 as
well as Canon 2(B), that prohibits judges from conveying or per-
mitting others to convey "the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge would be in conflict.' 1 21
Placing this concern in a larger context, such formal meetings
tend to impose legislative values upon the judicial function. For
example, the community leaders who attend these meetings are no
doubt influential in other aspects of community life, including the
processes through which judges are either appointed or elected. It
would be hyper-sanguine to think that disappointment over a
116. For a discussion of this point, see Carl Baar & Freda Solomon, The Role of
Courts: The Two Faces of Justice, 15 CT. MANAGER 19, 19-27 (2000).
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
118. The 1990 American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct is the
successor to 1972 ABA Code. The Code is not binding on judges unless adopted by
their states. All but two states (Montana and Wisconsin), the District of Columbia,
and the United States Judicial Conference have adopted codes modeled on either the
1990 or 1972 Model Code.
119. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCt 549 (1990).
120. Id. at 547.
121. Id.
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judge's failure to act on a community leader's views expressed in a
formal setting would not translate into the judicial selection
process.
Does the above emphasis on judicial independence require judi-
cial isolation from civic engagement? The answer to this question
must be no. As one state's highest court has written, incorporating
a commentary to the Model Code: "We agree emphatically that
complete separation of a judge from extrajudicial activities is
neither possible nor wise; he should not become isolated from the
society in which he lives." ' 2 Not only is it impossible to isolate the
court from opinion-shaping influences, but also it would be danger-
ous to do so. The public's understanding of the role of the court
system is extremely important to the system's ongoing legiti-
macy. 23 "In the absence of non-judicial activities that reflect the
tenor of a judge's ideas, the public and the bar will have no way of
knowing of the jurist's proclivities. A ban on non-judicial activities
will not erase biases, it will simply hide them."1 24 Judges also bene-
fit from civic activity. Judging requires that judges "live, breathe,
think and partake of opinions in that world. '1 25 But such activity
cannot be limitless. The question is where to draw the line. The
answer of necessity is general and somewhat circuitous. "This line
should not be drawn to eliminate all perceivable evils and tempta-
tions. Rather, the delineation should give the members of the judi-
ciary every reasonable degree of latitude, barring activities only
where they do measurable damage to the court's.., appearance of
impartiality."1 26 To which should be added "independence" or
"appearance of independence." Of course, this exploration of judi-
cial civic engagement does not directly provide an alternative to
Judge Green's community advisory board, with its emphasis on
very particular problems within the court's remedial power. And it
is not certain that such an alternative is possible, as it seems that
the goal of this advisory board is to provide a "community" bias in
122. In re Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669, 683 (Mass. 1978) (quoting CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCr Canon 5(A) cmt. (1972)).
123. See Kevin M. Esterling, Public Outreach: The Cornerstone of Judicial Indepen-
dence, 82 JUDICATURE 112, 112-13 (1998) (explaining how maintaining public confi-
dence through community involvement is vital for allowing courts to act as
independent decision-makers).
124. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICs 313-14 (3d ed.
2000).
125. Robert McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9, 12 (1970).
126. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 124, at 315.
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judicial decision-making. Otherwise what purpose does the board
serve?
C. The Plea Offer, Counsel's Advice, the Plea's Acceptance
Illustrations Three and Four include pleas of guilt and the impo-
sition of particular community court-type sentences. 127 Both in-
clude offenses discussed in the meeting described in the earlier
illustrations. In Illustration Three, George Rojas is charged with
defacing public property by spraying the phrase "Y2K" on the side
of a delivery truck.128 At arraignment, after spending a night in
jail, the prosecutor offers the defendant a plea to disorderly con-
duct and a sanction of time served . 29 The court disagrees with the
offered plea and a new plea is offered. 3 '
Judge Green: Do you want to take a moment to re-think your
offer, counselor? I don't see how time served does anything to
repay the community.
Assistant District Attorney Wright: Judge, on second thought,
we'd like to offer a plea to disorderly conduct and recommend a
sentence of eight hours of community service, which I think will
send a strong message to Mr. Rojas about the impact of his
behavior. 31
The plea is then accepted by the defendant after Judge Green
"engages the defendant in the required plea colloquy."'' 32 Judge
Green's interference with the offered plea unfavorably affects
Rojas's liberty interest. But does it violate Rojas's due process
rights? The answer is no. The prosecutor is not offering a plea to a
lesser charge, but just offering a lesser sentence for the same
charge that the court judges ought to be more severely sanctioned.
Basically the judge's discretion in this instance is unchallengeable.
Even if the question were one of offering a reduced sentence, the
court is under no obligation to accept a plea offered or
negotiated. 33
In Illustration Four, Judge Green is eager to impose a new sen-
tencing option on "johns."' 34 The sanction requires defendants to
127. COMMUNITY COURT, supra note 83, at 8-10.
128. Id. at 8.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 8.
132. Id.
133. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 21.3(e) (2d ed. 1992).
134. COMMUNITY COURT, supra note 83, at 9.
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participate on a "community impact panel," which, in effect, is a
facilitated meeting between three defendants and three community
members at which "the community would let the offenders know
how they have affected the community; the offenders would be
permitted to respond, to apologize, and to offer the community
suggestions for dealing with the problem of prostitution." '135 The
sanction has been fashioned by the court's community mediation
specialist.1 36 The defense bar has expressed some concern about
the new sanction, particularly because information disclosed at
such meetings might be usable against the defendant. 137
Ronald Slip is the first defendant to be subject to the new sanc-
tion. 38 He has been arrested for soliciting sex for money from a
police officer. 139 The prosecutor offers the new sanction as part of
the plea. 41 Susan Jones, the defense counsel, is aware that Slip
would not be sentenced to any jail time in the centralized court.' 4'
She is also aware that requesting an adjournment to the centralized
docket would require additional trips to court for Slip. 142 In the
end, after discussing the offered sanction with Slip, Jones an-
nounces that Slip is prepared to accept the offer. 43 The actual dis-
cussion between the two is not reported, but we can assume that it
would not differ much from the conversation that took place in the
drug court illustration.
But screening these cases through Judge Green's commitment to
community input might result in a different outcome. Does the
fact that the court is committed to community service in such in-
stances make a difference? Judges have points of view on the
value of various forms of sentencing and, as long as they are within
the court's authority to impose, such views are not disqualifying.
But, if the commitment to community service is a product of agree-
ment with the community that, for example, everyone charged with
disorderly conduct will receive community service, then the defen-
dant has been denied due process because her case, in effect, is not
being heard.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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V. THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT
A. Description
The West Jackson Domestic Violence Court was established to
address a number of problems relating to the prosecution of do-
mestic violence crimes.'44 Police officers did not take domestic vio-
lence with the necessary seriousness or were unaware of the grave
dangers faced by complainants; abused women did not wish to
press charges or testify; and defendants were often sentenced to
probation without conditions, despite research that indicated that
the risk of continued victimization was substantial. 145 At the time
the West Jackson Court was established, attitudes about domestic
violence had begun to shift, but the system remained unable to
provide adequate resources to address the problems of how to pro-
tect the safety of domestic violence victims and to build a solid case
against the defendant. 146 The goal of the court is "to ensure the
safety and well-being of victims," and to hold defendants accounta-
ble. 147 There are two prongs to this effort. The first is a concen-
trated effort to establish a "safety plan" for the victim and any
children. 48 This is effected by the prosecutor's office and victim
advocates. 14 9 The second is to monitor the activities of non-incar-
cerated defendants. 50 The case begins in a normal arraignment
part where bail or conditions of release are set.1 5 1 The case is then
sent to the domestic violence court, which is basically a court part
dedicated to addressing domestic violence cases. 52 Judge Hender-
son presides in this court.1 53 After a case has been put on his
docket, he reviews the pre-trial status of each defendant.154 He
makes sure that every defendant is subject to a protective order. 155
And "[d]efendants who are not held pending trial are required to
attend a batterers [sic] counseling program once a week as a means
144. CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, CASE STUDY: WEST JACKSON DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE COURT 3 (1999) [hereinafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT]. The Case Study is
reprinted in Appendix 3 with permission from the Center for Court Innovation.
145. Id. at 2.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 4.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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of keeping tabs on them." '156 Also, it is significant to note that case
studies attribute no remedial value to the counseling program,
describing it as "a means of keeping tabs on them."' 57
Key to the success of this court is its monitoring program. The
center of this program is the resource coordinator, a court staff
member who sits in the well of the court. 58 The coordinator's job
is to maintain a computer database on the status of both the defen-
dant and the victim, and to report regularly to the judge.'59
Sources for this data are the batterer's program, police, victim ad-
vocates, probation officers, and others.160 The normal monitoring
progress is a status hearing with the defendant every two or three
weeks. 16 1 Prior to the hearing, the judge reviews the case status
with the coordinator. 62 If an issue is raised, the judge confronts
the defendant with the issue and gives him an opportunity to re-
spond. 163 If the defendant is non-compliant, the judge may change
his release condition or detain him. 164 If an emergency arises, for
example, threatening the complainant, the coordinator is supposed
to be notified and an immediate hearing is scheduled. 65
At some point, defendants will plead guilty or go to trial. No
defendant who pleads guilty or is convicted is given straight proba-
tion. 6 6 At a minimum, defendants on probation must return to
court every two months and visit regularly with their probation
officers. 167
B. The Judge Speaks Out
Illustrations One and Two of the Domestic Violence Case Study
focus on Judge Henderson outside of the courtroom. 16 In Illustra-
tion One, Judge Henderson has convened his monthly "domestic
violence court partner session," meetings "between all of the enti-
ties who work together on domestic violence cases."' 169 Included at
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 5-7.
169. Id. at 5.
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this session are "a number of West Jackson police officials, proba-
tion officers, court clerks, intervention counselors for batterers,
staff from the local domestic violence shelter, victim advocates, jail
staff, and the domestic violence court's resource coordinator. 17 0
In Illustration Two, Judge Henderson is at the women's centers at
the state college, speaking on a panel on domestic violence. 71
With him is an advocate for a victim's group, the chief of police,
and a local prosecutor. As part of his presentation, Judge Hender-
son observes:
In the past, our society viewed domestic violence as a private
matter.... Problems between husbands and wives, boyfriends
and girlfriends, and same-sex partners were considered outside
of the law. Luckily, times have changed and courts all over the
country have finally begun to work cooperatively with police,
prosecutors, and battered women's advocacy organizations to
protect victims, ensure their safety, and hold abusers accounta-
ble for their actions. 1
72
And in retort to a question from a female student, who had felt
fearful and angry after an earlier West Jackson domestic violence
murder, he noted that "[the] domestic violence [court] was created
to address her concerns.' '1 73
Illustration One raises the same concerns raised by Judge
Green's community advisory board. Illustration Two raises a more
traditional judicial question regarding what limits, if any, ought be
placed on public outreach. Applicable again is the discussion of
Judge Green's community advisory board. In short, "a judge ought
to be able to express an opinion-pro or con-about controversial
legal issues, as long as neither the words nor the context suggest an
unwillingness to follow the law .... ,,174 There is nothing in Judge
Henderson's statement that would seem to offend this standard, by
aligning himself with a particular side on a political debate or
prejudging a particular case.
C. The Batterer's Program
Illustrations Three and Four return us to the court room. Illus-
tration Four focuses on the extension of an order of protection and
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 7.
173. Id.
174. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 124, at 333; see In re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 374
(Wash. 1998).
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the question of whether such an order should stop a couple from
seeking counseling. 175 The problem is the absence of the complain-
ant and no evidence that she wishes the order to allow such family
counseling.1 76 The events described signal no particular problem-
solving court problem discussed elsewhere or any problem at all.'
77
In Illustration Three, the defendant, Chin, is asking for a bail re-
duction. 78 Chin has been accused of assaulting his girlfriend,
Wanda Smith. 179 The prosecutor is willing to agree to lower bail if
the defendant agrees to a curfew and participation in a batterer's
intervention program. 181 The defense counsel objected to this con-
ditioned bail reduction, arguing that Chin has no record of domes-
tic violence and that participation in the batterer's program and the
curfew will harm his reputation and interfere with his work.' 8 ' The
defense counsel also argued, "[I]f the allegations in this case in-
volved strangers, you would not be ordering any kind of condition
of release-let alone a batterer's program. '182 Judge Henderson
ignores this argument, as well as Chin's assertion of his innocence,
and consequential protestation that the program would have no
value for him." 3 In response to this latter point, Judge Henderson
declared:
I'm not sending you to this program for your benefit-it's for
the benefit of Ms. Smith and the people of West Jackson....
While you are awaiting trial, it is my job to make sure I know
what you are doing, when, and how. As for your guilt or inno-
cence, you'll have your day in court to present a defense, if you
so choose.
18 4
Chin capitulates, is monitored for several months, including re-
ceiving calls at home from Judge Henderson, and is finally tried
and acquitted. 85
The above exchange demonstrates a unique aspect of domestic
violence courts. The "problem-solving" occurs prior to the disposi-
tion of the case, whether that disposition is through plea or trial.
175. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CouRT supra note 144, at 9.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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This means that Chin is being sent to a batterer's program, and is
subject to a curfew without admitting to, or being adjudicated, a
batterer.' 8 6 In this case, the defendant must choose between jail
(in lieu of bail) or the proffered conditions. This seems a bit odd
given Judge Henderson's concerns about the protection of the
complainant and the weekly program attendance requirement.
18 7
Perhaps Judge Henderson was concerned that he could not main-
tain this high level of bail, or any bail, given Mr. Chin's profile, or
that he might make the bail. 8 Apparently, though, such program
attendance is a requirement for any alternative to pre-trial incar-
ceration." 9 Judge Henderson will require a defendant, already out
on his own recognizance, to attend the program as an added condi-
tion of that defendant's continued release.' 90 According to the Do-
mestic Violence Case Study, "defendants who are not held pending
trial are required to attend a batterer's counseling program once a
week as a means of keeping tabs on them."'' The fact that prob-
lem-solving in domestic violence courts precedes disposition should
heighten judicial attention to the due process protections afforded
defendants whose guilt has yet to be established.
Considering the due process concerns, what constitutional
grounds support Judge Henderson's requirement of attendance in
a batterer's program, a limitation on the defendant's physical and
reputational liberty? The traditional basis for pre-trial detention,
risk of flight, 192 does not seem to be an issue in this case. Rather
the argument is that attendance at the batterer's program is neces-
sary to protect a witness, in this case, the abused complainant.
Does such a purpose support commitment to a batterer's program?
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the Due
Process Clause supports additional pre-trial detention purposes,
such as protecting a witness, 93 or obstructing justice. Similarly, in
Schall v. Martin, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that permit-
ted the pre-trial detention of a juvenile on any charge after a dem-
onstration that the juvenile might commit some undefined future
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979); Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d
1188, 1195 (N.Y. 1979).
193. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987) (upholding the Federal
Bail Reform Act of 1984).
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crime. 194 State courts, as a general matter, need not1 95 and have
not read their constitutions as broadly. 196 The New York Court of
Appeals, for example, has pronounced that, under its due process
clause, 197 "[t]he only legitimate purpose for pre-trial detention
then is to assure the presence of the detainee for trial."' 98 Never-
theless, New York's lower courts have allowed behavioral modifi-
cation programs as a condition of bail.199 In one such case, in fact,
a trial court upheld attendance at batterer's program as a condition
of release. z00 The judge reasoned that:
Until there is a determination of guilt or innocence the court is
responsible not only to seek justice by safeguarding the rights of
the defendant; it must also insure that the complainant is secure
and that societal peace is preserved during the pendency of the
action. Directing a defendant to attend alternative to violence
courses helps insure this.
Rather than implying guilt, attendance at the program, in tan-
dem with its educational benefits, reminds the defendant, as
does the order of protection, that although at liberty, he is still
bound by the dictates of the court, which can rescind his liberty
on his failure to abide by those dictates.
In requiring attendance at such programs, the court feels it is
less likely that a temporary order of protection will be violated.
Such a condition thus assists the court in its responsibility to se-
cure the peace and protect the family.20 1
This reasoning is too quick, at least as it relates to the Domestic
Violence Court Case Study. It basically draws its analysis from the
federal jurisprudence that holds that non-punitive, rational alterna-
tive bail purposes are constitutionally supportable, if not excessive
in relationship to the alternative purpose. 0 2 Punishment is defined
as a restriction on liberty that does not have another legitimate
government purpose that such restriction rationally furthers.20 3
Attendance at a batterer's program has a branding effect on a de-
194. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984).
195. See People v. Keta, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (N.Y. 1992) (finding greater protec-
tion for the defendant's right against search and seizure in the state constitution).
196. See LaFave & Israel, supra note 133, § 12.3(a).
197. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
198. Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1195 (N.Y. 1979).
199. See, e.g., People v. Bongiovanni, 701 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
200. Id.; see Halikipoulos v. Dillon, 139 F. Supp. 2d 312, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (up-
holding a shoplift program as a condition of bail).
201. Bongiovanni, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
202. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 537-38 (1979).
203. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
DUE PROCESS & PROBLEM-SOLVING
fendant's reputation, which is part of a person's liberty interest.2 °4
It is hard to understand subjecting Chin to such a substantial
diminishment of his liberty right for such limited state purpose.
Unlike the court in People v. Bongiovanni,20 5 Judge Henderson
provides a much more accurate description of the program's goal-
to allow the court to keep tabs on Chin.2 6 But how weekly attend-
ance at the program effects this goal is unclear. It also seems un-
necessary, given the availability of the curfew and other
alternatives, such as the order of protection and continuous report-
ing to a parole officer. Simply put, the program appears to be of
no real value, consequentially, it seems punitive. Thus, Chin is be-
ing required to attend an almost valueless batterer's program be-
cause of a complaint, which he denies.
If attendance at a batterer's program is a punishment, it may also
raise double jeopardy issues. Under Supreme Court doctrine, a de-
fendant cannot be subject to multiple punishments for the same
offense.2 °7
Even if Judge Henderson has the authority to compel Chin's at-
tendance at the batterer's program, the procedures used to arrive
at this restriction do not satisfy procedural due process. Chin is
still entitled to an individual determination that he presents a
threat to the complainant.20 8 Such a determination does not consti-
tutionally require a mini-trial with attendant procedural rights, par-
ticularly given the relative minimum restriction of weekly
attendance at the program. 20 9 But it does require that the state
assert reasons or evidence why the defendant ought to be retained
or subject such a level of bail.2" It does require that the defendant
be offered an opportunity to assert the reasons why he ought not
be subject to the conditions requested by the state.211 From these
arguments, the court must make a judgment on whether to limit or
condition the defendant's fundamental right to liberty.2 12
According, to the New York State Court of Appeals:
204. See Quinn v. Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Chilingirian v.
Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir. 1989)).
205. Bongiovanni, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
206. See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT, supra note 144, at 8.
207. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
208. The rationale for using weekly attendance at the batterer's program for this
purpose is elusive, given the court's skepticism over its tempering value.
209. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
210. See People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 71 N.E.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. 1947).
211. See id.
212. See id.
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The bailing court has a large discretion, but it is a judicial, not a
pure or unfettered discretion. The case calls for a fact determi-
nation, not a mere fiat. The factual matters to be taken into
account include:
"The nature of the offense, the penalty, which may be im-
posed, the probability of the willing appearance of the defen-
dant or his flight to avoid punishment, the pecuniary and social
condition of defendant and his general reputation and character,
and the apparent nature and strength of the proof as bearing on
the probability of his conviction. ..2.3
At a minimum, taking into account factual matters, requires an
impartial judge, at least one willing to assess and weigh the argu-
ments for and against restrictions on Chin's liberty. Is Judge Hen-
derson constitutionally impartial? Both his public speech and
expressed anger toward Chin would suggest a negative answer.
The charge itself appears to be determinative for Judge Henderson,
leading to the conclusion that such a charge in this court carries
with it an irrebuttable presumption that the defendant is too dan-
gerous to be released without conditions. This is not to argue that
Judge Henderson, like Judge Smith of the drug court, cannot have
a point of view on the treatment of certain categories of defend-
ants; but only to argue that advocacy cannot be or appear to be
determinative without regard to the case's particular facts.
These criticized practices of Judge Henderson do not seem cen-
tral to the due process success of the domestic violence courts.
Neither refusing invitations to anti-domestic violence "rallies," nor
restraining one's comments concerning the perceived virtues of do-
mestic violence courts would appear to end their effectiveness. Af-
fording the defendant a reasonable opportunity to present his
arguments for relief would not appear to end their effectiveness
either.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis of problem-solving courts is based on case
studies intended to portray "typical" problem-solving courts. The
comparative aspects of this analysis are with the McJustice courts
and not an idealized version of the court system. The goal of prob-
lem-solving courts are to restore a sense of order and justice to a
judicial system that to many seems chaotic and broken. Whether
these courts are successful awaits future judgment. Addressing
213. See id. (quoting People ex rel. Rothensies v. Searles, 243 N.Y.S. 15, 17 (App.
Div. 1930)).
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some due process concerns now will improve their chances for suc-
cess. These concerns resolve around judicial activism, which, in the
case of community courts, undermines judicial independence and,
in the case of domestic violence courts, punishes prior to
conviction.
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APPENDIX 1*
CASE STUDY: STANFORD DRUG
TREATMENT COURT 214
CONTEXT
Recent years have witnessed an explosion of drug-related crime.
The evidence can be seen on the nightly news and felt in our court-
rooms. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, almost 1.6
million state and local arrests were made for drug law violations in
1997.215 During that same year, in both Chicago and New York
City, approximately 80% of adult males tested positive for illicit
drug use at the time of their arrest.216 Drug crime recidivism is a
large part of this story: the Justice Department estimates that more
than half of defendants convicted of drug possession are likely to
recidivate with a similar offense within two to three years.217
BACKGROUND
Frank Smith is a judge in the Stanford criminal court system.
Over the years, he has been assigned to arraignments, a misde-
meanor calendar, and a general felony docket. By 1997, his 12th
year on the bench, Judge Frank Smith had handled hundreds of
cases-conducting hearings, ruling on motions and presiding over
trials. Many of the cases presented a different version of the same
tale: indigent defendants arrested for non-violent, drug related
* EDITOR'S NOTE: This Case Study has been reprinted with permission from the
Center for Court Innovation. The Case Study has undergone only minimal editing.
214. This case study is one of a set of case studies written by the Center for Court
Innovation in 1.999 as part of the briefing materials for a series of roundtables that
brought together leading academics and practitioners to explore some of the ethical
and legal challenges presented by problem-solving courts. These case studies were
not intended to describe best-or even appropriate-practice in problem-solving
courts. Instead, they were deliberately written to highlight possible tensions between
problem-solving courts and traditional practice in the courts and to provoke
conversation among roundtable participants. The case studies were written by a team
that included: Greg Berman, John Feinblatt, Scott Schell, and Mae Quinn. The
Center for Court Innovation would like to offer thanks to the following people who
commented on earlier drafts of the case studies: Cait Clarke, Susan Knipps, Eric
Lane, Roy Simon, and Michael Smith.
215. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, DRUG POL'Y INFO. CLEARING-
HOUSE, DRUG DATA SUMMARY 2 (April 1999).
216. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, ADAM 1997 ANNUAL REPORT ON ADULT AND JU-
VENILE ARRESTEES (NCJ-171672).
217. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE & TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROJECT AT AMERICAN UNIV., LOOKING AT A DECADE OF DRUG
COURTS 6 (June 1999).
DUE PROCESS & PROBLEM-SOLVING
crimes. And, in all too many cases it seemed the defendants were
drug addicts.
Unfortunately, the only sentencing options that were readily
available to Judge Smith were incarceration or probation. Given
limitations on resources and the number of addicted offenders
serving time, it was almost certain that a defendant sentenced to
incarceration would receive little in the way of drug treatment.
Similarly, overworked probation officers often did not have the
time, resources, or energy to find appropriate treatment programs,
let alone diligently monitor defendants who were ordered to obtain
treatment as a condition of probation. As a result, almost all ad-
dicted defendants passed through the system without meaningful
intervention to curb their addiction.
And, in the end, whether Judge Smith sentenced an individual
defendant to incarceration or probation, it was rarely the last time
the defendant would see a courtroom. Some time later-five
years? three years? six months?-the defendant would wind up
back in the system again, re-arrested for another defense. Then the
whole process would begin all over, sometimes in front of Judge
Smith and sometimes in front of another judge, with higher stakes
for the defendant who was by this time a predicate felon. In es-
sence, feeling like his work wasn't making much of a difference,
that he had become part of what critics were calling the "revolving
door" of justice, Judge Smith grew more and more frustrated. This
frustration drove Judge Smith to consider the broader implications
of his own efforts. If addiction was driving the majority of his
caseload, shouldn't the court be doing something about it?
PLANNING
Finally, in 1997, Judge Smith decided to lead an effort to estab-
lish a drug treatment court modeled after the country's first drug
court launched in Dade County, Florida in 1989. Judge Smith pro-
posed to court administrators that all non-violent felony drug cases
in the region be routed to a single, specialized courtroom, over
which he would preside. The goal of the court would be not only to
adjudicate the facts of the case, but also to address the problem
that brought the defendant to court in the first place: namely, ad-
diction. The idea was straight-forward-the court should actively
try to solve the underlying problem of addiction in addition to
processing the case. It would use its coercive power to achieve the
concrete goal of moving defendants from addiction to sobriety.
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After numerous meetings, Judge Smith won the support of court
administrators, elected officials, and community advocates. Others
were more skeptical. For instance, the local defense bar was con-
cerned about diverting judicial attention and energy away from de-
termining whether defendants were guilty or not guilty. And, since
much of the information disclosed by individuals in treatment is
usually treated as confidential, the thought of having a judge be-
come actively involved in defendants' progress in treatment raised
eyebrows. Moreover, defense attorneys were nervous about the
potential for judicial prejudgment of their clients, as well as the
danger of widening the net of government control over them.
Police were also worried about the implications of the new court.
They wanted to know what impact it would have on their work.
Would the court be soft on crime? Would their drug enforcement
efforts be a waste of time since defendants would be going to treat-
ment and having their cases dismissed?
Despite these initial questions and concerns, over time, local
prosecutors, defense attorneys, police, probation officers and drug
treatment providers all came to the table, willing to test a new ap-
proach to what everyone agreed was a problem that had resisted
conventional solutions. Together, they worked with Judge Smith to
create a pilot program, using funds provided by the federal
government.
The program was based upon the notion that a court could use
its coercive power to engage defendants in drug treatment. By es-
tablishing a framework for handling cases and making treatment
available, and by gaining the support of prosecutors and defense
counsel for this structure, the drug court sought to substantially
eliminate case-by-case judgments regarding sanctions and rewards.
Defendants receiving help for their drug problems would become
the norm, rather than an exception. Moreover, each defendant
would have a good understanding of what the deal was before
agreeing to participate.
DRUG TREATMENT COURT MODEL
The Stanford drug court, like most others, uses a "teamwork"
approach. The team-consisting of Judge Smith, the prosecutor,
defense counsel, court social workers, and offsite treatment provid-
ers-works together each day towards the goal of helping addicted
defendants achieve and maintain sobriety.
Under the scheme adopted during the planning process, the dis-
trict attorney determines which cases coming into the system
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should be routed to the drug treatment court. To accomplish this
task, intake prosecutors review all new felony drug cases to see if
they have features that would make them ineligible for the drug
court. As indicated in written eligibility guidelines, cases involving
alleged high-level drug dealers, drug ring organizers, or dealing
near schools, are usually left to be handled by regular criminal
court judges. While defense counsel has no formal role in deciding
which cases are selected, some defense lawyers have contacted the
screening prosecutor to argue for diversion. Sometimes these ef-
forts prove successful. Sometimes not.
Cases routed to the drug court are prosecuted by a designated
drug court assistant district attorney, Paula Phillips. Ms. Phillips
has served as a Stanford prosecutor for ten years. She has worked
on hundreds of drug cases, and was selected for the job based upon
her experience and interest in the project.
Similarly, most cases calendared in the drug court are assigned to
a single public defender, James Simkins. Mr. Simkins was origi-
nally opposed to working as a "team" member in a drug court. At
first blush the thought of regular collaboration between the prose-
cutor and defense counsel seemed antithetical to the notion of
zealous advocacy. And he recalled being taught that a defense at-
torney should be concerned about a client's expressed interest, not
necessarily his best interest-even though he now understands that
the choices for a practicing defense lawyer are seldom so black and
white. After reflecting on the complexities of representing defend-
ants and receiving some encouragement from Judge Smith-a
judge before whom he had appeared on many occasions-Mr. Sim-
kins decided to accept the assignment.
At the outset, Mr. Simkins did not wholeheartedly "sign on" to
all components of the program. Nevertheless, he approached the
position with an open mind. After all, he saw first-hand the devas-
tating impact of addiction on his clients' lives. And he knew from
experience that those defendants who did not receive treatment
were likely to recidivate. He felt certain that this new program
would complicate the decisions faced by his clients, but he also was
intrigued by the possibility that his clients would receive meaning-
ful help for the problems that brought them into the system.
Once they are routed to the drug court, defendants meet with a
drug court social worker for a full addiction assessment to screen
out those cases where defendants do not need drug treatment. The
drug court hired its own social workers for this job, rather than
asking the local probation department or pretrial services agency
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to fulfill this role. These hires were possible because of funds pro-
vided by the federal government. However, it is the hope of the
court that the state legislature will provide funding for the salaries
of the social workers in future court administration budgets.
Because of the confidentiality concerns flagged by defense coun-
sel during planning, defendants are asked to sign waivers allowing
for a limited disclosure of information learned during the initial
assessment. In most cases, the defendant signs the waiver after re-
ceiving an explanation from the social worker assigned to the case,
but without the advice of a lawyer. The initial assessment allows
social workers to form treatment recommendations based upon in-
formation such as the defendant's criminal record, his present
charges, the severity of his addiction, his community ties, and his
employment and housing status. This information also is available
for the court to consider.
Defendants who plead guilty to charges against them in the drug
court, usually a reduced felony count, are ordered into a recom-
mended drug treatment program by Judge Smith. If they success-
fully complete treatment, the plea is vacated and the charge is
dismissed, leaving them without a conviction-a substantial incen-
tive for participation.
The treatment programs used by the court are community-based
programs run by private, non-profit agencies that were solicited by
court administration staff. Both in-patient and out-patient in na-
ture, these programs last anywhere from a few months to two years
in duration. There is a close working relationship and extensive
communication between the court and the community-based pro-
grams; the court informs the treatment programs of each defen-
dant's compliance conditions, and the programs keep the court
informed as to defendants' progress. The programs promise to
make treatment slots available to the court, in exchange for the
court's commitment to make use of them.
Judge Smith-using a carrot and stick approach-plays a signifi-
cant role in moving defendants from addiction to sobriety. Judge
Smith follows the progress of each defendant in treatment through
updates frequently provided by the community-based programs.
Successful defendants are rewarded with applause, reductions in
the frequency of court appearances, and writing journals. Re-
lapsing or non-compliant defendants are quickly confronted and
must pay the consequences of graduated sanctions. Sanctions run
the gamut from writing essays to sitting in the courtroom all day to
spending a week in jail. The sanctions for non-compliance are
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spelled out for defendants in treatment agreements they sign at the
time they enter their guilty plea. The drug court takes into account
the realities for addicts trying to kick their substance abuse habit,
allowing them a number of opportunities to return to treatment
after relapsing. However, if over time a defendant fails to success-
fully complete a court ordered drug treatment program or is re-
arrested, the case will proceed to sentencing before Judge Smith.
ILLUSTRATION ONE
At 8:45 in the morning, attorney James Simkins meets with de-
fendant Charles Rogers in a court holding cell to discuss Mr. Rog-
ers's upcoming hearing before Judge Smith. At the last hearing,
two days before, the government offered to allow Mr. Rogers to
plead guilty to a lesser felony count of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine versus distribution of cocaine for which he was
originally charged. If Mr. Rogers pleads guilty, he would be or-
dered into an 18-month in-patient drug treatment program and if
he successfully completed treatment, the charges against him
would be dismissed. If he fails to complete the program, he would
serve 36 months' incarceration. "Mr. Rogers," Mr. Simkins begins,
"I know we have discussed your case a number of times, but I just
want to be sure you understand your options. The prosecution has
offered to let you plead to a lesser offense as part of the treatment
diversion offer. If you reject this offer you are facing up to 25 years
if convicted of the top charge."
Defendant Rogers tells Mr. Simkins he understands that part,
but doesn't understand the treatment component and why the
court would be interested in dismissing the charges against him.
"Well," Mr. Simkins explains, "this is a drug treatment court. In
these courts, the goal is making sure you get help for your addic-
tion. So, after you plead guilty, instead of serving a regular sen-
tence, the court would order you into the drug treatment program
recommended by the social worker you met with a few days ago.
In your case, the social worker has recommended that you be
placed in an 18 month in-patient drug treatment program."
"How did she come up with that?" Mr. Rogers asks.
Mr. Simkins continues, "The social workers are specially trained
in addiction cases. Your social worker considered all the informa-
tion you gave her-about your history of drug usage, your drug of
choice, the amount of drugs you use on a regular basis, your crimi-
nal history, your housing needs, and other things. She made her
decision based on her experience and with the help of the court's
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computer program-which calculates all the information she inputs
and spits out an analysis of your level of addiction. The recommen-
dation is pretty standard for people with your history of drug use
and the charge you're facing."
"Look, I know they found twelve rocks in my shoe when they
searched me. But I thought you said you could try to get the case
thrown out." Mr. Rogers tells Mr. Simkins.
"Well, nothing is certain, but you do have a pretty good Fourth
Amendment issue. If the judge agrees that the police didn't have
the right to stop you, the drug evidence against you would be sup-
pressed. But," Mr. Simkins warns Mr. Rogers, "you would be tak-
ing a real risk by going forward on a motion to suppress. If the
judge didn't throw out the evidence, you'd be back where you are
now, except the amount of time you'd be facing would probably be
more."
"What do you mean? Why more time?" Mr. Rogers asks.
"Right now, even though under the statute you can get up to ten
years in jail for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the
government has agreed that your "back up" time would only be 36
months' incarceration. So, if you failed out of treatment, or took
off, or got rearrested-the worst you would get on this case would
be 36 months. That's if you take the deal today. If you don't take
the deal today and we lose on the motion, the government will
probably ask for more backup time. That's the way it works. Let
me be clear: you can always ask for treatment in this court, but the
longer you wait, the more time you would likely face if you don't
follow through with your program. Does all of that make sense?"
Upset, Mr. Rogers asks: "Can they do that? Try and force me to
get treatment?"
Mr. Simkins explains that they don't have to offer him any deal
at all, and reminds him that he is presently facing up to 20 years
since he is charged with distribution.
"Well, what do you think I should do?" Mr. Rogers asks,
"You're my lawyer."
"The ultimate decision has to be yours Mr. Rogers," Mr. Simkins
begins. "I think you have a really good suppression issue-not a
slam-dunk, but good. Aside from the legal questions, though, you
should ask yourself what you think is best for you. Even if we got
this charge dismissed, where would you be? You told me you
thought you needed to clean up. Here you have been given the
chance to get off the street for a while. I'm not saying it would be
easy-you'd have to come back to court every two weeks, do drug
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tests all the time, and lose your freedom for a while. It's a good
deal, though, if you can make it through."
Mr. Rogers asks Mr. Simkins: "So, if I test dirty, then I've gotta
do the time?"
"No, you won't fail out with a few dirties; but you will face sanc-
tions. You'll have to sign an agreement when you enter the plea
saying you agree to the sanctions in advance-so you'll know what
they are. For instance, after a certain number of dirty urine tests
you would spend a weekend in jail. Too many mistakes, though,
could result in you having to do your agreed upon sentence."
"Man, I don't know what to do," Mr. Rogers says. "A year and
a half in a program is a long time, especially if I still might wind up
doing time anyway. But, I do want to start cleaning up. Things
have gotten pretty messed up for me lately."
"Well, think about it. Your case won't be called for about an-
other fifteen minutes or so. I'll come back right before the Judge
takes up your case to find out what you decide."
Judge Smith calls the case of State v. Charles Rogers at 9:15 a.m.,
at which time the defendant enters a guilty plea and agrees to enter
drug treatment.
ILLUSTRATION Two
The next case to be called is that of State v. Laura McManna, an
update on a defendant who entered the drug court program some
months before. Looking at the computer monitor on the bench,
Judge Smith sees that Ms. McManna tested positive for cocaine
when she came into the drug court for her first update on her pro-
gress in treatment. Since receiving a sanction of two days' court-
room observation at that time, however, Ms. McManna has stayed
off of drugs, testing negative for a total of three months. Reports
from her in-patient treatment provider, Pine Hills Rehabilitation
Facility, indicate that she is complying with the rules and regula-
tions of the program.
"Ms. McManna," Judge Smith begins, "I see you continue to do
well in your program and that your drug test results continue to
come back clean. Do you know what you looked like when you
first came before me? If you need a reminder, I can show you a
photo that was taken three months ago. Now look at you: clean,
well-dressed, ready to take on the world. I am very proud of you.
More importantly, however, you should be very proud of yourself."
"I am, your honor," Ms. McManna replies flashing a smile.
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Defense counsel Simkins chimes in: "Judge, I also wanted to
point out Ms. McManna is in the process of preparing to take her
GED exam."
"That's great," Judge Smith replies, "I'm sure going back to get
your diploma isn't an easy thing. It sounds like you're really taking
control of your life. And, since you are doing such a great job, I
think it's time you were rewarded."
Judge Smith steps down from the bench and walks towards the
defense table carrying a leather-bound journal. "Ms. McManna,
we'd like to present you with this award for all your hard work.
You can use this to keep track of your progress through treatment.
Congratulations and keep up the good work."
As Judge Smith hands the journal to Ms. McManna, the whole
courtroom, including defense counsel Simkins, assistant district at-
torney Phillips, the courtroom officers and the judge's clerk, begin
to applaud.
As the applause dies down, Mr. Simkins remains standing.
"Your honor, since Ms. McManna is doing so well in her treatment
program, we would like to make a request. Ms. McManna wishes
to complete her treatment at an out-patient program rather than at
Pine Hills. After she takes her GED exam next week, Ms.
McManna is interested in trying to go back to work. Your honor
has recognized how well she is doing, and I think Ms. McManna
will be able to make it in a less structured program. I would sug-
gest an outpatient program with daily reporting and weekly drug
test requirements to give her the guidance she needs."
Judge Smith asks the state about its position. Assistant district
attorney Phillips tells Judge Smith she would take no position as to
the request. She agrees that Ms. McManna is doing very well, but
is not sure if switching to an out-patient program at this time would
be in her best interest.
"Counsel," Judge Smith begins, "I share the same concerns as
Ms. Phillips. While I have tremendous faith in Ms. McManna, the
in-patient program she has been in is obviously working for her. I
am afraid if we change things now, we might run the risk of going
back to square one. What I will do is talk with our clinical director
during the lunch break and see what she has to say."
Closing down the court for lunch recess, Judge Smith stops by
the office of the drug court's clinical director, Bill Brown. Mr.
Brown supervises the court's social workers, and he is recognized
to be the court's authority on the various community-based treat-
ment programs used by the court. In speaking to Mr. Brown,
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Judge Smith learns that 90% of those defendants who are able to
successfully complete the first phase of the court's treatment com-
ponent-remaining clean for four months-have either success-
fully graduated from the program or are still active in treatment
after two years. As a result, it was Mr. Brown's opinion that it is
very important for all defendants to be given as much support as
possible to make it through phase one. With regard to Ms.
McManna, Mr. Brown believes it would be best for her to remain
in the in-patient program, at least until she makes it past the four
month threshold.
Returning to the courtroom after the lunch break, Judge Green
recalls Ms. McManna's case. "Ms. McManna, I have given your
request a good deal of thought and have spoken with our clinical
director, who is an expert on drug addiction. At this time I think
you should continue at Pine Hills. If you are able to make it
through the next month and stay clean, I will reconsider your re-
quest to be placed in an out-patient program. I am sure this is a
disappointment for you. But please understand this is not meant to
punish you. We all just want you to be able to graduate from the
court."
ILLUSTRATION THREE
Before reaching the next case on the status calendar, State v.
Frank Granada, Judge Smith calls Mr. Simkins and Ms. Phillips
into his chambers. "Counsel," Judge Smith begins, "what are we
going to do with Mr. Granada? He tests clean for a while, seems to
be doing well, and then just up and leaves his program. I got a
report from Mr. Granada's social worker, Sandra Morris, that he
absconded from the New Horizons program last week during an
outing. He didn't call the program, didn't call the court, and didn't
turn himself in. Instead, he was picked up on the warrant this
morning after he was found sleeping on a bus. He tested positive
for cocaine."
Judge Smith, the attorneys, and Ms. Morris, discuss Mr. Granada
and his history with the court. The first time Mr. Granada left the
program-a month ago-and came back on a warrant, the court
sanctioned him with five nights in jail, as per the terms of the treat-
ment agreement he signed when he entered the court. According
to the agreement, when a defendant leaves a program a second
time and involuntarily returns to the court, a sanction of between
15 and 28 days in jail will follow. A third time would result in ter-
mination from treatment and imposition of final sentence.
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"Well your honor, I think Mr. Granada should be given the full
jail sanction under the terms of his treatment agreement," Ms.
Phillips tells Judge Smith. "A month in jail might go a long way
towards teaching Mr. Granada a lesson about taking the program
seriously. He's on the edge right now and needs to understand
there can be no more next times. If he leaves the program again,
he goes to jail on his sentence."
"Clearly there is something going on here with Mr. Granada,"
Mr. Simkins joins in. "But I'm convinced that sending him to jail
for 28 days is not going to serve him well. I personally think the
most important thing is for him to get back in treatment as quickly
as he can. I've talked to Mr. Granada and he wants to give treat-
ment another try. However, he mentioned having a number of
problems with his current counselor at the program. Judge Smith, I
urge the court to return Mr. Granada to New Horizons as soon as
possible. Mr. Granada can succeed in this program if he is paired
with a new counselor. I'm sure Ms. Morris's intervention with the
people at the treatment center would go a great distance toward
arranging for this change."
Ms. Morris tells the court that the New Horizons program is will-
ing to give Mr. Granada another chance-but that they won't have
another bed available for two weeks or so. She also confirms that
Mr. Granada was having some difficulties with his counselor at the
facility.
"Okay," Judge Smith says, "let me think about what everyone
has said. I tend to agree that he should get back on track as
quickly as he can. But he has to understand he can't just make up
the rules as he goes along."
Thirty minutes later Judge Smith returns to the bench and calls
Mr. Granada's case. "So, Mr. Granada, I see we decided to take
another walk from treatment so you could use drugs again. Your
test results were positive for cocaine when you were brought in. I
guess you thought that the agreement you entered into when you
pleaded guilty in this case meant nothing."
"No, your honor, that is not true. I left New Horizons but I was
going to go back. I only left to visit my aunt. She's real sick. And,
I didn't use cocaine when I was out. I took one of my aunt's pain
killers for this back injury I have-maybe that's why the test is pos-
itive. But, I didn't shoot up. I swear it." Mr. Granada responds.
"Mr. Granada, I simply don't believe you. I don't think you vis-
ited your aunt, I don't think you had any intention of going back,
and I don't think you used a pain killer. You want to know what I
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do think? That you are simply in denial about your addiction.
Now, don't you think it's about time you started to take responsi-
bility for your actions? Mr. Granada, I am willing to give you an-
other chance at treatment, but you are going to have to recognize
you have a problem and recognize that you need help. If you don't
complete treatment, you'll be facing four years in jail. Is that what
you want, Mr. Granada?"
Defense counsel Simkins begins to respond on behalf of Mr.
Granada, but is cut off by the court. "Counsel, I am talking to Mr.
Granada. I want to hear what he has to say for himself." "Well,
no, your honor, I don't want to go to jail. I want another chance at
treatment. You're right. I messed up-but that guy over there at
New Horizons, my counselor, he just keeps pushing my buttons."
"Mr. Granada, if by pushing your buttons you mean confronting
you about your drug problem, I hate to tell you-that's just part of
your therapy. No one told you this was going to be easy. But, you
can't keep running from the program anytime you feel like it."
"I'll tell you what I am willing to do Mr. Granada," Judge Smith
continues, "I'm going to send you to jail for the next fifteen days to
cool out and give you some time to think about getting clean. In
the meantime, we are going to have the social workers here talk
with New Horizons and find out about getting you sent back to the
program-if they'll still take you."
"Fifteen days?" Mr. Granada exclaims, turning to his attorney.
"The last time I only got five days. Man, how can he give me so
much time? I said I'd go back to the program."
Judge Smith explains to the defendant, "Mr. Granada, when you
entered your guilty plea, you agreed to abide the court's sanctions
schedule. And, here is a copy of your treatment agreement. It says
right here in black and white that the sanction for leaving the pro-
gram two times and coming back involuntarily is 15 to 28 days in
jail."
Judge Smith, seeing Mr. Granada looking over the treatment
agreement instructs him: "Turn to the final page of that agreement,
Mr. Granada. Whose signature is that at the end of the document?
Is that someone else's name? No, it's yours. No one forced you to
sign that or told you that you had to enter a program. No, you
were smart enough to know that you needed treatment-that the
agreement was for your own good. So you see, Mr. Granada, you
are quite lucky I am sending you to jail for fifteen days instead of a
month, which I could do."
2003] 999
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
As Mr. Granada is being led out of the courtroom by the court
officers, Judge Smith calls in the drug court social worker, Ms.
Morris, and tells her to let him know what happens with New Hori-
zons. "If they'll take him back" he tells her, "let's see if they are
willing to switch him to another counselor's caseload. Maybe that
will help him stay in the program."
After his exchange with Ms. Morris, Judge Smith turns to the
attorneys in front of him and asks: "So, what do you think? Will he
complete the program?"
Ms. Phillips shrugs and tells the judge she hopes that Mr. Gra-
nada makes it. Mr. Simkins agrees that its not clear whether Mr.
Granada will make it, but he thinks a change in counselors cer-
tainly will improve Mr. Granada's chances.
According to a 1999 Department of Justice report, since the imple-
mentation of the first drug court in Dade County, Florida in 1989,
over 357 drug courts have opened their doors. Plans for the creation
of another 220 drug courts are underway. Based upon data from the
200 oldest drug courts in the United States, it is estimated that of the
approximately 100,000 participants who have entered into drug
court programs, 70% have either graduated or are still enrolled. Ac-
cording to one Department of Justice report, this retention rate is
more than double the retention rate for traditional voluntary treat-
ment programs. A number of studies have also demonstrated that
drug treatment courts provide a tremendous cost savings to the jus-
tice system, given the extent to which drug court defendants are di-
verted away from pretrial detention and incarceration upon
adjudication. Moreover, while additional, longer term studies need
to be done, preliminary research indicates that criminal behavior is
lowered by program participation, particularly for those defendants
who graduate from drug treatment court.
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APPENDIX 2*
CASE STUDY: BROWNSBERG COMMUNITY COURT
2 1 1
CONTEXT
Starting with the publication of the landmark essay, "Broken Win-
dows" by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson in 1982, police and
prosecutors have begun to recognize that creating and maintaining
safe communities requires keen attention to quality-of-life crimes.
Many cities have seen increased enforcement of offenses like illegal
vending, prostitution, and vandalism. Unfortunately, few courts
have been equipped to handle the infusion of petty cases. For exam-
ple, over the past decade, the number of misdemeanor cases in New
York City increased by 85% while the number of criminal court
judges remained constant. Overwhelmed by staggering caseloads,
many courts, particularly in urban areas, struggle to get through
their daily calendars. All too often, individuals charged with low-
level offenses are sentenced to nothing more than the process of be-
ing arrested and arraigned. In New York, a review of a random
sample of misdemeanor cases from 1992-93 showed that roughly
half of the defendants received "walks"-sentences where no addi-
tional conditions were placed on defendants. The consequences of
this are significant, both within the criminal justice system, where
cynicism is rampant, and among the general public, where public
confidence in courts has suffered.
BACKGROUND
The city of Brownsberg is a busy metropolis of more than one
million people. Its downtown area has long drawn both residents
and visitors from outside the city looking for entertainment. With
* EDITOR'S NOTE: This Case Study has been reprinted with permission from the
Center for Court Innovation. The Case Study has undergone only minimal editing.
218. This case study is one of a set of case studies written by the Center for Court
Innovation in 2000 as part of the briefing materials for a series of roundtables that
brought together leading academics and practitioners to explore some of the ethical
and legal challenges presented by problem-solving courts. These case studies were
not intended to describe best-or even appropriate-practice in problem-solving
courts. Instead, they were deliberately written to highlight possible tensions between
problem-solving courts and traditional practice in the courts and to provoke
conversation among roundtable participants. The case studies were written by a team
that included: Greg Berman, John Feinblatt, Scott Schell, and Mae Quinn. The
Center for Court Innovation would like to offer thanks to the following people who
commented on earlier drafts of the case studies: Cait Clarke, Susan Knipps, Eric
Lane, Roy Simon and Michael Smith.
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a heavy concentration of bars, clubs, restaurants, movie theaters,
and hotels, downtown is seen as both the seediest and trendiest
part of the city. For many, the downtown area's noise, traffic and
general commotion are part of its attraction.
The area has also long been known for low-level criminal activ-
ity: prostitution, drug dealing, public drinking, and vandalism.
About five years ago, disorder started to become more pervasive.
People seeking entertainment started avoiding the area after dark.
Businesses suffered. Empty, unlit storefronts, in turn, invited addi-
tional crime.
To local residents and business people, it seemed that the justice
system was doing little to slow this downward spiral. Brownsberg's
centralized criminal court, bogged down with serious criminal mat-
ters and a huge backlog of cases, spent little time on downtown's
relatively unimportant quality-of-life offenses. Less than one half
of 1% of the misdemeanor cases went to trial. More than 75% of
misdemeanor cases were disposed at arraignment. The most com-
mon sentence for these minor crimes was "time served"-the time
a defendant spent locked up awaiting arraignment. The process
had become the punishment. Thus, there was no real differentia-
tion between those who were guilty of the crimes charged and
those whose cases were dismissed. After a day spent in the arrest-
to-arraignment process, many defendants simply returned down-
town and resumed their commission of petty offenses. After a
while it seemed that police started making fewer arrests of low-
level offenders, seeing such work as a waste of time. Why should
they bother if the courts were simply going to release offenders
without punishment?
Block associations and other citizens groups banded together to
try to stem the deterioration of their neighborhood. They wrote
letters to their legislators, met with city agency officials, and com-
plained to the police. Uniformly, they received a sympathetic but
unhelpful response: "the system" wasn't working, but no one knew
how to fix it.
Then at a conference on urban justice two years ago, a court
administrator who lived in Brownsberg heard a presentation about
the Midtown Community Court that had been created in New
York City in 1993. He wondered if that model would work in his
city-could a court work hand-in-hand with the community to ad-
dress the problems plaguing downtown Brownsberg? Could such a
court slow or even reverse the steady decline in the area's quality
of life?
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PLANNING
Towards this end, over several months, planners from the
Brownsberg court system conducted focus groups with neighbor-
hood residents, local business owners, criminal justice experts, po-
lice, social service providers, and others to ascertain the exact
nature of the concerns and needs of the downtown area. Nearly
everyone involved expressed frustration with business-as-usual,
which took low-level offenders to a centralized court far removed
from the downtown area, and hardly ever provided more than the
proverbial slap on the wrist for those who committed crimes.
Those who were sentenced were seldom made to pay back the
downtown community for their wrongdoing. It was clear that both
the community and the local police blamed the government in gen-
eral, and the court system in particular, for failing to do enough.
For them, the courts seemed to be little more than a revolving
door, which did not do enough to restore their neighborhood or
prevent criminals from re-offending.
In addition to wanting local, quality-of-life crimes to be taken
more seriously, many of those who participated in the focus groups
also pointed out the value of providing help for those committing
crimes in the neighborhood. Shoplifters were often drug addicts
who stole to support their habit, many prostitutes were believed to
be runaways, and some offenders were homeless or suffered from
mental illness. Even police officers complained that they were
aware of no social service programs or agencies to which they
could refer offenders they came across on their beats.
With funding from area business owners, further research and
study were conducted. A new model court was proposed, one that
would specifically focus on minor offenses, impose a broad array of
sentencing alternatives, and also offer on-site social services for of-
fenders. However, such a court would need significant funding and
a place to conduct business. Again, area business owners pitched
in-providing a building for the court's use and providing funds to
pay for on-site social services. Judge Sandy Green, who had sat at
the downtown courthouse for four years, was asked to preside over
the new court. Brownsberg's administrative judge for the criminal
courts selected Judge Green for the assignment based on her skill
at dealing with the public and her willingness to "think outside of
the box."
Despite overwhelming support for the new court among court
administrators and local civic groups, there were a number of skep-
tics. For instance, some of Judge Green's colleagues on the bench
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expressed concern. At a local judicial luncheon, Judge Green was
approached by Judge Sarah Wallace, a judge in the centralized
criminal court. Judge Wallace told Judge Green that the commu-
nity court was already causing problems before it even opened. At
sentencing hearings, defense attorneys were citing the planning of
the community court as grounds that Judge Wallace should be pro-
viding social service-type sentences. In the alternative, they were
arguing their cases should be put off to be handled in the commu-
nity court. Judge Wallace told Judge Green she was concerned
about the way in which the community court might impact the
practices and proceedings in the centralized criminal in the future.
Would there be two brands of justice in Brownsberg?
In addition, the public defender serving Brownsberg was cau-
tious in his support of the new court. The defense bar feared de-
fendants would be facing sanctions from the community court
judge for cases that seldom would have been pursued at the cen-
tralized courthouse. They also felt that the possibility of different
results in different courts based solely on arrest location was unfair
and that the new court would further fragment an already compli-
cated and overworked justice system. Despite these concerns, the
court's commitment to providing services to low-level defendants
made it appealing to many defense attorneys.
COMMUNITY COURT MODEL
Judge Green's Community Court is very different from many
other urban court complexes. The court has an inviting and acces-
sible interior: clean, well-lit, and orderly. Entering the courthouse,
visitors are greeted by court security staff and directed to the
proper location. Inside the courtroom, television monitors display
the status of cases on the day's calendar. Both the judge and the
attorneys use computers in the courtroom to learn more about de-
fendants with whom they are dealing.
The court is a misdemeanor arraignment facility which has the
specific goal of helping to solve problems specific to the downtown
area. All defendants charged with quality-of-life crimes and other
low-level offenses in the downtown area are brought by police to
the Community Court rather than the centralized court for their
first appearance. In this way, these cases are not lost in the shuffle
between more serious matters and move quickly from arrest to
arraignment.
Prior to arraignment, defendants at the Community Court are
interviewed by a Brownsberg's pre-trial agency as part of the regu-
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lar bail recommendation process. For the purposes of the Commu-
nity Court, the standard interview has been expanded to include
background information on each defendant's drug use, housing sit-
uation, and health status. This self-reported information (which is
collected on a voluntary basis) is added to the court's computer
database so that Judge Green immediately knows about a defen-
dant's prior criminal record, housing status, employment status,
mental health issues, and current drug use.
Once community court defendants come before the judge, usu-
ally the same day as their arrest, community court defendants are
extended a plea offer. Defendants who do not wish to plead guilty
have their cases adjourned to the centralized court for further pro-
ceedings. Those who do accept the offer immediately proceed to
sentencing. The speed with which these cases move from arrest to
arraignment to plea to sentence helps to impress upon offenders
that consequences do follow from their criminal behavior. Moreo-
ver, it reduces the risk of non-compliance on the part of sanctioned
defendants, who begin their sentences soon after their arraignment
rather than weeks later.
Sentences imposed by Judge Green are meant to meet the needs
of both the defendant and the community. Towards this end, all
crimes-even those that may have gone essentially unpunished
before- receive some sanction. Defendants are almost never sent
away with the sentence of "time served." During planning, statis-
tics revealed that over one quarter of the defendants at the central-
ized court were sentenced to the time they had already spent in the
lock-up awaiting arraignment; the community court imposed that
sentence in less than one percent of its cases.
The judge has many different sentencing options at her disposal
at the community court. Almost all defendants are required to
perform community service in order to pay back the neighborhood
they have harmed. These projects, supervised by a community ser-
vice coordinator employed by the court, include graffiti removal,
improvement of park gardens, or office assistance for local non-
profit organizations. Because community service sentences com-
mence quickly after a defendant's conviction, compliance rates are
much higher than they were when such cases were handled at the
centralized court.
A wide range of social services are also available under one roof
at the community court, making it a gateway to assistance. For in-
stance, as part of their sentences, many defendants are mandated
to participate in short-term programs such as drug-treatment readi-
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ness sessions. These readiness sessions introduce the idea of drug
treatment to addicts who have committed offenses (criminal tres-
pass, prostitution) too minor to warrant mandated long-term treat-
ment, but who nonetheless are in need of help. Because these
services are available on-site, social services-based sentences can
also commence promptly. For defendants, being arrested becomes
an opportunity to turn crisis into a second chance. Indeed, while
they serve their sentences, court staff continue to engage defend-
ants, encouraging them to take advantages of the array of services
the court has to offer. As a result, many defendants-as many as 1
in 5-voluntarily return to the court after their cases are closed in
order to access programs available and receive further services
such as vocational counseling and GED classes.
The judge frequently tests new sentencing options and court staff
monitor the effectiveness of existing sanctions. Moreover, Judge
Green maintains constant and open communications with all of the
parties-both courtroom and non-courtroom players-about the
workings of the court. She often requests feedback from the of-
fices of the public defender and the district attorney. The judge
also meets with the court's social service staff to learn about newly
available programs and new clinical thinking regarding the effects
of drugs or mental illness. Perhaps most importantly, every month
Judge Green convenes a panel of community members and police
officers to hear about concerns and changes in the community.
ILLUSTRATION ONE
It is Thursday at 7:30 p.m. Judge Green sits at a table in her
chambers. With her is the community advisory board, a group of
ten people who are invited to represent various segments of the
neighborhood, including community leaders, business representa-
tives, and law enforcement representatives. Also present are a
number of court personnel.
Nina Elkins, the president of a local block association, has been
informing Judge Green about the increasing problem of prostitu-
tion on her street: "The corner of Park and Main has been awful
lately-nothing but prostitutes, 'johns,' and noise. The same
cars-filled with guys looking to buy sex-drive around and
around all night long. They shout and honk their car horns until
the early hours of the morning. I can't get any sleep. Everyone in
our building is sick and tired of it."
Ms. Elkins explains that things were the same way a few years
back, but quieted down over time. "We thought the problem went
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away, but here it is again. I realize that a lot of the prostitutes are
just teenagers and drug addicts. I kind of feel sorry for them. But
you've got to see these guys who pick them up. Most of them are
older men driving nice cars with out-of-state plates. I don't feel so
bad for them. I mean they're really to blame. I bet they don't
drive around causing a ruckus in their own neighborhood. They're
probably perfectly upstanding citizens there."
Nora Walsh, a local parent, offers a similar account as well as her
thoughts on how "johns" should be handled. "You know, in some
places they use really out-of-the-ordinary sentences for defendants
who are caught soliciting a prostitute-like printing their name in
the newspaper or taking away their car." Laughing, she continues:
"Maybe we should try something like sentencing 'johns' to having
someone honk a car horn outside their window at three in the
morning every night for a month. At least then they'd know what
it was like to live here."
Although her suggestion was made in jest, Ms. Walsh's com-
ments strike a chord with Judge Green. Judge Green has always
struggled with determining what kind of sentence is most meaning-
ful in solicitation cases. What kind of punishment would both meet
the concerns of the community and be useful for the offender?
Maybe confronting these defendants with the community impacts
of their crimes wouldn't be such a bad idea. But what would such a
sentence look like?
Police officers Paul Perry and Patricia Prince inform the advisory
committee that their precinct has received an increased number of
calls about the corner of Park and Main. Officer Prince tells the
group: "I think we may need to conduct another undercover sweep
at that intersection."
Towards the end of the meeting, representatives from a local
merchants organization, Stan Erickson and Fred Alberts, report to
the judge that downtown has been hit by a wave of vandalism.
Both men complain that their storefronts have been spray-painted
with graffiti in the last month. "The same person must have done
all the stores in the area," Mr. Erickson explains. "About ten
storefronts had the same thing written on them: a giant 'Y2K' in
red paint." Mr. Alberts adds "It's just not fair. I know one guy
who has just about had it. He's thinking about closing down his
shop and moving to the suburbs."
Judge Green tells the business owners she will look into sending
a community service team to the area to remove the graffiti. The
men seem very grateful that the problem will be addressed in this
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way. "Wow," Mr. Erickson says, "That would be terrific. Let the
group who made the mess clean it up for a change."
ILLUSTRATION Two
"I thought we heard some really interesting things at the com-
munity advisory board meeting last night, didn't you?" Judge
Green asks the staff with whom she is meeting. It is Friday morn-
ing and all of the court personnel have come together for their
weekly session with the judge. Amongst those present are Aaron
Alston, the court's community mediation expert, Byron Bradley,
the community service coordinator, and Carrie Conroy, a clinical
psychologist who works with the court, all of whom were also pre-
sent for the community advisory board meeting.
Judge Green continues: "It sounds like the businesses have been
hit pretty hard by vandals."
Byron Bradley agrees with Judge Green and tells her the com-
munity garden project that he started with a group of defendants
two weeks ago is just about finished. "I'll be able to send a crew
out to remove the graffiti starting tomorrow."
Judge Green continues, "The prostitution in the area is really
getting to people, too. I really wish there were some other solu-
tions available for those kinds of cases. I think we have some good
alternative sentences available for drug offenders-like our treat-
ment readiness program-but not a whole lot for prostitutes and
johns. Do you have any ideas?"
Carrie Conroy responds: "I used to teach a health education
class at a university health clinic," Carrie Conroy begins. "We used
materials, which outlined the risks involved with unprotected sex-
ual activity. I was thinking that the prostitutes might benefit from
a similar class, but one that would really address the particular is-
sues they face in their work. For instance, a number of the prosti-
tutes I have dealt with think they are practicing safe sex because
they use condoms with their clients, even though they have unpro-
tected sex with their pimps. Maybe they could be sentenced to the
class-which would dispel some of these myths-along with com-
munity service."
Judge Green thanks Carrie and tells her she would use such a
class as a sentence for prostitutes if it were available. Carrie Con-
roy agrees to put curriculum materials together as soon as possible.
"As for this issue of the 'johns,'" Aaron Alson joins in, "I re-
ceived some materials at a conference I attended in Washington
D.C. that talked about restorative justice conferences-facilitated
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conversations between offenders and victims. They say it helps of-
fenders to realize that their acts have harmed the community, and
it allows the community to play a role in the criminal justice pro-
cess. A facilitator makes sure the whole thing is balanced and that
all participants are given a chance to be heard. I thought it was an
interesting concept and had been wondering what kind of cases
might be appropriate for that kind of meeting."
After a discussion of the pros and cons of such an approach,
Aaron Alston tells the judge he will contact organizations using
such conferences to learn more about what they are doing. "I
think it would be a good idea to try as a new type of sanction for
'johns'," Aaron says. Judge Green agrees and encourages him to
keep her informed.
ILLUSTRATION THREE
It is the first Monday in June. Judge Green is on the bench han-
dling new matters. The first case she calls is State v. George Rojas.
Mr. Rojas is charged with defacing private property. As she reads
through the complaint on the computer, Judge Green sees that Mr.
Rojas was allegedly seen spraying the phrase "Y2K" on the side of
a delivery truck. Judge Green immediately connects this defendant
with Mr. Erickson's report about the vandalism to his building two
months before.
As a community court judge, Judge Green often sees the same
defendants over and over. It also happens, from time to time, that
she learns information from the community or police about an of-
fender she later sees in court.
"Your honor, given that Mr. Rojas has already spent the night in
jail, we would be willing to accept a plea to disorderly conduct and
recommend a sentence of time served," Assistant District Attorney
Wanda Wright tells the judge.
Judge Green thinks about the government's offer. The charge of
disorderly conduct, a lesser offense than defacing private property,
has a lower statutory maximum penalty. The sentencing recom-
mendation made by the government is the standard offer made at
Brownsberg's centralized court to defendants who have no prior
criminal record. However, it is an unusual recommendation for the
Community Court, which typically sentences offenders to perform
community restitution.
"Do you want to take a moment to re-think your offer, coun-
selor?," Judge Green asks. "I don't see how time served does any-
thing to pay back the community."
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Wright is quick to respond. "Judge, on second thought, we'd like
to offer a plea to disorderly conduct and recommend a sentence of
eight hours of community service, which I think will send a strong
message to Mr. Rojas about the impact of his behavior."
After conferring with his client, Mr. Rojas's defense attorney ac-
cepts the offer. "Very well," Judge Green announces and engages
the defendant in the required plea colloquy. Mr. Rojas acknowl-
edges the court's power in this regard and admits that he has
painted the term "Y2K" on the side of a delivery truck.
Before imposing sentence, Judge Smith reviews background in-
formation about Mr. Rojas on her computer screen. She sees he
has no prior criminal record and lives with his parents in an apart-
ment in the next town.
Judge Green admonishes Mr. Rojas: "Do you realize the extent
to which graffiti harms this part of town? Business-owners cannot
afford to keep cleaning up after people like you who decide they
want to destroy property. If these businesses are driven out of
downtown we all suffer-including people like you and your family
who don't live here. I am very tempted to hit you with a much
harsher sentence than the one the government has recommended.
But I will stick with the district attorney's proposal-eight hours of
community service-because according to your record this is your
first offense. Mr. Rojas, I certainly hope that we don't ever see you
again, because if there is a next time you'll be seeing jail time. I
hope doing community service work to pay back the community
makes you think twice before you commit another crime here."
Later that day, Mr. Rojas is taken by the community service co-
ordinator with a group of defendants to start his community service
time. Transported in a van that says "Justice at Work" on the side
and wearing orange jumpsuits, the defendants are delivered to the
area of downtown where Mr. Rojas was arrested and required to
paint over graffiti.
ILLUSTRATION FOUR
Since the last advisory board meeting, Aaron Alston, the court's
community mediation specialist, has worked to create the restora-
tive justice sentencing option for "johns." This sanction-which
the court is calling a community impact panel-requires defend-
ants convicted of solicitation to participate in a facilitated conver-
sation with selected members of the community for two hours.
Unlike other victim-offender panels, it is not voluntary. Unlike
other restorative justice groups, the goal is not for the community
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to fashion a sentence. The plan is to have three defendants and
three community members take part in each meeting. All panel
conversations would have certain parameters-the community
would let the offenders know how they have affected the commu-
nity; the offenders would be permitted to respond, to apologize,
and to explain what draws people to commit crime in the area.
And, each conversation would be facilitated by Mr. Alston to en-
sure that each party has an opportunity to be heard, the conversa-
tions are respectful, and they do not stray off point.
Recently, attorneys assigned to the Community Court met with
Judge Green and court administrators to learn more about the new
sanction. At the meeting, Judge Green suggested the prosecutor's
office might offer the new sanction as part of its plea agreements;
the office of the public defender was asked if it would keep an
open mind and encourage clients to participate in the panel. The
defense bar expressed concern that such sanctions were equivalent
to public shaming and that defendants might make potentially
damaging statements in the sessions. Judge Green assured defense
counsel that the sessions would be private-only the participants
and court staff would be present-and that the information dis-
closed in the conversations would not be used against the defen-
dant by the court. Despite the judge's assurances, the defense bar
did not whole-heartedly welcome the new sentencing option.
Today, Judge Green is handling the first solicitation case to reach
the court after the creation of the community impact panel: State v.
Ronald Slip. As Mr. Slip is brought out of the lock up, Judge
Green reviews the information on her computer screen. According
to the criminal complaint, Mr. Slip was arrested at the corner of
Park and Main-the very area that community members talked
about during the last advisory panel meeting-for soliciting sex for
money from an undercover police officer.
"Your honor," says the Assistant District Attorney assigned to
the court, "If Mr. Slip pleads guilty to solicitation in this matter, we
will not seek jail time. Rather, we would recommend that he par-
ticipate in the new impact panel program that the Court has
established."
Judge Green knows that Mr. Slip, with no prior criminal record,
would not be sentenced to jail time under any circumstance. It is
likely that his defense attorney, Susan Jones, has already informed
him of this. If Mr. Slip refuses the plea offer, his case would be
adjourned to the centralized court. However, Ms. Jones knows
that requesting an adjournment of the case to the centralized
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docket for further proceedings would require Mr. Slip to make ad-
ditional trips to court, particularly if he ultimately proceeds to trial.
These trips would occur during business hours and would require
time off from work for the defendant. Any failure to appear would
result in the issuance of a warrant-and a stiffer sentence should
Mr. Slip be re-arrested. Given her knowledge of these factors,
Judge Green thinks it is likely this defendant will enter a guilty plea
today in order to quickly put this matter behind him.
However, defense attorney Jones objects to the prosecutor's rec-
ommendation. "Your honor, I'm not sure I feel comfortable coun-
seling my client about whether he should take part in this new
experimental sentence being offered. I understand what it is, but
there still seem to be a number of unknowns involved."
In response, Judge Green explains to Mr. Slip that the purpose
of the impact panel is for him to learn, directly from members of
the community, about the impact of his actions. Judge Green as-
sures Mr. Slip that the court's mediation expert will be present to
monitor the conversation and that what is said there will remain
private. Judge Green then asks Mr. Slip's attorney to take a few
moments to discuss the new offer with his client. After a few mo-
ments of whispering to his client, Mr. Slip's attorney turns to the
bench: "Judge, Mr. Slip wishes to enter a plea of guilty at this time
and will accept the government's offer. I have discussed the impact
panel with Mr. Slip and he understands all that it entails."
Mr. Slip's plea is accepted by the judge and he is sentenced to
participate in the first panel, which is scheduled for a Wednesday
evening the following week. Judge Green knows which community
members have been asked by court administrators to participate in
the panel-Nina Elkins and Nora Walsh-the two individuals who
were so vocal during the advisory group meeting about the impact
of prostitution on the community.
Following the first impact panel session, the one in which Mr.
Slip was ordered to attend, Judge Green reads the comment forms
that were filled out by all of the participants-both defendants and
community members. While some suggestions were made to im-
prove the process, the comments were overwhelmingly positive.
The community members felt that they had had a chance to partici-
pate in the justice process and voice their concerns in a meaningful
way. Though it appears that Mr. Slip said little, he apologized for
his behavior and acknowledged that the panel had been conducted
as advertised.
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In 1993, the country's first community court-the Midtown Com-
munity Court of New York City-opened its doors. The court was
designed to go beyond the routine processing of low-level crimes and
to help resolve problems that were specific to New York City's mid-
town area-including the high concentration of low-level quality of
life crimes. According to independent evaluators, the Midtown
Community court has reduced arrest to arraignment time and im-
proved compliance with community service by 50%. Low-level
crime in the neighborhood has dropped by as much as 63% in the
case of prostitution. And focus groups with police, defendants, and
residents revealed improved confidence in courts. These results have
spurred other jurisdictions to follow Midtown's lead. Six commu-
nity courts have already opened, and another two dozen are in the
planning stages.
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APPENDIX 3*
CASE STUDY: WEST JACKSON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COURT 2 19
CONTEXT
The criminal justice system has long had difficulty in calibrating
its response to domestic violence. Over the past 25 years, it has
moved from a vision of domestic violence as primarily a private
matter to increasing recognition that domestic violence is a criminal
offense meriting traditional criminal justice responses. More re-
cently, prosecutors and courts have experimented with approaches
that acknowledge that domestic violence is intrinsically different
from other criminal offenses without abandoning the recognition
that domestic violence is first and foremost a criminal matter. These
initiatives are a response to both increased public awareness about
domestic violence and a significant growth in domestic violence
cases.
According to the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics,
each year in the United States there are an estimated 960,000 inci-
dents of physical violence against a current or former spouse, boy-
friend, or girlfriend,221 and roughly 85% of these victims are
women. 221 Approximately 30% of female homicide victims are
killed by an intimate partner or former intimate partner. Though
* EDITOR'S NOTE: This Case Study has been reprinted with permission from the
Center for Court Innovation. The Case Study has undergone only minimal editing.
219. This case study is one of a set of case studies written by the Center for Court
Innovation in 1999 as part of the briefing materials for a series of roundtables that
brought together leading academics and practitioners to explore some of the ethical
and legal challenges presented by problem-solving courts. These case studies were
not intended to describe best-or even appropriate-practice in problem-solving
courts. Instead, they were deliberately written to highlight possible tensions between
problem-solving courts and traditional practice in the courts and to provoke
conversation among roundtable participants. The case studies were written by a team
that included: Greg Berman, John Feinblatt, Scott Schell, and Mae Quinn. The
Center for Court Innovation would like to offer thanks to the following people who
commented on earlier drafts of the case studies: Cait Clarke, Susan Knipps, Eric
Lane, Roy Simon, and Michael Smith.
220. In some jurisdictions, intimate or domestic violence is defined more broadly to
include same sex partnerships and non-physical (e.g., emotional and economic) abuse
as well as physical violence. Measured with this definition, the number of domestic
violence incidents per year would be larger.
221. Unless otherwise noted, the statistics in this "context" paragraph are taken
from LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS FACTBOOK: VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY
CURRENT OF FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS (1998).
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just one in five female victims who are injured by domestic vio-
lence seek professional medical treatment, approximately 40% of
women visiting emergency rooms for injuries caused by intentional
violence received those injuries from an intimate. The caseloads
resulting from domestic violence offenses are large, even with half
of domestic violence incidents going unreported to the police. In
1998, the combined volume of felony and misdemeanor cases in
New York City's Criminal Court exceeded 25,000-more than one
out of five pending criminal cases.222
BACKGROUND
Judge Charles Henderson has been a criminal court judge in the
city of West Jackson for almost a decade. He currently presides
over its recently developed specialized domestic violence court.
Before taking the bench, Judge Henderson served as a prosecu-
tor for over twenty years. During his tenure with the office of the
district attorney, perhaps the most difficult cases he dealt with were
those involving crimes of domestic or intimate violence.
Often, the first hurdle was getting the police department to take
incidents of domestic violence seriously. Many officers who re-
sponded to domestic violence calls viewed these matters as private
family disputes better resolved by the parties themselves than the
criminal justice system. Officers untrained about the nature of do-
mestic abuse and unaware of the grave dangers faced by complain-
ants often handled such calls without making an arrest or providing
assistance to the complainant. Indeed, in many instances persons
accused of battering were simply told by police to cool off at a
friend's house overnight or to take a walk around the block.
Even if an arrest was made, however, these cases presented
many other concerns. For a variety of reasons, women who were
abused frequently did not wish to press charges or testify against
their batterers. Many feared retaliation by their partners and, par-
ticularly, the violence which frequently occurs as a result of at-
tempts to separate. Others were economically dependent upon
their partners, and worried that going forward with prosecution
would leave them and their children destitute. Non-citizen victims
sometimes sought to withdraw complaints because they were con-
vinced they would be deported otherwise. As a result of these
complexities, many criminal cases against batterers never went for-
222. CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THREE YEAR OPERATIONAL
PLAN, 2000-2001 THROUGH 2002-2003, at 5-12.
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ward, either because of an explicit request by the victim to have the
case dismissed or her failure to respond to a subpoena to testify at
trial.
Even in cases that were prosecuted, the special dynamics of do-
mestic violence often were not adequately taken into account. At
sentencing hearings, unless a case involved serious physical harm
to the victim, defendants were often sentenced to "straight" proba-
tion terms without any conditions. Because domestic violence
cases were commonly viewed as private "family matters," the
sentences imposed were frequently lighter than those for ordinary
assault upon a stranger-even though research reveals that the risk
of continued victimization is far greater in a domestic violence
case. In many instances, defendants who were out on bail often
continued to harass their partners, frequently coercing them to
withdraw their charges, or worse, continuing to physically harm
them. Throughout the process, the complainant was essentially
viewed as a mere witness needed to testify at trial. Children in the
household were given virtually no consideration at all. Complain-
ant safety was not of paramount concern; support services for vic-
tims were not being provided; defendants were not being
adequately monitored; and justice, it seemed, was not being served.
After he took the bench, Judge Henderson continued to grapple
with the difficulties presented by domestic violence. By that time,
attitudes had begun to change about domestic abuse-a battered
women's shelter had opened in the area, the press often reported
the stories and statistics relating to relationship violence, and do-
mestic abuse finally began to be viewed by the public and by
elected officials as a widespread social problem. Nonetheless,
without changes to the system, judges had neither the time nor the
resources to give domestic violence matters the attention they re-
quired. Time and again, judges were asked by prosecutors to dis-
miss the domestic violence cases on their dockets. Even Judge
Henderson felt he had to close those cases the government moved
to dismiss, despite his concerns about what might happen to the
victim and her family afterward.
In 1995, however, a highly publicized tragedy in West Jackson
forced everyone to rethink the way domestic violence was being
handled, particularly by the court system. A defendant, charged
with assaulting his girlfriend, returned home to kill her after being
released without conditions pending trial. A review of the case re-
vealed that the matter had been passed among the dockets of three
judges and had been handled by two different lead prosecutors.
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The public was outraged by the murder; it appeared that no one
within the court system had taken responsibility for the case.
PLANNING
In response, the state court's administrative judge created an ad-
visory board to consider what the court could do to prevent future
tragedies. The board consisted of judges, prosecutors, public de-
fenders, police officials, probation officers, social service and
mental health agencies, and others with expertise in the area of
dealing with both abusers and victims of domestic violence. After
many meetings, the advisory board produced a report recom-
mending that West Jackson create its own specialized domestic vio-
lence court, following the lead of places like Quincy,
Massachusetts.
The explicit goals of the court would be to ensure the safety and
well-being of victims, and to hold defendant's accountable. To pro-
vide domestic violence victims the special services and protections
that they previously lacked, it was suggested that all complainants
be provided with victim advocates. These advocates would help
guide complainants through the process, providing referrals and
support, acting as a liaison to the justice system, and assisting in
developing safety plans. Judges, it was proposed, should closely
monitor defendants charged with acts of domestic violence who
were not held pending trial. The advisory board also advocated
greater coordination among the criminal justice players, including
judges, police officers, the probation department, and others, such
as battered women's shelters, in order to ensure effectiveness and
consistency in response to domestic violence matters.
When the advisory board's report was released, the local defense
bar's reaction was mostly negative. They were opposed to the cre-
ation of a specialized domestic violence court and argued that a
court with the expressed goal of ensuring victim safety would un-
doubtedly infringe fundamental protections for defendants, includ-
ing due process and the presumption of innocence. In particular,
they expressed strong doubts about the planned pre-trial monitor-
ing of all defendants and the form this supervision would take. A
minority of the defense bar disagreed, arguing that active monitor-
ing could help defendants avoid probation violations and that a
judge specializing in domestic violence cases would be better
equipped to consider the circumstances of battered women
defendants.
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West Jackson's prosecutors, on the other hand, were decidedly
more sanguine, excited by the prospects of lower dismissal rates.
Though some prosecutors worried about whether this new court
would lessen their role in determining which cases were to be
treated as domestic violence cases, they were largely supportive
and undertook plans to create their own separate domestic vio-
lence unit.
The court system decided to authorize the creation of an experi-
mental specialized court in West Jackson. Judge Charles Hender-
son was asked to preside over the new court, which would handle
both felony and misdemeanor cases. After taking on that task,
Judge Henderson attended training seminars on the effects of do-
mestic violence, visited domestic violence shelters around the
country, and read hundreds of articles and books relating to do-
mestic abuse in order to bring himself up to speed on the issues.
With funding from the federal government, a resource coordinator
was hired to help Judge Henderson run the pilot program.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT MODEL
Defendants arrested in West Jackson for charges stemming from
an alleged incident of domestic violence-which is defined by stat-
ute as any abusive act directed towards a current or former spouse,
boyfriend, girlfriend or same sex partner-still make their first ap-
pearance before the ordinary presentment court for an arraign-
ment and initial bail determination. Prosecutors from the district
attorney's domestic violence unit as well as victim advocates meet
with the complainant-either before the defendant's initial appear-
ance, or as soon thereafter as possible. The purpose of this meet-
ing is not only to gather information for the bail hearing and the
prosecution of the case, but to create a framework for getting the
victim needed services and for keeping the victim informed about
the status of the case, including whether a defendant has been re-
leased from jail.
Both the victim advocate and the prosecutor work with the com-
plainant to devise a safety plan for herself and her children, if she
has any. Housing at the local battered women's shelter is arranged
if necessary, or the complainant might be encouraged to stay with
family or friends. Victim advocates sometimes refer complainants
to social service providers or organizations that can provide legal
assistance in related family law matters-such as divorce proceed-
ings or child custody disputes. Together, these efforts seek to cre-
ate a feeling of safety for complainants working within the system.
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After the initial presentment, where bail or conditions of release
are set, the case is transferred to Judge Henderson's specialized
docket for all further proceedings. Judge Henderson reviews every
defendant's pre-trial status. He makes sure that defendants who
are out on their own recognizance have been ordered to stay away
from the complainant under a criminal order of protection. De-
fendants who are not held pending trial are required to attend a
batterers counseling program once a week as a means of keeping
tabs on them.
Another important feature of the court, differentiating it from
traditional criminal courts, is its use of a resource coordinator. The
resource coordinator is a full-time staff person, who sits in the well
of the courtroom next to the judge and is responsible for making
sure that problems in need of attention do not fall through the
cracks. The resource coordinator receives ongoing status reports
from batterers programs, victim advocates, probation officers, po-
lice and others: Has the defendant been complying with conditions
of release? Has the victim moved to a shelter? This information,
in turn, is communicated to the judge.
When defendants appear before Judge Henderson for their sta-
tus hearings, the resource coordinator is present. For pre-disposi-
tion defendants, Judge Henderson holds a status hearing every two
to three weeks. Prior to the hearing, the resource coordinator will
provide the judge with an update, informing him of issues in need
of attention, such as whether it is alleged that the defendant has
contacted the victim or failed to attend the batterers program.
When an issue is raised, the judge gives the defendant an opportu-
nity to be heard and then may decide to detain the defendant
pending adjudication, if it appears the defendant has been non-
compliant. For defendants who continue to have problems, Judge
Henderson may revoke the defendant's conditions of release.
When an emergency arises-such as a defendant making threats to
the complainant-the resource coordinator is immediately in-
formed, usually by the victim advocate, prosecutor, batterers pro-
gram, or other involved party. The resource coordinator will then
have the case placed on the calendar for a prompt hearing so that
the judge may respond swiftly.
In addition, the resource coordinator is responsible for sharing
information about changes in the status of the case with the rele-
vant parties and agencies. For instance, the resource coordinator
informs victim advocates, batterer's intervention programs, and
others about changes in a defendant's court-ordered conditions of
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release. When domestic violence cases involve persons who have
cases pending in the matrimonial court, the resource coordinator
makes certain to inform the matrimonial court judge about findings
of guilt or any other relevant developments.
Given the intense monitoring of defendants, the communication
facilitated by the resource coordinator, and the range of services
made available to complainants, few cases-only about 4%-result
in dismissal in Judge Henderson's court. Moreover, in the new
court, many fewer defendants violate their conditions of release or
fail to appear. In fact, at the end of its first year in operation, the
court had only a handful of outstanding warrants for defendants
failing to appear.
Defendants may proceed to trial or plead guilty in the domestic
violence court. In either event, Judge Henderson usually handles
the cases from start to finish-over 100 cases are on his calendar at
any given time. There are no "straight" probation sentences in the
domestic violence court; defendants placed on probation must re-
turn to court once every two months for close monitoring in addi-
tion to visiting regularly with their probation officers.
ILLUSTRATION ONE
It is the first Monday of the month and Judge Henderson has just
entered a meeting. It is a large group. In attendance are a number
of West Jackson police officials, probation officers, court clerks,
prosecutors, public defenders, intervention counselors for batter-
ers, staff from the local domestic violence shelter, victim advocates,
jail staff, and the domestic violence court's resource coordinator,
Barbara Taylor. Judge Henderson calls these meetings-which he
calls domestic violence court partner sessions-on a monthly basis
to facilitate formal communications between all of the entities who
work together on domestic violence cases.
The topic of today's meeting is probation's role in overseeing
sentenced defendants. Judge Henderson has chosen this topic be-
cause of a recent case involving a probation officer who failed to
notify the court of a defendant who missed a scheduled visit. The
incident did not come to the court's attention until two weeks after
the no-show occurred.
"I can't stress enough the importance of all of us working closely
on these cases if we are going to make the domestic violence court
a success. You know, as well as I do, how these cases work. We
have to stay on top of these cases," Judge Henderson continues,
"even after sentencing."
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The assistant director of the probation department tells Judge
Henderson he is aware of his concerns. "I know that there was
some failure to follow-through on the Carlyle case, but I have had a
long conversation with my staff. I think everyone now recognizes
they must inform the court at the earliest possible juncture of any
failure on the part of the defendant to comply with the terms of
probation."
One of the public defenders interrupts: "Judge Henderson, we
all know why today's topic is the oversight of sentenced defend-
ants. But I thought one of your ground rules is that there is to be
no discussion here of individual cases."
Judge Henderson agrees, reminding the group that the purpose
of the court partner meetings is limited to improving communica-
tion and considering general policies and practices of the court.
Returning to the matter at hand, Judge Henderson suggests the of-
fice take further action: "Maybe it would make sense for Ms. Tay-
lor to go over and introduce herself to the probation officers. That
way they could match a face with her voice on the phone. Perhaps
it would help your staff to feel more connected to what we are
doing at the court."
The director of the local battered women's shelter, Tara West,
suggests that it might also be useful for her organization to provide
a day-long training for probation officers. "I know that we came
out to do a training on the dynamics of domestic violence when the
court first opened, but it's been over a year. I bet there are a num-
ber of new officers who haven't been trained, not to mention some
of the older officers who could benefit from a refresher course."
Police precinct captain Thomas Frederick tells the group about a
training conducted for new officers in his precinct. "It really
opened the eyes of a lot of those guys," the captain tells the group.
"All of us should make sure new staff are properly trained to han-
dle domestic violence cases."
Judge Henderson tells the probation department's representa-
tive that he would like them to accept Ms. West's offer.
After the meeting, the probation department follows through on
both suggestions-inviting Ms. Taylor out to the office and requir-
ing its officers to undergo a domestic violence training each year.
ILLUSTRATION Two
Each year, the women's center at the state college hosts a con-
ference on issues relating to domestic violence. This year they
have invited Judge Henderson and asked him to speak about the
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role of the judiciary in deterring violence against intimates. Judge
Henderson's panel, billed as "The Government Response to Do-
mestic Violence," includes an advocate from a victim's group, the
chief of police, and a local prosecutor. During his ten-minute pres-
entation, Judge Henderson explains the workings of the West Jack-
son specialized domestic violence court and shares his thoughts
with the group on the need for meaningful judicial responses in
domestic violence matters:
"In the past, our society viewed domestic violence as a private
matter," Judge Henderson explains. "Problems between husbands
and wives, boyfriends and girlfriends, and same-sex partners were
considered outside of the law. Luckily, times have changed and
courts all over the country have finally begun to work coopera-
tively with police, prosecutors, and battered women's advocacy or-
ganizations to protect victims, ensure their safety, and hold abusers
accountable for their actions." During the question and answer pe-
riod which follows, a female student talks about the fear and anger
she felt at the time of the highly-publicized 1995 domestic violence
murder in West Jackson. Judge Henderson responds by explaining
that his domestic violence was created to address her concerns.
The following week, Judge Henderson receives a copy of the col-
lege newspaper. On the front page is an article about the confer-
ence he attended along with a photograph taken during his
presentation. The caption under the photograph states: "Judge
Henderson stands up for victims of domestic violence."
ILLUSTRATION THREE
Judge Henderson calls the matter State v. Victor Chin. Mr. Chin
is accused of assaulting his girlfriend, Wanda Smith. At the time of
his arrest, bail was set at $10,000. Mr. Chin was unable to post the
money bond to make bail, and his attorney asked for a hearing
before Judge Henderson to request a reduction in the bail amount.
At the hearing, Assistant District Attorney George Tyler indi-
cates that the State will agree to a lower bail amount, if the court
imposes a curfew on Mr. Chin and requires that, while he is out on
bail, Mr. Chin attend an intervention program for batterers. "Your
honor, this is a case with strong evidence. Last Saturday night, in
the parking lot of a popular West Jackson bar, two witnesses clearly
saw Mr. Chin first shove Ms. Smith up against a car, and then pull
her into the car by her hair. Clearly, this is a defendant who needs
close supervision."
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The defense counsel argues that Mr. Chin has no prior record of
domestic violence and that he is being punished without being
found guilty. "Your honor, once Mr. Chin is forced to enter a bat-
terer's intervention program, his reputation will be seriously
harmed. The program will interfere with his work and could jeop-
ardize his job. If the allegations in this case involved strangers, you
would not be ordering any kind of condition of release-let alone a
batterer's program. There is no reason for such a requirement to
be imposed in this matter. This is an isolated incident. My client
has never been accused of any other crime."
Judge Henderson responds that this case isn't about strangers,
it's about domestic violence-which presents a host of different is-
sues from ordinary assault cases. "So, while a defendant is out on
bail in my court, he will be taking part in a program."
Speaking directly to Mr. Chin, Judge Henderson warns: "Sir, let
me explain my order to you. Until this order is terminated, you are
subject to a curfew, requiring that you return to your home by 9
o'clock each night, and you also must attend a batterer's interven-
tion program. The program meets each week. I am going to be
watching your progress closely. If you fail to attend, if you don't
follow the program's rules, if you don't comply with this order in
any way, you will find yourself back here answering to me. Is all of
this clear?"
Upset, Mr. Chin asks Judge Henderson why he is being ordered
to go to a batterer's program. He tells the judge that he is a stable,
working man who is innocent of the charges against him, and that
he does not need to be monitored. Mr. Chin goes on to say that,
since he is not a batterer, he doesn't see how the program will
change anything.
Since being appointed to the domestic violence court Judge Hen-
derson has read a number of studies regarding batterer's interven-
tion programs. Some indicate that they are successful in changing
the behaviors of abusers; others are less conclusive. Regardless,
Judge Henderson knows that sending defendants to batterer's pro-
grams enables him to keep tabs on their whereabouts.
Accordingly, Judge Henderson tells Mr. Chin: "I'm not sending
you to this program for your benefit-it's for the benefit of Ms.
Smith and the people of West Jackson. It doesn't matter to me
whether you like it, or what you say there. The point is, you've
been charged with a serious crime, and I need to keep an eye on
you. While you are awaiting trial, it is my job to make sure I know
what you are doing, when, and how. As for your guilt or inno-
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cence, you'll have your day in court to present a defense, if you so
choose."
Over the next few months, the court monitors Mr. Chin's behav-
ior. Mr. Chin returns to court once every two weeks, where the
resource coordinator provides status reports to the court about his
compliance with his conditions of release. And, on a few occa-
sions, Judge Henderson calls Mr. Chin at his home, in the evening,
to check whether he is obeying the curfew imposed as a condition
of his release.
At the end of his third month in the domestic violence court,
following a jury trial, Mr. Chin is acquitted of the charges against
him.
ILLUSTRATION FOUR
Joseph and Maria Farrell have been married for twenty-five
years. After a series of bitter fights, followed by hopeful reconcili-
ations-a pattern which stretched out over most of the past year-
Mrs. Farrell decided to leave her husband and seek a divorce. She
moved in with her sister, Hannah Cunningham, and told Mr. Far-
rell that until he heard from her, she wanted no contact with him
either in person or by the phone. She explained that she needed to
move on with her life, and that she did not want to repeat the terri-
ble arguments they had been having.
Two weeks after their separation, Mr. Farrell went to Ms. Cun-
ningham's home to talk to Mrs. Farrell about reconciling and hav-
ing her return to their home. Their conversation quickly turned
into an argument, growing increasingly heated. Mrs. Farrell, scared
by her husband's behavior, closed herself in a bedroom and barri-
caded the door. Using a large kitchen knife, Mr. Farrell attempted
to stab through the door and force his way into the room. The
police, who had been called by Mrs. Farrell, arrived before Mr. Far-
rell was able to enter the bedroom. They disarmed Mr. Farrell and
arrested him.
Following his arrest, Mr. Farrell was arraigned at the downtown
arraignment court, where he was charged with criminal possession
of a weapon and aggravated assault. Mr. Farrell, who had no prior
criminal history, was able to post the money bond needed to make
bail. Before releasing Mr. Farrell, the arraignment court judge
routed the case to Judge Henderson's domestic violence court and
imposed a standard order of protection, barring Mr. Farrell from
having any contact with his wife. The order would remain in effect
until Mr. Farrell appeared before Judge Henderson.
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At the first status hearing in Judge Henderson's court, the assis-
tant district attorney tells the judge that the arraignment court's
order of protection has expired and asks Judge Henderson for a
new order: "Your honor, I'm sure you'll agree, given the poten-
tially life-threatening nature of Mr. Farrell's attack on his wife, that
an order of protection barring any contact is essential in this case.
Mr. Farrell is accused of committing a terribly violent crime."
Mr. Farrell's attorney, Max McGuire, asks to be heard and in-
forms the court that since the evening of the incident, Mr. and Mrs.
Farrell have decided to enroll in marriage counseling sessions with
a highly regarded social worker and that they are committed to
repairing their marriage. "Your honor, I have spoken to Mrs. Far-
rell by phone. She has indicated that she wants to pursue these
counseling sessions with her husband."
According to Mr. McGuire, the unfortunate incident at Ms. Cun-
ningham's house was a low point for the Farrells which has spurred
them to take a fresh look at their problems. "Judge Henderson,
given the Farrells' wishes, it would be a mistake for this court to
stand in the way of their efforts to preserve their marriage. Under
these circumstances, a no-contact order of protection simply makes
no sense. In fact, the Farrell's actions-their recent conversations
leading to their decision to go to counseling-already have violated
the arraignment court's no-contact order. I ask the court to modify
the order requested by the assistant district attorney, so that it al-
lows Mr. and Mrs. Farrell to attend marriage counseling sessions
and to speak with each other as necessary to arrange these
meetings."
Mrs. Farrell is not present in the courtroom. Judge Henderson
asks Barbara Taylor, the resource coordinator, whether she has any
information regarding Mrs. Farrell's wishes with respect to the
counseling sessions. Ms. Taylor tells the judge that she contacted
Mrs. Farrell's victim advocate, but, because of the newness of the
case, the victim advocate had not yet had an opportunity to speak
with Mrs. Farrell. Ms. Taylor is unable to confirm whether Mrs.
Farrell has had a change of heart.
Judge Henderson addresses the defendant: "I have heard the ar-
guments made on your behalf by Mr. McGuire. But without being
certain of Mrs. Farrell's wishes, I simply cannot allow you to have
contact with her. My concern for her safety, given your past ac-
tions, is too great. As a result, I am issuing an order of protection
prohibiting you from having any contact with your wife. We will
schedule another hearing within two weeks to consider again
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whether this order should be modified to allow you to go to coun-
seling sessions. Your efforts to save your marriage will have to
wait." Weighing heavily on Judge Henderson's mind was the be-
lief, based on his experience with these cases, that counseling
rarely works when violence is the issue.
Judge Henderson continues: "Mr. Farrell, I want to be very clear
about this order of protection. It is my order. You are to have no
contact at all with your wife. You cannot see her in person. You
cannot talk to her on the phone. If she calls you, you are not to
speak with her. If she asks to see you, you are not to meet with
her. Do you understand, Mr. Farrell?"
Mr. Farrell tells the judge that he understands. Judge Henderson
then asks the assistant district attorney and Mr. McGuire to ap-
proach the bench. He schedules a hearing in two weeks and directs
Ms. Taylor to work with the victim advocate so that Mrs. Farrell is
quickly informed about the order of protection. Back on the re-
cord, Judge Henderson ends the hearing, saying, "Ms. Taylor, I
want to see a full report from the victim advocate regarding Mrs.
Farrell's wishes before the next status hearing two weeks from
now."
Since 1987, when the first domestic violence court opened its
doors in Quincy, Massachusetts, state courts across the country have
begun to rethink the way they handle domestic violence cases, creat-
ing specialized domestic violence courts of their own. These experi-
ments have been driven by several forces, including increases in
domestic violence cases, judicial frustration with traditional re-
sponses, and public pressure. Domestic violence courts are still a
new phenomenon; as of yet, no one has taken a comprehensive look
at their impacts. Still, preliminary research suggests they are making
a difference, reducing dismissal and warrant rates, and providing
improved services to victims.
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JUST THE (UNWIELDY, HARD TO GATHER,
BUT NONETHELESS ESSENTIAL) FACTS, MA'AM:
WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW ABOUT
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
Greg Berman*
and Anne Gulick**
Policymakers often think, incorrectly, that an evaluation is like
an "audit" or trial in which the results are usually clear cut and
definitive. Either the funds were spent or they weren't; either
the program served its intended beneficiaries at a reasonable
cost per client or it didn't. Such "audit" questions are much eas-
ier to answer than the "evaluation" questions of cause and ef-
fect, often stretching out over a lifetime of the targets of crime
prevention efforts.'
The expected value of any net impact assessment of any large scale
social program is zero.2
INTRODUCTION
Robert Martinson's seminal 1974 Public Interest article, What
Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform offered a
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Attorney Bulletin, the Fordham Urban Law Journal, and other publications. Prior to
joining the Center for Court Innovation, Mr. Berman created the New York Common
Application, a universal form designed to expedite the foundation grant proposal pro-
cess for community groups. A native Washingtonian, Mr. Berman is a graduate of
Wesleyan University and a former Coro Fellow in Public Affairs. He serves on the
board of Poets House.
** Anne W. Gulick holds a B.A. from Columbia University and has completed
graduate work at Duke University. As an Americorps*VISTA member at the Passaic
County Legal Aid Society, she implemented several community legal education and
empowerment projects. She has been involved with the Center'songoing examination
of the work and effects of problem-solving justice initiatives across the country.
1. Lawrence W. Sherman, Thinking About Crime Prevention, in NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING 2-
1, 2-15 (Lawrence W. Sherman et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter WHAT WORKS].
2. Peter H. Rossi, The Iron Law of Evaluation and Other Metallic Rules, 4 REs.
Soc. PROBS. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 4 (1987).
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bleak assessment of rehabilitative initiatives aimed at criminal of-
fenders.3  This literary review of prison-based treatment pro-
grams-from vocational training to psychotherapy-concluded
that, "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts
that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on
recidivism." 4 Martinson determined the failure of treatment pro-
grams by demonstrating a failure of research because the more
than 200 studies he reviewed gave little evidence that the programs
studied were linked to a reduction in crime. 5 Yet, what seems to
have most frustrated the author were the studies themselves, many
of which left unclear whether the programs had not worked, or
whether the system under which they were administered prevented
successful implementation.6
Martinson's hugely influential article cast a pall over rehabilita-
tive criminal justice programs for years. To this day, reformers in
the field find themselves grappling with the suspicion-held by
many academics, policymakers, and citizens-that "nothing
works." The 1996 report, Preventing Crime: What Works, What
Doesn't, What's Promising confronted this mindset head on:
Merely because a program has not been evaluated properly does
not mean that it is failing to achieve its goals. Previous reviews
of crime prevention programs, especially in prison rehabilita-
tion, have made that error, with devastating consequences for
further funding for those efforts. In addressing the unevaluated
programs, we must blame the lack of documented effectiveness
squarely on the evaluation process, and not on the programs
themselves.7
Sherman attempted to infuse hope into the field by throwing out
the "nothing works" conclusion.8 But the more accurate conclu-
sion he offered in its place-that very little is known about what
works'-comes with its own set of frustrations.
Problem-solving court research, 10 most of it conducted post-
Sherman, faces a political climate that prefers definitive answers
3. See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Re-
form, 35 PuB. INT. 22 (1974).
4. Id. at 25.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 24.
7. Sherman, supra note 1, at 2-21 to 2-22.
8. Id. at 2-21.
9. Id. (discussing what is unknown about crime prevention programs).
10. For the purposes of this Essay, "problem-solving courts" refers to drug courts,
community courts, domestic violence courts, mental health courts, juvenile interven-
tion courts, and family treatment courts. Specialized court initiatives seek to focus the
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over cautious preliminary findings, and is still likely to mistake un-
certainty for proof of failure. Yet, at present, cautious preliminary
findings are the best tools. The research to date on these new judi-
cial experiments does not offer many definitive conclusions.
Projects that fall under the "problem-solving" umbrella have been
around for a relatively short time-anywhere from a decade to a
few months. It takes time and money to track recidivism over the
long term, to meaningfully weigh program costs and benefits, and
to compare new practices to one another, as well as to business as
usual.
The best research designs use a random assignment model, split-
ting a single pool of defendants between an experimental track and
normal case processing, but in most cases this "gold standard" is
not feasible for studies of problem-solving courts. Quasi-experi-
mental comparison groups range from the good (defendants in
traditional court with carefully matched characteristics to drug
court participants), to the not so good (less rigorously selected
groups of defendants undergoing normal prosecution), to the bad
(defendants who refused to participate in the problem-solving
court).
In truth, many programs are not subject to even a bad quasi-
experimental evaluation. While the demand for criminal justice re-
search is high, both among policymakers and practitioners, the fi-
nancial support lags. 1 Outside of the National Institute of Justice,
there are few sources of funding for criminal justice research.' 2
Nevertheless, problem-solving courts have begun to leave a pa-
per trail. Many problem-solving courts have produced, are produc-
ing, or plan to produce process evaluations with detailed
information about how the programs have been implemented.
Sherman noted that newer programs have the advantage of more
rigorous standards for evaluation, 3 and in the long history of crim-
inal justice innovation, it is indeed difficult to locate many new
ideas that have been better documented or more well-researched
than problem-solving courts.
What is known about problem-solving courts? After more than
a decade of practice, what conclusions, if any, can be drawn about
energies of judges, lawyers, and administrators on solving difficult social, human, and
legal problems.
11. Lawrence W. Sherman, Conclusions: The Effectiveness of Local Crime Preven-
tion Funding, in WHAT WORKS, supra note 1, at 10-1, 10-15 to 10-18.
12. See id. at 10-16 to 10-18 (noting that neither Congress nor state legislatures
have funded evaluations of research programs).
13. Id. at 10-20 to 10-21.
2003] 1029
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
these judicial experiments? Where are the gaps in the current
knowledge and which areas are ripe for further study? This Essay
attempts to answer these questions. It is not a piece of original
research, but rather an effort to map the territory of this new field,
offering for the first time both a review of current problem-solving
research and a sketch of a future agenda.
I. DRUG COURTS
Any review of problem-solving court research must begin with
drug treatment courts, the first projects to fall under the problem-
solving court umbrella, and the most extensively studied. Since
1989, when the first drug court opened, the model has been repli-
cated widely. 4 There are now hundreds of drug courts in opera-
tion or in planning.15 Moreover, these courts have generated a
sizeable body of research on their operations and outcomes. Drug
courts now have enough of a track record to promote an informed
discussion of how they work, how well they work, and why they
work.
A. What We Know
Steven Belenko's reviews of drug court evaluations are the most
authoritative source of information on the what, where, and how of
drug court research to date.' 6 His Research on Drug Courts: A
Critical Review 2001 Update reviewed thirty-seven evaluations
from thirty-six different drug courts and only included studies con-
ducted by outside evaluators.' 7 Most of the studies included were
process evaluations, but some included limited outcome measures
and cost analyses as well.' 8 Based on Belenko's review and other
drug court studies, the following can be stated about drug court
programs:
14. See, e.g., Ctr. for Court Innovation, Problem-Solving Courts, at http://
www.problem-solvingcourts.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) (noting that "over the past
decade, hundreds of experimental courts have sprung up across the country.").
15. Id.
16. STEVEN BELENKO, NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT CO-
LUMBIA UNIV., RESEARCH ON Diu.U COURTS: A CRITICAl. REVIEW 2001 UPDATE 1(2001), available at http://www.casacolumbia.org/usr-doc/researchondrug.pdf (last vis-
tited Mar. 15, 2003).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 9.
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1. Drug Courts are Popular and Serve a Needy Population
According to Belenko, "[d]rug courts have achieved considera-
ble local support and have provided intensive, long-term treatment
services to offenders with long histories of drug use and criminal
justice contacts, previous treatment failures, and high rates of
health and social problems." 9
2. Court-Mandated Treatment Programs Result in Higher
Retention Rates
The estimated national average one-year retention rate for
mandatory treatment is sixty percent.2 0 By way of contrast, re-
ported retention rates for voluntary treatment programs range
from thirty to sixty percent over a three-month period (one-year
rates not available).2 '
3. The Longer Participants Stay in Treatment, the Better
the Outcomes
A 1978 study of an Oregon program demonstrated that people
who dropped out of treatment were less likely to be rearrested if
they had stayed in treatment for at least ninety days. 2 This finding
pointed to the importance of looking beyond what happens to
graduates of drug courts. Outcomes for other participants (even
those who "fail" in treatment) can be substantial and are worth
studying.
4. Drug Court Participants had Lower Rates of Recidivism and
Drug Use While Still in the Program, than did
Comparison Groups Undergoing
Normal Prosecution2
3
Lower in-program recidivism rates demonstrated that offenders
in drug court pose a reduced risk to public safety, at least during
19. Id. at 1.
20. Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 2 NAT'L DRUG
CT. INST. REV. 2, 26-27 (1999), available at http://www.npcresearch.com (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003).
21. Ward S. Condelli & George DeLeon, Fixed and Dynamic Predictors of Client
Retention in Therapeutic Communities, 10 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 1, 11-16
(1993).
22. Sherry Holland, Gateway Houses: Effectiveness of Treatment on Criminal Be-
havior, 13 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 369, 371-72, 374 (1978).
23. Belenko, supra note 20, at 26-37.
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the multi-year period when they are under drug court
supervision.24
5. Even Absent Treatment, Graduated Sanctions Can Have a
Statistically Significant Impact on Offenders' Behavior
An Urban Institute study of the District of Columbia Superior
Court suggested that ongoing monitoring and graduated sanctions
and rewards could help drug offenders avoid rearrest in the year
after sentencing, even if offenders were not linked to treatment.25
The results point to the value of intensive judicial monitoring.26
6. The Certainty and Severity of Drug Court Sanctions Are
Crucial to the Model's Effectiveness
Criminal justice researchers looked at the effects of punishment
in terms of certainty (whether the sanction will be enforced), sever-
ity (how harsh the sanction will be), and celerity (how quickly the
sanction will be imposed).27 One recent study surveyed college
students about the likelihood that they would drive home from a
party drunk, given the possibility of being caught and punished for
the crime. 28 Respondents showed less concern for how quickly the
punishment would come, and more concern with its certainty and
severity in deciding whether to commit the crime. 29 Extralegal
consequences were also important factors, but the study's most
prominent conclusion was the weakness of a punishment's celerity
as a deterrent.30 Another study by Adele Harrell of the Urban In-
stitute compared the graduated sanctions programs in three drug
24. See id. at 37 (noting that criminal activity is reduced in the drug court
programs).
25. ADELE HARRELL ET AL., URBAN INST., FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF
THE D.C. SUPERIOR COURT DRUG INTERVENTION PROGRAM 53-62 (1998), available
at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/409041-findings.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2003).
26. See id. at 47-67.
27. See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity Impulsivity and Ex-
tralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2000), available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/Durlauf/
networkwebl/London/Criminologyl-15-01.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 24 (reporting that coefficients for probability and severity are negative
and statistically significant).
30. Id. at 25 (stating that the deterrent impact of extra legal consequences is at
least as great as that for legal consequences).
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treatment court settings, and found that the severity of the sanc-
tions had the greatest effect across the board.31
7. Well-Designed Post-Program Studies About the Recidivism of
Drug Court Clients are Relatively Sparse
Of the more than three-dozen evaluations included in Belenko's
latest review, only six looked at post-program recidivism rates.32
Of these, two showed a statistically significant reduction in recidi-
vism. 33 Clearly, there is a need for more information in this area.
8. Cost Analyses Revealed Cost Savings for Drug Courts
Compared to Traditional Adjudication
Nearly all studies showed significant savings to the criminal jus-
tice system when drug courts were implemented. For example, a
Multnomah County, Oregon study reported that for every dollar
spent on drug court treatment and program administration, the sys-
tem saved two dollars and fifty cents in avoiding the costs of con-
ventional adjudication.34 This figure excluded costs related to
victimization, theft reduction, public assistance, and medical
claims.35 When those costs were added in, the savings were ten
dollars for every one dollar spent.36
9. Cost Savings for Jail and Prison Beds are Less Clear
A 2000 Vera Institute of Justice report cited the need to look at
multiple factors in evaluating a drug court's impacts on jail and
prison costs. 37 While faster case processing and reduced recidivism
among program graduates may lower these costs, other factors may
offset these savings. 38 For example, costs accrue when judges use
jail time as a sanction for participants who slip up. The authors
also questioned whether some drug court participants would have
31. Adele Harrell & John Roman, Reducing Drug Use and Crime Among Offend-
ers: The Impact of Graduated Sanctions, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 1 (2001).
32. BELENKO, supra note 16, at 33.
33. Id.
34. MICHAEL W. FINIGAN, N.W. PROF'L CONSORTIUM, AN OUTCOME PROGRAM
EVALUATION OF THE MULTOMOAH COUNTRY S.T.O.P. DRUG DIVERSION PROGRAM
36 (1998).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. REGINALD FLUELLEN & JENNIFER TRONE, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, Do DRUG
COURTS SAVE JAIL AND PRISON BEDS? 1-2 (2000), available at http://www.vera.org/
publication.pdf/drugcourts.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
38. See id. at 2.
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been incarcerated had they undergone traditional adjudication.39
The report concluded that "[w]e simply do not know enough about
the interaction of these elements to accurately predict overall bed
savings." 40
B. Unanswered Questions
Even with the relatively extensive body of drug court research,
there are a lot of unanswered questions. Variations in research
quality and program design make it difficult to draw general con-
clusions about the drug court model. Recidivism rates among pro-
gram participants as compared with those undergoing normal
prosecution, arguably the most important measure of a drug treat-
ment court's success, are still mostly unknown. Post-program stud-
ies are few and far between, and relatively little funding is in place
for this kind of research. Many of the studies that do exist fail to
distinguish between recidivism during and after program
participation.
Post-program effects, other than recidivism, have received even
less attention. Belenko cited the need for information on partici-
pants' future drug use, employment, family stability, and use of so-
cial services, pointing to the benefits of tracking the work of drug
courts and the progress of their participants over a substantial pe-
riod of time.4 One-shot evaluations, Belenko noted, were far less
useful than multi-year analyses, since impacts may fluctuate, partic-
ularly in a program's first years of operation.42
Studies also frequently fail to track the progress and failure of
defendants who do not graduate from drug court programs, but
instead drop out early. Drug court graduates will almost always
have lower recidivism than drug court failures and comparison
group defendants.43 The proper comparison, however, is of all
drug court participants with comparison group defendants. Track-
ing drug court failures is important not simply for the sake of a
thorough comparison, because we know that treatment can benefit
even those participants who do not complete their entire regimen.
The fate of less successful defendants, however, might shed light on
the effectiveness of some of the program's components.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 6.
41. BELENKO, supra note 16, at 54-55.
42. Id. at 55.
43. See id. at 56.
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C. New Types of Drug Courts
More research is also needed to assess the efficacy of adaptations
of the drug court model. The two most prominent adaptations are
family treatment courts and mental health courts, which apply drug
court principles to cases involving addicted parents charged with
child neglect, and cases involving defendants with chronic persis-
tent mental illness.
A 1999 Urban Institute evaluation of the implementation of
three family treatment courts cited many of the challenges particu-
lar to this emerging model (client confidentiality, juggling the
rights of the parent and the welfare of the child, the use of sanc-
tions, and extensive service needs).44 A future research agenda for
family treatment courts emerges out of the lessons learned from
implementation. These authors felt that the focus should be on de-
tailed process evaluations that document parents' and children's
service needs, outcomes, both immediate and long-term, for par-
ents and children,45 system impacts for courts and other agencies,46
and the direct expenditures and the value of contributions required
to operate these model projects.47 Any effort to seriously evaluate
44. ADELE HARRELL & ALICE GOODMAN, URBAN INST., REVIEW OF SPECIAL-
IZED FAMILY DRUG COURTS: KEY ISSUES IN HANDLING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 2 (1999), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/speclizd.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2003).
45. Id. at 36.
Immediate outcomes [for children] include the duration and number of fos-
ter care episodes while the case is before the court and the final placement
(parents, in kinship foster care, and in foster care). Longer-term outcomes
for those placed with their parents include the percentage named in subse-
quent abuse or neglect petitions, and, for those in which parental rights were
terminated, the percentage adopted. Immediate outcomes [for parents] in-
clude treatment graduation/failure, substance abuse and participation in af-
tercare following case termination, perceptions of fairness of court process,
effects of process on treatment motivation and retention, and assessment of
the relationship between FDC services and reductions in problems faced by
parents.
Id.
46. Id. at 36-37.
System impacts. For courts, these include; the duration of cases, the number
of hearings; the demands for staff, courtroom space, and other resources; the
net widening effects of encouraging early intervention; the potential efficien-
cies of combining multiple petitions for multiple children in a family in a
single case; and the potential for linking of cases active in different courts or
dockets. For other agencies, these include the impact on demand for staff
and services, the requirements to change procedures, and the barriers to par-
ticipation based on agency mandates or funders.
Id.
47. Id. at 37.
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family treatment courts will run up against a number of obstacles,
including the need to track multiple parties (parents and children)
and serious confidentiality restrictions.48
Mental health courts pose a somewhat different set of chal-
lenges. They require an individualized approach to defining success
for participants, each of whom must receive a treatment regimen,
and graduation requirements based on her unique affliction.49 For
this reason, outcome measures are difficult to standardize even
within a single court. As John S. Goldkamp and Cheryl Irons-
Guyun of the Crime and Justice Research Institute wrote in their
2000 review, "[c]ourts cannot say, 'be cured within 12 months."'
Research must take this reality into account.
It is too soon to examine recidivism rates for mental health
courts, but self-reported data on retention and jail savings has be-
gun to surface. For example, the Seattle Municipal Court's Mental
Health Court reported that more than two-thirds of all participants
continued to be successfully engaged in treatment at the end of
their first year.5' The Santa Clara County (CA) Mental Health
Court Progress Report assessed the total cost savings to the county
in unserved jail days of moving fifty-six clients from jail custody to
community treatment at sixty-five dollars and eighty cents per cli-
ent, per day. 52 Moreover, advocates marshaled significant anecdo-
tal evidence to support the notion that mental health courts offered
more resources and a more sensitive approach to the needs of men-
tally ill defendants than did conventional case processing. 3
While these findings are interesting, this question remains-how
do you define success in a mental health court? As the programs
develop, there will be significant pressure to demonstrate reduced
recidivism, a goal that may not be realistic for many participants.
What other measures are there? Improved functionality and qual-
48. Id.
49. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & CHERYL IRON-GUYNN, CRIMINAL & JUSTICE RE-
SEARCH INST., EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE
CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE,
SAN BERNARDINO, AND ANCHORAGE 74 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdf-
files 1/bja/182504.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
50. Id.
51. See Eric Trupin et al., City of Seattle, Mental Health Court: Evaluation Report
48 (2001), available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/courts/pdf/mhreport.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2003).
52. SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., SANTA CLARA COUNTY, MENTAL HEALTH COURT
PROGRESS REPORT 7 (2001).
53. See generally GOLDKAMP & IRON-GUYNN, supra note 49, at 9-57 (discussing
mental health courts in Fort Lauderdale, Seattle, San Bernardino, and Anchorage).
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ity of life? Cost savings? A reduction in the frequency of arrests?
Given the difficult population the courts work with, mental health
courts may want to make a deeper investment in qualitative re-
search by conducting interviews with participants and their family
members to assess both their functionality and their satisfaction
with the process.
II. COMMUNITY COURTS
Each community court is more or less a model unto itself, de-
signed to address quality-of-life problems within a specific neigh-
borhood or group of neighborhoods.54 Among the nearly two
dozen community courts currently in operation there is wide vari-
ety in the types of cases each court tackles-prostitution, landlord-
tenant disputes, truancy, public urination, and unlicensed street
vending, to name a few." Community courts seek to have an effect
on both individual litigants and on the community as a whole. 56 A
community's quality of life, however, is a much more complicated
outcome to measure than, for instance, drug treatment retention
rates. Benefits to neighborhood residents range from the concrete
(less graffiti), to the intangible (how safe people feel, and how peo-
ple relate to each other and their physical space). 57 Therefore, fac-
tors to take into account when evaluating the effectiveness of a
community court project might include the neighborhood's percep-
tion of the court, its staff, and its mission, the impact on local hot
spots and eyesores, and the way government and citizens relate to
one another.58 Community courts thus call for a research agenda
that goes beyond counting cases and tracking dispositions.
Surveys, ethnographies, interviews, and other narrative records are
essential to a critical examination of whether these programs work.
54. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DISPENSING
JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMU-
NITY COURT 3 (2000), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
disp-justjIoc.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
55. MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPACTS,
COST AND BENEFITS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT 5 (2001), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResCtCommMidtownExecSumPub.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
56. SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 2.
57. See id. at 7.
58. See SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 55, at 5 (noting that these factors were con-
sidered when evaluating the Midtown Community Court).
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A. Midtown Community Court
The most thorough community court study to date is the Na-
tional Center for State Courts' evaluation of the Midtown Commu-
nity Court in Manhattan, which was conducted in two stages. The
first, completed in 1997, included a process analysis and prelimi-
nary impact measures. 59 The second, in 2001, evaluated the long-
term impacts of the court over three years and included a cost-
benefit analysis."
The first stage of research documented the following:
1. Case Outcomes
One of the threshold questions for the Midtown Community
Court was whether the court could change outcomes in cases in-
volving misdemeanor and quality-of-life crimes (prostitution, shop-
lifting, illegal street vending, low-level drugs). During the period
studied, quality-of-life offenders who went through conventional
case processing in Manhattan tended to receive either jail or no
sanctions at all from the criminal justice system.61 Offenders re-
ceived a larger amount of intermediate sanctions, like community
service or a social service referral, in Midtown than in the down-
town court.62
2. Community Service Compliance Rates
Midtown achieved a seventy-five percent compliance rate in con-
trast with fifty percent in the downtown sample.63 Midtown also
tracked defendant characteristics in tandem with compliance rates
and found that the faster offenders were assigned their service, the
more likely they were to comply.64
3. Reduced Crime
The first evaluation of Midtown included an ethnography de-
signed to provide insight into the daily lives of street offenders, to
elicit their opinion about the court, and to examine how the street
scene had changed in the neighborhood since the court's opening.
Prostitution arrests dropped fifty-six percent in Midtown during
59. SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 1.
60. SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 55, at 2.
61. SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 6.
62. Id.
63. /I. at 7.
64. Id.
65. Id.
1038
JUST THE FACTS, MA'AM
the court's first eighteen months of operation.66 Unlicensed vend-
ing arrests dropped twenty-four percent.67 Ethnographic data sug-
gested that the court was responsible for increased pressure, and a
subsequent drop in local activity.68 In both industries, sex workers
and vendors complained about the inconvenience of frequent court
appearances and community service sanctions, and some reported
exploring other ways to make a living as a result.69
4. Community Attitudes
Focus group research revealed that in the months following the
court's opening, the police department moved from skepticism to
support for Midtown.7 ° Community members expressed positive,
but less dramatic, feedback in the first phase of the evaluation.7'
The second stage of the National Center for State Courts' evalu-
ation of Midtown unearthed some of the complexities of measuring
long-term success of a community court. The court opened during
a period of dramatic neighborhood turnaround for midtown Man-
hattan. Many factors contributed to the positive changes, including
the improved local economy and the Giuliani administration's con-
certed effort to clean up the Times Square area. The Midtown
Community Court undoubtedly played a role in the transforma-
tion, but it is not possible to accurately apportion the credit.72
The second stage of the evaluation also demonstrated that fewer
Midtown offenders were initially sentenced to jail.73 Unlike con-
ventional criminal courts, Midtown has rigorously monitored the
compliance of offenders with community and social service
sentences. 4 Offenders who did not comply were often sentenced
to jail when they reappeared in court.75 In other words, Midtown
used jail less frequently than other Manhattan courts hearing com-
parable cases, but when offenders were sentenced to jail, it was for
longer periods because they had already been given a chance to
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 7-8.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 6.
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fulfill intermediate sanctions.76 This use of jail as a "secondary"
sanction in response to non-compliance led to a reduction in the
net jail savings generated by Midtown. 77 The evaluators con-
cluded: "[a]fter accounting for the greater use of secondary jail at
the Midtown Court, the net jail saving of the project over three
years was reduced to roughly 12,600 jail days-or approximately
thirty-five jail years. "78
Finally, as part of a cost-benefit analysis, researchers made use of
a neighborhood survey, which revealed that two-thirds of residents
would be willing to pay more taxes to keep the court in opera-
tion.79 "Overall, the survey demonstrated that local respondents
saw the benefits of the Midtown Court as equal to or greater than
its costs and supported public funding for comparable projects." 80
B. Future Research
Needless to say, it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions
about community courts based on the results of a single study, no
matter how encouraging. In the days ahead, society's understand-
ing of community courts will undoubtedly become much richer.
Each community court in operation is documenting its own im-
pacts. Two research projects are particularly worth watching.
Taken together, they demonstrate the multifaceted approaches that
research in this field must take in order to capture a full picture of
a community court's outcomes. The first is the Columbia Univer-
sity Center for Violence Research and Prevention's study of the
Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn. Red Hook de-
parts significantly from the Midtown model. The court is multi-
jurisdictional and serves a diverse set of neighborhoods.8 Offend-
ers tend to live within the community, as opposed to Midtown,
where most serious offenders do not.82 The primary neighborhood
demonstrates less social organization, and its demographics are en-
tirely different (public housing tenants, as opposed to a mixture of
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 55, at 6-7.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id.
81. GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, RED HOOK DIARY: PLAN-
NING A COMMUNITY COURT 3 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
redhook-diary.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
82. See id. (noting the residents' need for judicial services); see also DAVID C.
ANDERSON, IN NEW YORK CITY, A "COMMUNITY COURT" AND A NEW LEGAL CUL-
TURE 5 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/commcrt.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003).
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middle-class residents and businesses).83 The current evaluation
will focus on qualitative measurements of community improve-
ments and perceptions of procedural justice, and look for results in
the form of enhanced community involvement and support.84 Key
research questions include the following: To what extent does the
Justice Center bring a new approach to case processing, the roles of
court personnel, and the disposition of cases? How does local
knowledge and information sharing affect the business of the
court? How are community members involved in the Justice
Center, and how does the Justice Center get involved with the
community?
A second study of note is underway in Hartford, Connecticut.
Since opening in 1998, the Hartford Community Court differs from
Midtown most sharply in terms of its target population. The court
serves all of Hartford's seventeen downtown neighborhoods
(though the total number of residents is still smaller than the num-
ber in Midtown's jurisdiction)." Hartford has developed a process
evaluation to document nine key elements of the court: target
problems, target locations, target populations, court processing fo-
cus and adaptations, identifying, screening, and enrolling partici-
pants, dispositional options and the structure and content of
services, community involvement, productivity (services delivered
and impact per resource), and extent of systemwide support and
participation. 6 The evaluation strategy, similar to Midtown's, is a
two-tiered initial study of implementation and immediate
outcomes.
87
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS
The primary stated objective of most domestic violence courts is
the enhancement of victim safety.8 Other outcome measures in-
clude reduced recidivism, improved monitoring and accountability
for defendants, improved case processing speed and systemization,
83. ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 5; BERMAN, supra note 81, at 2.
84. COMM. JUSTICE EXCH., COMMUNITY SURVEY: BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, at
http://www.communityjustice.org/frameset.asp?heading=bestractices%5F1 (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2003).
85. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., CRIME & JUSTICE RESEARCH INST., DEVELOPING
AN EVALUATION PLAN FOR COMMUNITY COURTS: ASSESSING THE HARTFORD COM-
MUNITY COURT MODEL 11 (2001).
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 42.
88. See Kerry Healey et al., Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Crimi-
nal Justice Strategies, ISSUES & PRACS. CRIM. JUST., Feb. 1998, at xii, available at http:/
/www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/168638.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
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and better coordination among all the players in domestic violence
cases.
As domestic violence courts have only begun to yield published
evaluations, most of what we know about the model's outcomes
derives from studies of its core components, particularly batterer
intervention programs, judicial monitoring and orders of protec-
tion, within the context of regular criminal court.
A. Batterers Intervention Programs ("BIP")
Intervention programs, usually "re-education" programs that
give an overview of the history and context of domestic violence,
are widely used in conventional criminal courts as a sanction for
batterers. Recent research estimates that nearly eighty percent of
individuals in batterer programs were sent by probation officers or
the courts.8 9 In some cases, as in Florida, state law requires pro-
gram participation of all domestic violence defendants. Batterer
intervention is popular, but how well does it work? An August
2001 literature review conducted by Larry W. Bennett and Oliver
J. Williams cited three measures for a program's success: "(1) Are
batterers held accountable for their crime (or, has justice been
served?) (2) Are victims safe? And, (3) Has the batterer changed
his attitudes and behavior?" 9°) The authors reached two conclu-
sions: "(1) Batterers [sic] programs as currently configured have
modest but positive effects on violence prevention, and (2) there is
little evidence at present supporting the effectiveness of one BIP
approach over another." 91
To date, few studies address the relative effectiveness of differ-
ent types of batterer programs (the Deluth "re-education" model
has dominated the field in the past, but now faces competition
from other emerging models). Thankfully, there is significant in-
terest within the research community in this area. As a result, the
next few years may yield much more information on how different
program models compare with one another. Bennett and Williams
cited a number of questions for comparative study, including the
following: What roles do program structure and length play in ef-
89. Id. at 1.
90. LARRY W. BENNETT & OLIVER J. WILLIAMS, CONTROVERSIES AND RECENT
STUDIES OF BA-trERER INTERVENTION PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS (2001), at http://
www.vawnet.org/VNL/library/general/AR-bip.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
91. Id. These findings concur with a 1999 BIP literature review authored by Rob-
ert C. Davis & Bruce G. Taylor, Does Batter Treatment Reduce Violence? A Synthesis
of the Literature, in WOMEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY Ap-
PROACii 69, 72, 82-83 (Lynette Feder ed., 1999).
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fectiveness? How do programs that adopt an integrated approach
to other issues-such as drug abuse and mental health-fare in
comparison to more narrowly defined programs? And what about
cultural specificity? 92 Three studies suggested that African-Ameri-
can men who participated in batterers intervention programs ex-
perienced higher rearrest and reoffending rates, lower rates of
program completion, and lower levels of "trust, comfort, willing-
ness to discuss critical subjects, and participation in treatment. '93
B. Judicial Monitoring
Evidence suggests that rigorous court monitoring may have
more of an effect on recidivism than do batterer reeducation pro-
grams. Most telling in this regard is a recent random assignment
experiment in Brooklyn, which compared offenders assigned to
community service to those linked to batterers' intervention. 94
There were three experimental groups: one community service
track, one twenty-six week batterers' intervention program track,
and one eight week program track (while the length of the pro-
grams was considerably different, the total number of hours was
the same).95 Perhaps predictably, more participants successfully
completed the eight week program than the twenty-six week pro-
gram.96 Only participants in the twenty-six week program exhib-
ited lower violence rates than those of the community service
group.97 Neither program track group provided evidence that par-
ticipants had learned anything as a result of their treatment, but
the ones least likely to reabuse were those who were under court
supervision for the longest period of time.98 In other words, judi-
cial monitoring, not batterers' intervention, seems to have made
the difference in victim safety.
Two other studies are worthy of note here. In 2000, San Diego
court administrators conducted an internal study that underlined
the importance of judicial monitoring by showing that highest rates
92. BENNETT & WILLIAMS, supra note 90.
93. Id.; see Rhea Almeida & Ken Dolan-Delvecchio, Addressing Culture in Batter-
ers Intervention: The Asian Indian Community as an Illustrative Example, 5 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 654, 654 (1999) (discussing Somerset, New Jersey's Cultural Con-
text Model for a batterers' intervention program).
94. ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., DOES BATrERER TREATMENT REDUCE VIOLENCE?
A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT IN BROOKLYN-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INCLUDED
(2000).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
2003] 1043
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
of recidivism in domestic violence cases took place between the
time of arrest and the time of a case's disposition.99 In the first
year, with only a batterers' program in place, recidivism was at
twenty-one percent. 00 The next year, when the court added a judi-
cial monitoring component, recidivism dropped to fourteen
percent.101
A 1997 study of two projects in Milwaukee examined the effects
of two changes in the court system with respect to domestic vio-
lence cases-the establishment of a specialized court, and a change
in the district attorney's screening policy that increased the pool of
cases to include uncooperative victims. 10 2 The creation of the spe-
cialized court resulted in a fifty percent reduction in case process-
ing time, a twenty-five percent increase in convictions, and a
decline in pretrial crime. 10 3 The change in prosecutorial policy de-
tracted from some of these positive effects, causing a case backlog,
a decline in convictions, an increase in pretrial crime, and lower
levels of victim satisfaction.1 4 Researchers found that shortening
court processing time in domestic violence cases was a good idea,
introducing domestic violence cases with reluctant victims into the
criminal justice system should be carefully considered and under-
taken only with sufficient resources for prosecution and adjudica-
tion, and in deciding whether or not to prosecute, the victim's voice
should be taken into account.10 5
C. Orders of Protection
Do orders of protection keep victims safer? Research suggests
that the answer is no. A 1996 study by Adele Harrell and Barbara
E. Smith pointed to some of the limitations of restraining orders. 6
Findings were based on interviews of female complainants and the
99. WAYNE L. PETERSON & STEPHEN THUMBERG, STATE JUSTICE INST., EVALUA-
TION REPORT FOR THE SAN DIEGO COUNTY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS 26 (2000).
100. Id. at 27.
101. Id.
102. Robert C. Davis et al., Prosecuting Domestic Violence Cases with Reluctant
Victims: Assessing Two Novel Approaches in Milwaukee, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN
FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 71,71 (Am. Bar
Ass'n ed., 1998) [hereinafter LEGAL IMPLICATIONS], available at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffiles/171666.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 71-72.
106. Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic
Violence Victims, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214, 238-41
(Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
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men named in their orders, as well as court and police records.1 °7
The researchers found that women who sought orders of protection
reported serious incidents of abuse (severe violence, including
punching, choking, forced sex, and threats on their lives). 8 Har-
rell and Smith concluded that the orders were generally not sought
"as a form of early intervention, but rather as a signal of despera-
tion following extensive problems."'10 9
Unfortunately, permanent orders of protection made no differ-
ence in the likelihood that victims would experience physical abuse
in the future, nor did they reduce the probability of contact be-
tween the victim and the abuser."10 Permanent orders of protec-
tion were effective in significantly reducing psychological abuse,
and victims generally agreed that it was worthwhile to file the or-
der-even if they still had concerns about their safety."' Harrell
and Smith concluded their report by recommending that courts tai-
lor orders of protection to the needs of individual victims, coordi-
nate with other criminal justice agencies to improve enforcement,
help victims develop a safety plan, and encourage women to return
to court to report future violations. 12
Harrell and Smith's findings were echoed by a 1997 study by Su-
san Keilitz, Paula Hannaford, and Hillery S. Efkeman that re-
viewed the effectiveness of civil protection orders. 1 3 This report
also highlighted the need for courts to link victims to additional
services, specifically citing the need for victim counseling and
safety planning, the need for the court to address petitioners' spe-
cific concerns, and the need for more detailed knowledge of al-
leged abusers' histories of crime and substance abuse.'14
D. The Role of Victims
A recent study of a specialized domestic violence court in To-
ronto revealed that a case was seven times more likely to be prose-
cuted if the victim was perceived as cooperative, even in a court
107. Id. at 214-15.
108. Id. at 216.
109. Id. at 231.
110. Id. at 232-33.
111. Id. at 240.
112. Id. at 241.
113. SUSAN KEILITZ ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3
(1997).
114. Id.
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specifically designed to minimize reliance on victim cooperation.' 5
How do the roles that victims play in their own cases influence the
ways in which domestic violence courts work to ensure victim se-
curity? What effects do victim advocacy, prosecutorial policies, and
other court procedures have on outcomes for victims?
The role of victims in case processing is a topic that has gener-
ated significant interest among domestic violence researchers. For
example, a 1993 Indianapolis Domestic Violence Prosecution Ex-
periment examined a number of different prosecutorial policies de-
signed to reduce repeat incidents abuse among misdemeanor
domestic violence defendants. 16 In the six months following case
settlement, regardless of prosecutorial policy, researchers found
significant rates of battery.II7 The victims in the greatest jeopardy
of renewed violence were those who dropped charges after the bat-
terer was summoned to court." 8 The researchers concluded that
"[p]rosecutors can help victims minimize the chance of violence by
affirming the legitimacy of their criminal complaints and by re-
specting their decisions about what is best under their unique cir-
cumstances, even if contrary to the prosecutor's administrative
concerns." "19
Other research qualified the above findings by indicating that
mandatory arrest policies result in a net reduction in domestic vio-
lence offenses, regardless of how the victim participates in the pro-
cess. 21' Victim cooperation is not the only variable in domestic
violence case outcomes, but its importance should not be
overlooked.
Taking the needs of victims into account and studying impacts on
victim safety presents some distinct challenges for domestic vio-
lence court researchers. Police and court records may not indicate
how much abuse has actually occurred, and victims-if they are
involved in the court process at all-are often reluctant to partici-
pate in formal studies.
115. Myrna Dawson & Ronit Dinovitzer, Victim Cooperation and the Prosecution
of Domestic Violence in a Specialized Court, 18 Jusr. Q. 593, 593 (2001).
116. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, Selected Findings and Implications Drawn
From The Indianapolis Domestic Violence Prosecution Experiment, in LEGAL INTER-
VENTIONS, supra note 102, at 62.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 63.
119. Id.
120. See Christopher D. Maxwell et al., The Effects of Arrest on Intimate Partner
Violence: New Evidence from the Spouse Assault Replication Program, NAT'L INSTS.
JUST. RES. IN BRIEF, July 2001, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/
188199.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
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Most research to date on specialized domestic violence courts
takes the form of process evaluations, not experimental designs.
Preliminary findings from an Urban Institute study of the Brooklyn
Felony Domestic Violence Court, for example, point to some sig-
nificant outcomes. 121 The study reveals improved coordination
among stakeholders both inside and outside the court system.
Lawyers, judges, and representatives from victims' services and
batterers' programs started meeting together for the first time
under the new specialized court structure. 122 Victim advocates
were assigned to one hundred percent of victims who came
through the court, up from fifty-five percent under the old sys-
tem. 123 Among defendants released on bail, forty-four percent
were sent to batterers' programs (up from zero) and five percent
were sent to substance abuse treatment (up from two percent). 24
An additional four percent were mandated to both batterers' pro-
grams and substance abuse treatment. 25 Before the specialized
court opened, seventy-three percent of domestic violence felony
defendants entered a guilty plea.126 After, eighty-eight percent en-
tered guilty pleas. 127
A pending experiment in the Bronx, conducted by the Center for
Court Innovation with funding from the National Institute of Jus-
tice, seeks to explore the relative effectiveness of court monitoring
and batterers' intervention as responses to domestic violence. 2s
Convicted batterers in the Bronx will be divided at random into
four, 200-person test groups. 2 9 One group will participate in a bat-
terers' intervention program and receive monthly monitoring, a
second group will participate in a batterers' program and receive
court monitoring on a graduated schedule, a third group will not
participate in a batterers' program and receive monthly monitor-
121. See LISA NEWMARK ET AL., URBAN INST., SPECIALIZED FELONY DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COURTS: LESSONS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACTS FROM THE KINGS
COUNTY EXPERIENCE (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/
410381_domviolcourts.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
122. Id. at 17-19.
123. Id. at 19-20.
124. Id. at 56, 60.
125. Id. at 60.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. National Institute of Justice, Current NIJ Grants, Testing the Impact of Court
Monitoring and Battering Intervention Programs at the Bronx Misdemeanor Domes-
tic Violence Court (Grantees Fund for the City of New York & Center for Court
Innovation), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/vawprog/grnt-2001_09.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003).
129. Id.
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ing, and a fourth group will not participate in a batterers' program
and receive graduated monitoring.1 30 This study, scheduled to con-
clude in 2004, presents an opportunity to simultaneously test two
components of the specialized court model, both batterers' pro-
grams and court monitoring, under experimental conditions and
within the context of the specialized court itself.
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
While problem-solving courts are designed to improve case
processing and court outcomes, they also seek to make an impact
in the world of public opinion. How are these courts perceived by
relevant stakeholders? Do they have the potential to improve pub-
lic confidence in justice? How about the job satisfaction levels of
judges and attorneys?
Recent surveys conducted by the National Center for State
Courts have attempted to document public attitudes toward prob-
lem-solving courts.1 3 1 These surveys have demonstrated that the
public shares problem-solving court innovators' concerns about
court efficiency, fairness, and responsiveness to communities.132
The research also indicated high levels of public support for prob-
lem-solving methods aimed at improvements in these areas. 33 A
2001 survey found strong support, particularly among African-
American and Latino respondents, for common problem-solving
strategies, including the hiring of treatment staff and social work-
ers, bringing offenders back to court to report on their progress in
treatment, coordinating the work of local treatment agencies to
help offenders, and bringing in relevant outside experts to help
courts make more informed decisions.134
What do judges think of problem-solving courts? A recent study
of state court judges commissioned by the Center for Court Inno-
vation and conducted by the University of Maryland's Survey Re-
search Center suggested that the judiciary shares the public's
130. Id.
131. David B. Rottman, On-Line Court Reform: Can Technology Boost Public
Confidence in the Courts?, JUDGELINK, at http://judgelink.org/insights/1999/reform
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
132. Id.
133. DAVID B. ROTTMAN & RANDALL M. HANSEN, How RECENT COURT USERS
VIEW T]HE STATE COURTS: PERCEPTIONS OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS, LATINOS, AND
WHITES 18 (2001).
134. Id. at 13-14.
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endorsement of basic problem-solving tools. 135 More than 500
criminal court judges were surveyed. 136 Participants supported
treatment as an alternative to incarceration for addicted, nonvio-
lent offenders (over seventy percent agreed that treatment was
more effective than jail).' 37 They overwhelmingly agreed that the
bench should be involved in reducing drug abuse among defend-
ants (ninety-one percent). 138 They also cited the need for more in-
formation about past violence when deciding bail and sentences in
domestic violence cases (ninety percent agreed). 39 Sixty-three
percent of criminal court judges and seventy-one percent of prob-
lem-solving court judges said they should be more involved with
community groups in addressing neighborhood safety and quality-
of-life concerns. 140 This runs counter to the popular assumption
that judges, concerned with neutrality and independence, are un-
willing to engage with the community.
How do defendants perceive problem-solving courts? While no
national survey has been undertaken, as part of the National
Center for State Courts' evaluation of the Midtown Community
Court, researchers conducted individual interviews with defend-
ants, who commented on the court's better facilities and faster case
processing time.141 Interestingly, they found the sentences meted
out by the court tougher than those issued in conventional
courts. 142 When asked which court they preferred, however, they
chose Midtown because personnel treated them better. 1
43
V. DEVELOPING A FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
While problem-solving courts and related innovations have gen-
erated a solid and growing body of research to date, there remain
more unanswered questions than firm conclusions about these judi-
cial experiments. Further, new models are quickly moving to the
forefront and producing their own preliminary research findings
and future directions. An Urban Institute study, published in April
135. Center for Court Innovation, State Court Judges Survey, Executive Summary
(2001) (unpublished survey, on file with the Center for Court Innovation).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Survey Research Center, University of Maryland, College Park, State Court
Judges Project #1409 Crosstab 12 (2001) (unpublished report, on file with the Center
for Court Innovation).
139. Id. at 16.
140. Id. at 8.
141. SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 9.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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2002, evaluates the performance of four teen courts (where low-
level juvenile offenders are adjudicated by their peers), and sets
parameters for further research in this area. Teen courts and other
new models must be integrated into a problem-solving court re-
search agenda, drawing upon the same questions and approaches
that have been used so far while also helping to shape what the
research of the future will look like.
Going forward, the operative questions for problem-solving
court researchers may be both the open-ended "Do they work?"
query and some more specific questions: How do these programs
work? For what populations and under what circumstances? With
that in mind, what follows is an attempt to define an agenda for the
future of problem-solving court research. It is intended to spark
conversation rather than foreclose it. Inevitably, the most provoca-
tive questions will emerge at the local level-the product of a dy-
namic conversation between researchers and practitioners.
A. Studies of the Components
Recognizing that complex problems call for complex solutions,
problem-solving courts employ a vast array of ideas and strategies.
Nonetheless, as the current Bronx Domestic Violence Court exper-
iment suggests, it is worth isolating some of their core components,
such as treatment, graduated sanctions, or judicial monitoring, to
more precisely understand how the pieces within the problem-solv-
ing court model affect outcomes. What is the "active ingredient" in
these experiments? To answer this question, it may make sense to
look across projects, for example, studying the role of the judge in
drug courts, community courts, and domestic violence courts.
B. Long-Term and Post-Program Outcomes
Researchers face tremendous challenges when they try to gather
data about problem-solving court participants, particularly those
who have left the programs, either due to graduation or failure. If
program drop-outs or failures end up in jail, "post-program" only
begins once they get out, which could be years from the original
arrest that diverted them to a problem-solving court in the first
place. Many studies do not currently track what happens to par-
ticipants who do not graduate from a problem-solving court, but
instead return to traditional adjudication. Nevertheless, post-pro-
gram outcomes are vital to understanding the long-term effects of
problem-solving courts and how they compare to the effects of
conventional practice.
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C. Other Outcomes for Program Participants
While recidivism may be the holy grail for problem-solving court
outcomes, there are a number of other potential effects that bear
investigation, particularly as these courts broaden their scope to
include difficult populations with histories of mental illness and vi-
olence. Graduation exit interviews can shed light on how partici-
pants' lives have changed since their first contact with the court.
Offenders who were homeless upon arrest may now have a place to
live, women who were pregnant and addicted may have given birth
to drug-free babies, and people without high school diplomas may
have GEDs. Alternatively, participants in long-term treatment
may have lost their jobs or their marriages while getting help for
their addiction. There are potentially endless consequences, some
intended, others not, that might occur from participating in a prob-
lem-solving court. Studies can track these types of changes with
relative ease while defendants are under the court's control, but
again, post-program effects are harder to assess. If all goes well, a
problem-solving court graduate will never again have formal con-
tact with the criminal justice system after program completion.
Unfortunately, this best of all outcomes makes it difficult for re-
searchers to track other events in the lives of graduates over a
longer period of time. For example, it is nearly impossible to de-
termine whether drug court graduates remain sober over time if
they are not rearrested.
D. Speed
With increases in caseloads every year, state court systems are
looking for ways to reduce backlog and repeat appearances. In
some cases, problem-solving courts may alleviate some of the bur-
den on the traditional system by diverting certain types of offend-
ers, but they also require more face time between defendant and
judge, better tracking and record-keeping, and more administrative
resources while the case is in the system. It is uncertain whether
problem-solving courts speed up or slow down the administration
of justice.
E. Coercion and the Protection of Rights
Problem-solving courts exert-or threaten to exert-legal force
as part of their efforts to change the behavior of offenders. Some
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critics have argued that no one should be coerced into treatment.'4 4
Others have wondered if problem-solving courts diminish the abil-
ity of defenders to engage in zealous advocacy on behalf of their
clients.' 45 Advocates have argued that problem-solving courts
have done little to alter the practice of lawyering or the nature of
due process but have simply given attorneys and judges more tools
to work with. 46 Future research could investigate whether prob-
lem-solving courts do indeed represent a change in the way defend-
ants' rights are protected. This might include both qualitative work
(how defendants and their attorneys perceive coercion and repre-
sentation in a problem-solving court) and quantitative work (for
example, comparing the number of objections and plea bargains
with those of a conventional court).
F. Net Widening
Critics with concerns about defendants' Fourth Amendment
rights and the decline of adversarialism in the problem-solving
court model are uneasy about the effect of these courts on the ac-
tions of other players in the criminal justice system. 147 Does the
existence of a drug court, for example, lead police to make arrests
they otherwise would not have made? Does an increase in infor-
mation sharing lead to more scrutiny of specific groups of offend-
ers? Or, more glibly, is there a "build it and they will come"
phenomenon at work here? Having created problem-solving
courts, will criminal justice agencies feel compelled to ensure their
caseloads by any means necessary? Research can help answer
these questions by studying arrest patterns and prosecutorial and
judicial decision making.
G. Community Impacts
In recent years, a number of new theories (social capital, bowling
alone, community efficacy) have been advanced to explain why
some neighborhoods are safe, healthy, and economically viable for
problem-solving courts and others are not. One of the key ideas
running through these theories is that strong communities promote
144. GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, PROBLEM
SOLVING COURTS: A BRIEF PRIMER, available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
prob.solv-courts.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
145. Id. at 136.
146. Id.
147. See SVIRID)OFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 3 (noting that some were doubtful that
the project would have an effect on "business as usual").
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information sharing and coordination among civic institutions,
whether they are churches, schools, civic associations, or govern-
ment agencies. Because of their emphasis on inter-agency collabo-
ration and public engagement, problem-solving courts hold out the
possibility that they might contribute to the healthy functioning of
the neighborhoods in which they reside. This idea is ripe for fur-
ther exploration. Does the coordination of services within the
court lead to new levels of cooperation among community stake-
holders beyond the courthouse? Can courts serve as a bridge be-
tween government and citizens? How might researchers document
and assess this? These are questions that as yet have attracted little
attention in the field.
CONCLUSION
It goes without saying that this Essay only touches the surface of
the possibilities for problem-solving court research. The rapid
proliferation of these experiments have been driven by more than
rhetoric or funding. It has been driven by the ability of problem-
solving courts to generate demonstrable results, however provi-
sional or inadequately studied. Framing a research agenda for
problem-solving courts is much more than an academic exercise-
it is of vital importance to the future of the problem-solving move-
ment. If problem-solving courts hope to continue to thrive, and to
move from experiments to institutionalization, they must answer
the concerns of critics and continue to win over the agnostics. The
only way to do this is through rigorous, independent research that
focuses on the questions that matter most to practitioners and
policymakers.
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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS
Bruce J. Winick*
1. PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS: A TRANSFORMATION IN THE
JUDICIAL ROLE
In the past dozen or so years, a remarkable transformation has
occurred in the role of the courts.' Courts traditionally have func-
tioned as governmental mechanisms of dispute resolution, resolv-
ing disputes between private parties concerning property,
contracts, and tort damages, or between the government and an
individual concerning allegations of criminal wrongdoing or regula-
tory violations. In these cases, courts typically have functioned as
neutral arbiters, resolving issues of historical facts or supervising
juries engaged in the adjudicatory process.
Recently, a range of new kinds of problems, many of which are
social and psychological in nature, have appeared before the
courts. These cases require the courts to not only resolve disputed
issues of fact, but also to attempt to solve a variety of human
problems that are responsible for bringing the case to court. Tradi-
tional courts limit their attention to the narrow dispute in contro-
versy. These newer courts, however, attempt to understand and
address the underlying problem that is responsible for the immedi-
ate dispute, and to help the individuals before the court to effec-
tively deal with the problem in ways that will prevent recurring
court involvement.
The new courts, increasingly known as problem solving courts,2
are specialized tribunals established to deal with specific problems,
often involving individuals who need social, mental health, or sub-
stance abuse treatment services. These courts also include criminal
cases involving individuals with drug or alcoholism problems,
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Comments or ques-
tions for the Author should be addressed to bwinick@aw.miami.edu.
1. Leonore M. J. Simon, Proactive Judges: Solving Problems and Transforming
Communities, in THE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS (David Car-
son & Ray Bull eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 4-7, on file with author).
2. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS,
CCJ RESOLUTION 22 & COSCA RESOLUTION 4: IN SUPPORT OF PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS (2000) [hereinafter CCJ RESOLUTION 22 & COSCA RESOLUTION 4], at http:/
/cosca.ncsc.dni.us/Resolutions/resolutionproblemsolvingcts.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2002).
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mental health problems, or problems of family and domestic vio-
lence. The juvenile court is the forerunner of these specialized
courts; it was started in Chicago in 1899 as an attempt to provide a
rehabilitative approach to the problem of juvenile delinquency,
rather than the punitive approach of the adult criminal court. The
modern antecedents of this movement are the drug treatment
courts, founded in Miami in 1989.4
The drug treatment court was a response to the recognition that
processing nonviolent drug possession charges in the criminal
courts and then sentencing the offender to prison did not succeed
in changing the offender's addictive behavior.' Criminal court
dockets had become swollen with these drug cases, and the essen-
tially retributivist intervention of the criminal court and prison
seemed to do little to avoid repetition of the underlying problem.6
The result was a "revolving door effect in which [drug offenders
typically] resumed their drug-abusing behavior after [being] re-
leased from prison."7 Instead of relying on the traditional criminal
justice approach, the drug treatment court emphasized the of-
fender's rehabilitation, and placed the judge as a member of the
3. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1967) (recapitulating the development of
the differences between adult and juvenile justice); Janet Gilbert et al., Applying
Therapeutic Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency),
52 ALA. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2001) (supplying a brief historical background of the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act of July 1, 1899, which established the first juvenile court);
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (describing the
establishment of the first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899).
4. John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Court in Miami, in THE
EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 19, 23 (W. Clinton
Terry ed., 1999); Peggy F. Hora, A Dozen Years of Drug Treatment Courts: Uncover-
ing Our Theoretical Foundation and the Construction of a Mainstream Paradigm, 37
SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1469, 1483 (2002); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Drug Treatment Courts: A Symbiotic Relationship, in
PRINCIPLES OF ADDICTION MEDICINE (Allan W. Graham & Terry K. Schultz eds., 3d
ed. forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, 6-7, on file with authors) (discussing the relation-
ship between therapeutic jurisprudence and specialized problem solving courts, such
as drug treatment courts); see Peggy F. Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and The
Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Re-
sponse to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 453-54
(1999) (describing drug treatment courts as "judicially initiated treatment solutions
for a certain class of drug offenders."); Pamela L. Simmons, Solving the Nation's Drug
Problem: Drug Courts Signal a Move Toward Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 35 GONZ. L.
REV. 237, 258 (1.999/2000) (attributing nationwide success of drug courts to therapeu-
tic jurisprudence).
5. See Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2).
6. See Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 20-24; see also Winick & Wexler, supra note 4
(manuscript at 2) (discussing the ineffectiveness of criminal courts in permanently
changing drug offenders).
7. Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2).
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treatment team.8 Offenders accepting diversion to the drug treat-
ment court, or pleading guilty and agreeing to participate in the
drug treatment court as a condition of probation, agreed to several
conditions; to remain drug-free, "to participate in a prescribed
course of drug treatment, to submit to periodic drug testing in or-
der to monitor their compliance [with the treatment plan], and to
report [periodically] to court for judicial supervision of their
progress."9
These court's success in helping many addicts to end their addic-
tion and to avoid re-involvement with the criminal court led to a
tremendous growth in the number of drug courts nationally and
internationally, with the result that, as of December 2000, there
were 697 such courts in America, and many more in the planning
stage.'0 Indeed, there now are juvenile drug treatment courts,
which specialize in juveniles with drug abuse problems, and depen-
dency drug treatment courts, that deal with families with drug
problems that are charged with child abuse or neglect."
Other specialized treatment courts or problem solving courts, as
they are now known, include domestic violence courts, 12 which at-
tempt to protect the victims of domestic violence, to motivate per-
petrators of domestic violence to attend batterer's intervention
programs, and to monitor compliance with court orders and treat-
8. Id. (manuscript at 3).
9. Id.
10. CAROLINE S. COOPER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2000 DRUG COURT SURVEY
REPORT: PROGRAM OPERATIONS, SERVICES AND PARTICIPANT PERSPECTIVES EXEC-
UTIVE SUMMARY [DRAFT] 3 (2001), available at http://www.american.edu/aca-
demic.depts/spa/justice/publications/execsum.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). As of
November 2001 there were 502 Adult Drug Courts, 191 Juvenile Drug Courts, 37
Family Drug Courts, and 39 Tribal Drug Courts. Id.
11. Barbara A. Babb & Judith D. Moran, Substance Abuse, Families, and Unified
Family Courts: The Creation of a Caring Justice System, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 1, 18 (1999) (describing the creation of the Family Division of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, Maryland); Amy K. Brown, Drug Courts Help Keep Families To-
gether, F.B. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.flabar.org/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003).
12. See, e.g., Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M. J. Simon, The Development of a
Specialized Domestic Violence Court in Vancouver, Washington Utilizing Innovative
Judicial Paradigms, 69 UMKC L. REV. 139, 139 (2000); Amy Karan et al., Domestic
Violence Courts: What Are They and How Should We Manage Them?, JuV. & FAM.
CT. J., Spring 1999, at 75, 75-82; Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in
Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 36 (2000) [hereinafter Winick, Do-
mestic Violence].
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ment progress.' 3 More than two hundred domestic violence courts
now exist.' n
Reentry courts are another form of problems solving courts.
These courts were designed to assist offenders that are released
from prison into a form of judicially-supervised parole, to effect a
successful integration into the community. 5 A recently proposed
application of the reentry court model deals with sex offenders and
attempts to manage the risk of their reoffending through close su-
pervision and monitoring through the use of polygraph
examinations. 16
Another example is the dependency court, a branch of family
court that deals with issues of child abuse and neglect. 7 This is a
civil court that adjudicates whether child abuse or neglect has oc-
curred, and when it has, it attempts to provide services designed to
avoid its repetition.'8 When such services appear fruitless, the de-
pendency court works to terminate parental rights and arrange fos-
ter care for the child.' 9
Teen court, sometimes known as youth court, is another problem
solving court." This court deals with cases involving juveniles
charged with minor offenses.2' In addition, it allows other
juveniles who have been through the teen court process, and who
13. Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 36-45.
14. See Karan et al., supra note 12, at 75 (finding that in "a 1998 survey over 200
courts reported having some specialized processing practice for domestic violence
cases."); Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 39.
15. John Q. LaFond & Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Reentry Courts: A Cost Ef-
fective Proposal for Managing Sex Offender Risk in the Community, in SEXUAL AG-
GRESSION: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT (Robert Prentky et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 26-28, on file with author); Joan Petersilia, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, When Prisoners Return to Communities: Political, Economic, and
Social Consequences, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
Nov. 2000, at 1, 5, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/l84253.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2003); Terry Saunders, Staying Home: Effective Reintegration Strategies
for Parolees, 41 JUDGES' J., Winter 2002, at 34, 35; Jeremy Travis, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, SENTENCING & CORREC-
TIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, May 2000, at 1, 8, available at http://
www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/181413.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
16. LaFond & Winick, supra note 15 (manuscript at 27-28).
17. Brown, supra note 11, at 1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Butts & Janeen Buck, The Sudden Popularity of Teen
Courts, 41 JUDGES' J., Winter 2002, at 29, 29; Allison R. Shiff & David B. Wexler,
Teen Court.: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 287, 287-98 (David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996).
21. Shiff & Wexler, supra note 20, at 287.
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have received special training, to play the role of prosecutor, de-
fense attorney, or member of the jury.22 This special process pro-
vides the juveniles charged with minor offenses with the ability to
see their behavior from the victims' or society's perspective and to
receive an inoculation of empathy training.23
One of the most recent types of problem solving courts to
emerge is the mental health court,24 started in 1997 in Broward
County, Florida.2 5 The mental health court is a misdemeanor crim-
inal court designed to deal with people arrested for minor offenses
whose major problem is mental illness rather than criminality.2 6
This is a revolving door category of patients who are periodically
committed to mental hospitals where they are treated with psycho-
tropic medication. 7 Due to the use of medication, they experience
sufficient improvement, which allows hospitals to discharge them,
but, when they are back in the community, they fail to take their
medication.28 As a result, they frequently decompensate, some-
times committing minor offenses that result in their arrest.29
Mental health courts seek to divert them from the criminal justice
system and to persuade them to voluntarily accept treatment while
in the community.30 In addition, they link them with treatment re-
22. Id. at 289-95.
23. Id. at 288.
24. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & CHERYL IRONS-GUYNN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILl IN THE CRIMINAL
CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FT. LAUDERDALE, SEAITILE, SAN BERNAR-
DINO, AND ANCHORAGE 9 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/bja/
182504.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); Randal B. Fritzler, How One Misdemeanor
Mental Health Court Incorporates Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Re-
storative Justice, in MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL
HEALTH CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE, ADMINISTRATION 14-1 to 14-22 (Jacqueline
Moore ed., 2003); Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Action: Spe-
cialized Courts for the Mentally Ill, 84 JUDICATURE 184, 184 (2000); Bruce J. Winick,
Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 39, on file with author) [hereinafter
Winick, Outpatient Commitment].
25. John Petrila et al., Preliminary Observations from an Evaluation of the Brow-
ard County Mental Health Court, 37 CT. REV. 14, 15-16 (2001).
26. Id. at 16.
27. Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 4, 14); see
GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 24, at vii (discussing jail overcrowding and
the increased number of persons with mental illness and with co-occurring mental
illness and substance abuse in the criminal justice system); Petrila et al., supra note
25, at25 (discussing how mentally ill patients are frequently being arrested).
28. Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 4, 14).
29. Id. (manuscript at 14).
30. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 24, at 31, 89; Petrila et al., supra note
25, at 14-15.
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sources, and provide social service support and judicial monitoring
to ensure treatment compliance."
All of these courts grew out of the recognition that traditional
judicial approaches have failed, at least in the areas of substance
abuse, domestic violence, certain kinds of criminality, child abuse
and neglect, and mental illness. These are all recycling problems,
the reoccurrence of which traditional interventions did not succeed
in bringing to a halt. The traditional judicial model addressed the
symptoms, but not the underlying problem. The result was that the
problem reemerged, constantly necessitating repeated judicial in-
tervention. All these areas involved specialized problems that
judges of courts of general jurisdiction lacked expertise in. Moreo-
ver, they involved treatment or social service needs that traditional
courts lacked the tools to deal with.
In response to these failures, courts decided that they needed
new judicial approaches. These new approaches involve a collabo-
rative, interdisciplinary approach to problem solving where the
judge plays a leading role. Not only is the judge a leading actor in
the therapeutic drama, but also the courtroom itself becomes a
stage for the acting out of many crucial scenes. On this stage, the
judge also assumes the role of director, coordinating the roles of
many of the actors, providing a needed motivation for how they
will play their parts, and inspiring them to play them well.
The new problem solving courts are all characterized by active
judicial involvement, and the explicit use of judicial authority to
motivate individuals to accept needed services and to monitor their
compliance and progress. They are concerned not merely with
processing and resolving the court case, but in achieving a variety
of tangible outcomes associated with avoiding reoccurrence of the
problem. Problem solving courts generate the need for new kinds
of information not typically collected by courts, and, in the process,
have significantly improved the quality and quantity of information
needed to understand the problem and deal more effectively with
it.32 They play an educative role in raising community conscious-
31. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 24, at 10, 31.
32. See, e.g., LaFond & Winick, supra note 15 (manuscript at 8-9) (discussing the
use of risk assessment instruments and polygraph examinations to gather information
about released sex offenders in order to increase the effectiveness of court supervi-
sion and monitoring); Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 55 (discussing the
use of risk assessment instruments by domestic violence courts to gather information
concerning a batterer's risk of re-offending); Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manu-
script at 2-5) (noting drug treatment court's ongoing and constant intervention into
defendant's rehabilitation).
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ness about the problem in question, its causes, and the resources
that courts need to resolve it.33 In addition, they become advocates
for the populations they deal with and for the increased allocation
of community resources needed to resolve their problems.34 Fi-
nally, they work closely with community agencies and treatment
providers, and, in the process, monitor and improve their
effectiveness. 35
Problem solving courts represent a significant new direction for
the judiciary. These judges seek to actively and holistically resolve
both the judicial case and the problem that produced it.36 They
extend help to people in need by connecting them to community
resources, motivating them through creative uses of the court's au-
thority to accept needed services and treatment, and monitoring
their progress in ways that help to ensure their success.37  By
targeting recurring problems that seem to be the product of behav-
ioral, psychological, or psychiatric difficulties or disorders, and in-
tervening to prevent their reoccurrence, these courts can be seen as
applying a public health approach to social and behavioral
problems that cause serious individual suffering and deterioration
in the quality of community life. Not only have these techniques
emerged in the specialized problem solving courts described above,
but also judges in general courts have begun to apply the problem
solving approaches derived from these courts.38
33. See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 4, at 462-68; Karan et al., supra note 12, at 75;
Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 37; Winick, Outpatient Commitment,
supra note 24 (manuscript at 12-13).
34. See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 4, at 453; Winick, Domestic Violence, supra
note 12, at 39-40; Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 12).
35. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 833-34 (2000).
36. See id. at 832 (discussing how drug treatment courts were created in response
to the excessive amount of cocaine and crack offenses, and how their intentions are to
rehabilitate these offenders instead of sending them to jail).
37. Id. at 843-50.
38. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for
Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 469, 522-23 (1998); Brown, supra note 11, at 1; Pamela Casey & David
B. Rottman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Courts, 18 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 445, 454-55
(2000); Gilbert et al., supra note 3, at 1175-77; William Schma, Judging for the New
Millennium, 37 CT. REV. 4, 4 (2000); David B. Wexler, Robes and Rehabilitation: How
Judges Can Help Offenders Make Good, 38 CT. REV. 18, 18-19 (2001).
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II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AS A THEORETICAL
FOUNDATION FOR PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS
The problem solving courts' revolution has been largely athe-
oretical. It grew out of experimental approaches used in drug
treatment courts to facilitate the substance abuse treatment pro-
cess, which, because of their success, were transplanted into other
judicial arenas.39 These programs appear to be successful, although
the empirical research on their efficacy remains preliminary and
often methodologically flawed.4" Why these programs seem to
work, however, has remained largely unexamined.
Therapeutic jurisprudence can be seen as a theoretical grounding
for this developing judicial movement. We can understand the
problem solving courts' revolution by situating it within the schol-
arly and law reform approach known as therapeutic jurispru-
dence.4' Therapeutic jurisprudence began in the late 1980s as an
interdisciplinary scholarly approach in the area of mental health
law.42 It criticized various aspects of mental health law for produc-
ing antitherapeutic consequences for the people that the law was
designed to help.43
Legal rules and the way they are applied are social forces that
produce inevitable, and sometimes negative, consequences for the
39. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
40. See STEVEN BELENKO, THE NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE
AT COLUMBIA UNIV., RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2001 Up-
DATE 26-33 (2001), available at http://www.casacolumbia.org/usr-doc/researchon-
drug.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). Compare Hora et al., supra note 4, at 449-50,
with Morris Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437,1489-90 (2000).
41. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEU-
TIC JURISI'RUDENCE 17-18 (1991); BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
APPLIEI: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTII LAW 3-8 (1997); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship [hereinafter Wexler,
Changing Conceptions[, in LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 20, at 597, 597-610; Bruce J. Winick, The Juris-
prudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 184, 184 (1997)
[hereinafter Winick, The Jurisprudence].
42. DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERA-
PEUTIC AGENI 3-4 (1990); WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 41, at 6.
43. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization:
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIA-
TRY 169, 172 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Competency to Consent] (criticizing the
United States Supreme Court's broad dicta in Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113
(1990), that voluntary admission to a mental hospital should always be preceded by an
inquiry into the individual's competence to consent to voluntary hospitalization);
Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated
Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571,
582-85 (1995) [hereinafter Winick, Reforming Incompetencyl (criticizing incompe-
tency to stand trial doctrine and practice).
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psychological well-being of those affected. Therapeutic jurispru-
dence's basic insight was that scholars should study those conse-
quences and reshape and redesign law in order to accomplish two
goals 4 4-too minimize antitherapeutic effects, and when it is con-
sistent with other legal goals, to increase law's therapeutic poten-
tial.45 Thus, therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary
approach to legal scholarship that has a law reform agenda. Al-
though it started in the area of mental health law, therapeutic juris-
prudence soon spread to other areas of legal analysis, and has
emerged as a mental health approach to law generally."6
Therapeutic jurisprudence is not only concerned with measuring
the therapeutic impact of legal rules and procedures, but also of
the way they are applied by various legal actors-judges, lawyers,
police officers, and expert witnesses testifying in court, among
others.41 Whether they know it or not, these legal actors are thera-
peutic agents, affecting the mental health and psychological well-
being of the people they encounter in the legal setting. For exam-
ple, how lawyers deal with their clients in the law office and the
courtroom can have a significant impact on a client's emotional
well-being, and therapeutic jurisprudence has spawned a growing
literature concerning how attorneys should act in this regard.48
44. See Bruce Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN
A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
20, at 645, 647-52.
45. Id.
46. See David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in
LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 20, at 713, 713-21; Winick, The Jurisprudence, supra note 41, at 184. For an
up-to-date bibliography of therapeutic jurisprudence work, see the Therapeutic Juris-
prudence website, at http://www.therapeuticjurisprudence.org (last visited Mar. 15,
2003).
47. See Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 91 (proposing a more thera-
peutic application of the law in domestic violence cases); Winick, Outpatient Commit-
ment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 31-48) (discussing how judges and lawyers can play
their role more therapeutically in conducting civil commitment hearings, conditional
release hearings, and in mental health court); Winick, The Jurisprudence, supra note
41, at 201 (describing the increasing body of therapeutic jurisprudence work ranging
across a large spectrum of legal issues); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 52-60 (1999)
[hereinafter Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing] (proposing how judges, lawyers, and
expert witnesses can apply the law more therapeutically in civil commitment cases).
48. See, e.g., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000) (anthology of essays applying thera-
peutic jurisprudence approach to lawyering); Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Preventive Law: Transforming Legal Practice and Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 793, 793-1210 (Bruce J. Winick et al. eds., 1999) (containing a symposium
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In a similar way, therapeutic jurisprudence has much to offer
judges concerning how they treat the people appearing before
them and courts concerning how they should be structured and ad-
ministered to maximize their therapeutic potential. Therapeutic ju-
risprudence uses insights from psychology and the behavioral
sciences to critique legal and judicial practices, and to suggest how
they can be reshaped to increase their therapeutic potential and
avoid the risk of psychological harm.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is one of the major "vectors" of a
growing movement in the law towards a common goal of a more
comprehensive, humane, and psychologically optimal way of han-
dling legal matters.4 9 Problem solving courts are also one of these
"vectors," and thus, share many common aims with therapeutic ju-
risprudence." Thus, one may see problem solving courts as related
to therapeutic jurisprudence, but they are not identical with the
concept. Problem solving courts often use principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence to enhance their functioning. Indeed, the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Adminis-
trators, following a joint task force analysis, recently adopted a
resolution approving the growing movement in the direction of
problem solving courts, and their use of principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence in performing their functions.5 These principles in-
clude "integration of treatment services with judicial case process-
ing, ongoing judicial intervention, close monitoring of and
immediate response to behavior, multidisciplinary involvement,
and collaboration with community-based and governmental
organizations. "52
Although problem solving courts developed separately from
therapeutic jurisprudence, their development occurred at the same
time, and they share similar aims. Drug treatment courts, domestic
violence courts, and mental health courts, for example, can be seen
as taking a therapeutic jurisprudence approach to the processing of
of articles applying the therapeutic jurisprudence/preventive law model to lawyering
in various contexts).
49. See Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence within the Compre-
hensive Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A
HELPING PROFESSION, supra note 48, at 465.
50. See Casey & Rottman, supra note 38, at 454 (stating that "therapeutic jurispru-
dence principles are consistent with court performance goals."); David B. Rottman &
Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Emergence of Problem Solving
Courts, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Summer 1999, at 12-19; Simon, supra note 1 (manuscript
at 2-7); Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 1).
51. CCJ RESOLUTION 22 & COSCA RESOLUTION 4, supra note 2.
52. Id.
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cases, inasmuch as their goal is the rehabilitation of the offender
and their use of the legal process, in particular, the role of the
judge, to accomplish this goal. 3 All of these courts seek to deal
with the offender's underlying problem, and emphasize its resolu-
tion through the provision of treatment and rehabilitative services
where the judge is an important member of the treatment team.54
Judges in these specialized courts receive special training in the na-
ture and treatment of drug addiction,55 domestic violence,56 and
mental illness, 57 and themselves function as therapeutic agents
through their supervision and monitoring of the offender's treat-
ment progress. Unlike traditional judges functioning in traditional
courts, judges in problem solving courts consciously view them-
selves as therapeutic agents, and, therefore, one can see them as
playing a therapeutic jurisprudence function in their dealings with
the individuals who appear before them.
Moreover, principles of therapeutic jurisprudence can help prob-
lem solving court judges play this function well. Therapeutic juris-
prudence has already produced a large body of interdisciplinary
scholarship analyzing principles of psychology and the behavioral
sciences, and probing the ways in which they can be used in legal
contexts to improve mental health and emotional well-being.5 A
growing body of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship has also ad-
dressed how judges in specialized problem solving courts can apply
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence in their work.5 9 For in-
stance, a recent symposium issue of Court Review, the official pub-
lication of the American Judges Association, was devoted entirely
53. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 35, at 841-44, 852; Winick, Domestic Violence,
supra note 12, at 39-45; Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at
31-39).
54. See supra notes 7-31 and accompanying text.
55. Hora et al., supra note 4, at 476-77.
56. Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 44.
57. Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 38).
58. See, e.g., LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JU-
RISPRUDENCE, supra note 20 (anthology of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship
ranging across the legal spectrum).
59. See, e.g., Casey & Rottman, supra note 38, at 451-52, 455-56; Fritzler, supra
note 24, at 14-1 to 14-22; Fritzler & Simon, supra note 12, at 59-62; Hora, supra note 4,
at 1472-73, 1477, 1481-84; Hora et al., supra note 4, at 476-77; see also Carrie J. Pe-
trucci, Respect as a Component in the Judge-Defendant Interaction in a Specialized
Domestic Violence Court that Utilizes Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL.
263, 266-67, 288-94 (2002); Shiff & Wexler, supra note 20, at 291-95 (discussing the
therapeutic jurisprudence of teen courts); Simon, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6);
Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 36); Winick & Wexler,
supra note 4 (manuscript at 1-7).
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to therapeutic jurisprudence and its application to judging.6° An
understanding of therapeutic jurisprudence's approach and of the
psychological and social work principles it uses can thus provide
considerable help in the structuring of problem solving courts and
in defining the role played by judges functioning within them.
Both therapeutic jurisprudence and problem solving courts see
the law as an instrument for helping people, particularly those with
a variety of psychological and emotional problems. Our society
has not done a particularly good job of dealing with many social
problems, with the result that society often dumps them at the
doorstep of the courthouse. When courts deal with such vexing
problems as drug addiction, alcoholism, domestic violence, mental
illness, child abuse and neglect, and juvenile delinquency, they can
be seen to function as psychosocial agencies. In order for problem
solving courts to succeed and function well, however, they need to
be aware of some basic principles of psychology and social work.
Thus, therapeutic jurisprudence can be understood as providing a
theoretical foundation for much of the problem solving court
movement, and a variety of principles that can help judges play this
new and exciting role.
I11. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
PROBLEM SOLVING COURT JUDGES
Problem solving courts are less involved with the adjudication of
historic issues of fact than with functioning as psychosocial agen-
cies that attempt to rehabilitate an offender or provide access to
services designed to address the underlying problem that has
brought the individual to court and monitor and supervise the
treatment process. Therapeutic jurisprudence can provide instru-
mental prescriptions for how judges in problem solving courts can
perform these new tasks.6' Just as judges dealing with antitrust
cases need to understand basic principles of economics and judges
dealing with patent cases need to understand basic principles of
engineering, judges in problem solving courts, dealing as they do
with human problems, need to understand some principles of psy-
chology, the science of human behavior. They must be aware that
they are functioning as therapeutic agents, and that how they inter-
act with the individuals appearing before them will have inevitable
60. Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 37 CT. REv. 1, 1-68 (2000).
61. See Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Integrated Inquiry and In-
strumental Prescriptions, 17 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 589, 592-604 (1999) (describing thera-
peutic jurisprudence as providing "instrumental prescriptions" for law reform).
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consequences for their ability to be rehabilitated or otherwise deal
with their underlying problems.
Individuals usually appear before problem solving courts be-
cause of social or psychological problems they have not recognized,
or because of their inability to deal with these problems effectively.
They may have alcoholism or substance abuse problems, which
may contribute to repetitive criminality, domestic violence, or child
abuse and neglect.62 They may be repetitive perpetrators of do-
mestic violence or child abuse because of cognitive distortions con-
cerning their relationships with their spouses or children, or
because they lack the social skills necessary to manage their anger
or resolve problems through means other than violence. 63 They
may suffer from mental illness that impairs their judgment about
the desirability of their continuing to take needed medication.64
They may be in denial about the existence of these problems, refus-
ing to take responsibility for their wrongdoing, rationalizing their
conduct, or minimizing its negative impact on themselves and
others. Many of these are problems that will respond effectively to
available treatment, but only if the individual perceives that she
has a problem and is motivated to deal with it.65
In these situations, the problem solving court judge cannot sim-
ply order the individual to recognize the existence of the problem
and to obtain treatment. People must come to these realizations
for themselves. Therefore, problem solving court judges must un-
derstand that although they can assist people to solve their
problems, they cannot solve them. The individual must confront
and solve her own problem and assume the primary responsibility
for doing so. The judge can help the individual realize this, and,
together with treatment staff, can help the individual to identify
and build upon her own strengths and use them effectively in the
62. See Babb & Moran, supra note 11, at 8-9; Brown, supra note 11, at 1.
63. See Brown, supra note 11, at 1; Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at
77.
64. See Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 4, 14) (dis-
cussing the conditions and consequences that mentally ill individuals undergo when
they fail to take their medication).
65. See Michael D. Clark, Change-Focused Drug Courts: Examining the Critical
Ingredients of Positive Behavior Change, NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REV., Winter 2001, at
35, 44-46, 48-56 (suggesting that treatment programs in general are effective, but that
factors related to the individual's own strengths are more important in treatment effi-
cacy than the particular form of treatment used, and that court and program staff
must build trust and find effective methods to encourage the individual to participate
in treatment, affording increased choice and autonomy).
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collaborative effort of solving the problem.66 How can the judge
facilitate this process?
A. Improving Interpersonal Skills
At the outset, the judge should always treat the individual with
dignity and respect.67 Treatment is a collaborative process between
the individual and the treatment team, including the judge, and the
conditions necessary to forge a genuine treatment alliance include
reciprocal understanding, mutual affirmation, emotional attach-
ment, and respect.68 Therefore, the judge and treatment personnel
must act so as to give the individual the perception that they are
empathic, accepting, warm, and willing to permit self-expression. 69
Judges performing these functions need to improve their inter-
viewing, counseling, and interpersonal skills. Even though they
have engaged in wrongdoing, a special sensitivity to the individ-
ual's pain, shame, sadness, and anxiety in coming to terms with the
existence of psychological or behavioral problems that have pro-
duced criminality and the victimization of others is called for in the
judge-offender interaction.70 Even though judges may strongly dis-
approve of the individual's conduct, they must strive in the judge-
offender dialogue to be supportive, empathetic, warm, and good
listeners.7' These are highly sensitive conversations and offenders
will be less likely to recognize their problems and resolve to deal
with them effectively if they perceive the judge to be cold, insensi-
tive, or judgmental. This is not to say that the judge should excuse
or justify the individual's inappropriate behavior, but the judge
should direct her disapproval at the individual's antisocial conduct,
and not at the individual herself.72 Once the individual has come
to the recognition that her prior behavior has been inappropriate,
the judge and treatment staff should shift to a future-focused orien-
tation that concentrates on the steps needed to solve the prob-
66. See id. at 57-58 (discussing strength based approaches and their importance in
the drug treatment court treatment process).
67. Petrucci, supra note 59, at 285-86.
68. See Clark, supra note 65, at 44-46.
69. See id.
70. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 85 (1989);
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L.
BULL. 244, 257-61 (2002) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Restorative Justice].
71. See Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, supra note 70, at 257-61.
72. Id. The literature on restorative justice criticizes the shaming of the individual,
recommending instead "reintegrative shaming," a condemnation of the act and not
the person. Id.
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lem.73 Focusing upon past failures, by contrast, can result in
demoralization and resignation."4 To be an effective agent of
change, the judge should convey empathy to the individual, even if
not to her act.
Empathy involves the ability to experience another person's
feelings and to see the world through that person's eyes.7 5 Empa-
thy has both cognitive and affective components.7 6 The judge
should convey both an intellectual response to the individual, com-
municating that she understands the individual's predicament, and
an emotional response, communicating that she shares the individ-
ual's feelings. The individual, after all, is a fellow human being
with a human problem that the judge is attempting to help her deal
with. Therefore, in discussing the individual's problem with her,
and the need for rehabilitation or treatment, the judge should com-
municate a sense of caring, sympathy, genuineness, and under-
standing.77  Just as physicians need to develop their "bed-side
manner," judges need to develop what can be termed their "bench-
side manner."7 8 This can help create a comfortable space in which
offenders can feel free to express their emotions about their
problems and deal effectively with them.
Judges playing this role need to be sensitive to the psychological
mechanisms of transference and counter-transference, and how
they can affect communication in the judge-offender interaction.
Transference is an individual's tendency to project onto a current
relationship, feelings that originated in prior relationships with
others, frequently parents and siblings.7 9 Counter-transference oc-
73. See Michael D. Clark, Change-Focused Youth Work: The Critical Ingredients of
Positive Behavior Change, 3 J. CENTER FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 59, 63-64 (2001) [herein-
after Clark, Change-Focused Youth]; Clark, Drug Courts, supra note 65, at 53-55.
74. See Clark, Drug Courts, supra note 65, at 53-54.
75. Bruce J. Winick, Legal Counseling About Advance Directive Instruments: Cli-
ent Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context: Reflections on How Attor-
neys Can Identify and Deal With a Psycholegal Soft Spot, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
901, 909 (1998) [hereinafter Winick, Legal Counseling].
76. Gerald A. Gladstein, Understanding Empathy: Integrating Counseling, Devel-
opmental, and Social Psychology Perspectives, 30 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 467, 468
(1983); Daniel W. Shuman, The Use of Empathy in Forensic Examinations, 3 ETHICS
& BEHAV. 289, 296 (1993).
77. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 145-46 (1995); DANIEL
GOLEMAN, WORKING WITH EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 137-46 (1998); Marjorie A.
Silver, Therapeutic Jurisprudence/ Preventive Law and Law Teaching: Emotional Intel-
ligence and Legal Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1173, 1196-1203 (1999).
78. Cf Francis Peabody, The Care of the Patient, 88 JAMA 877, 877-82 (1927)
(discussing the importance of physician's bedside manner).
79. Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Law-
yer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 263-65 (1999) [hereinafter Silver,
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curs when the judge transfers feelings onto the individual that stem
from the judge's own prior relationships. 0 The judge should be
sensitive to the possibility of transference on the part of the indi-
vidual, and should seek to induce positive transference and avoid
negative transference when possible. For example, individuals who
have experienced repeated exposures to the criminal justice system
because of their repetitive wrongdoing are likely to have had par-
ents, family members, teachers, friends, and others unsuccessfully
lecture them about their need to shape up and achieve rehabilita-
tion. To the extent that these individuals infected the lectures with
a paternalistic tone, they might have stimulated feelings of resent-
ment and humiliation or produced a degree of resistance or psy-
chological reactance.8 Hence, problem solving court judges
should seek to avoid tainting their interactions with offenders with
these prior negative feelings and relational images that these for-
mer unsuccessful lectures might have produced.
Similarly, problem solving court judges should be sensitive to the
possibility of counter-transference on their own part, which can in-
terfere with their ability to develop rapport with the individual.
Judges will inevitably have had prior experiences with criminal of-
fenders that have produced anger and other negative reactions di-
rected at such offenders. The reemergence of these negative
feelings engendered in prior relationships with offenders may pro-
duce a negative counter-transference toward the individual appear-
ing in the problem solving court that might compromise the
problem solving court judge's ability to play the therapeutic role
contemplated. Judges, therefore, must be on their guard to avoid
such counter-transference, in other words, to avoid associating the
individual appearing before them in the problem solving court with
prior offenders who may have invoked strong negative emotional
reactions.
In helping offenders come to grips with their criminality and un-
derlying psychological and behavioral problems, problem solving
court judges need to be good listeners.8 2 Rather than giving the
Love & Hate]; Stephanie Stier, Essay Review, Refraining Legal Skills: Relational
Lawyering, 42 J. LE GAL EDUC. 303, 310-12 (1992); Winick, Legal Counseling, supra
note 75, at 911.
80. Silver, Love & Hate, supra note 79, at 262-65; Stier, supra note 79, at 312;
Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 911-1.9.
81. See Sharon S. Brehm & Jack W. Brehm, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A
TiiiEoRY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 13 (1981).
82. See Clark, Drug Courts, supra note 65, at 50-51 (discussing the need for im-
proved communication skills in drug treatment court contexts, including the use of
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offender a speech, the judge should seek to promote dialogue. At
appropriate intervals, the offender should be encouraged to speak,
since this will require the judge to stop speaking, signaling to the
individual that what she has to say is important. Problem solving
court judges need to convey to individuals appearing before them
that they genuinely wish to hear them, are interested in their
problems, and are interested in attempting to help them find a so-
lution. They need to listen to the individual in ways that are atten-
tive, non-judgmental, and sympathetic. Finally, active listening and
passive listening techniques may be helpful in this connection.8 3
Problem solving court judges also need to learn to read the indi-
vidual's non-verbal forms of communication and to interpret her
underlying feelings.84 Non-verbal forms of communication, such as
facial expression, body language, and tone of voice, can be impor-
tant clues for understanding both the individual's emotions in the
context of the sensitive judge-offender conversation, and how
judges should respond to them.8 5 Attempting to facilitate the indi-
vidual's acceptance of responsibility for her wrongdoing, and to
motivate the individual to accept help for an underlying problem
that may contribute to it, requires a high degree of psychological
sensitivity on the part of the problem solving court judge.
B. Avoiding Paternalism and Respecting Autonomy
It is important for problem solving court judges to avoid pater-
nalism in these judge-offender interactions. The judge may be fully
aware that the individual suffers from an emotional or psychologi-
cal problem that produces repetitive criminality and that she could
respond effectively to available rehabilitative programs. A pater-
nalistic attitude, however, is not likely to help in facilitating the
individual's recognition of these realities.
Its recipients often experience paternalism as offensive. Pater-
nalism may create resentment and possibly backfire by producing a
reflective listening, in which the judge or treatment staff member frequently checks
the accuracy of what she believes the individual has said); see also Steven Keeva,
Beyond the Words: Understanding What Your Client Is Really Saying Makes for Suc-
cessfid Lawyering, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 60 (providing pointers on good listening
techniques for attorneys to use in lawyer-client conversations); Silver, supra note 77,
at 1174 (discussing listening skills on the part of lawyers).
83. See David A. Binder et al., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 16-24 (1991); see also Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 912.
84. See Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 912 (extolling the virtues of
"nonverbal responses that express interest, caring, warmth, and sympathy"); see also
Stier, supra note 79, at 309.
85. See Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 910-11.
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psychological reactance to the advice offered that might be
counter-productive.86 Many offenders will be in denial about their
underlying problems, and paternalism is unlikely to succeed in al-
lowing them to deal with such denial.87 Instead, it may produce
anxiety and other psychological distress that will make it harder for
them to do so.
Accordingly, problem solving court judges should respect the au-
tonomy of the individuals they are seeking to help, thus, allowing
them to make decisions for themselves about whether to accept
treatment, rather than mandating treatment participation. For ex-
ample, a problem solving court judge should remind an individual
charged with a drug offense that she is free to deal with the charges
in criminal court and accept a sentence to prison if found guilty.
Drug treatment court is not required, but is only an alternative op-
tion. Hence, the judge should remind the offender that the choice
is hers, and that she should not elect the drug treatment court un-
less she is prepared to admit the existence of a problem and ex-
press a willingness to deal with it. This is important because the
approach can be empowering to such individuals who often feel
powerless and helpless.
Individuals should see the role of the problem solving court
judge in discussing rehabilitation with the offender as one of per-
suasion rather than of coercion. Judges should be aware of the psy-
chological value of choice. 88 Self-determination is an essential
aspect of psychological health. Moreover, if individuals who make
their own choices perceive them as non-coerced, they will function
more effectively and with greater satisfaction. People who feel co-
erced, by contrast, may respond with a negative psychological reac-
tion,89  and may experience various other psychological
86. See BREHM & BREHM, supra note 81, at 13; Winick, Legal Counseling, supra
note 75, at 913 (suggesting that if attorneys are not "attentive, nonjudgmental and
sympathetic," clients may respond negatively).
87. See Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 903 (warning that lawyers
should expect that clients may frequently be in denial); see also Bruce J. Winick,
Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and Sentenc-
ing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law Model, 5 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'Y & L.
1034, 1064 (1999) [hereinafter Winick, Redefining].
88. See BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
334 (1997) [hereinafter WINICK, RIGHT TO REFUSE]; Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and
Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENY. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1997) [hereinafter Winick,
Mental Health]; Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1992) [hereinafter Winick, Autonomy].
89. See BREHM & BREHM, supra note 81, at 49-51 (explaining the results of a test
showing that a removal of "freedom" in choice of essay topic caused a significantly
higher reactance arousal).
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difficulties. 90 In appropriate circumstances, the judge should com-
municate to the individual her own views concerning the individ-
ual's best interests, but should ultimately cede the choice to the
individual. To succeed, treatment or rehabilitation will require a
degree of intrinsic motivation on the part of the individual.91 If she
participates in the program only because of extrinsic motivation,
then it will be less likely that she will internalize the program goals
and genuinely change her attitude and behavior.
The individual should be afforded a choice not only in deciding
whether to elect to participate in a problem solving court, but also
in the design of the rehabilitative plan, when feasible. Typically,
there may be many options available in fashioning such a plan, in-
cluding variations in rehabilitative techniques and service provid-
ers.92 The problem solving court judge can lay the options out for
the individual, who can then exercise choice. The individual's
choice concerning the various issues that arise in the design of the
treatment plan can be empowering, and can influence the likeli-
hood of success.
Some problem solving court judges describe what they do as
"benevolent coercion," and extol the virtues of judicial coercion as
an essential ingredient in the rehabilitative enterprise.93 While
many of the individuals in drug treatment or other problem solving
courts who agree to participate in a course of treatment or rehabili-
tation will benefit from the structure, supervision, and compliance
monitoring that they provide, it is neither appropriate nor desire-
able to regard this as coercion. 94 An individual who decides to ac-
cept diversion to a drug treatment or other problem solving court,
or to plead guilty and accept treatment in a problem solving court
program as a condition of probation, is making a legally voluntary
90. See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Impli-
cations for Mental Health Law, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6, 13-22 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Winick, Side Effects].
91. See ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A
SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 471-72, 477-78 (1986); Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the
Power of the Bet: Wagering With the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Indi-
vidual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 762-63 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Harnes-
sing]; see also EDWARD DECI, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 53 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1975).
92. See Babb & Moran, supra note 11, at 25-34 (detailing the various options avail-
able to families who are affected by subtance abuse).
93. See, e.g., Jeffrey Tauber, Address at the Eleventh Annual Symposium on Con-
temporary Urban Challenges at the Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 28,
2002), in Problem Solving Courts: Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1755, 1901-05 (2002) ("We have an opportunity through prob-
lem-solving courts to use coercion, but to do it in a benevolent way.").
94. See Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91, at 768-72.
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choice as long as she is not subjected to duress, force, fraud, or a
form of improper inducement.95 Individuals making such choices
may be functioning within a coercive context. Although they may
face hard choices, none of which may be agreeable, they are in
these difficult situations because of their own actions. For exam-
ple, they were not arrested as a vehicle for forcing them into treat-
ment, but because they possessed drugs or committed some other
crime. Moreover, they are free to either plead not guilty and face
trial, or plead guilty and receive an appropriate sentence. There-
fore, extending to them the additional option of accepting a reha-
bilitative alternative does not make the choice they will then face a
coercive one.
An analogy to plea-bargaining is appropriate. Although offend-
ers who have been offered plea deals may feel that the choice they
are required to make is coercive, as long as the prosecutor's offer
was not illegal, unauthorized, unethical, or otherwise inappropri-
ate, the courts have held that it does not constitute legal coercion.96
Accordingly, if an individual's decision about whether to accept a
guilty plea is not coerced, then her decision as to whether to accept
diversion to a problem solving court, or to plead guilty and accept
treatment through the auspices of such a court as a condition for
probation also would not constitute coercion in a legal sense. Plea-
bargaining is an example in which individuals face hard choices,
but where, absent an offer that is improper, illegal, or unethical,
the courts will not consider the choice to be coercive.
Parole from prison presents another example. The criminal jus-
tice system may release an individual on parole before the expira-
tion of her prison term, if she accepts certain conditions of parole.9 7
These conditions may include, for example, an undertaking that the
individual not use alcoholic beverages or associate with other indi-
viduals who have a criminal record.98 Unless the conditions of pa-
role are improper or illegal, we would consider the individual's
choice to accept these conditions as voluntary, rather than co-
95. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308 (1987).
96. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 755, 758 (1970); WERTHEIMER, supra note 95, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301,
308; Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91, at 771 n.107; Winick, Mental Health, supra
note 88, at 1153-55.
97. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561-3566 (2000).
98. Id. § 3563(a)(5), (b)(6).
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erced.99 Even though the individual's desire to be released from
prison might be so powerful that she may feel that she has no real
choice other than to accept the conditions of parole, it would be
absurd for the law to invalidate her choice on grounds of coercion.
As long as the conditions of parole are not unlawful, improper, or
unreasonable, parole accords the individual an opportunity that
she may find more desirable than serving the remainder of her sen-
tence in prison.
Opportunities for diversion from the criminal process are essen-
tially similar. An individual charged with a crime that must decide
between facing her charges or accepting diversion into a rehabilita-
tive program may be facing a hard choice. It is a fair and reasona-
ble choice, however, and is not one that the law will invalidate on
grounds of coercion.100
99. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 95, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308 (discussing how
choices given to defendants are not considered coercive unless illegally imposed upon
them).
100. See McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2042-43 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(distinguishing pressure from compulsion for Fifth Amendment purposes, and noting
that compulsion is limited to choices involving grave consequences). At least this is
true where diversion is reasonably related to the offense charged, and does not im-
pose conditions that would themselves be unconstitutional. Requiring mental health
treatment as part of a diversion program for an individual whose offense does not
involve mental illness, for example, would seem to be an arbitrary governmental im-
position, arguably offending due process. Moreover, although an individual may have
the constitutional right to refuse such treatment, such a right may generally be
waived, as long as the waiver is competent, voluntary, and knowing. WINICK, RIGHT
TO REFUSE, supra note 88, at 303, 345-70. While some constitutional rights may be
unwaivable, for example the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, most
will be subject to waiver, at least where the right in question is reasonably related to
the governmental purpose sought to be served. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309, 317-18 (1971) (requiring waiver of Fourth Amendment right to be free of war-
rantless searches as condition for receipt of certain welfare benefits when such search
was related to assessing continued eligibility for benefits).
It is important that an offender understand the risks of entering into a problem
solving court treatment program as part of diversion from the criminal court or as a
condition of probation, and it is an important role of defense counsel to ensure that
the client possesses this understanding. See Martin Reisig, The Difficult Role of the
Defense Lawyer in a Post-Adjudication Drug Treatment Court. Accommodating Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence and Due Process, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 216, 218-19, 221-23 (2002)
(discussing the relationship between a defense lawyer and a defendant and the role
the defense lawyer should play). Defense counsel who fail to fully advise their clients
in this regard may be depriving them of the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment, particularly since those offenders who repeatedly fail to
comply with program requirements may, as a consequence, be re-diverted back to
criminal court for a revocation of probation or a criminal sentence. See Mae C.
Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug
Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 54-56 (2000-2001).
Moreover, failing to fully advise the client concerning the potential consequences of
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The line between coercion and choice can be a narrow one.
Moreover, the concept of legal coercion does not necessarily coin-
cide with the psychological perception of coercion. When judges,
attorneys, and other court personnel help individuals consider
whether to opt for a problem solving court rehabilitative alterna-
tive instead of criminal court, they should rely on persuasion or
inducement, and avoid coercion and negative forms of pressure.
Of course, once the individual chooses the treatment option, her
future actions are constrained by the choice she has voluntarily en-
tered into. Thus, the individual, as a condition for accepting the
drug treatment court, may agree to attend a drug treatment pro-
gram, to remain drug-free, and to submit to periodic drug test-
ing. 1 1 The individual knows that if she fails to comply, the court
can apply sanctions (typically graduated sanctions) agreed to in ad-
vance by the individual." 2 Moreover, the individual knows that
repeated non-compliance can result in expulsion from the program
and return to criminal court, or a violation of probation if the indi-
vidual had pled guilty.' 03 While, in a manner of speaking, these
potential sanctions may pressure the individual to comply and even
induce her compliance, there is no need to regard this as coercion.
It is not legal coercion, and, if properly applied, the individual may
not even experienced it as psychologically coercive.
In this connection, problem solving court judges must under-
stand what makes people feel coerced and feel that they have acted
voluntarily. They should be aware of the implications of recent re-
search conducted on coercion by the MacArthur Research Net-
work on mental health and the law.'0 4 This research examined the
entering into a problem solving court program not only can compromise the defen-
dant's rights, but also can undermine the potential for treatment success. See Reisig,
supra, at 218-19, 221-23 (discussing the importance of a defendant's informed consent
and waiver); Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4-5).
101. Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3).
102. Hora et al., supra note 4, at 528.
103. Id. at 478, 510.
104. Nancy S. Bennet et al., Inclusion, Motivation, and Good Faith: The Morality of
Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 295, 296-305 (1993);
William Gardener et al., Two Scales for Measuring Patient Perceptions of Coercion
During Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 307, 308-20 (1993); Steven K.
Hoge et al., Perceptions of Coercion in the Admission of Voluntary and Involuntary
Psychiatric Patients, 20 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 167, 170-81 (1997); Charles W. Lidz
et al., Perceived Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures and Process, 52
ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1034, 1034 (1995); John Monahan et al., Coercion and
Commitment: Understanding Involuntary Mental Hospital Admission, 18 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 249, 252-55 (1995) [hereinafter Monahan et al., Coercion and Committ-
ment]; John Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision of Mental Health Services: The
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causes and correlates of what makes people feel coerced. Con-
ducted in the context of mental patients facing involuntary hospi-
talization, this research concluded that even though patients were
subjected to legal compulsion through involuntary civil commit-
ment, they did not feel coerced when treated with dignity and re-
spect by people who they perceived as acting with genuine
benevolence, and as providing them with a sense of "voice" (the
ability to have their say), and with "validation" (the impression
that what they said was taken seriously). °5 This research also
showed that there is a correlation between the degrees of per-
ceived coercion, and the kinds of pressures that doctors, families,
and friends placed upon the patient. 10 6 Negative pressures, such as
threats and force, tend to make individuals feel coerced, whereas
positive pressures, such as persuasion and inducement, do not.10 7
Even though courts subject these individuals to the legal compul-
sion of civil commitment, if treated in these ways, they tend to not
feel coerced.
Problem solving court judges should apply the lessons of the
MacArthur research on coercion, treating all individuals appearing
before them with dignity and respect, and according them voice
and validation in the interactions they have with them. 8 They
should avoid negative pressures and threats, relying instead on pos-
itive pressures like persuasion and inducement. If they do so, it is
more likely that they will experience the treatment they have con-
sented to as voluntary, rather than coerced, and as a result, they
will experience the psychological benefits of choice, 10 9 and avoid
the negative psychological effects of coercion."10 People resent
others treating them as incompetent subjects of paternalism, and
suffer a diminished sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy when not
permitted to make decisions for themselves. 11' To the extent that
MacArthur Studies, in COERCION IN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (J. Morrissey & John
Monahan eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-17, on file with authors) [hereinafter
Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision].
105. Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision, supra note 104 (manuscript at 12-
14, 17).
106. Id. (manuscript at 10-12, 17).
107. Id. (manuscript at 10-11, 17).
108. See Winick, Mental Health, supra note 88, at 1166-67.
109. See WINICK, RIGHT TO REFUSE, supra note 88, at 303, 327-44; Winick, Civil
Commitment Hearing, supra note 47, at 48-52; Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra
note 24 (manuscript at 38-39).
110. See Winick, Mental Health, supra note 88, at 1159.
111. ALBERT BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL 12-13
(1997); Winick, Side Effects, supra note 90, at 6.
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the individual experiences her decision to participate in a problem
solving court treatment or rehabilitative program as voluntary, it
can have significant positive effects on treatment outcome.112
Therefore, problem solving court judges should avoid paternal-
ism and respect the individual's autonomy. They should encourage
and urge the individual to accept needed treatment or rehabilita-
tion. They should use techniques of persuasion or inducement, but
avoid a heavy-handed approach, strong negative pressure, and
coercion.
If handled properly by the problem solving court judge, conver-
sations about the need for treatment or rehabilitation can be an
opportunity for empowering the individual in ways that can have
positive psychological value. Such conversations can build self-es-
teem and self-efficacy, without which these individuals may not feel
they can succeed in what might be a long and difficult path to reha-
bilitation. These conversations can facilitate the individual's sense
that she has made a voluntary choice in favor of treatment, which
can increase her commitment to achieving the treatment goal, and
set in motion a variety of psychological mechanisms that can help
to bring it about.
C. Using Persuasion and Sparking Motivation
Persuasion, not coercion, should be the hallmark of judge-of-
fender interactions in problem solving court contexts. Involvement
in the judicial process itself can provide an important motivating
force that may prompt the individual to reexamine past patterns
and seek to undergo change. The process of attempting to per-
suade the individual in this direction often will occur in conversa-
tions with the individual's own defense attorney. 13 At times,
however, the judge will participate in the persuasion process
through conversations with the individual occurring in open court.
When such occasions present themselves, judges functioning in the
problem solving court context should remember that judicial con-
versations that are perceived by the individual as coercive may be
counterproductive, and that there is an important difference be-
tween coercion and persuasion.114
112. See Michele Cascardi et al., Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commit-
ment: An Analogy Study, 18 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 731, 736-38 (2000); Winick, Civil Com-
mitment Hearing, supra note 47, at 40-41, 48.
113. See Astrid Birgden, Dealing with the Resistant Criminal Client: A Psychologi-
cally-Minded Strategy for More Effective Legal Counseling, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 225,
226-29, 232-39 (2002); Winick, Redefining, supra note 87, at 1049-51.
114. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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When the context calls for the judge to attempt to persuade the
individual to accept treatment or rehabilitation, the judge's under-
standing of the social psychology of persuasion will augment her
ability to be an effective persuader."15 This body of psychological
research identifies three elements of the persuasion process as criti-
cal-source, message, and receiver.116 The content of the message,
and the way it is delivered, significantly influence the likelihood of
persuasion.
Persuasion theory has postulated an elaboration likelihood
model, which asserts that certain persuasive elements are influ-
enced by the extent to which the receiver of information is actively
involved in the processing of the information presented." l7 Under
this theory, when the individual receiving the information has a
high likelihood of elaboration, this will maximize the potential for
successful persuasion, for example, when they engage in issue-rele-
vant thinking about the content of the message itself. It is more
likely that a judge will be successful in persuading individuals if the
message has personal relevance to them and they have prior
knowledge about the issue.
118
Individuals facing criminal charges wish to minimize the risk of
imprisonment, so they will value strategies that can achieve this
result. Problem solving courts should present them with informa-
tion concerning the rehabilitative alternatives to criminal court that
they present, as well as the positive consequences for successfully
completing the program, including, in many cases, the dismissal of
charges. Then, judges should leave them free to engage in instru-
mental thinking concerning the value of electing these rehabilita-
tive alternatives. Judges should also give these individuals the
opportunity to ask questions about their options, the freedom to
engage in their own processing of the information, and the freedom
to reach their own decision. Additionally, they should fully en-
courage individuals facing criminal charges to discuss their options
115. See DANIEL J. O'KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 134 (1990);
see also RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUA-
SION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986) (discussing
the use of central and peripheral persuasion in communication as a method of chang-
ing people); Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 915-17.
116. See O'KEEFE, supra note 115, at 130-88.
117. PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 115, at 1-60.
118. See Wendy Wood, Retrieval of Attitude-Relevant Information From Memory:
Effects on Susceptibility to Persuasion and on Intrinsic Motivation, 42 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 798, 799-800 (1982); Wendy Wood & Carl A. Kallgren, Communica-
tor Attributes and Persuasion: Recipients' Access to Attitude-Relevant Information in
Memory, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 172, 172-73 (1988).
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with counsel, and provide them with a reasonable opportunity to
see counsel and think about their choices. This form of persuasion,
known as "central route" persuasion, 19 can be more effective than
pressuring the individual to make a decision, and can allow her to
internalize the rehabilitative goal and increase the intrinsic motiva-
tion needed to accomplish it.
The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion is similar to the
motivational interviewing technique developed for use by clinicians
to help motivate individuals to deal with problems of addiction and
alcoholism. 120 Thus, problem solving court judges should also
master the techniques of motivational interviewing. Although
treatment staff' 2' and the individual's own attorney 122 will be pri-
marily involved in conducting such motivational interviews, occa-
sionally problem solving court judges will personally engage in
such interviews. Likewise, judges will have the opportunity to rein-
force the motivational effects of interviews conducted by the treat-
ment staff or defense attorney.
Five basic principles underlie this technique.' 23 First, the inter-
viewer needs to express empathy.' 24 This involves understanding
the individual's feelings and perspectives without judging, criticiz-
ing, or blaming. 125 Second, the interviewer, in a non-confronta-
tional way, should seek to develop discrepancies between the
individual's present behavior and important personal goals. 26 Ap-
plying this approach, the judge should attempt to elicit the individ-
ual's underlying goals and objectives.12 In addition, the judge
should attempt to get the individual to recognize the existence of a
problem through the use of interviewing techniques, such as open-
ended questioning, reflective listening, providing frequent state-
ments of affirmation and support, and eliciting self-motivational
statements. 128 For example, if the individual wishes to obtain or
keep a particular job, the judge can ask questions designed to
probe the relationship between her drinking or substance abuse
and her poor performance in previous employment that may have
119. PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 115, at 3-11.
120. WILLIAM R. MILLER & STEPHEN ROLLNICK, MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING:
PREPARING PEOPLE TO CHANGE ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 51-63 (1991).
121. See Clark, Drug Courts, supra note 65 (manuscript at 23-27).
122. See Birgden, supra note 113, at 237.
123. MILLER & ROLLNICK, supra note 120, at 55-62.
124. Id. at 55-56.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 56-58.
127. Id.
128. See id. (describing the general goal of eliciting discrepancies).
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resulted in dismissal. An interviewer will create motivation for
change only when individuals perceive the discrepancy between
how they are behaving and the achievement of their personal goals.
Third, the interviewer should avoid arguing with the individual,
which can be counter productive and create defensiveness. 29
Fourth, when resistance is encountered, the interviewer should at-
tempt to roll with the resistance, rather than becoming confronta-
tional. 130 This requires listening with empathy and providing
feedback to what the individual is saying by introducing new infor-
mation, which also allows the individual to remain in control, to
make her own decisions, and to create solutions to her problems.
Fifth, it is important for the interviewer to foster self-efficacy in
the individual. The individual will not attempt change unless she
feels that she can reach the goal, overcome barriers and obstacles
to its achievement, and succeed in effectuating change. 3 '
Problem solving court judges, court officials, treatment profes-
sionals working with them, and lawyers counseling clients about
their options to enter into problem solving court rehabilitative pro-
grams should learn the techniques of motivational interviewing and
apply them in their conversations with offenders. These motiva-
tional interviewing techniques have recently been adapted for ap-
plication by criminal defense lawyers dealing with clients who have
recurring problems, are in denial about their problems, and are re-
sistant to change.' 32 Additionally, in mental health courts, the
techniques have been adapted to apply to lawyers representing cli-
ents, mental health professionals, and mental health court
judges. 33 These techniques can be particularly effective when the
individual finds herself in a situation where change is being con-
templated.'34 The individual's arrest and need to face criminal
charges can present the pressures needed to create such a teacha-
ble moment or therapeutic opportunity in which the individual is
ready to contemplate change, accept responsibility for wrongdoing,
and consider making a genuine commitment to rehabilitation. The
129. Id. at 58-59.
130. Id. at 59-60.
131. Id. at 60-62.
132. See Birgden, supra note 113, at 232-42.
133. See Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 38-42).
134. See JAMES 0. PROCHASKA & JOHN C. NORCROSS, SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOTHER-
APY: A TRANSTHEORETICAL ANALYSIS 109-39 (1994); Birgden, supra note 113, at
240-41; James 0. Prochaska et al., In Search of How People Change: Applications to
Addictive Behaviors, 47 A. PSYCHOL. 1102, 1108-12 (1992); James 0. Prochaska & J.
M. Prochaska, Why Don't Continents Move? Why Don't People Change?, 9 J. PSY-
CHOTHERAPY INTEG. 83, 83-102 (1999).
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use of motivational interviewing and related psychological strate-
gies as a means to sparking and maintaining the individual's moti-
vation to accept needed treatment can substantially increase the
potential of problem-solving courts to help the individual solve her
problem.
D. Increasing Compliance
Once the individual has made the decision to enter into a treat-
ment program under the auspices of the problem solving court, the
judge's focus should shift to the question of how to assure the indi-
vidual's compliance with the requirements of the treatment pro-
gram. A body of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship has
examined how to increase compliance in a variety of legal con-
texts. 35 This work has analyzed the adaptation of health care com-
pliance principles and methods of behavioral or contingency
contracting to legal contexts and has explored the implications of
the psychology of procedural justice for improving compliance with
judicial orders. These approaches can easily be adapted for appli-
cation in the context of problem solving courts.
1. Health Care Compliance Principles
A parallel problem arises in the context of medical practice-
how can physicians and other healers convince their patients to
comply with their medical advice? Patient non-compliance is a sig-
nificant problem that has been addressed extensively in the medi-
cal literature.' 36 Behavioral medicine, a field of medical practice
that builds on principles of behavioral psychology, offers much
help for the resolution of this problem.1 37 For example, the work
of psychologists Donald Meichenbaum and Donald Turk sets forth
a number of health care compliance principles, and shows how they
can be applied by health care professionals to increase the likeli-
135. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity
Acquitee Conditional Release Process [hereinafter Wexler, Health Care], in WEXLER
& WINICK, supra note 41, at 199, 208-1.7; Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91, at 740-88;
Winick, Redefining, supra note 87, at 1062; David B. Wexler, How the Law Can Use
What Works: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Look at Recent Research on Rehabilitation,
15 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 365, 367-70 (1997) (book review).
136. See, e.g., DONALD MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREAT-
MENT ADHERENCE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDEBOOK 149-84 (1987).
137. See id. (discussing the theory and practice of behavioral medicine).
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hood that their patients will follow their treatment
recommendations. 3
8
Patients frequently fail to comply with treatment recommenda-
tions when the physician or other health care professional fails to
instruct them adequately concerning the treatment they are asked
to follow. 139 The way the health care professional interacts with
the patient during the period when treatment is explained can be
most significant. 140 If the physician appears to be distant, dis-
tracted, reads case notes, uses professional jargon, asks questions
calling for brief "yes" or "no" answers, fails to allow the patient the
opportunity to tell her story in her own words, describes the treat-
ment plan imprecisely or in technical terms, acts paternalistically,
or is abrupt with the patient, compliance with the health care pro-
fessional's treatment recommendations will be less likely.' 4'
To increase treatment adherence, Meichenbaum & Turk recom-
mend that the health care provider introduce herself to the patient,
avoid jargon, and elicit the patient's views, preferences, and active
involvement in designing the treatment plan.142 Providing patient
choice even concerning minor details of treatment can be signifi-
cant in increasing compliance. 143 Moreover, adherence is furthered
when the physician is perceived as prestigious, competent, caring,
and motivated by the patient's best interests. 4 4 Involving family
members and others significant to the patient can also increase
compliance.'45 These individuals can provide encouragement and
reminders to the patient and can help the physician access informa-
tion about compliance. 146 Furthermore, when the patient makes a
public commitment concerning the treatment plan to significant
others, compliance is more likely to occur than when the patient's
commitment is privately made. 14 The anticipated disapproval of a
respected physician and of the patient's family members, as well as
138. Id.; see Wexler, Health Care, supra note 135, at 199 (discussing health care
compliance principles and their application by criminal judges making insanity acquit-
tee conditional release decisions).
139. See Meichenbaum & Turk, supra note 136, at 55-60.
140. See id. at 78.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 81.
143. Id. at 171.
144. Id. at 172.
145. Id. at 124.
146. Id. at 162.
147. Id. at 173-75 (discussing the making of formal commitments through a written
instrument).
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her own anticipated self-disapproval, can significantly increase the
patient's motivation to comply.'48
These health care compliance principles can be adapted for use
by judges in problem solving courts. Judges, court personnel, treat-
ment providers, and defense attorneys, should take care to instruct
the individual carefully and understandably concerning her obliga-
tions relating to participation in the treatment program and report-
ing to court. The judge should act concerned rather than distant,
provide the individual with her undivided attention during conver-
sations, avoid jargon, allow the individual an opportunity for voice,
avoid paternalism, and generally treat the individual with respect.
At the outset, the judge should encourage the individual's active
involvement in both the negotiation and design of the rehabilita-
tive plan, providing as great a degree of choice concerning the de-
tails as is possible in the circumstances. The judge should treat the
individual with dignity and respect, conveying to the individual that
her actions are motivated by the individual's best interests. When-
ever possible, the judge should seek to involve family members and
significant others in the process during which the individual makes
a commitment to participate in treatment, and that commitment
should be made in a formal and relatively public way.
2. Behavioral Contracting
A behavioral psychology technique known as "behavioral con-
tracting" or "contingency management" captures many of these
compliance principles and may be helpful in insuring the individ-
ual's compliance with the treatment or rehabilitative program. 49
Under this technique, an explicit, formal contract is entered into
between the parties in which specific goals are set forth. 5 " Motiva-
tion to achieve the goal is facilitated through contract terms pro-
viding for a combination of agreed-upon rewards or positive
reinforcers for success or aversive conditioners for failure. 5' This
technique is frequently used in clinical practice, and the combina-
tion of positive reinforcement to encourage compliance and aver-
sive conditioning to decrease or extinguish non-compliant behavior
148. Id.
149. See Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91, at 772-89, 793-97 (advocating the adop-
tion of a wager system to cure social ills such as drug addiction, unproductivity in
government employment, and repeat criminal offenses, which borrows heavily from
behavioral conditioning theory and uses both positive and negative reinforcement).
150. Id. at 780-89.
151. Id. at 779-81.
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can be quite effective.1 52 The behavioral contract provides rewards
and penalties for the achievement and failure to reach intermediate
and long-term goals.'5 3 Partial rewards or sanctions can be pro-
vided periodically as intermediate goals that are measured at fre-
quent intervals are either achieved or missed, thereby facilitating
the progressive shaping of the individual's behavior. 54 Tailoring
the rewards and punishments to the individual's incentive prefer-
ences, and involving the individual in the process of selecting the
goals and reinforcers, when practicable, can significantly increase
motivation to comply.1 55 Such sub-goals will best maintain self-mo-
tivation, provide inducements to action, provide guideposts for
performance, and, if attained, will produce self-satisfaction needed
to sustain effort. 156
The behavioral contract makes explicit the expectations of eve-
ryone involved. Target behaviors are objectified, measurable, and
well understood by all parties. The setting of explicit goals is itself
a significant factor in their achievement.' 57 The behavioral con-
tract is a successful method of ensuring compliance, in part, be-
cause of the goal-setting effect, 158 which posits that the mere
setting of a goal produces positive expectancies for its achievement
that themselves help to bring about success.159 Goals serve to
structure and guide the individual's performance, providing direc-
tion and focusing interest, attention, and personal involvement.
The behavioral contract also engages other mechanisms of psychol-
ogy that help to achieve effective performance, including intrinsic
motivation, cognitive dissonance, and the psychological value of
choice. 60
Such behavioral contracts are explicitly used in many drug court
treatment programs. 16' Whether or not formally negotiated and
executed, individuals agreeing to participate in treatment or reha-
152. Id. at 780-81.
153. Id. at 758-59.
154. Id. at 748 n.31, 758 n.66 (defining shaping as the breaking down of a desired
behavior into smaller easier to understand steps).
155. Id. at 780-88.
156. Id. at 758.
157. Id. at 761.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 761-70.
161. See William M. Burdon et al., Drug Courts and Contingency Management, 31
J. DRUG IssuEs 73, 74, 78-81 (2001); David Carson, Civil Proceedings: Legal
Frameworks for Psychology's Contribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN
LEGAL CONTEXTS 395, 406 (David Carson & Ray Bull eds., 2d ed. 1995); Simon,
supra note 1, at 452; Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4).
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bilitation in a variety of problem solving court contexts are, in ef-
fect, engaging in behavioral contracting. 62 Offenders that agree to
participate in reentry courts and to submit to supervision by the
reentry court judge are also engaging in behavioral contracting. 63
Domestic violence perpetrators who agree to enter a batterer's in-
tervention program as a condition of bail, diversion, or probation
are, in effect, engaging in behavioral contracting with the domestic
violence court.'64 Individuals with mental illnesses in mental
health court who agree to accept treatment in the community as a
condition for diversion from the criminal court similarly are engag-
ing in behavioral contracting with the mental health court. 65
These contracts should be explicitly negotiated, written, and agreed
to by both the court and the individual in a formal and public way.
Judges in these problem solving courts should understand the
psychology of behavioral contracting, and how it can be used to
increase motivation, commitment, compliance, and effective per-
formance. Behavioral contracting also increases the satisfaction of
people involved in problem solving court programs. 66 Moreover,
the process through which the behavioral contract is negotiated
and entered into can itself provide an important opportunity for
minimizing feelings of coercion that might undermine compliance
and successful performance. 167
Rather than rushing through the process in which the individual
is asked to make an election in favor of drug treatment court or
another problem solving court rehabilitative program, 68 the prob-
lem solving court process should regard the individual's decision
and the behavioral contract as a significant opportunity for reduc-
ing feelings of coercion and inspiring the perception of voluntary
choice. As the MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health
and the Law research shows, according individuals a sense of voice
and validation, treating them with dignity and respect, and convey-
ing to them that the court is acting in good faith and in their best
interest will diminish the perception of coercion and increase the
162. See Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 36).
163. See LaFond & Winick, supra note 15 (manuscript at 16-17).
164. See Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 41-42.
165. See Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 5).
166. See Adele V. Harrell, Address at the Eleventh Annual Symposium on Con-
temporary Urban Challenges at the Fordham University School of Law (Mar. 1,
2002), in Problem Solving Courts: Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence,
supra note 93, at 1933-36.
167. See Winick, Mental Health, supra note 88, at 1147.
168. See Quinn, supra note 100, at 47; Reisig, supra note 100, at 220.
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perception of voluntary choice.'6 9 Individuals opting for a problem
solving court rehabilitative program should be reminded that the
choice is entirely up to them. In addition, they should be given the
opportunity, when practicable, to participate in the negotiation of
the behavioral contract and the selection of the reinforcers, sanc-
tions, and conditions that will be used and applied. This participa-
tion and involvement should occur in ways that respect their need
for voice and validation. If handled properly, the negotiation and
entry into the behavioral contract can constitute an important op-
portunity to engage intrinsic motivation and commitment and to
establish a mechanism that will help to assure compliance in ways
that the individual will regard as fair.
By requiring an individual accepting drug treatment court to
agree to periodic drug testing and reporting to court, the drug
treatment court is monitoring compliance with the behavioral con-
tract. When the drug test shows the individual to be drug-free, the
drug treatment court judge praises the individual, often in the pres-
ence of a room full of attorneys, court personnel, and other drug
treatment court participants. Such praise is an important form of
positive reinforcement that rewards the individual for compliant
behavior, helps to shape future behavior, and builds much needed
self-esteem and self-efficacy. At the successful completion of the
drug treatment court program, the individual is given a graduation
ceremony in court where the arresting officer usually presents a
"diploma," the judge offers praise, and there is general applause.'
When other program participants observe this "graduation" ritual,
they themselves receive a form of vicarious reinforcement. 17 1
When the individual's drug test is positive, the judge applies an
agreed-upon sanction or aversive conditioner, which is designed to
deter future non-compliant behavior.7 2 Future incidents of non-
compliance are then subjected to graduated sanctions that were
agreed to in advance by the individual, as well as verbal disap-
proval, occurring in the presence of others. 73 The court maintains
169. Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision, supra note 104 (manuscript at 12-
14, 17); Winick, Mental Health, supra note 88, at 1166-67.
170. Steven Belenko, Diverting Drug Offenders to Treatment Courts: The Portland
Experience, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INTERVEN-
TION, supra note 4, at 108, 127-28.
171. See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Through Imitation, in NEBRASKA SYMPO-
SIUM ON MOTIVATION 211, 211-13 (M. Jones ed., 1962); Winick, Harnessing, supra
note 91, at 749.
172. Hora et al., supra note 4, at 528.
173. Id.
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close monitoring and supervision of the treatment process by hav-
ing the individual report to the court every ten to fourteen days, so
that the judge may receive frequent feedback from the treatment
team and information concerning whether the individual has re-
mained drug-free. 174
The periodic delivery of positive reinforcement or sanctions con-
tingent upon whether the individual has met intermediate goals
helps to maintain the individual's commitment and motivation dur-
ing the one and one-half to two years that drug treatment court
typically requires. In this way, what the drug treatment court does
can be seen as an application of behavioral contracting or contin-
gency management, a technique which, if properly applied, can
substantially increase the likelihood of treatment success.'75 Other
problem solving courts should adapt this approach and all judges in
these courts should receive training in its application.
3. The Psychology of Procedural Justice
In all of their interactions with the individual, problem solving
court judges should be careful to apply procedures that fully re-
spect the individual's participatory and dignitary interests. 76 Ther-
apeutic jurisprudence scholarship has frequently pointed to the
literature on the psychology of procedural justice, 177 suggesting
that its application in a variety of contexts can achieve therapeutic
benefits for the individuals involved. 78 This literature, based on
174. Id. at 475.
175. See Burdon et al., supra note 161, at 73-90; Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91,
at 799-808.
176. See Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 47, at 53, 57-58.
177. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTiCE (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
178. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice and Voluntary Participa-
tion: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CINN. L. REV. (forth-
coming) (manuscript at 23-35, on file with author) (discussing the application of
therapeutic jurisprudence to juvenile offenders); Amy D. Runner & Bruce J. Winick,
Silencing the Appellant's Voice: The Antitherapeutic Per Curiam Affirmance, 24 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 499, 504 (2000); Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 47, at
53, 57-58; Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 33; Winick, Outpatient Com-
mitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 8); Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the
1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 537,
565-66 (1998); Bruce J. Winick & Ginger Lerner-Wren, Do Juveniles Facing Civil
Commitment Have a Right to Counsel?: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Brief, 71 U.
CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3-5, on file with author) (discussing the
application of the psychology of procedural justice in the context of juveniles in foster
care under state custody when the state seeks to transfer them to residential treat-
ment centers); Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2-7) (discussing drug
treatment court proceedings); see also Amend. R. of Juv. Proc., Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350,
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empirical work in a variety of litigation and arbitration contexts,
shows that if people are treated with dignity and respect at hear-
ings, given a sense of "voice," (the ability to tell their story) and
"validation" (the feeling that what they have said has been taken
seriously by the judge or hearing officer), and generally treated in
ways that they consider to be fair, they will experience greater sat-
isfaction and comply more willingly with the ultimate outcome of
the proceedings, even if adverse to them.
Thus, according individuals in problem solving court contexts a
full measure of procedural justice can help to increase compliance
with and successful participation in a treatment or rehabilitative
program. For reasons developed earlier, according individuals pro-
cedural justice will also diminish their perception of coercion in the
judicial process and increase the chances that they will experience
the decision to enter into a treatment or rehabilitative program as
having been voluntarily made. 79 The resulting perception can it-
self help to increase the likelihood of genuine participation on the
part of the individual, intrinsic motivation, program compliance,
and treatment success.18 0 These utilitarian reasons for respecting
the procedural rights of individuals in problem solving court con-
texts coalesce with the historic commitment to fairness embodied
in the concept of due process of law.18' Even when functioning as
psychosocial agencies, problem solving courts should accord the in-
dividual a full measure of due process.
CONCLUSION
Therapeutic jurisprudence can contribute much to the function-
ing of problem solving courts, which can provide rich and fascinat-
ing laboratories to generate and refine therapeutic jurisprudence
approaches. Considerably more research is needed on the func-
tioning of problem solving courts and their effectiveness in rehabil-
itating offenders and avoiding recidivism. To the extent that these
804 So. 2d 1206, 1210-11 (2001) (recognizing psychology of procedural justice as pro-
viding a therapeutic jurisprudence basis for adopting rule allowing children facing
civil commitment to be represented by counsel).
179. See supra notes 86-112 and accompanying text (discussing the MacArthur Re-
search Network on Mental Health and the Law research on the causes and correlates
of perceived coercion).
180. See Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 47, at 48-49, 60; Winick,
Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 30-31); Winick & Wexler, supra
note 4 (manuscript at 4-5).
181. See Reisig, supra note 100, at 216-19; Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing,
supra note 47, at 38, 44-47.
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courts are successful, as the preliminary research and many anec-
dotal reports suggest, there is considerable need to understand why
they work and more research is needed on this question. The inter-
action between the problem solving court judge and the individual
seems to be an important ingredient in program success, and more
empirical work should probe how this occurs. 182
This Essay has offered a number of suggestions concerning how
judges should act in problem solving court contexts to spark the
motivation of the individual to achieve rehabilitation and to in-
crease compliance with treatment. These proposals are derived
from psychological literature in other contexts, therefore, further
analytical analysis and empirical research are needed concerning
the application of these principles in the problem solving court
arena.
Problem solving courts are a noble undertaking. They represent
a newly broadened conception of the role of the courts, one that is
fully consistent with the basic concept of therapeutic jurisprudence.
To perform this role effectively, judges need to develop and im-
prove their interpersonal, psychological, and social work skills.
Therapeutic jurisprudence can help judges in this effort. Problem
solving courts can become natural laboratories for the develop-
ment and application of therapeutic jurisprudence principles and
for research on what works best in the court-involved treatment
and rehabilitative process. Therapeutic jurisprudence and problem
solving courts share a common mission-how legal rules, judicial
practices, and court structures and administration can be rede-
signed to facilitate the rehabilitative process. Problem solving
courts, applying principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, can be-
come an important force for dealing with a number of the most
vexing social and psychological problems that affect our communi-
ties. Although problem solving courts are not identical with thera-
peutic jurisprudence, these two approaches can be seen as having a
symbiotic relationship. 18 3 Together they can do much to transform
law into an instrument of healing for both the individual and the
community.
182. See Petrucci, supra note 59, at 294-95 (acknowledging importance of judge-
defendant interaction and recommending future research).
183. See Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2).
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SPECIALIZED COURTS: NOT A CURE-ALL
Phylis Skloot Bamberger*
INTRODUCTION
Discussion of judicial problem solving in criminal cases through
specialized courts is, in reality, a discussion about alternatives to
incarceration and the administration of those alternatives.' Judicial
efforts to avoid inappropriate incarceration by the use of suitable
alternative programs is old stuff. It has been going on at least since
the advent of the probation system. The story of how New York
added pre-trial and pre-sentence programs to post-conviction im-
prisonment alternatives, and went from probation to specialized
courts is well documented.2 In the last few years, the focus in many
state judicial systems has been on specialized courts to provide the
response to societal problems that arise in courts with criminal
dockets, including administration of alternatives to incarceration.3
The most well-known of these problem solving courts having crimi-
nal case jurisdiction are drug courts and domestic violence courts.
Other courts of specialized jurisdiction have also been suggested or
funded. These courts are given unique resources and staffing to
* Judge, Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County.
1. There are other specialized courts. For example, community courts are con-
cerned with matters in addition to docketed cases, and compliance courts deal only
with cases in which the defendant is already in a program. See Michael Scrhunk &
Judith Phelan, Problem Solving Courts, 41 JUDGES J., Winter 2002, at 17. There are
also specialized courts for trying felony cases like those in which juveniles are tried.
This Essay deals only with specialized courts that are specially staffed, and have ac-
cess to special services to allow non-incarceratory dispositions.
2. See N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF ACTION UNIT No. 7, at 31-57 (1998)
[hereinafter STATE BAR]; N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS & THE COURTS, CON-
FRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION AND RECIDIVISM 10 (2000) [hereinafter FISKE
REPORT]; N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF COURT DRUG TREATMENT, THE FIRST YEAR: RE-
PORT TO CHIEF JUDGE KAYE AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE JONATHAN L.
LIPPMAN (2002) [hereinafter FIRST YEAR]; N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., RE-
PORT OF THE UNITED COURT SYSTEMS COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS 16 (1995) [hereinafter UNIFIED COURT] (detailing, inter alia, the need to
reduce the burdens on probation courts which has given rise to more specialized
courts); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Report on Alternatives to Incarceration
and Probation, 49 REC. 376 (1994) [hereinafter City Bar] (in 1985, the New York
State Division of Probation was reorganized as the Division of Probation and Correc-
tional Alternatives to meet the increasing demand for specialized amounts of proba-
tionary contact).
3. See FISKE REPORT, supra note 2, at 35 n.81 (discussing alternatives to incarcer-
ation in Drug Courts).
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administer post-plea sentences that are alternatives to incarcera-
tion. They are given access to the professional delivery of diagno-
sis, screening, and assessment services not generally available to
courts of general jurisdiction, as well as to the programs that pro-
vide the services.4 Specialized courts are part of the continuing ef-
fort to avoid putting people in jail or prison when something less
drastic will work to the advantage of the defendant and the public,
satisfying concerns of humane treatment and reducing the costs of
punishment.
Traditionally, the courts of general criminal jurisdiction, how-
ever, have assumed the role of administering pre-trial and pre-sen-
tence programs, funded both publicly and privately, that provide
education, vocational training, counseling, and substance abuse re-
habilitation. And historically, when a non-incarceratory sentence
is imposed, probation departments have played the administrative
role, selecting the appropriate program, supervising compliance,
and acting as liaison with the court when problems arise needing
judicial intervention.5
The focus on specialized courts requires reexamination of fund-
ing and staffing of courts of general jurisdiction to administer alter-
natives to incarceration. General jurisdiction courts have the
authority, at any point in the proceeding, to involve probation eli-
gible defendants who do not come within the scope of the work of
specialized courts in alternate programs. Thus, despite the shift to
specialized courts, the general jurisdiction judges are left with the
administrative responsibility for initiating, effectuating, and moni-
toring alternates to incarceration, and the responsibility of super-
vising defendants who are in pre-trial programs as alternatives to
jail detention and post-conviction/ pre-sentencing alternatives to
prison.
Further, in recent years there has been insufficient funding and
staffing of probation services, which, in New York State, is mostly
the responsibility of the counties.6 According to a recent report by
the New York State Commission on Drugs and the Courts,
4. See id. at 34.
5. See id. at 75 (discussing the role of probation in drug courts).
6. New York State's probation system is organized on a countywide basis; there is
one system, however, for New York City. The New York State Division of Probation
and Alternatives to Incarceration exercises general supervision over local probation
systems and contributes matching funds to local offices. See id. at 76; City Bar, supra
note 2, at 398. Furthermore, state funding to local departments has declined and the
caseloads have skyrocketed. See UNIFIED COURT, supra note 2, at 17-18; see also
FISKE, RiPORT, supra note 2, at 76-77.
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"[p]robation departments are often underfunded and beset with
enormous caseloads which make effective supervision a virtual im-
possibility. Indeed, in many respects some of the treatment inno-
vations that are described in this Report have arisen to fill the gaps
left by the failure of traditional probation supervision. 7 While cre-
ation, funding, and support of some specialized courts are appro-
priate, my view from the bench is that all courts should be provided
with the panoply of services, including a properly funded probation
department, so that alternatives to jail or prison are equally availa-
ble to all defendants found eligible for them, regardless of the
court before which their cases are pending. While specialized
courts, such as drug courts, dealing with defendants charged with
crimes are of critical importance, I believe that sole or even pri-
mary reliance on specialized courts is not sufficient. Rather, for
the reasons that follow, what should be done is to make centralized
resources available as necessary to all courts in a county or city in
which alternatives to incarceration are possible, although not
automatic.
I. THE POPULATION DEPENDENT ON COURTS OF GENERAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
There are defendants who, for various reasons, are not serviced
by specialized courts. Such defendants must seek probation and
jail or prison alternatives from the general jurisdiction judges
before whom their cases are pending. The defendants include those
seeking pre-plea and pre-sentence alternatives to jail, all those
seeking a sentence alternative to prison, but who are not in the
target population of a specialized court, and all those who choose
not to seek early diversion from the traditional court processes into
the specialized court.
Offenders who are addicted or substance abusers are the most
well-known target population of the specialized court system. Tak-
ing specialized drug courts as an example, in New York, the target
population is defendants, nineteen years old or older, charged with
possession or sale of drugs in an amount below the drug weight
needed for the most serious felony drug charge, provided the of-
fense did not occur on certain days and times within a thousand
feet of a school, and provided the defendants have no prior felony
conviction.8 Defendants in the target group who pass a screening
7. FiSKE REPORT, supra note 2, at 75.
8. See id. at 34.
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review are placed in substance rehabilitation programs, given in-
tense supervision, and appear regularly before a judge.9
There are, however, many cases in which defendants who are
addicts are excluded from specialized courts because they have
prior convictions, are charged with crimes other than drug law of-
fenses, have sold drugs within a thousand feet of a school at the
requisite time, or who have other disqualifying factors. Many
would benefit from participation in a program under strict supervi-
sion without posing a danger to the community. Their cases re-
main pending before judges of general jurisdiction.'" In addition,
there are defendants who are substance abusers or addicts who
would be excluded from some, although not all, drug courts be-
cause they have problems other than addiction. People addicted to
drugs may also have heart conditions, asthma, AIDS, positive re-
sults for HIV, learning disabilities, emotional disturbances, mental
illness, retardation, syndromes from physical or sexual abuse, illit-
eracy, infirmities from old age, an absence of any marketable skills,
and homelessness. These cases remain in general jurisdiction
courts where the judge must determine whether to order an alter-
native to jail or prison in these difficult cases.
Further, specialized drug courts do not reach those defendants
who are not addicts, but who do have one or more of the other
problems listed above. People charged with crimes who appear
before courts of general jurisdiction have such a vast array of
problems and needs that, for the most part, there is not a special-
ized court for each of these separable groups. It is apparent that if
specialized courts were established to respond to the needs of each
of these groups, an expensive infrastructure and costly staffing
would be required in a single court for a comparatively small, al-
though important, population needing help. Defendants with these
problems are before the many general jurisdiction judges, who will
be the administrators for any pre-sentence program alternative to
jail.
Finally, defendants who are eligible for help in a specialized
court may choose not to take that option because it comes very
early in the processing of the case. The premise of many of the
specialized courts is early diversion, and, as noted, a guilty plea by
the defendant is required within a short time after the case is com-
menced in order that the defendant may take advantage of the pro-
9. See id. at 33.
10. See id. at 34-35.
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gram offer. I I If no plea is entered early in the proceedings, the
defendant goes through the usual court processes.
While the goal of prompt intervention is often an appropriate
consideration for treatment therapy, the defendant has a right to
make a thoughtful, voluntary, and knowing decision about whether
to plead guilty and take the treatment route. And the defendant
has a right to make such a decision after consultation with a lawyer
who has information about the pending case. At the early stage in
the proceedings, when the specialized court begins intervention,
counsel often does not have very much information about the accu-
sations and the case, has had virtually no discovery or police
paperwork, and does not know what issues may be present in the
case, as, for example, if there is any basis to challenge the admissi-
bility of the evidence against the defendant, or if there is a defense
to the charges. Counsel's advice is particularly significant if the
plea is to a felony. There is the risk that the felony guilty plea will
remain on the defendant's record if the defendant does not com-
plete the program. Further, because only the prosecutor can au-
thorize a reduction in a charge, the plea arrangement may require
the defendant to plead to a felony, albeit one not requiring a prison
term, even if the defendant successfully completes the program.
12
Even entry of a misdemeanor plea has collateral consequences for
the defendant, and she should be advised by counsel of the conse-
quences. When the defendant chooses to exercise constitutional or
statutory rights and remain in the court of general jurisdiction, that
judge will determine if the alternate sentence is appropriate.
The First Year Report to New York's Chief Administrative
Judge concludes that most participants in drug court programs
"face severe socioeconomic disadvantages, posing a substantial
challenge to rehabilitation efforts and highlighting the importance
of supplemental vocational educational or employment ser-
vices... .,13 The needs of many non-addicted people with criminal
cases before the general jurisdiction courts are comparable to those
who are addicted. All courts that people come before should be
aided in their efforts to provide appropriate supportive alternative
programs.
11. See id. at 37.
12. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(3)-(4) (McKinney 2002). In addition, under
recent federal law, a guilty plea can result in deportation for a non-citizen. See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(2) (1999).
13. FIRST YEAR, supra note 2, at 9.
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II. CASES WHERE PROBLEM SOLVING DISPOSITIONS ARE
AVAILABLE TO CRIMINAL COURTS OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION
Problem solving when dealing with felony cases is directly af-
fected by the sentencing structure. Many states, including New
York, require mandatory prison sentences for many felonies. In
New York, the mandatory sentence can be either a determinate or
indeterminate sentence, depending on whether the crime is defined
as a violent felony.1 4 Mandatory sentences are enhanced if the
convicted person is a predicate felony offender,15 or a persistent,
violent felony offender. 6
Even within this legal framework of required incarceration, de-
fendants are eligible for non-incarceratory sentences. Judges of
general felony and misdemeanor courts can provide alternatives to
incarceration for these probation-eligible defendants who are not
eligible for processing and sentencing by specialized courts.
Referring to New York as an example, a judge handling felony
cases is able to provide an alternative to incarceration in three situ-
ations: when the defendant is eligible for youth offender adjudica-
tion; when the defendant is charged with a felony requiring
incarceration, but the prosecutor agrees that the defendant will be
allowed to plead to a lesser charge carrying a non-incarceratory
sentence;' 7 and when the defendant is charged with a crime, and
probation is a permissible sentence.
A. Youth Offender Adjudication
Under New York law, a defendant who is at least sixteen , and
not more than nineteen years old at the time the crime is commit-
ted, and who has not been previously convicted of a felony, or pre-
viously adjudicated a youth offender, is eligible for youth offender
adjudication.' An eligible youth charged with a felony may be ad-
judicated a youth offender in the court's discretion, "[i]f in the
opinion of the court the interest of justice would be served by re-
lieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record and by
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(6), 70.02 (McKinney 2002).
15. Id. §§ 70.04, 70.06.
16. Id. § 70.08.
17. Id. § 220.10(3)-(4).
18. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10(1)-(2) (McKinney 1995). There are excep-
tions for certain crimes, but even as to these crimes, the defendant is eligible if the
defendant was not the only participant in the crime, and her actions were minor, or
there are mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime. Id. § 720.10(2)(a)-
(3).
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not imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of more than
four years ... ."19 The eligible youth charged with a misdemeanor
must be adjudicated a youth offender if she has not been previously
convicted of a crime or adjudicated a youth offender.20 The adjudi-
cation allows the court to impose a probation sentence, and to con-
dition probation upon the participation in a program as an
alternative to incarceration. If the defendant violates the condi-
tions of probation, an indeterminate prison sentence with a maxi-
mum of four years can be imposed.
In a court of general jurisdiction dealing with eligible youths who
are charged with felonies normally requiring imprisonment, there
are two stages at which the eligible youth can make a positive track
record to enable the judge to determine the appropriateness of
youthful offender adjudication and the imposition of probation
with a program as an alternative to incarceration. The first is prior
to conviction by plea or verdict. The second is after conviction. At
either of these times, the defendant can be ordered to attend edu-
cational, vocational training or substance abuse programs, psychi-
atric treatments, or other appropriate programs.2'
To the extent that the judge is uncertain as to whether the defen-
dant should be entitled to youth offender adjudication, the defen-
dant's participation in any assigned program and her general
behavior can provide the basis for the adjudication. Once one is
adjudicated a youth offender, if the judge makes the separate deci-
sion to impose a sentence of probation, participation in a program
can be made a condition.
B. The Prosecutor's Agreement
In some circumstances where incarceration is mandatory, the de-
fendant enters a plea of guilty to the felony requiring a prison sen-
tence because the prosecutor consents to allow the defendant to
remain out of custody, to participate in a program, and, on condi-
tion that the defendant completes the program, consents to allow
the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty to the charge requiring
imprisonment, and to plead guilty to a crime that permits a non-
incarceratory sentence. In Bronx County courts of general juris-
diction, arrangements for this disposition, except in drug cases, are
made by the judge acting with the defense counsel.
19. Id. § 720.20(1)(a).
20. See id. § 720.
21. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10.
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There are other cases where the prosecutor makes no initial
promise to consent to a plea to a reduced charge, but the defen-
dant, under court supervision, agrees to participate in a structured
out-patient or residential program of schooling, vocational training,
psychiatric counseling, or other suitable activity. In these cases, the
defendant agrees to delay the trial until she can make a track re-
cord and entry of a plea is delayed. Here, too, substantial efforts
are assumed by the judge to administer the arrangement. The
whole undertaking is pursued with the knowledge that the prosecu-
tor makes no promise to consent to the reduced plea or to a proba-
tion sentence and, in the end, may reject any such proposal. Yet,
there are cases in which the defendant makes a sustained and suc-
cessful effort in the program, supported by the interest of counsel
and under the supervision of the judge. In such circumstances, the
prosecutor may determine that it is appropriate to allow the defen-
dant to plead to a crime that will allow the imposition of a proba-
tion sentence. Once the sentence is imposed, monitoring and
supervision of the defendant rests with the probation department.
C. Crimes for which Probation is a Permissible Sentence
In New York, convictions for misdemeanors and some felonies
treated as non-violent by the penal law can result in probation, de-
terminate sentences of up to one year, or indeterminate sentences.
Where a choice is permissible, the option of imposing probation is
based in part on the judge's evaluation of the history and character
of the defendant. Where that history and character raise questions
as to the suitability of probation, or where the record is unclear,
the judge can order the defendant to participate in a program, and
monitor the progress as part of the evaluation. If the record, con-
sidering the probation department's pre-sentence report, leaves no
question, the judge can immediately impose probation. In the for-
mer circumstance, the judge undertakes the administration of the
defendant's participation in the program. In the latter circum-
stance, the probation department undertakes supervision, in accord
with the statute.
The possibility of probation for the felony of gun possession 22 is
an extremely important statutory provision given the number of
people charged with that offense, and the large number who can be
supervised on probation without any harm to the community.
22. Id. §§ 70.02(c)(ii), 265.02(4)-(8).
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Il. METHODS OF PROBLEM SOLVING IN GENERAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION COURTS: A VIEW FROM THE BENCH
The importance of the constituency of the courts of general juris-
diction emphasizes the importance of making sure that the commit-
ment to those courts matches the commitment to specialized
courts. Both deserve the resources available to administer alter-
nates to incarceration. In the pre-plea stages of a proceeding, a
judge of the general criminal jurisdiction court is responsible for
putting in place and supervising any alternative to incarceration.
After a plea of guilty or conviction after trial, the judge can ask for
the assistance of the probation department in supervising the de-
fendant, or can individually undertake the responsibility. After the
imposition of the sentence, the probation department is the admin-
istrative and supervising agency until the department re-engages
the judge in the event of a problem. This structure depends on two
factors: first, the ability of the busy judge to participate in the de-
tails of setting up a program for a defendant and supervising that
participation; and second, the ability of local probation officers to
perform their statutory obligations and traditional functions.
As a judge of general criminal jurisdiction, I have sought to find
ways to identify those defendants who should be given an opportu-
nity to avoid jail or prison by participating in programs that are
alternatives to incarceration, and I have tried to encourage the ef-
forts of these defendants.
The first task is to find a suitable program to do a screening in-
terview of the defendant. The search for a suitable program is com-
plicated if the defendant has multiple problems, such as drug
addiction, AIDS, or mental retardation.23 Programs assisting de-
fendants with multiple problems are limited. Although in 1994 the
Unified Court report recommended use of a data base of all pro-
grams and their target populations, there is no updated list of avail-
able programs. Nonetheless, over time I have learned about
available programs that are funded by local, state, and federal gov-
ernment levels, and by private agencies and foundations. Through
repeated efforts, I have learned the names and telephone numbers
of directors and intake officers.
The second task is to arrange for admission of the defendant to
the program. I have arranged for intake interviews. I have assisted
in efforts to obtain necessary documentation required for admis-
sion. These documents included school records, as well as mental
23. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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health records from private doctors and hospitals, prison health
services, and public hospitals. I have assisted in attaining medicaid,
housing, and other benefits which have been delayed or improperly
denied to defndants. In one case, I assisted when the defendant
was disqualified for benefits because an outstanding warrant, that
had long been resolved, came up on the computer.
The third task is to monitor and supervise the defendant's partic-
ipation in the program once the defendant is accepted into either
an inpatient or outpatient program. Written, detailed, and periodic
progress reports are necessary to monitor the defendant. If the re-
ports are not supplied or sufficiently specific, I contact the program
personnel for the necessary information.
I also communicate with the program staff to make clear that if
the defendant violates program rules, uses drugs, absconds, or is
expelled from the program, such incidents must be reported to the
court immediately.
In one case, the immediate reporting resulted in a miraculous
recovery. The defendant had been placed in a drug rehabilitation
program. During the course of attending required counseling, the
defendant became highly distressed. The program counselor re-
ported to me that the defendant would be dismissed from the pro-
gram because the facility could not handle the problem. The
program delayed any action until I was able to reach a doctor who
agreed to walk the defendant through emergency intake at the psy-
chiatric unit of a hospital. The program representative took the
defendant to the hospital. There the defendant was admitted, re-
ceived several months of treatment, returned to the program and
completed it successfully.
The help that I have received from both the prosecutor and de-
fense counsel has demonstrated that judges will greatly benefit in
their efforts from a systematized and courtwide administration of-
fering help comparable to that given to specialized courts.
The District Attorney of Bronx County, working with a program
called Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime ("TASC"), 24 has es-
tablished a highly organized program of screening, program selec-
tion, and supervision for those charged with drug offenses. Once
the prosecutor determines that a defendant is eligible, TASC repre-
sentatives interview the defendant to determine eligibility for one
of the programs is in the community. TASC collects the necessary
paperwork, finds the program, makes sure that the defendant is
24. See Education and Assistance Corporation, Programs & Services, at http://
www.eacinc.org/criminal.htm#Bronx%20tasc (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
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transported to the program, makes sure that the program supplies
the necessary reports, arranges for court dates, and reports mis-
steps, expulsions, and successes. At the completion of the eighteen
to twenty-four month program, TASC advises the court whether
the imposition of the non-incarceratory promised sentence is ap-
propriate. TASC is a courtwide program, assisting all judges, but is
limited to defendants charged with drug offenses deemed eligible
by the prosecutor.
In many cases defense counsel has also provided much needed
assistance. The time consuming nature of program associated
work, and the need to tend to it immediately, however, is some-
times incompatible with the demands of criminal litigation that
face every defense lawyer. In the last few years, an agency called
Defense Advocacy Services has been providing assistance to locate
programs, arrange screening, conduct interviews, collect required
paperwork, and escort defendants to program facilities. The pro-
gram has done an excellent job, often acting beyond the call of
duty. This program, like TASC, is available to all judges. Its re-
sources, however, are limited by budget constraints.
There are several programs that have their own administrators
who, when contacted by the judge, arrange for screening interviews
and do all the administrative work needed for the admission of an
defendant accepted into the program. One of the most significant
is the St. Elizabeth Ann's program affiliated with St. Vincent's
Hospital.2 5 The program is a dual diagnosis program. For one de-
fendant, it provided a safe and comfortable haven until he died; for
another, it restored him to a modicum of health that now enables
him to live in circumstances approaching reasonable normalcy.
There are some defendants who are already receiving medical or
psychiatric treatment. For these defendants, it makes sense to
make those existing arrangements into a program that satisfies the
meaning of an alternative to incarceration. In several cases, the
prosecutor has agreed to accept a plea to a crime allowing a non-
incarceratory sentence after the defendant continued treatment for
approximately two years with periodic reporting to me along with
the submission of reports from the treatment providers. One of
the defendants was treated weekly at a Veterans Administration
Hospital where he was trained to take his medication; another was
treated by a psychologist and attended a vocational training school;
25. See Saint Vincent Catholic Medical Centers: St. Elizabeth Ann's Health Care
& Rehabilitation Center, at http://www.svcmc.org/stelizabethann (last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
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and another went to a combination of medical and psychiatric
clinics.
The remaining need of courts of general jurisdiction, as well as of
the community, is a properly funded and staffed probation depart-
ment. In all the reports, cited above, it has been stated that proba-
tion departments, locally funded and organized, must be given
resources to fulfill their post-plea supervision responsibilities, also
known as interim supervision, and their traditional role as supervi-
sors of those on probation imposed as a sentence.
It appears that the specialized court approach has resulted in
neglect of local probation departments, the traditional agencies for
providing information to the court about defendants and for pro-
viding services and conducting supervision of defendants. They
have been inadequately funded, understaffed, and left in the back-
water of technological development, 26 pre-empted by a new layer
of service providers and administrators. This deprivation of re-
sources has caused serious limitations on the traditional functions
of local probation offices. Specialized courts did not cause the fail-
ure of support for probation departments27 because funding for the
two comes from different sources. Nevertheless, it is hoped that
the current emphasis on funding and staffing specialized courts will
stimulate efforts to reinvigorate regular probation services and
staffing. The problems created by the underfunding and conse-
quent underutilization of probation departments affects the work
of courts of general criminal jurisdiction. It is, however, the proba-
tion department that provides a ready made infrastructure for ad-
ministering problem solving programs in courts of general criminal
jurisdiction.
In 1995, the Unified Court System report concluded that "most
judges are unable to assume responsibility for monitoring a sen-
tenced offender's progress in an alternate program. As a result,
this responsibility should be borne by the local probation depart-
ment, which should be appropriately funded for this responsibil-
ity. ' ' 28 The report notes that the statutes require the probation
department to monitor the sentenced offender and that the legal
obligations make "the probation department ideally suited to fulfill
this monitoring function. '2 9 At least since the State Bar's 1988 re-
26. FISKE REPORT, supra note 2, at 76-80; UNIIFIED COURT, supra note 2, at 17-18;
City Bar, supra note 2, at 398-404.
27. See State Bar, supra note 2, at 36-43.
28. UNIFIED COURT, supra note 2, at 38.
29. 1d. at 39.
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port, proper and sufficient funding and staffing of probation de-
partments has been recognized as an important need. The
significance of that need is enhanced by the present effort not only
to supervise people who return to the community, but also people
who are in programs as alternatives to prison.
CONCLUSION
Every defendant eligible for a sentence that is an alternate to
incarceration should be given the opportunity to have such a sen-
tence. Countywide support services for all courts is the key to
making such programs available to every such defendant. To ac-
complish this important goal, the recognized achievements of spe-
cialized courts should be used to generate support services for
courts of general jurisdiction and the local probation departments.
4 AS
RECENT NEW YORK APPELLATE DECISIONS
WILL IMPACT MUNICIPAL
TORT LITIGATION
John M. Shields*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the past thirty years, the Fordham Urban Law Jour-
nal has progressively published numerous articles concerning a
broad range of topics, including discussions of decisions affecting
litigation practice and municipal liability.1 This Article will discuss
and summarize the recent significant decisions by the New York
State Court of Appeals and other appellate courts that will alter or
greatly impact future tort litigation, especially with regard to mu-
nicipal liability.
Although the State of New York has waived its sovereign immu-
nity, the waiver was not absolute. The waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is specifically conditioned upon compliance with the
requirements that accompany the waiver and the standards estab-
lished by the Court of Claims Act.2 In Alston v. State of New
York,3 the Court of Appeals stressed the potential rigidity of the
time limitations for filing a claim against the State, pursuant to the
Court of Claims Act.4
On several recent occasions, the Court of Appeals thoroughly
discussed the "serious injury" standard conditioned within New
* Assistant Attorney General in the Suffolk Regional Office assigned to the liti-
gation of civil claims against the State of New York. Mr. Shields received the 2002
"Louis J. Lefkowitz Memorial Award" from the Office of the Attorney General for
dedication, professionalism, and outstanding service. He was previously an Assistant
Town Attorney with the Town of Southampton and trial attorney with the Legal Aid
Society of Suffolk County. He has published over thirty legal articles. He attended
Hamilton College and obtained his Juris Doctorate and Masters in Business Adminis-
tration from Fordham University. Any opinions expressed in the Article are exclu-
sively those of the Author and not the Office of the Attorney General.
1. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Fordham Urban Law Journal: A New Millen-
nium, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 797 (2003); Constantine N. Katsoris, The Fordham Ur-
ban Law Journal: Twenty Years of Progress, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 915 (1992).
2. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT §§ 1 et seq. (Consol. 2003).
3. 762 N.E.2d 923 (N.Y. 2001).
4. Id. at 926.
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York Insurance Law. Accident victims must present admissible
evidence that contains verified, quantitative, and objective medical
results in order to successfully establish a prima facie case that a
plaintiff sustained a "serious injury," as defined by the State Insur-
ance Law.
6
In more than one decision, the court took the opportunity to
clarify the rule of apportionment contained within Article 16 of the
Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR").7 Article 16 permits a de-
fendant to seek apportionment of its liability with another
tortfeasor. Additionally, apportionment of damages for personal
injuries is permissible between a negligent landlord or owner and a
non-party assailant in cases involving negligent security.8
Twice this past year, the court addressed the standard of care
required for the operation of hazard and emergency vehicles. 9 The
court confirmed that "recklessness" was the proper standard of
care to apply to "hazard" vehicles."' At the same time, the court
rejected the argument that such vehicles must be located in a desig-
nated "work area" in order to qualify for the hazard vehicle
exemption."I
In Criscione v. City of New York, 2 the Court of Appeals clarified
that a "police officer who was driving a patrol car in response to a
[non-emergency] dispatch call was engaged in the 'emergency op-
eration' of a vehicle as defined in New York State Vehicle and Traf-
fic Law ("VTL") [section] 114-b. ' 13 "Consequently, [the officer's]
actions should not be measured by ordinary negligence standards,
but rather by the 'reckless disregard' standard of [VTL] section
1104(e).' 14
The appellate courts further discussed the requisite standard re-
quired to establish municipal liability for the negligent perform-
ance of a governmental function. 15 Absent a special relationship,
5. See, e.g., Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 1197, 1199-1200
(N.Y. 2002); Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, 751 N.E.2d 457, 460 (N.Y. 2001); Grossman
v. Wright, 707 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236-37 (App. Div. 2000).
6. N.Y. INS. LAw § 5102(d) (Consol. 2003).
7. See, e.g., Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 749 N.E.2d 184, 184-86 (N.Y. 2001);
Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 181-83 (N.Y. 2001).
8. See, e.g., Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 725-26 (N.Y. 2002).
9. See, e.g., Riley v. County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 103-05 (N.Y. 2000).
10. Id. at 104.
11. Id. at 102.
12. Criscione v. City of New York, 762 N.E.2d 342, 345 (N.Y. 2001).
13. Id. at 343; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 114-b (Consol. 2003).
14. Criscione, 762 N.E.2d at 343: see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1104(e).
15. See, e.g., Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 737 N.Y.S.2d 412, 414-16 (App. Div.
2002).
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tort liability cannot be fixed for the State's performance of a gov-
ernmental function. 6 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
State, through direct personal contact, assumed an affirmative duty
to act on the injured party's behalf, which was conveyed to the in-
jured party and subsequently relied upon. 17 Courts have recently
focused on the most critical element of the special relationship, the
injured party's justifiable reliance on the government's assur-
ances."' The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct ac-
tually placed her in a more dangerous position by creating a false
sense of security, causing her to relax her guard and not pursue
other options of protection.' 9
Similarly, the court reiterated that immunity protects discretion-
ary engineering decisions made by municipalities.2 0 Recently, the
court confirmed that the decision to install a traffic control device
is a purely discretionary governmental function, which is com-
pletely protected from liability by qualified immunity.2' "Some-
thing more than a choice between conflicting opinions of experts is
required before a governmental body may be held liable for negli-
gently performing its traffic planning function. '22 "[N]either let-
ters urging [a municipality] to install a signal nor the
recommendation by the [private engineer] that one be installed
raises an issue of fact concerning the reasonableness of the [munic-
ipality's] determination.2 z3
Finally, the court discussed whether a party to a contract may be
liable in tort to a third party. 4 Although a contractual obligation
alone does not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party, the
court articulated three specific exceptions that would create liabil-
ity in such circumstances.25
16. Id.
17. Id. at 414.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 415.
20. See Affleck v. Buckley, 758 N.E.2d 651, 653-54 (N.Y. 2001).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 654.
23. Id. at 653
24. See Church v. Callanan Indus., 782 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2002); Espinal v. Mel-
ville Snow Contractors, 773 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 2002).
25. Church, 782 N.E.2d at 53.
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I. STRICT TIME LIMITATIONS FOR FILING CLAIM AGAINST
THE STATE
In Alston v. State of New York,26 the Court of Appeals stressed
the potential rigidity of the time limitations for filing a claim
against the State, pursuant to the Court of Claims Act.27 In Alston,
after an unsuccessful attempt in federal court by parole officers to
recover overtime allegedly earned, the claimants filed a proceeding
in the Court of Claims to obtain the same monetary reward.28 The
Court of Claims granted the State's motion to dismiss the claims
because the claimants failed to timely file their claims pursuant to
section 10(4) of the Court of Claims Act. 9
"The State's waiver of sovereign immunity was not absolute, but
[specifically] conditioned upon claimant's compliance with the [re-
quirements accompanying] the waiver, including the .. .filing [of]
deadlines."3 "The Court of Claims Act could not be [more] clear
in conditioning the waiver of sovereign immunity on compliance
with the [established] time limitations . . . ."I' The unequivocal
language of the Act states that, "no judgment shall be granted in
favor of any claimant, unless [the] claimant" complies with the ex-
isting time limitations. 32 "[B]ecause the claimants failed to [timely]
file their claims in the Court of Claims ... and did not timely seek
relief from the Court under the Court of Claims Act [section]
10(6), the State was entitled to dismissal of the claim on sovereign
immunity grounds. '33
II. REVISITING THE "SERIOUS INJURY" STANDARD UNDER
INSURANCE LAW
The Court of Appeals has addressed the "serious injury" stan-
dard within the meaning of No-Fault Law, New York State Insur-
26. Alston v. State, 762 N.E.2d 923 (N.Y. 2001).
27. Id. at 926.
28. Id. at 924.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 926.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 10 (Consol. 2001)).
33. Id.; see Clark v. City of New York, 739 N.Y.S.2d 624, 624-25 (App. Div. 2002);
James v. City of New York, 662 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 1997); Deegan v. City of
New York, 643 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (App. Div. 1996); Ragin v. City of New York, 636
N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (App. Div. 1995); Lamper v. City of New York, 626 N.Y.S.2d 253, 253
(App. Div. 1995); Weber v. County of Suffolk, 616 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (App. Div.
1994).
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ance Law section 5102(d),34 in several decisions during the past two
years. The No-Fault Law provides a system whereby victims of au-
tomobile accidents can receive compensation for their economic
losses without regard to fault or negligence.3 5 An injured party
may still bring an action to recover for non-economic loss, pain,
and suffering, as long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that she has
suffered a "serious injury" within the definition of No-Fault Law.36
In Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, the court indicated "that only a
'total loss' of use [of a body organ, member, function, or system] is
compensable as a 'permanent loss of use' exception to the no-fault
remedy. '37 In Oberly, the plaintiff suffered a minor injury to his
forearm when a pump fell on his arm while he was being trans-
ported in an ambulance. 38 The court held that "the statute speaks
in terms of a loss of a body member, without qualification. '39 Ad-
ditionally, "requiring a total loss is consistent with the statutory
[language] of the categories 'permanent consequential limitation of
use of a body or organ or member' and 'significant limitation of use
of a body function or system."' 4 ° Accordingly, only a total loss of
use is compensable under the permanent loss of use exception.4 '
A. Nature and Extent of Qualified, Objective Medical Evidence
Necessary to Meet the Serious Injury Threshold
In Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Systems,42 the court consolidated
three appeals and focused specifically on the nature and extent of
qualified, objective medical evidence required to overcome the se-
rious injury threshold.43 Initially, the court noted that the legisla-
34. "Serious injury" means a personal injury which results in death; dismem-
berment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss
of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequent-
ial limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use
of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impair-
ment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from
performing substantially all the material acts which constitutes such person's
usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the
one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury
or impairment.
N.Y. INs. LAw § 5102 (d) (Consol. 2003).
35. Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, 751 N.E.2d 457, 459 (N.Y. 2001).
36. Id. at 458.
37. Id. at 459.
38. Id. at 458-59.
39. Id at 460.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 458.
42. Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 1197 (N.Y. 2002).
43. Id. at 1204-05.
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tive intent of the No-Fault Law was to eliminate "frivolous claims
and limit recovery to serious injuries. ' 44 The court stressed that
objective medical evidence of a plaintiff's injury is required to sat-
isfy the serious injury threshold.45 An expert's quantitative and
qualitative assessment of a plaintiff's condition may substantiate a
claim, "provided that the evaluation [is supported by] an objective
basis and compares the plaintiff's limitations to the normal func-
tion, purpose and use of the affected body [part]. 46
In one case, the plaintiff submitted an affirmation of a neurosur-
geon to oppose defendant's motion for summary judgment. 47 The
court held that the plaintiff, at a minimum, created an issue of fact
by submitting an expert's affirmation supported by objective medi-
cal evidence, including Magnetic Resonance Image ("MRI") and
Computerized Tomography ("CT") scan tests and reports and per-
sonal observations, which sufficiently described the qualitative na-
ture of the plaintiff's limitations. 48 Similarly, in the second case,
the treating orthopedic surgeon described the qualitative nature of
plaintiff's limitations based on the normal function, including the
plaintiff's own medical history, physical examination, and review of
the MRI scan.49
In the final case, the court held that the plaintiff's doctor failed
to adequately demonstrate a significant limitation.50 Although the
doctor detected a back spasm, he failed to articulate what objective
test, if any, induced the spasm. 5' Additionally, the expert's conclu-
sion was based, in part, on a review of an MRI report that was
never introduced into evidence, thus foreclosing cross-
examination.52
B. Threshold for "Serious Injury" Under Insurance Law
Requires Admissible, Verified, Objective
Medical Findings
Previously, the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department thoroughly clarified the specific type and
quality of admissible evidence necessary to sustain a "serious in-
44. Id. at 1199-1200.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1200.
47. Id. at 1200-01.
48. Id. at 1202.
49. Id. at 1202-03.
50. Id. at 1204.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1204-05.
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jury" claim. Accident victims must present admissible evidence
that contains verified, quantitative, objective medical results in or-
der to successfully establish a prima facie case that the plaintiff sus-
tained a "serious injury. 53
In Grossman v. Wright, the plaintiff alleged that, as a result of a
motor vehicle accident, he sustained an injury to his back 4.5  "The
plaintiff specifically alleged that as a result of the accident, he sus-
tained a 'significant limitation of use of a body function or sys-
tem.' ' '5 5 The defendant moved for summary judgment "on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to establish that he had sustained a
serious injury. ' 56 "In support of [the] motion, the defendant sup-
plied ... affirmed medical reports prepared by ... an orthopedic
surgeon and . . . a radiologist. '57  The plaintiff submitted an un-
sworn affidavit prepared by a chiropractor. 8
Applying an interpretation of the legislative intent, the Court of
Appeals determined that the word "significant," as applied to
"'limitation of use of a body function or system,' should be con-
strued to mean something more than a minor limitation of use." 59
A "minor, mild or slight limitation of use should be classified as
insignificant within the meaning of the statute. ' 60 The "legislative
intent of the 'no-fault' legislation was to [eliminate] frivolous
claims and [restrict] recovery to major or significant injuries. "61
Accordingly, "summary judgment should be granted in cases where
the plaintiff's opposition [consists solely of] 'conclusory assertions
tailored to meet statutory requirements.' , 62
C. Defendant Establishes Injuries Are Not "Serious" Through
Admissible Medical Evidence
"[A] defendant can establish that the plaintiff's injuries are not
serious within the meaning of [section] 5102(d) by submitting affi-
53. Grossman v. Wright, 707 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (App. Div. 2000).
54. Id. at 235.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 235-36.
59. Id. at 236 (quoting Licari v. Elliot, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (N.Y. 1982)).
60. Id.
61. Id.; Milne v. Cheema, 706 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. 2000).
62. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37 (citing Lopez v. Senatore, 65 N.Y.S.2d 1017,
1019 (App. Div. 1985)); see Walker v. Betts Cab Corp., 710 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28-29 (App.
Div. 2000) (concluding that plaintiff's medical evidence was unsworn, conclusory, and
speculative); Decayette v. Kreger Truck Renting, Inc., 687 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (App.
Div. 1999) (detailing how a plaintiff doctor relied on inadmissible medical records).
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davits or affirmations of medical experts who examined the plain-
tiff and conclude[d] that no objective medical findings support the
plaintiff's claim."'6 3 The medical report prepared by the defen-
dant's orthopedic surgeon in Grossman stated that he had con-
ducted an independent medical examination of the plaintiff two
days earlier.64 After a brief absence from work, the plaintiff re-
sumed his full work responsibilities and was no longer undergoing
any treatments or taking any prescription medication.6 5 The defen-
dant's chiropractor and radiologist specified the observations made
and the objective medical records and tests conducted on the plain-
tiff during the physical examination.66 The diagnosis was that any
minor problems were resolved or unrelated to the accident.67
D. Plaintiff Must Submit Verified Objective Medical Evidence
Once the defendant has demonstrated prima facie entitlement to
summary judgment, the "burden [then] shifts to the plaintiff to
come forward with evidence to overcome the defendant's submis-
sions by demonstrating a triable issue of fact that a serious injury
was sustained ....',68 "The plaintiff in such a situation must pre-
sent objective evidence of the injury. The mere parroting of lan-
guage tailored to meet statutory requirements is insufficient."6 9
A plaintiff's subjective claim of pain and limitation of motion
must be supported by quantitative "verified objective medical find-
ings," based on objective tests and a recent examination of the
plaintiff."' Accordingly, any considerable delay between the con-
clusion of the "plaintiff's medical treatments after the accident and
the physical examination conducted by his own expert must be ad-
equately explained."'"
63. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Turchuk v. Town of Wallkill, 681.
N.Y.S.2d 72, 72-73 (App. Div. 1998)).
64. Id. at 235.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 237 (citing Gaddy v. Eyler, 591 N.E.2d 1176, 1176 (N.Y. 1992)).
69. Id. (citing Powell v. Hurdle, 625 N.Y.S.2d 634, 634-35 (App. Div. 1995); Gian-
nakis v. Paschilidou, 622 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (App. Div. 1995)); Decayette v. Kreger
Truck Renting, Inc., 687 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (App. Div. 1999).
70. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Kauderer v. Penta, 689 N.Y.S.2d 190,
191-92 (App. Div. 1999) (emphasis added)); Garland v. Allison, 705 N.Y.S.2d 682,
682-83 (App. Div. 2000).
71. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Smith v. Askew, 695 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406
(App. Div. 1999)); see Jimenez v. Kambli, 708 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461 (App. Div. 2000);
Schifano v. Golden, 701 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (App. Div. 2000); Decayette, 687 N.Y.S.2d
at 681.
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In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff in Grossman submitted
his own affidavit, as well as an affirmation by a doctor of chiroprac-
tic medicine, and other medical records, which were presented in
unsworn and inadmissible form.72 The plaintiff complained that he
had been forced to make lifestyle changes as a result of the injuries,
that he experienced daily pain, and he could no longer participate
in vigorous athletic activities he previously enjoyed.73 As part of
the examination, the plaintiff's chiropractor performed range of
motion tests on the plaintiff's spine, where he found slight restric-
tions in the range of motion. 4
The affirmed report of a medical expert must not only contain
objective clinical findings, but also must demonstrate that the
plaintiff's injuries are causally related to the subject accident.7 5
Physical examinations personally conducted by the doctor prepar-
ing the affidavit or affirmation are sufficient. 76 "An affidavit or
affirmation simply setting forth the observations of the affiant are
insufficient, [however,] unless supported by objective proof, such
as X-rays, MRIs, or other similarly-recognized tests or quantitative
results based on a neurological examination. '77
E. Opposition in Grossman in Inadmissible Form and Failed to
Describe Objective Tests
The court in Grossman held that the evidence submitted by the
defendant in support of her motion was sufficient to establish a
prima facie case that the plaintiff did not sustain a "serious" in-
jury.78 The medical opinions expressed by the defendant's doctors
were supported by a personal physical examination of the plaintiff,
72. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36.
73. Id. at 236.
74. Id.
75. Williams v. Hasenflue, 708 N.Y.S.2d 343, 343 (App. Div. 2000); Latiuk v.
Cona, 708 N.Y.S.2d 531, 531 (App. Div. 2000); Har-Sinay v. Accessible Windows &
Glass & Mirror Corp., 708 N.Y.S.2d 634, 634 (App. Div. 2000).
76. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Cesar v. Felix, 581 N.Y.S.2d 411, 411-12
(App. Div. 1992)).
77. Id.; see Garvey v. Riela, 708 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (App. Div. 2000); Green v.
Miranda, 708 N.Y.S.2d 310, 311 (App. Div. 2000); Mitchell v. Kowalski, 708 N.Y.S.2d
437, 438 (App. Div. 2000); Jimenez v. Kambli, 708 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461 (App. Div.
2000); Pramnieks v. Bush, 707 N.Y.S.2d 682, 683 (App. Div. 2000); Kraemer v. Hen-
ning, 655 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (App. Div. 1997); Zalduondo v. Lazowska, 651 N.Y.S.2d
117, 117 (App. Div. 1996); Kim v. Cohen, 618 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (App. Div. 1994);
Georgia v. Ramautar, 579 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (App. Div. 1992); Spezia v. DeMarco,
570 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (App. Div. 1991).
78. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
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a review of plaintiff's medical records, and the objective physical
tests performed on the plaintiff. 9
By contrast, the court found that the plaintiff's opposition was
insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact." ° The medical evidence
submitted consisted of various reports which were not in admissi-
ble form."' The affirmation of the plaintiff's chiropractor was not
subscribed before a notary or equivalent authorized official, and
therefore was not deemed competent evidence.82 Regardless, the
report failed to present a triable issue of fact as to whether the
plaintiff sustained a serious injury, as the report was void of any
description of any objective tests performed that substantiated the
doctor's conclusions concerning the claimed restrictions in the
plaintiff's motion.83
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS CLARIFIES ARTICLE 16
APPORTIONMENT FOR CASES INVOLVING JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY
Article 16 of the CPLR, adopted as part of 1986 Tort Reform
Legislation, was drafted to address inequities created by the com-
mon law rule of joint and several liability. 4 "Prior to the [enact-
ment of Article 16,] a joint tortfeasor could be held liable for an
entire judgment, regardless of the relative share of culpability."85
Thus, joint and several liability provided an incentive to sue "deep
pocket" defendants, including municipalities, even if they were
only minimally involved with the injury causing event. In 1986, the
Governor's Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance recom-
mended that the rule of joint and several liability be amended "to
assure that no defendant who is assigned a minor degree of fault
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Pagano v. Kingsbury, 587 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (App. Div. 1992)).
82. Id. at 238 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2106 (Consol. 2003)); see Bernadel v. Beran,
704 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290 (App. Div. 2000); Perry v. Pagano, 699 N.Y.S.2d 882, 882 (App.
Div. 1999); Young v. Ryan, 697 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (App. Div. 1999): Doumanis v.
Conzo, 696 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (App. Div. 1999): Valencia v. Lui, 657 N.Y.S.2d 1007,
1007 (App. Div. 1997); Gill v. O.N.S. Trucking, 657 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (App. Div.
1997).
83. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
84. Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 181 (N.Y. 2001); Morales v.
County of Nassau, 724 N.E.2d 756, 759 (N.Y. 1999).
85. Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 181 (citing Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d
1365, 1372 (N.Y. 1992)).
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can be forced to pay an amount grossly out of proportion to that
assignment."86
CPLR section 1601 provides that when there is a verdict for a
plaintiff in a personal injury action involving multiple tortfeasors
who are jointly liable, and the liability of one of the defendants is
found to be fifty percent or less of the total liability, the liability of
such defendant for non-economic loss shall not exceed the defen-
dant's equitable share.87 Although Article 16 was intended to rem-
edy the inequities created by joint and several liability where one
defendant is found to be minimally at fault, yet where "deep
pocket" defendants, including municipalities, remain subject to va-
rious exceptions that preserve the traditional rule.88
Initially, CPLR section 1602 established that the limitations cre-
ated by the general rule in section 1601 do not apply to cases in-
volving the use or operation of motor vehicles, although
municipalities are entitled to protection for accidents involving fire
or police vehicles. Additionally, section 1602(2)(iv) excludes ap-
portionment protection for "any liability arising by the reason of a
non-delegable duty."89 The plain language of CPLR section
1602(2)(iv) clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend to
create an exception to the apportionment rule, but rather section
1602(2)(iv) was drafted to preserve the principles of vicarious lia-
bility and prevent defendants from improperly disclaiming respon-
sibility for non-delegable duties.90
A. Rangolan v. County of Nassau
In Rangolan, the plaintiff, who had cooperated as a confidential
informant against other inmates, was seriously beaten by a fellow
inmate while incarcerated. 9' Although the plaintiff's inmate file
specifically cautioned that he was not to be housed with his assail-
ant, the two inmates were placed in the same dormitory.92 In
Rangolan, the plaintiff commenced a federal action against the
County of Nassau, alleging, among other things, negligence for fail-
ure to protect him while in custody and violation of his Eighth
86. Id. at 182.
87. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (Consol. 2003).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 1602(2)(iv).
90. See Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 182-83.
91. Id. at 181.
92. Id.
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Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 93 The district court dis-
missed his § 1983 claim, but granted judgment as a matter of law
on his negligence claim.94 The court refused to instruct the jury on
apportionment of damages between the county and the attacker,
holding that CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) prohibited apportionment
where the defendant's liability arose from a breach of a non-dele-
gable duty.95
Following a damages award for pain and suffering, both parties
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.96 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the 1983
claim, but, noting the absence of controlling precedent interpreting
CPLR section 1602(2)(iv), certified to the New York State Court of
Appeals the question whether a municipal tortfeasor can seek to
apportion its liability with another tortfeasor, pursuant to CPLR
section 1601, or whether CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) precludes such
apportionment. 97
B. CPLR Section 1602(2)(iv) Is Not an Exception to
Apportionment, but a Savings Provision that Preserves
Vicarious Liability
The Court of Appeals held that under the facts and circum-
stances of the case in Rangolan, the defendant was permitted to
seek apportionment of its liability with another tortfeasor, such as
the other inmate. 98 The fact that "the precise 'shall not apply' lan-
guage [drafted] by the legislature to [delineate] the exceptions" to
the rule is absent "in section 1602(2)(iv) indicates that the legisla-
ture [did not] intend to include an exception for liability based on a
breach of a non-delegable duty." 99 Therefore, the court in Rango-
lan held that CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) does not create an excep-
tion to apportionment, but is a "savings provision that preserves
the principles of vicarious liability."' 00
93. Id.; see Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 51 F. Supp. 2d 233, 233 (E.D.N.Y.
1999), affd in part, question certified by, 216 F.3d 1073 (2d Cir. 2000).
94. Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 181.
95. Id.; Sanchez v. State, 2002 N.Y. LEXIS 3578, at *1 (N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002) (de-
ciding whether an attack on an inmate was foreseeable and holding that the question
raised a triable issue of fact).
96. Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 181.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 184
99. Id. at 182-83.
100. Id. at 181; Rucker v. Allis, 732 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (App. Div. 2001); Grant v.
Ore, 725 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387-88 (App. Div. 2001) (detailing claim by passenger injured
in automobile accident when driver failed to see maintenance work site on bridge).
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CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) was drafted to prevent defendants
from disclaiming liability for duties for which they are responsible
by delegating such responsibilities to another party.1"' Accord-
ingly, CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) ensures that a defendant is liable
to the same extent as its delegate or employee, and that CPLR
Article 16 is not construed to alter this liability. 10 2 When a munici-
pality delegates a duty for which it is legally responsible, such as
the maintenance of its roads, the municipality remains vicariously
liable for the negligence of the contractor, and cannot rely on
CPLR section 1601(1) to apportion liability with regard to its con-
tractor. 103 Similarly, CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) prohibits an em-
ployer from disclaiming respondeat superior liability by arguing
that an employee was the actual tortfeasor. 10 4 "[N]othing in CPLR
1602(2)(iv)," however, "precludes a municipality, landowner or
employer from seeking apportionment between itself and other
tortfeasors for whose liability it is not answerable."'0 5
"[Section] 1602 [contains] several exceptions to the apportion-
ment rule, [that] explicitly [state] that Article 16 shall 'not apply' in
certain circumstances."'10 6 The Rangolan court reasoned that
CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) specifically does not contain the "shall
not apply" introductory language, "but instead provides that the
limitations on liability shall 'not be construed' to impair, limit or
modify any liability arising from a non-delegable duty or respon-
deat superior."' 117 The court in Rangolan held that "the Legislature
did not intend 1602(2)(iv) to establish a free-standing exception to
the apportionment rule."'0° "[Section] 1602(2)(iv) was [simply] in-
tended to insure that the courts did not [interpret] article 16 as
altering [established] law regarding respondeat superior or non-
delegable duties."109
The fact that CPLR section 1602(8), using the "shall not apply"
language, creates a separate non-delegable duty exception, rein-
forces that section 1602(2)(iv) was not intended as an exception to
101. Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 182.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citations omitted); see Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 749 N.E.2d 184,185-
86 (N.Y. 2001); Grant, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 388; Denio v. State, 723 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915
(App. Div. 2001).
106. Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 182.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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the apportionment rule. "° "To construe CPLR 1602(2)(iv) as cre-
ating a blanket non-delegable duty exception would render CPLR
1602(8) meaningless and redundant." '111 A statutory construction
that "'result[s] in the nullification of one part of a [statute] by an-
other,' is impermissible" because the various elements of a statute
must be compatible with each other and conform with the general
intent of the statute.' 12
Given the breadth of responsibilities that may be considered
non-delegable, each potentially requiring a specific inquiry, the leg-
islature could not have intended to exclude the breach of every
non-delegable duty from possible apportionment.' 13 "Reading
[section] 1602(2)(iv) as an exception would impose joint and sev-
eral liability on municipalities ... the[] ... precise[] ... entities
that [the rule] was designed to protect."1'1 4
In Faragiano, the plaintiff was a passenger injured in a motor
vehicle accident who commenced an action against several parties,
including "the contractor that resurfaced the road and the Town of
Concord ... alleg[ing] that the Town negligently constructed and
maintained [the] road and that [the] contractor ... negligently per-
mitted a build-up of oil or tar on the road."'1 5 "The Town asserted,
as an affirmative defense, that its liability for any noneconomic
losses should be apportioned among the other tortfeasors pursuant
to CPLR [section 1602(2)(iv)]," while the plaintiffs argued that
CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) precluded apportionment. ' 6 The court
in Faragiano held that the "plaintiffs [could] not rely on CPLR
[section] 1602(2)(iv) to preclude the Town from seeking apportion-
ment between itself and other joint tortfeasors for whose liability it
was not answerable." ' 7 The court went on to State, however, that
the town could not use CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) to apportion lia-
bility to the agent for whom it was vicariously responsible." 8
110. Id. at 183.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 749 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 2001).
116. Id.
117. Id.; see Grant v. Ore, 725 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387-88 (App. Div. 2001).
118. Faragiano, 749 N.E.2d at 186.
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C. Recent Rulings Concerning Apportionment Relating to
Premises Security
Recently, three separate Appellate Division First Department
panels issued rulings concerning Article 16 apportionment. In all
three cases, the named defendants were sued for simple negligence
for failing to secure the premises against an assailant, not named as
a party, that injured the plaintiff.
In Concepcion v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corpora-
tion, the plaintiff was stabbed by an out-patient while visiting a
hospital. 19 Following a threatening confrontation with the out-pa-
tient, plaintiff informed a nurse about the incident, who assured
the plaintiff that she would alert security. 120 The nurse failed to
inform security and the plaintiff was assaulted. 12' The Court in
Concepcion held that:
[t]here is nothing in the exclusion that would indicate that it was
intended to preclude a negligent tortfeasor from seeking appor-
tionment from [a non-party] intentional tortfeasor. Moreover,
any further extension of the exclusion would defeat the purpose
of Article 16, which is to protect low-fault, "deep pocket" de-
fendants from being fully liable pursuant to joint and several
liability rules.' 22
Chianese v. Meier involved allegations of inadequate building se-
curity.123 The court held that the fact that an assailant had acted
intentionally did not elevate the purely negligent behavior of the
other actors to intentional conduct, thus entitling the defendant
building owner and manager to Article 16 protection. 24 Accord-
ingly, apportionment of damages for personal injuries is permissi-
ble between a negligent landlord and a nonparty intentional
tortfeasor.125
119. Concepcion v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 729 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (App.
Div. 2001).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 480; see Roseboro v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474-75
(App. Div. 2001) (finding that apportionment is available against non-party inten-
tional tortfeasors); Maria E. v. 599 West Assocs., 726 N.Y.S.2d 237, 242-43 (Sup. Ct.
2001) (providing pleading requirements of Article 16 apportionment).
123. Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 723 (N.Y. 2002).
124. Id. at 725-26.
125. See id. at 726; see also N.X. v. Cabrini Med. Ctr., 228 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 2002,
at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
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D. Intentional Act of Non-Party Tortfeasor Does Not Bring
Pure Negligence Action Within Section
1602(5) Exclusion
Section 1602 excepts certain types of actions from the ambit of
section 1601, including "actions requiring proof of intent." 126 "This
exception applies to prevent defendants who are found to have
committed an intentional tort from invoking the benefits of section
1601. "127 In Chianese, a tenant sued her landlord and building
manager for negligence, alleging inadequate building security, after
she was assaulted inside the building.128 The attacker was later ap-
prehended and convicted of a series of crimes, including the attack
on the plaintiff. 29 A jury found the landlord and manager fifty
percent responsible for the assault, and apportioned damages on
that basis. 3 " The plaintiff in Chianese argued that her negligence
claim against defendants, because it necessarily involved an inten-
tional act by her attacker, was also an "action requiring proof of
intent," thus precluding apportionment by defendants.131
"Because the plaintiff's negligence claim is not an 'action requir-
ing proof of intent,' section 1602(5), on its face, does not apply to
preclude apportionment of liability."'' 32 The defendants' liability,
in Chianese, did not depend on proof of the attacker's state of
mind. 3 3 The plaintiff merely had to prove that "she was injured as
a result of the defendants' failure to provide adequate security on
the premises."' 34 The mere fact "that a nonparty tortfeasor acted
intentionally does not bring a pure negligence action within the
scope of the exclusion."'' 35
"While section 1602(5) forecloses intentional tortfeasors from
seeking apportionment irrespective of the mental state of any other
tortfeasors, section 1602(11) precludes apportionment with any
parties found to have acted knowingly or intentionally and in con-
cert." ' 36 "The primary purpose of [section 1602](11) is ... to pre-
126. Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 724.
127. Id. at 724-25.
128. Id. at 723.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 724-25.
131. Id. at 725.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see Roseboro v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 472, 475 (App. Div.
2001); Concepcion v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 729 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (App.
Div. 2001); Siler v. 146 Montague Assocs., 652 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (App. Div. 1997).
136. Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 726.
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vent apportionment among multiple intentional tortfeasors ...
when dividing liability among them would [place] them under the
section 1601 [fifty percent guideline].' 37 This interpretation of
section 1602(5) is consistent with the exception to apportionment
set out in section 1602(11) and "does not render section 1602(11)
duplicative."' 38
What little legislative history there is accords with the reading of
section 1602(5) which indicates that Article 16 preserves joint and
several liability for instances where a defendant performs acts are
willfully or intentionally performed in concert with others.'39 Con-
versely, there is "no indication in the legislative history that section
1602(5) was intended to create what would amount to a broad ex-
ception to apportionment at the expense of the low-fault, merely
negligent landowners and municipalities-the very parties article
16 intended to benefit."1 40
In Chianese, under the plaintiff's proposed reading of the statute,
the right of a low-fault defendant to benefit from apportionment:
would depend entirely on the nature of the culpability of the
third-party tortfeasor. A negligent defendant could apportion
liability with a negligent or reckless third-party tortfeasor, but
not an intentional tortfeasor .... Such a result is not only illogi-
cal but also inconsistent with the [legislative intent and] chief
remedial purpose of article 16.141
The unequivocal language of CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) bespeaks
that the legislature did not intend to create an exception to the
apportionment rule. Section 1602(2)(iv) does not contain the pre-
cise language, explicitly present in other areas of CPLR section
1602, necessary to create an exception. CPLR section 1602(2)(iv)
was formulated to simply preserve the principles of vicarious
liability.
IV. MUNICIPAL VEHICLES ARE PROTECTED BY A
RECKLESSNESS STANDARD WHILE ENGAGED IN WORK
ON A HIGHWAY
The Court of Appeals recently confirmed that "recklessness"
was the proper standard of care to apply to "hazard" vehicles,
which are exempt from the rules of the road, pursuant to New
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.; Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 182 (N.Y. 2001).
141. Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 726 (citations omitted).
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York Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") section 1103(b). At the
same time, the court rejected the argument that such vehicles must
be located in a designated "work area" in order to qualify for the
hazard vehicle exemption.
In Riley v. County of Broome and Wilson v. New York, the Court
of Appeals addressed two independent situations that involved in-
juries resulting from automobile collisions with a municipal street
sweeper and snow plow respectively. 142 The trial courts dismissed,
and the Appellate Division affirmed both personal injury claims,
finding that, under VTL section 1103(b), "all vehicles engaged in
'highway maintenance' are exempt from the rules of the road and
subject ... to [the higher] recklessness standard."' 143
The Vehicle and Traffic Law section 117's definition of a "hazard
vehicle" includes a municipal vehicle engaged in highway mainte-
nance or ice and snow removal, where such operation involves the
use of a public highway. 144 "Hazardous operation" is defined in
VTL section 117-b as, "the operation, or parking, of a vehicle on
or ... adjacent to a public highway while such vehicle is actually
engaged in an operation which would.., interfere with the normal
traffic flow .. .
Obviously, a certain "degree of risk ... is inherent in travel on
public highways."' 146 Particular classes of vehicles are intended to
reduce the risks involved in highway travel by maintaining the
safety of roadways. 147 "While serving an important public func-
tion, however, [such] vehicles may themselves cause [certain] risks
to [routine] motorists." 148
"At common law, all vehicles, including emergency vehicles,
were held to an ordinary negligence standard."'' 9 The common
law and various statutes also recognized that the level of care owed
by emergency and roadwork vehicles must be tempered by the na-
ture of their work, providing certain exceptions to the rules of the
142. Riley v. County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. 2000).
143. Id. at 100; Kearns v. Piatt, 716 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (App. Div. 2000) (applying
the recklessness standard to a municipal truck applying sand and salt mixture to icy
road); Wilson v. State, 703 N.Y.S.2d 848, 848-49 (App. Div. 2000) (affirming decision
exempting snowplow plowing snow on a highway); Gawelko v. State, 710 N.Y.S.2d
762, 763-65 (Ct. Cl. 2000) (holding a snowplow that lost control was exempt).
144. Riley, 742 N.E.2d at 100.
145. Id. at 100 n.1 (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 117-b (Consol. 1996)).
146. Id. at 100.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 101.
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road for such vehicles.15 ° "Nevertheless, the common law required
that such vehicles ... [act] with care and caution [proportional to]
the purpose and necessity of the right. 151
Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1103(b) explicitly states that the
rules of the road do not apply to vehicles "while actually engaged
in work on a highway. '152 Section 1103(b) further states that such
operators shall not be protected from the consequences of "reck-
less disregard for the safety of others. '153
In Bliss v. New York, 154 the claimant impacted the rear of a New
York State Thruway Authority ("NYSTA") truck that was operat-
ing in reverse as part of a three truck crew dismantling a lane clo-
sure on a bridge.' 55 The court in Bliss held that even though the
state driver pled guilty to the VTL violation of unsafe backing, and
may have failed to adhere to NYSTA's regulations for operating a
truck in reverse on a highway, his conduct did not rise to the level
of recklessness required by section 1103(b). 56 "The recklessness
standard requires more than a showing of lack of due care, which is
associated with ordinary negligence," such as a violation of an ad-
ministrative regulation or traffic rule.' 57
Section 1103(b) adds that VTL section 1202(a), "which regulates
stopping, standing, and parking, does not apply to hazard vehicles
while actually engaged in hazardous operation on ... the highway,
but shall apply to such vehicles when traveling to or from such haz-
ardous operation."'158  "Similarly, [VTL section] 1104 exempts
'emergency vehicles,' such as ambulances, police.., and fire vehi-
cles, [from the rules of the road while] engaged in emergency oper-
ations, subject to [certain] conditions."1 59
The plain language of these statutes clearly states that vehicles
actually engaged in work on a highway, similar to emergency vehi-
cles engaged in emergency operations, are exempt from the rules
of the road, regardless of their classification. 6 ° The statute does
not create a distinction between hazard vehicles and work vehicles,
1_50. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 686 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Ct. Cl. 1998).
155. Id. at 558.
156. Id. at 560.
157. Id.
158. Riley v. County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 101 (N.Y. 2000).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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nor does it deny "hazard vehicles" the special protection given to
all vehicles actually engaged in roadwork. 161
"The primary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature....
[T]he words of the statute are the best evidence of the Legislature's
intent ... [and] unambiguous language is alone determinative. 1 ' 6 2
The history of section 1103(b) evidences that the legislature in-
tended to create an expansive exemption from the rules of the road
for all vehicles engaged in highway construction and maintenance,
regardless of their classification.
Thus, the exemption [focuses] on the nature of the work being
performed, not on the nature of the vehicle employed for the
work.
Further, the legislative history shows that the reference to "haz-
ard vehicles" in section 1103(b) is wholly unrelated to the provi-
sion excusing vehicles engaged in road work from the rules of
the road. Notably, the original version of section 1103(b) ex-
empted vehicles "engaged in work on a highway" from the rules
of the road, [but] did not contain any separate provisions con-
cerning hazard vehicles. In 1970, the legislature amended the
Vehicle and Traffic Law to [define] the "hazard class" of vehi-
cles ... and amend[ed] section 1103(b) to exempt hazard vehi-
cles from the standing, stopping and parking regulations. 163
The history of the amendment demonstrates that it was intended
to distinguish the classification of different flashing colored lights
on various vehicles, but was not intended to curtail the exemption
for any vehicles. 164
Section 1103(b) does not require that a vehicle be located in a
designated "work area" in order to receive the protection. 65 The
VTL section that defines work area was not enacted until long af-
ter section 1103(b) was adopted. "Thus, there is no credible argu-
ment that the legislature only had designated work areas in mind
when it adopted section 1103(b)."' 166
Originally, section 1103(b) provided vehicles actually engaged in
work on a highway with an unqualified exemption from the rules of
the road.' 61 In 1974, the legislature amended section 1103(b), ad-
161. Id. at 102.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 102- 03 (citations ommitted).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 105.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 103.
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ding that vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway must pro-
ceed with due regard for the safety of others and are not protected
"from the consequences of their reckless disregard for the safety of
others."' 68 The legislative history explains that the "minimum
standard of care" was designed to curtail the outright exemption of
vehicles engaged in road work from the rules of the road. 16 9
In Saarinen v. Kerr, the Court of Appeals held that VTL section
1104(e), which contains identical language requiring emergency ve-
hicles to act with "due regard for the safety of all persons," imposes
a standard of reckless disregard.' Specifically, under section
1104(e), a plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries caused by an
emergency vehicle must show that "the actor has intentionally
done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known
or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to
the outcome."' 71 Section 1103(b) imposes the same recklessness
standard on vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway.' 72
The legislature's specific reference to reckless disregard would be
unnecessary and, in fact, inexplicable if the conventional criterion
for negligence, reasonable care under the circumstances, were the
intended standard.
In Saarinen, a driver was struck by a police vehicle with its emer-
gency light activated that was engaged in a brief pursuit of a vehicle
that was driving recklessly. 73 The common law and VTL section
1104 recognize that emergency and police vehicles are frequently
faced with emergency situations. 174 The court in Saarinen reasoned
that any standard other than a recklessness standard would result
in judicial second-guessing of split second decisions made by emer-
gency personnel in the midst of highly pressurized situations and
could deter trained emergency personnel from acting decisively to
protect or save human life or property.7 5
As a general principle of statutory construction, when a word is
used in a statute, and subsequently used in a statute concerning the
same topic, it is understood to possess the same meaning for each
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Saarinen v. Kerr, 644 N.E.2d 988, 992-93 (N.Y. 1994).
171. Id. at 991 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 34, at 213 (W. Page Keeton
et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
172. See Riley, 742 N.E.2d at 102.
173. Saarinen, 644 N.E.2d at 989.
174. Id. at 991.
175. Id. at 992.
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application. 176 The "history of section 1103(b) confirms that the
Legislature intended to subject vehicles engaged in road work to
the same standard of care as emergency vehicles."'' 77 In McDon-
ald, the court stated that although the snowplow operator was
clearly negligent in failing to observe the claimants' vehicle before
initiating a lane change, the "improvident determination . . . did
not rise to a level of a reckless disregard for the safety of others so
as to warrant a recovery by claimants."'' 78
Several judges have found it difficult to accept the prevailing in-
terpretation that gives all hazard vehicles more expansive section
1103(b) exemption, regardless of whether in a designated work
area or performing their jobs. 7 9 According to the Court in
Gawelko, rural letter carriers and truck drivers appear to benefit
from greater protection than ambulance drivers and police. 8 ° Al-
though the court indicated that this result defied logic and plain
common sense, "the most fundamental and overriding rule of stat-
utory construction is that courts must give effect to the intent of
the legislature."''
In Cottingham, the court held that the hazard vehicle exception
should be narrowly construed to a limited "work area," as defined
by VTL section 160.182 The court concluded that there is no com-
pelling reason or explicit legislative intent to extend the standard
of ordinary negligence to reckless disregard for the operation of
hazardous vehicles. 183 The court in Cottingham stated that it would
be absurd to provide drivers of hazard vehicles greater protection
than drivers of police vehicles, concluding that VTL sections 1103
and 1104 merely created four distinct categories of vehicles that
each receive varying degrees of protection.18 4
The protection provided to emergency vehicles under section
1104(e) "represents a recognition that the duties of emergency per-
sonnel often bring them into conflict with the rules that are in-
tended to regulate [general] conduct."' 8 5 The court recognized
that the importance of public safety and law enforcement justifies a
176. Riley, 742 N.E.2d at 104.
177. Id.
178. McDonald v. State, 673 N.Y.S.2d 512, 520 (Ct. Cl. 1998).
179. Gawelko v. State, 710 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (Ct. Cl. 2000); Cottingham v. State,
701 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292, 298 (Ct. CI. 1999).
180. Gawelko, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
181. Id.
182. Cottingham, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 298-99.
183. Id. at 299.
184. Id. at 300.
185. Riley v. County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 104-05 (N.Y. 2000).
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qualified privilege afforded to emergency personnel where neces-
sary to conduct their vital responsibilities that "will inevitably in-
crease the risk of harm to innocent motorists and pedestrians."'' 8 6
Although it is unclear that the increased risk to the general public
is similarly justified for all non-emergency vehicles engaged in road
work, the legislature has clearly established that vehicles engaged
in road work enjoy the same benefit of the reduced standard of
care as emergency vehicles. 8 7 Any change in that standard, there-
fore, must come from the legislature.'88
A. Emergency Vehicles Are Entitled to a Reckless Disregard
Standard, Even During Non-Emergency Operations
In Criscione v. City of New York, 8 9 the Court of Appeals held
that a police officer who was driving a patrol car in response to a
non-emergency dispatch call to investigate a family dispute was en-
gaged in the "emergency operation" of a vehicle as defined in New
York State Vehicle and Traffic Law section 114-b. 90 Consequently,
his actions should not have been measured by ordinary negligence
standards, but rather by the "reckless disregard" standard of VTL
section 1104(e).' 9' Whether the police officer violated a New York
City Police Department policy in responding to that type of call
would be an important, but not dispositive, factor in determining
whether he had acted recklessly. 92
Plaintiff and defendant, both New York City police officers, were
traveling in a police radio patrol car during a tour of duty. 93 De-
fendant officer was the driver of the vehicle, while plaintiff sat in
the front passenger seat communicating with the police dispatcher
and writing down the calls received. 94 While traveling to the loca-
tion of a complaint, the patrol car entered an intersection and col-
lided with a civilian vehicle, causing injuries to the plaintiff.195
During the trial, the defendant officer testified that, prior to the
accident, he and the plaintiff received a "non-crime" dispute radio
186. dat 105.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 762 N.E.2d 342 (N.Y. 2001).
190. Id. at 345.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 343.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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call from a dispatcher.1 96 "In accordance with departmental policy
regarding non-criminal calls, the defendant testified that he did not
increase the speed of the vehicle or activate the siren or turret
lights while driving to the scene, because the call did not fit the
criteria for an emergency response. '"9'
The court in Criscione held that the driver of an "authorized
emergency vehicle" engaged in an "emergency operation" is ex-
empt from certain rules of the road under VTL section 1104.198
Vehicle and Traffic Law section 101 specifically designates a police
vehicle as an "authorized emergency vehicle."' 19 9 Additionally, in-
cluded in the VTL section 114-b description of "emergency opera-
tion" of a vehicle is the operation of an authorized emergency
vehicle, while responding to a police call."' ° This qualified privi-
lege, however, does not relieve the driver "from the duty to drive
with due regard for the safety of all persons," nor shall it protect
the driver from the consequences of his "reckless disregard for the
safety of others." '
The statutory analysis of the relevant VTL sections begins with
determining the plain meaning of each word of the statutory provi-
sions.2 12 Although section 114-b does not define the phrase "police
call," the court in Criscione determined that a radio call to officers
on patrol by a police dispatcher regarding a 911 call falls squarely
within the plain meaning of the term "police call. '203
The court further held that there is no evidence of any "legisla-
tive intent to vary the definition of 'emergency operation' based on
individual police department incident classifications," including,
but not limited to, criminal, non-criminal, or emergency.20 4 The re-
quirements of VTL section 114-b were met in Criscione "as it is
undisputed that [the Defendant] was operating a patrol vehicle
while responding to a police dispatch to investigate a 911 call when
he was involved in the traffic accident. 20 5 Therefore, the court
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 344.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1104(e) (Consol. 2003); Criscione, 762 N.E.2d at
344.
202. Criscione, 762 N.E.2d at 345.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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held that as a matter of law, the defendant was involved in an
"emergency operation" at the time of the accident.2 6
"Given the legislative determination that a police dispatch call is
an 'emergency operation,' it is irrelevant whether the officers be-
lieved that the call was an emergency or how the Police Depart-
ment categorized this type of call. ' 20 7 "Whether [the defendant
officer] violated a New York City Police Department policy in re-
sponding to this type of call would [merely] be an important, al-
though not dispositive, factor in determining whether [he] had
acted recklessly. '20 8 The defendant was involved in an "emergency
operation" of an "authorized emergency vehicle" as a matter of
law, and thus, pursuant to VTL section 1104(e) was entitled to a
qualified privilege to disregard the ordinary rules of prudent and
responsible driving, subject to a "reckless disregard" standard of
liability.20 9
V. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS
UNLESS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IS PROVEN
The State is protected by immunity for actions or decisions re-
quiring the exercise of discretion. The Appellate Division recently
confirmed that negligent performance of a governmental function,
such as the protection and safety of the public, cannot result in
liability without the demonstration of a "special relationship" be-
tween the injured party and the State.210 In order for liability to
attach, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the State, through direct
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing Saarinen v. Kerr, 644 N.E.2d 988, 992-93 (1994)).
209. Id.
210. Sebastian v. State, 720 N.E.2d 878, 880 (N.Y. 1999); De La Paz v. City of New
York, 743 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (App. Div. 2002); Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 737
N.Y.S.2d 412, 414 (App. Div. 2002); Respass v. City of New York, 733 N.Y.S.2d 210,
211 (App. Div. 2001); Rogers v. State, 732 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (App. Div. 2001); Miller
v. State, 716 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (App. Div. 2000); D'Avolio v. Prado, 715 N.Y.S.2d 827,
829 (App. Div. 2000); Pfaler v. Town of Friendship, 705 N.Y.S.2d 772, 772 (App. Div.
2000); McEnaney v. State, 700 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260-61 (App. Div. 1999); Haggerty v.
Diamond, 673 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (App. Div. 1998); Clinger v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,
650 N.E.2d 855, 856 (1995); Mohamed v. Town of Greenbush, 646 N.Y.S.2d 424, 425
(App. Div. 1996); Gonzalez v. County of Suffolk, 643 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (App. Div.
1996); Cardona v. County of Albany, 728 N.Y.S.2d 355, 358 (Sup. Ct. 2001). Similarly,
absent a special relationship, liability cannot be imposed on a governmental agency
for failure to enforce a statute or regulation. Lindsay v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 99
Civ. 3315, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1893, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1999); Gonzalez v.
Barbieri, 705 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (App. Div. 2000); Rickson v. Town of Schuyler Falls,
694 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215 (App. Div. 1999); Weiss v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.S.2d 533,
533 (App. Div. 1999); Josyln v. Village of Sylvan Beach, 682 N.Y.S.2d 781, 781 (App.
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personal contact, assumed an affirmative duty to act on the injured
party's personal behalf, which was conveyed to the injured party
and subsequently relied upon.21 The critical element of the special
relationship exception, and the one most difficult to prove, is the
plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the government's assurances.21 2
The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct actually lul-
led her into a false sense of security, caused her to either relax her
vigilance or forego other means of protection, and thereby placed
her in a worse position than she would have been in otherwise. 21 3
The State has always maintained its immunity for governmental
actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion.21 a
"This immunity ... is absolute when the action involves the con-
scious exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial na-
ture." 215 This absolute immunity "reflects the value judgment that
the public interest in having officials free to exercise their discre-
tion unhampered by the fear of retaliatory lawsuits outweighs the
benefits to be had from imposing liability. 216
"It is a well-settled principle that an action of a governmental
employee.., is [protected by] ... immunity.., if the functions and
duties of the ...particular position ...inherently entail[s] the
exercise of ... discretion and judgment. 21 7 "Discretion is indicated
if the powers are to be executed or withheld according to a govern-
mental agent's own view of what is necessary and proper [under
the circumstances]."2 ' Whether immunity applies to a discretion-
ary act depends on whether the position entails making decisions
based on an "exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically
produce different acceptable results. ' 219 Judicial and quasi-judicial
acts are even protected when the decision and results are incorrect
or tainted by improper motives. 220 To hold otherwise would sub-
Div. 1999); Shahin v. City of Yonkers, 678 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (App. Div. 1999);
Urbiera v. Hous. Now Co., 709 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
21.1. See cases cited supra note 210.
212. See cases cited supra note 210.
213. See cases cited supra note 210.
214. Arteaga v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (N.Y. 1988).
215. Id.
216. Id.; Mosher-Simons v. County of Allegany, 783 N.E.2d 509, 512-13 (N.Y.
2002); Davis v. State, 691 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (App. Div. 1.999).
217. Davis, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 671 (internal citations ommitted).
218. Id. (internal citations ommitted).
219. Id.
220. Tarter v. State, 503 N.E.2d 84, 86-87 (N.Y. 1986); Semkus v. State, 708
N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (App. Div. 2000).
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ject the local and state municipalities to massive liability, placing an
impossible burden on local and state government.
For example, determinations pertaining to parole and its revoca-
tion are strictly sovereign and quasi-judicial in nature and accord-
ingly, the State, in making such determinations, is absolutely
immune from tort liability.22 1 The courts have also applied the spe-
cial duty and governmental function analysis in dismissing claims
by victims of escaped prisoners, holding that the duty to safeguard
prisoners was a governmental duty owed to the public at large, not
to individuals.22
A. Special Relationship Required to Overcome
Governmental Immunity
Unless precise assurances were made to the specific individual,
there can be no liability for the State's performance of a govern-
mental function.223 In Clark, the plaintiff sued to recover for inju-
ries sustained by the decedent, which she claimed resulted from the
failure of the town police department to provide her with adequate
police protection from her estranged husband.224 In an effort to
avoid the operation of the general rule that a municipality may not
be held liable for injuries resulting from a failure to provide police
protection, the plaintiff asserted the existence of a "special rela-
tionship. ' 225 In order to establish a special relationship the plain-
tiff must prove: 1) an assumption by the municipality of an
affirmative duty to act on her behalf; 2) knowledge on the part of
the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; 3) direct
contact between the parties; and 4) the plaintiff's justifiable reli-
ance on the assurances.226
In Clark, after a series of threatening events involving the plain-
tiff and her estranged husband, criminal charges were filed and a
temporary protection order was issued.227 When an officer deliv-
ered a copy of the temporary order of protection to plaintiff, the
officer assured the plaintiff that the police would "keep an eye on"
221. Tarter, 503 N.E.2d at 85; Semkus, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
222. McEnaney v. State, 700 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (App. Div. 1999); Cossano v. State,
514 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (App. Div. 1987).
223. D'Avolio v. Prado, 715 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (App. Div. 2000).
224. Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 737 N.Y.S.2d 412, 413 (App. Div. 2002)
225. Id. at 413-14; Grieshaber v. City of Albany, 720 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (App. Div.
2001).
226. Clark, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 414; Greishaber, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 215; DAvolio, 715
N.Y.S.2d at 829.
227. Clark, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
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her. 28 Subsequently, the plaintiff's husband confronted her and
was charged with violating the terms of the temporary order of
protection, but was released on his own recognizance.229 The
plaintiff later saw her husband in the area, but she did not call the
police because she realized that the police could not do anything at
that time.230 Tragically, her husband arrived shortly thereafter and
repeatedly stabbed the plaintiff.23'
B. Justifiable Reliance Necessary for Special Relationship
Although the plaintiff in Clark was able to prove that a special
relationship existed, she was unable to prove that she had justifia-
bly relied on the town's undertaking. 32 "Providing the essential
causative link between the special duty assumed by the municipal-
ity and the alleged injury, the justifiable reliance requirement goes
to the core of the special relationship exception. 233
"The 'reliance' that is required is [more than a mere] hope or...
belief that the defendants could provide her with adequate ... po-
lice protection. ' 234 When the plaintiff's husband was released on
his own recognizance, the plaintiff was aware that he was not in
custody and that "the police were [unable] to take any [further]
action against [him] unless he further violated the order of protec-
tion or committed an independent crime.235
The governmental function doctrine is based primarily upon sep-
aration of powers principles. 236  The legislative and executive
branches of government, rather than the judiciary, have the unique
responsibility to allocate scarce public resources.237 Second-guess-
ing of the discretionary priorities set and resources allocated by the
other two branches of government is not appropriate. 238 "That the
function has traditionally been assumed by police rather than by
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 415.
233. ld.; see Greishaber v. City of Albany, 720 N.Y.S.2d 214, 216 (App. Div. 2001).
234. Clark, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
235. Id.
236. See Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443, 445-46 (N.Y. 1999).
237. Id.; Greishaber, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
238. Balsam v. Delma Eng'g Corp., 688 N.E.2d 487, 488-89 (N.E. 1997); Tarter v.
State, 503 N.E.2d 84, 86-87 (N.Y. 1986); Weiner v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 433 N.E.2d
124, 127 (N.Y. 1982).
1132
MUNICIPAL TORT LITIGATION
private actors is a tell-tale sign that the conduct is not proprietary
in nature.239
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the State, through direct
personal contact, assumed an affirmative duty to act on the injured
party's personal behalf, which was conveyed to the injured party,
and subsequently relied upon.24° The most critical element of the
special relationship is the injured party's justifiable reliance on the
government's assurances.241
VI. COMPLAINT LETTERS OR CONFLICTING EXPERT OPINIONS
REGARDING THE DECISION TO INSTALL A TRAFFIC
CONTROL DEVICE DO NOT AFFECT A MUNICIPALITY'S
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Recently the Court of Appeals confirmed that highway planning
decisions are purely discretionary governmental functions, which
are completely protected from liability by qualified immunity.242
The court reiterated that a recommendation from a private engi-
neering firm that a traffic signal be installed at a particular location
does not create liability for a municipality.243 "Something more
than a choice between conflicting opinions of experts is required
before a governmental body may be held liable for negligently per-
forming its traffic planning function. ' 244 The court in Affleck went
further to hold that letters of complaint to a municipality regarding
the necessity of installing a traffic control device do not alter the
affect of the judgement by an authorized traffic planning
authority.245
It is well settled that a municipality has a non-delegable duty to
maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe condition.246
239. Balsam, 688 N.E.2d at 489.
240. Clark, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
241. Id. at 415
242. Affleck v. Buckley, 758 N.E.2d 651, 652-54 (N.Y. 2001); McCabe v. Town of
Brookhaven, 735 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (App. Div. 2001); Quigley v. Goldfine, 714
N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (App. Div. 2000); Schuster v. Town of Hempstead, 692 N.Y.S.2d
721, 722 (App. Div. 1999); Onorato v. City of New York, 684 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (App.
Div. 1999); O'Brien v. City of New York, 647 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (App. Div. 1996).
243. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 654.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 653
246. Vizzini v. State, 717 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (App. Div. 2000); Ciasullo v. Town of
Greenville, 712 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (App. Div. 2000); Ring v. State, 705 N.Y.S.2d 427,
427 (App. Div. 2000); Schuster v. Town of Hempstead, 692 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722 (App.
Div. 1999); Zecca v. State, 669 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (App. Div. 1998).
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It is [similarly] well [established] that a municipality is not an
insurer of the safety of its roadways. The design, construction
and maintenance of public highways is entrusted to the sound
discretion of municipal authorities and, so long as a highway
may be said to be reasonably safe for people who obey the rules
of the road, the duty imposed upon the municipality is
satisfied.247
A governmental entity may not be liable for highway planning de-
cisions unless its study of traffic conditions is "plainly inadequate
or there is no reasonable basis for its plan." '248 Additionally, "the
State is not required to undertake expensive reconstruction of
highways [merely] because the [highway] design standards have
been [amended or] upgraded since the time of the original con-
struction [of a highway]. 249
If a municipality determines that a traffic control device is neces-
sary to remedy a dangerous condition, the municipality should act
within a reasonable time frame to correct the condition.25 ° If there
is an unjustifiable delay in implementing a remedial plan by the
municipality, then the municipality may be subject to liability.251
Even assuming that the State was negligent in highway design or
maintenance, the State will not be liable for an accident unless its
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. 52
The Affleck case involved an automobile accident where plain-
tiff's decedents were struck by an oncoming car, while attempting
to make a left-hand turn into an entrance to a shopping center.253
"In addition to instituting an action against the drivers and owners
of the other cars involved in the accident, plaintiff ... administra-
tor ... sued the County ... alleging that the County negligently
failed to conduct traffic studies of the area [in question], relying
instead on a private[] . . . study. '254 The plaintiff further asserted
247. Ciasullo, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 581 (internal citations ommitted).
248. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 653 (internal citations ommitted); see McCabe v. Town
of Brookhaven, 735 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (App. Div. 2001); Quigley v. Goldfine, 714
N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (App. Div. 2000); Romeo v. State, 709 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (App. Div.
2000); Light v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (App. Div. 1998).
249. Vizzini, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
250. See Ring, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29.
251. See id..
252. Hamilton v. State, 716 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (App. Div. 2000); see Ring, 705
N.Y.S.2d at 428; Dumond v. State, 689 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (App. Div. 1999).
253. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 652-53.
254. Id.
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that the county's decision not to install a traffic signal at the inter-
section in question was unreasonable.255
[I]n response to customer reports of difficulty exiting the park-
ing lot, [the shopping center commissioned a private engineer]
to conduct a study of traffic conditions at the intersection. Ap-
proximately nine months before the accident, the [private engi-
neer] presented the study to the County with its
recommendation that a traffic light be installed. Although the
[private engineer's] report focused primarily on the difficulties
faced by drivers attempting to exit the [shopping center's] park-
ing lot, it also analyzed traffic conditions for drivers entering the
parking lot from [the street where the accident occurred]. The
[engineer's] report indicated that, at all times of the day, condi-
tions for drivers making left-hand turns into the parking lot
were within acceptable parameters as set by the Federal High-
way Administration of the Department of Transportation.
According to [undisputed] affidavits, the County relied on the
[private] report, as well as its own [independent] studies of traf-
fic conditions at the intersection, to determine [that] a traffic
signal [at the intersection was unwarranted]. 6
The county did, however, take remedial measures to improve visi-
bility for drivers exiting the driveway and installed warning signs
for drivers approaching the driveway. 725 The court in Affleck held
that the county adequately examined the need for a traffic signal.
The court in Affleck held that neither the letters urging the
county to install a signal nor the recommendation by the private
engineer that one be installed raises an issue of fact concerning the
reasonableness of the county's determination.2 58 "[Although] the
letters may have alerted the county to a situation warranting study,
[such letters] do not substitute for, nor do they cast doubt upon,
the considered determination by a duly authorized traffic planning
authority. 259
"Something more than a mere choice between conflicting [ex-
pert] opinions is required before the State [or one of its agencies]
may be charged with a failure [of] its duty to plan highways for the
safety of the traveling public. 26° The plaintiff must show not
255. Id.
256. Id. at 653.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 653-54.
259. Id.
260. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 653-54; McCabe v. Town of Brookhaven, 735 N.Y.S.2d
608, 609 (App. Div. 2001); Romeo v. State, 709 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (App. Div. 2000)
(quoting Weiss v. Fote, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 415 (N.Y. 1960)); Chary v. State, 696
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merely that another option was available but also that the plan
adopted lacked a reasonable basis.26' Strong public policy consid-
erations warrant that the qualified immunity doctrine shall be ap-
plied in circumstances where a governmental body has invoked the
expertise of qualified employees.262
VII. LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTY PURSUANT TO A CONTRACT
On two separate occasions, the Court of Appeals recently ad-
dressed whether a contract can result in liability in tort to a third
party. Generally, a contractual obligation standing alone will not
give rise to tort liability to a third party. The court has recognized,
however, three distinct exceptions where a party who enters into a
contract to render services may assume a duty of care to persons
outside the contract. A party to a contract may be liable to third
persons where: (1) the contracting party creates or exacerbates a
harmful condition or launches a force or instrument of harm; (2)
the plaintiff detrimentally and reasonably relies on the continued
performance of the contracting parties' duties; or (3) the con-
tracting party completely assumes the other party's duty to main-
tain the premises safety.
263
A. Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors
In Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors,264 "the plaintiff brought
a personal injury action against the defendant, a company that en-
tered into a snow removal contract with a property owner. '265 The
plaintiff alleged that she slipped and fell in the parking lot owned
by her employer, due to an icy condition created by negligent snow
removal by the defendant.266
Initially, the court indicated that a finding of negligence must be
based upon the breach of a duty.267 "[A] threshold question in tort
cases is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the
injured party. ' '268 In Espinal, the issue was whether any duty ran
N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (App. Div. 1999); Light v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (App. Div.
1998); Monfiston v. County of Suffolk, 670 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1998).
261. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 652-53.
262. Romeo, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
263. Church v. Callanan Indus., Inc., 782 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2002); Espinal v. Mel-
ville Snow Contractors, 773 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 2002).
264. Espinal, 773 N.E.2d at 485.
265. Id. at 486.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 487.
268. Id.; Darby v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 753 N.E.2d 160, 162-63 (N.Y. 2001).
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from the contractor to the plaintiff, given that the snow removal
contract was with the property owner.269 "The existence and scope
of a duty is a question of law requiring courts to balance ... com-
peting public policy considerations.1 27 0
"[A] contractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not
give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party.1271 "Imposing
[tort] liability under such circumstances could render contracting
parties liable in tort to an indefinite number of potential
[plaintiffs]."272
The court in Espinal, discussed the decisions in H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co.,273 Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Re-
alty Corp.,274 and Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services
Corp.,275 which identify contractual situations involving possible
tort liability to third persons.276 In Moch:
the defendant entered into a contract with the City of Rensse-
laer to supply water to the City for various purposes, including
water at the appropriate pressure for fire hydrants. A building
caught fire and, because the defendant allegedly failed to supply
sufficient water pressure to the hydrants, the fire spread and de-
stroyed the plaintiff's warehouse. Although the contract was
valid and enforceable between the city and the defendant ... the
contract was not intended to make the defendant answerable to
anyone who might be harmed as a result of the defendant's al-
leged breach. Because the plaintiff company was not a third-
party beneficiary, it could not sue for breach of contract... [or
tort]. 'Liability would be unduly and indeed indefinitely ex-
tended by this enlargement of the zone of duty.'" 277
Ultimately, the court in Moch held that tort liability to a third per-
son may arise where the alleged wrongdoer launched a force or
instrument of harm.278
269. Espinal, 773 N.E.2d at 487.
270. Id.
271. Id. (internal citations ommitted).
272. Id. at 487 (citing H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 158 N.E. 896, 898-99
(N.Y. 1928)).
273. 158 N.E. at 896.
274. 556 N.E.2d 1093 (N.Y. 1990).
275. 634 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1994).
276. Espinal, 773 N.E.2d at 487.
277. Id. (quoting Moch, 158 N.E. at 896).
278. Id. at 487-88.
2003] 1137
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
In Eaves Brooks, the court held that detrimental reliance is an-
other basis for a contractor's liability in tort to third parties.279 In
Eaves Brooks:
a commercial tenant sought to recover for property damage sus-
tained when a sprinkler system malfunctioned and flooded the
premises. The tenant sued the companies that were under con-
tract with the property owner to inspect and maintain the sprin-
kler system. For policy reasons, [the court] refused to extend
liability to encompass the defendant companies, noting that the
building owners were in a better position to insure against
loss.281
The court in Eaves Brooks held that tort liability may arise where
performance of contractual obligations has induced detrimental re-
liance on continued performance and the defendant's failure to
perform those obligations causes an injury to the plaintiff. 281
In Palka, the court considered:
whether a maintenance company under contract to provide pre-
ventive maintenance services to a hospital assumed a duty of
care to the plaintiff, a nurse who was injured when a wall-
mounted fan fell on her as she was tending to a patient. The
contract between the parties was "comprehensive and exclu-
sive" and required the maintenance company to inspect, repair
and maintain the facilities, and to train and supervise all support
service personnel. The company's obligation to the hospital was
so [comprehensive] that it entirely displaced the hospital in car-
rying out maintenance duties. 282
Accordingly, the court held that the "contracting provider owed a
duty to non-contracting individuals reasonably within the zone and
contemplation of the intended safety services, including the
plaintiff. 283
By the express terms of the contract, the snow removal company
was obligated to plow only when the snow accumulation had ended
and exceeded three inches.2 84 In addition, the company agreed
that upon landowner's request, it would spread a mixture of salt
and sand on certain areas of the property.2 5 As for snow removal,
the company contracted to plow during the late evening and early
279. Id. at 488.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 487-89.
285. Id. at 489.
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morning hours, and not until all accumulations have ceased, on a
one time plowing per snowfall basis.286
This contractual undertaking was not "comprehensive and exclu-
sive" property maintenance.28 7 The snow removal company "did
not entirely absorb [the landowner's duty] to maintain the premises
safely. Indeed, the contract stated that 'it is the responsibility of
the property manager or owner to inspect the property and decide
whether an icy condition warrants application[] of salt-
sand.... 288
Pursuant to the contract, the owner was required to communicate
any defect in performance to the contractor immediately.2 9
Although [the company] undertook to provide snow removal
services under specific circumstances, [the landlord] ... retained
its .. .duty to inspect and safely maintain the premises. [The
company] was under no obligation to monitor the weather to
see if melting and re-freezing would create an icy condition.29 °
The plaintiff in Espinal failed to allege detrimental reliance on
the company's continued performance of its contractual obliga-
tions. 291 "[A] defendant who undertakes to render services and
then negligently creates or exacerbates a dangerous condition may
be liable for any resulting injury. "292 The snow removal company,
however, simply cleared the snow as required by the contract.293
"Plaintiff's fall on the ice was not the result of [the company] hav-
ing launched a force or instrument of harm.294 By merely plowing
the snow, [the company] cannot be said to have created or exacer-
bated a dangerous condition."2 95
Because the mere plowing of snow by an outside contractor did
not rise to the level of any of the specific exceptions, the defendant
owed no duty to the plaintiff and therefore cannot be held liable in
tort. 296
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (internal quotations ommitted).
296. Id.
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B. Church v. Callanan Industries, Inc.
In Church, an infant plaintiff received catastrophic spinal injuries
when the driver of the car, in which he was a rear passenger, fell
asleep at the wheel. The vehicle veered off the highway and into a
ditch.297 The site where the vehicle left the highway was within a
substantial resurfacing and safety-improving project, which was
completed years earlier, pursuant to an agreement between the
Thruway Authority and Callanan Industries, as the general
contractor.298
The project plans and specifications called for the removal and
replacement of existing guiderail with a longer guiderail system.299
In a related agreement, the Thruway Authority engaged a con-
struction-engineering firm (engineer) to inspect and supervise the
contractor's compliance with the plans and specifications.3 °°
"Under the ... agreement with [the contractor], the engineer's rec-
ommendation was required before final acceptance of the contrac-
tor's work. 30 1
The contractor entered into a subcontract for the installation of
the guiderail system, which incorporated the general contract by
reference.30 2 Pursuant to the subcontract, "all drawings, certifica-
tions and approvals of the Subcontractor shall be submitted for ap-
proval of the Architect or Engineer. '30 3  "In addition, [the
contractor] reserved the right to demand at any time that [subcon-
tractor] furnish evidence of its ability to fully perform the subcon-
tract in the manner and within the time specified in the
subcontract. "304
"The gravamen of the action was both the negligent failure to
complete the full [installation] of new guiderailing called for by the
general contract and... subcontract, and [the engineer's] negligent
inspection and approval of the installation, despite such non-com-
pletion. ' 30 5 The contractor and the subcontractor moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that, "as purely contracting parties with
respect to installation of the guiderailing, they owed no duty to the
297. Church v. Callanan Indus., Inc., 782 N.E.2d 50, 51 (N.Y. 2002).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. (internal quotations ommitted).
304. Id.
305. Id.
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plaintiffs. 30 6 The plaintiff's submitted opinion evidenced that, had
the guiderailing been completed in accordance with the contracts,
the car would have been prevented from traveling down the
embankment. °7
The subcontractor "had no preexisting duty imposed by law to
install guiderailing at that point on the Thruway."3 8 "There was
no evidence in the record that the incomplete performance of [the]
contractual duty to install [ ] guiderailing ... created or increased
the risk of [the car's] divergence from the roadway beyond the risk
which existed, even before .. .any contractual undertaking. 30 9
The plaintiff did not contend that the loss of control of the car oc-
curred because the driver detrimentally relied on the continued
performance of the contractual duties when she failed to remain
awake and alert at the wheel.31 0 Finally, "tort liability for breach of
contract will not be imposed merely because there is some safety-
related aspect to the unfulfilled contractual obligation." 31' If liabil-
ity invariably follows non-performance of some safety-related as-
pect of a contract, the exception would assume the general rule
against recovery in tort, based merely upon the failure to act as
promised.312 There are limitations on the imposition of liability
based upon a defendant's assumption of its promisee's duty to safe-
guard third persons.31 3
The court in Church found that the subcontractor:
did not comprehensively contract to assume all the Thruway Au-
thority's safety-related obligations with respect to the guiderail
system. Instead, the Thruway Authority retained a separate
project engineer to provide inspection and supervision of all as-
pects of the project, including contract compliance with respect
to the stipulated length of the guiderail system.314
Conversely, the contractor "assumed significant obligations to
assure that the construction complied with the project specifica-
tions and.., in a timely fashion, thus undertaking an obligation to
inspect and oversee all aspects of the subcontractor's work." '315
306. Id. at 52.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 53.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 54.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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The subcontractor "had no reason to foresee the likelihood of
physical harm to third persons as a result of reasonable reliance by
the Thruway Authority on it to discover" any alleged safety de-
fects, and therefore did not assume the corresponding potential
tort liability." 6
CONCLUSION
A substantial portion of significant decisions by the Court of Ap-
peals during the past year may have a profound impact on civil
litigation, specifically with regard to municipal liability. Given the
complexity and potential impact of several of the key rulings, the
court may be required to provide further guidance and interpreta-
tion in the same areas in the coming years.
316. Id. at 55.
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INTRODUCTION
With the United States Supreme Court's condemnation of legal
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education' in 1954, and a vigor-
ous civil rights movement that led to the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,' the nation entered the beginning of a new era in race
relations. This, and future civil rights legislation, would be charac-
terized by the development of a national agenda for ending dis-
crimination and promoting equality. One area that was not
included in this initial congressional effort, but later found its way
into the legislative agenda, was the subject of housing discrimina-
tion. Despite the relatively few debates and the near absence of
any extensive record from committees, Congress finally passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.4 This provision, enacted as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 and § 3631, and also known as the Fair Housing Act
* Associate Professor of Law, City University School of Law; B.A., Northwest-
ern University; J.D., Rutgers Newark School of Law. I would like to thank the dedi-
cated staff of the Open Housing Center of New York with whom I have served as a
Board member for the last eight years and whose work to end housing discrimination
helped inspire this Article.
** Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law; B.A., Colum-
bia University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to the following people for
their assistance with various aspects of this project: Professors Mary Marsh Zulack,
Victor Goode, and Harriet S. Rabb. Additional thanks are owed to Esther Hoffman,
Rochelle Shoretz, John P. Relman, Charles Cronin, Shavonne Norris, and Dr. Hugh
F. Butts. This Article is dedicated to my children, for whom I hope that over time,
this serves only as a reminder of past practices, not current events.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Pub L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scatered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
3. The term "the Second American Revolution" was coined over half a century
ago to refer to this period of change. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at xxiii (1988). The struggle to pass the 1964
Civil Rights Act is certainly a continuation and extension of the civil rights concepts
enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1868.
4. See Jean E. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8
WASHBURN L.J. 149, 160 (1969) (noting that the combination of the assassination of
Martin Luther King and the release of the Kerner Commission Report following mas-
sive rioting in 1968, prompted Congress to pass a version of the Fair Housing Act that
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("FHA"), prohibits discrimination in the lease, sale, or rental of
housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.5 Nevertheless, many recent commentators have
agreed that few areas of the law have failed to achieve their lofty
goals as dramatically and persistently as our nation's fair housing
statutes.6 The dream of ending discrimination in housing, which
many hoped would provide the vehicle for integrating neighbor-
hoods, schools, and eventually the nation's consciousness, has been
largely unrealized.7 Some have argued that this has been primarily
due to the deficiencies in the law itself.8 Others criticize the limited
enforcement it has received, 9 but most agree that persistent opposi-
tion to the integration of our housing market has left Title VIII as
an ironic component of the civil rights arsenal.' 0 The law certainly
stands as a bold and optimistic proclamation. As stated by Senator
Walter Mondale, one of its sponsors, the Act would replace the
nation's ghettos by "truly integrated and balanced living pat-
terns."11 While some civil right measures have been curtailed over
the years, Title VIII has been uniformly supported by the few Su-
preme Court decisions that have reviewed the constitutionality or
was almost identical to the bill introduced by Senator Mondale that had been previ-
ously rejected).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3619 (2003); id. § 3631.
6. See Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using
Equitable Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L.
REv. 909, 913-15 (1991) (commenting on Congress's continued legislative efforts to
combat housing discrimination and the remaining deficiencies in the current state of
the law).
7. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 2-3 (1993) (stating that contin-
ued segregation in urban America has been largely overlooked for the past twenty
years).
8. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 910-12 (arguing that although the 1988 amend-
ments did remove the limitations on damages and added the option of seeking an
administrative remedy, systemic housing segregation could only seriously be ad-
dressed by an equally large scale enforcement effort on the part of the government).
9. Guido Calabresi, Preface to THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS:
A CONFERENCE AT YALE LAW SCHOOL 7, 7-8 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989).
10. The 2002 Fannie Mae National Housing Survey found that only thirteen per-
cent of whites and twenty percent of African-Americans cite a neighborhood's ethnic
makeup as key to their choice of where to purchase a home. THE GROWING DEMAND
FOR HOUSING: 2002 FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 5 (2002), available at
http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/survey2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2003). Nearly half (forty-seven percent) of the African-American respondents, how-
ever, said that they are treated less fairly than other groups in the home-buying pro-
cess. Id. at 11. These statistics illustrate the disparity between a growing acceptance
of multiracial communities on the one hand, and African-Americans' experiences of
housing discrimination on the other.
11. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
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the application of the statute.' 2 Since its adoption over thirty years
ago, lower courts have mainly adopted an interpretation of the Fair
Housing Act that reflects an effort to fulfill its broad legislative
purpose.13 Many state agencies have also adopted the principle
prohibitions of Title VIII,'4 and with its 1988 amendments, the law
has been strengthened, broadened, and attorney's fee provisions
have permitted the private bar to play a primary role in its enforce-
ment.'5 Nevertheless, housing discrimination remains persistent
and Title VIII is a mere stopgap measure for a social issue that
seems intractable.1 6
Despite repeated judicial sanctioning of the most egregious
forms of housing discrimination, there are areas of fair housing law
and litigation that warrant a closer examination because they re-
veal the legacy of racial discrimination that continues to infect the
process of change in this field. This Article will examine one aspect
of compensation remedies in fair housing cases. While the general
scope of potential damages under Title VIII has been well estab-
lished for many years, 17 one area of potential relief that remains
fraught with uncertainty is adequate compensation for emotional
12. While the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of Title
VIII, several lower courts have addressed the issue. United States v. Parma, 661 F.2d
562, 571-73 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115,
120 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973). "All of these court decisions
have been rendered by lower federal courts. ... The Supreme Court, in almost 20
years since Title VIII was enacted, has not decided a single substantive case under the
Fair Housing Act." BUREAU NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE NEW FAIR HOUSING LAW: IMPACT
AND ANALYSIS 20 (1988).
13. One of the early cases that addressed the breadth and scope of Title VIII was
Trafficante. In that case, the Court said that Congress intended the FHA to be con-
strued broadly to carry out its mandate to achieve fair housing opportunities, and that
the interpretations by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") be given considerable weight. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211.
14. For a full list of state laws prohibiting housing discrimination, see 1A ASPEN
LAW & Bus., FAIR HOUSING- FAIR LENDER (2001).
15. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211 (describing private lawyers as "private attorneys
general," for the purposes of enforcement); see Keith Aoki, Recent Developments,
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 249, 262 (1989)
(listing the extension of coverage to the handicapped and families, strengthening the
administrative review process, increasing penalties, and permitting attorney fees for
successful plaintiffs).
16. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 187.
17. An early case is Steele v. Title Realty Co., in which a prospective tenant sued a
real estate broker under the FHA. 478 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1973). The Tenth
Circuit stated that, "[d]amages in cases of this kind are not limited to out-of-pocket
losses but may include an award for emotional distress and humiliation." Id. at 384.
Later, after the 1988 amendments to Title VIII, a California district court held that
"[t]he FHA ... entitles the original plaintiff in a private action for violation of the
provisions of the Act to seek an award of 'actual and punitive damages.' This includes
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distress.18 While the general trend of cases, in both administrative
agencies and courts, indicates that significant progress has been
made in the recognition and understanding of emotional harm, fail-
ures to adequately address this issue continue.19 Although admin-
istrative judges appear more receptive to evidence of emotional
harm and are more likely to award significant damages now than in
the past,2" the federal bench has not demonstrated a similar consis-
damages for emotional distress, humiliation, and mental anguish." Ambruster v. Mon-
ument 3: Realty Fund VIII Ltd., 963 F. Supp. 862, 865 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
18. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
25-17 to 25-21 (2002).
Establishing the size of a Title VIII damage award has turned out to be a
most uncertain process. Awards of actual damages in private fair housing
cases have ranged from as little as $1 to as high of $1 million and more. The
case law provides little in the way of explanation for these variations or of
guidance or standards for evaluating future fair housing claims.
Id. at 25-17 to 25-20.
19. See Robert G. Schwemm, The Future of Fair Housing Litigation, 26 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 745, 758-60 (1993). Professor Schwemm notes that:
[t]he upper level of damage awards in fair housing cases has increased dra-
matically in recent years. Four cases in a thirteen-month period from 1991 to
1993 illustrate this phenomenon. First, in December 1991, a Los Angeles
case involving rental discrimination against blacks and Hispanics was settled
for $1,100,000, the first time a Title VIII case had exceeded the one million
dollar figure. In May of 1992, a jury in Washington, D.C., awarded $850,000
to a black homeseeker and two fair housing groups against a condominium
complex that had used only white models in its advertisements. A few
months later, another Washington jury awarded $2,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages and $415,000 in compensatory damages to an individual and two fair
housing groups in a rental case involving familial status discrimination....
The results in these cases reflect a general trend toward much higher awards
that make the size of earlier fair housing verdicts seem paltry by comparison.
Id. at 759. But see Portee v. Hastava, 853 F. Supp. 597, 607-09 (1994) (reversing a
jury's damages award, saying that it was shocking to the judicial conscience, despite
testimony concerning the impact of the discrimination on an interracial couple's rela-
tionship, the wife's performance on her job, the husband's attempt to lessen the
trauma through drinking, and the impact on a minor child who was subjected to one
of his first experiences with racism. Also, in Johnson v. Hale, the district court refused
to order any compensation for emotional harm. 13 F.3d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1994).
On remand, the judge ordered $125 for each victim. Id. at 1353. In United States v.
Lepore, a victim was only awarded $500 for emotional distress. 816 F. Supp. 1011,
1025 (M.D. Pa. 1991). These amounts represent a near total disbelief that discrimina-
tion produced emotional harm and it is precisely this uneven, potentially biased, and
idiosyncratic approach that is addressed in this Article.
20. Schwemm, supra note 19, at 757 n.89 ("All of the large HUD ALJ awards for
intangible injuries" have been made in race cases). This may reflect the fact that
unlike state or federal court judges, the HUD administrative judges are specialists in
discrimination matters and may have become more sensitive to these issues as a
result.
2003] EMOTIONAL HARM: LINGERING PROBLEM 1147
tency toward accepting claims of emotional harm.2 1 Despite the
progress in judicial recognition of the emotional harm caused by
racism, there is still a disturbing trend that diminishes the value
ascribed to the harm suffered by victims of housing discrimination
and limits proper compensation.22
There are many variables that affect the awarding of emotional
harm damages. 23 Achieving full compensation for emotional harm
resulting from discrimination presents special practical problems
and raises theoretical issues that deserve greater attention. This is
particularly true in light of the new perspectives on racial discrimi-
nation emanating from the critical race and feminist legal move-
ments.24 Insights from these theoretical perspectives and social
science studies suggest that when confronted with the full panoply
of remedies designed to fully compensate the victim of housing dis-
crimination, some juries and judges are unable to comprehend the
depth of harm from discrimination and do not see an African-
American plaintiff through an empathetic, unbiased lens.25 Com-
pensating a victim of racial discrimination requires a level of empa-
21. Deborah Dubroff, Sexual Harassment, Fair Housing and Remedies: Expanding
Statutory Remedies Into a Common Law Framework, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 215,
228 (1997).
22. The current focus on the emotional harm component of a housing discrimina-
tion case owes much to the early work of Professor Robert G. Schwemm. In 1981,
Professor Schwemm pointed out that courts and administrative agencies were reluc-
tant to recognize the depth of emotional harm caused by discrimination. Robert G.
Schwemm, Compensatory Damages in Federal Fair Housing Cases, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 83, 104 (1981). He argues that the legal theories that underlie compen-
sation for emotional harm were common in housing discrimination cases, but pointed
out several reasons for the very low awards that he tracked in both administrative
agencies and courts. Id. at 93-94. These include the lack of any definitive guidelines,
the presumption that the victim will react to discrimination like a "reasonable person"
(the traditional tort standard), the possibility of jury bias, and the receptivity of the
judge. Id. at 101, 108-09, 115.
23. Id. at 86.
24. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Foreword to The Jurisprudence Of Reconstruction,.
82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 743 (1994) (describing the Critical Race movement, she states,
"CRT inherits from traditional civil rights scholarship a commitment to a vision of
liberation from racism through right reason. Despite the difficulty of separating legal
reasoning and institutions from their racist roots, CRT's ultimate vision is redemptive,
not deconstructive."). The Authors attempt to apply "right reason" in Part III of this
Article where recommendations are made for addressing the issue of emotional harm
in housing discrimination cases.
25. See 1 HUGH F. Bu-Frs, THE BLACKNESS OF DARKNESS 99 (1993).
A frequently expressed sentiment is the view that white Americans lack em-
pathy for Blacks and as a result can not [sic] identify with racism and oppres-
sion, and take steps to extirpate them. Without accepting or rejecting that
view, one wonders at the difficulty in developing empathy toward any group
that is regarded as lowly or inhuman. Thus, the development of empathy
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thy and understanding that consists of more than a careful
weighing of the evidence.26 While this Article does not assert that
bias by the fact-finder is the single cause of low damage awards,
there is concern about the unevenness and general devaluation of
many emotional harm awards, their causes, and consequences.27
Emotional harm claims in housing discrimination cases tend to sub-
tly reflect the shadow of racism in this country.28 It is the persis-
tence of segregated housing patterns that contributes to a lack of
understanding of the impact of racism and a diminished sense of
empathy that is so essential in compensating the full nature of the
dignitary harm that flows from housing discrimination.29
While the pioneering work in critical race theory is one of the
lenses through which the present theories of compensation are ex-
amined, particularly as it applies to African-American victims of
housing discrimination, this Article also draws on other resources.
The Authors have utilized the insights of personal experience in
the fair housing clinic as a means of developing a practical strategy
to address this problem.3" This approach has led to a review of
relevant social science data that offers some explanations and per-
spectives on the effects of discrimination on its victims. 31 More im-
portantly, this Article attempts to address the issue with
appears to be secondary to an understanding of the barriers, resistances,
myths, and unconscious conflicts that inhibit that development.
Id. Dr. Butts has testified as an expert witness in a number of Title VII and fair
housing cases and has lectured on this subject at the Columbia Law School Fair Hous-
ing Clinic.
26. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974) (recognizing that jury bias may
deprive a victim of discrimination the full consideration she deserves).
27. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 121-22.
28. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 97.
29. See, e.g., Diane Maluso, Shaking Hands With a Clenched Fist: The Effects of
Interpersonal Racism, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION 50
(Bernice Lott & Diane Maluso eds., 1995). Maluso outlines findings from sociological
studies that have shown that reducing biases and stereotypes occurs most effectively
in social interactions where there is interracial contact between persons of equal sta-
tus, "in the pursuit of common goals." Id. at 58. This contact must be sustained and is
enhanced by strong institutional support or authority figures. Id. at 74. In other
words, the interpersonal activity that would normally occur in an integrated commu-
nity can be a major factor in achieving the conditions for a lessening of bias. But
conversely, the absence of integrated social experiences makes it more difficult to
overcome social biases.
30. Conrad Johnson has been teaching a fair housing clinic at Columbia Law
School for the past eleven years. Victor Goode worked with him and Professor Mary
Zulack as a visiting clinical professor from 1994 through 1996 and served on the
Board of the Open Housing Center. Their many discussions on this issue motivated
the development of this Article.
31. See infra Part II.
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recommendations for presenting emotional harm issues so that
both plaintiffs' attorneys and members of the judiciary can develop
a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the effects of
emotional harm on victims of discrimination.32 In examining these
issues, there will be a review of the use of medical and psychother-
apeutic treatment and the use of expert witnesses. It will also sug-
gest an approach for educating fact finders about the nature of the
emotional harm that flows from a racist event.
There are no empirical studies that adequately explain how and
why decision-makers value emotional harm in housing discrimina-
tion cases in a manner that differs so greatly from the victim's ex-
perience and the scientific evidence of the effects of trauma
resulting from discrimination.33 This Article argues that biased
perceptions, a lack of information about the depth of emotional
trauma, or racial insensitivity may affect this process and it will
change only with a renewed effort and a different approach to
these cases from the civil rights bar.34 It is also an attempt to pro-
vide information that may assist in the proper evaluation of emo-
tional injury with data from social science sources that have not
32. Professor Schwemm's pioneering work in this field has laid the foundation for
future inquiries, including this Article. He points out that amassing the evidence of
emotional harm may be difficult. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-31 to 25-33. We
also believe that attorneys who take on housing discrimination cases do so out of a
personal and professional commitment to end this extremely destructive aspect of
discrimination in our society. This Article attempts to expand on this base by taking a
look at data drawn from inter-disciplinary sources, particularly the fields of psychol-
ogy, psychiatry, and sociology. While many of the problems in the development of
the emotional harm aspects of a discrimination case remain as Professor Schwemm
described them in 1982, studies in the social sciences have added considerable depth
and theoretical insight to those issues. Armed with this additional information, prac-
titioners may be even better prepared to plan the strategy of their case. For a fuller
discussion of these practical issues, see infra Part III.
33. In stark contrast to the almost cavalier perspective offered by some judges, see
Hope Landrine & Elizabeth A. Klonoff, The Schedule of Racist Events: A Measure of
Racial Discrimination and a Study of Its Negative Physical and Mental Health Conse-
quences, 22 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 144, 145-47 (1996).
[R]acist events (unlike losing one's car keys or getting stuck in a traffic jam)
are inherently demeaning, degrading, and highly personal; they are attacks
upon and negative responses to something essential about the self that can-
not be changed: being an African American. Racist discrimination thereby
has a higher potential to erode the physical and mental health of African
Americans.
Id. at 147. "[T]he single most common problem presented by African Americans who
seek psychotherapy is anger about racism in their lives." Id. at 160.
34. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 107 n.124 (referring to the Court's opinion in
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), when acknowledging that low awards for emo-
tional harm may be due to jury prejudice).
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previously been marshaled primarily for this purpose. Evidence
of emotional harm must be presented in a manner that reveals the
full scope of its effects. The under-valuation by decision-makers is
not for the most part an open hostility to the reality of racial harm
as much as it is a lack of understanding and a reflection of the
cognitive distortion of race and racial issues that is a social phe-
nomena as well as a legal one.36 This Article will explore these
dynamics from the perspective of relevant social science data and
examine how they affect the analysis and understanding of evi-
dence of emotional harm.37 Part I provides an overview of the cur-
rent state of emotional harm cases. Part II discusses the issue of
bias in the process of reviewing discrimination cases from the per-
spective of critical race theory and recent social science data. In
Part III, this Article examines the cycles of ignorance that have
contributed to an under-valuation of emotional harm in housing
discrimination litigation. Finally, suggestions are made about how
to gather relevant psychological and medical information on the
effects of discrimination and how to incorporate that information
into a case so that the full extent of emotional harm is more prop-
erly understood and the victim of discrimination is made whole.
I. EMOTIONAL HARM OVERVIEW
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act has been the primary legal
instrument at the federal level for attacking housing discrimination
for the last thirty years.38 The Act has had mixed results, but has
35. While the use of expert witnesses, particularly psychologists or therapists, has
been previously recommended, this Article attempts to expand upon those more gen-
eral recommendations. In particular, the issues of exploring bias from fact-finders are
examined, contextualized, and an individualized picture of the harm suffered by peo-
ple of color is presented. For a very valuable early treatment on emotional harm
issues, see Larry Heinrich, The Mental Anguish and Humiliation Suffered by Victims
of Housing Discrimination, 26 J. MARSHALL L. Ri-v. 39, 39 (1992).
36. See generally GORION ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1st ed. 1954).
This is one of the definitive works on racism and bias. He queries whether "discrimi-
nation and prejudice [are] facts of the social structure or of the personality structure."
1d. at 514. The answer, according to this Article, is both. Allport describes racism as
a social problem that has historical roots. Id. at 208-11. He describes how prejudice is
learned behavior by all groups and its belief structure is acquired from the social
order as the individual personality develops. Id. at 17-19, 297-310.
37. The premise of this Article is not that every judge and jury is biased against
minority plaintiffs. It is more likely that judges and juries in many cases may be no
better prepared than the general population in understanding the effects of discrimi-
nation and in their ability to give full value to those effects when the evidence is
presented.
38. See Roi3EIR- G. SCHWEMM, HOUSINc, DISCRIMINATION LAW 15 (1983). In
1968, the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., gave new life to the Recon-
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generally received judicial support, and over its brief life there has
been very little dilution in its scope and application.39 Unlike the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which have gone through an
evolution of expansion followed by a more restrictive interpreta-
tion by the Courts,4 ° the FHA and its post-Reconstruction prede-
cessor, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, have both received supportive judicial
interpretations and have changed very little.4" Yet, despite this
generally favorable judicial treatment, housing discrimination re-
mains a persistent social problem, which seems to elude any solu-
tion through litigation.42  Persistent patterns of residential
segregation are a constant reminder of the lack of progress that this
country has made toward the integration of living space.43 This Ar-
struction era statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which guarantees all persons the right to sell,
lease, and convey property. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). The Court held that § 1982 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 barred racial discrimination in the sale, rental, and lease
of housing. Id. at 413. While the language of the FHA and § 1982 differ, both have as
their underlying principal Congress's authority to bar discrimination in housing. Id.
39. The courts have generally supported the scope of coverage of the FHA, al-
though some procedural aspects of the FHA have been limited by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 98 (1979)
(dealing with standing); Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195 (dealing with the right to a trial by
jury); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 205 (1972) (dealing with stand-
ing). In Trafficante, the Court reiterated its decision to follow Congress's intent to
construe the act broadly. 409 U.S. at 209-10.
40. An example of this trend is the requirement for a finding of discriminatory
intent articulated by the Court in Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
This interpretation is generally seen as a limiting factor on the use of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in proscribing racial discrimination. See Derrick A. Bell, Foreword:
Equal Employment Law and the Continuing Need for Self-Help, 8 Loy. U. Ci. L.J.
681, 683 (1997). Similarly, the school desegregation cases saw the Fourteenth Amend-
ment scaled back as a tool for creating integrated public schools. In Milliken v. Brad-
ley, inter-district desegregation remedies were restricted. 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
The decision in Freeman v. Pitts raised the de facto-de jure distinction to a doctrinal
level that all but trumped the principle of integration as a continuing legacy of Brown.
503 U.S. 467, 469 (1992). Ironically, one of the reasons for the "re-segregation" of the
schools in Dekalb County Georgia, described in Pitts, was "white flight" from the
district. Id. at 506. This gradual change in housing patterns along racial lines altered
the Court's ability to make student assignments in a manner that could remedy the
effects of the previously legally segregated schools.
41. See SCHWEMM, supra note 38, at 227-98 (discussing the procedures for enforce-
ment and cases supporting Title VIII).
42. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 60-82.
43. Id. This point has been brought out in dramatic fashion by Massey and
Denton. They cite considerable evidence that housing discrimination remains one of
the most persistent and damaging legacies of America's history of racial subordina-
tion. Id. Their data shows that despite our efforts to enforce fair housing laws at the
state and federal level, society has made very little progress toward the desegregation
of our living space. Id. at 64. They also say that the main factor is the continued sense
in a considerable portion of white society that while civil rights may be desirable in
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ticle argues that one corollary to the persistence of housing dis-
crimination is the devaluation of the experience of its victims.
While there is little evidence that this phenomenon is motivated by
ill will or open hostility by fact-finders, their reluctance to compre-
hend and value the full extent of the psychological damage of ra-
cism and the true toll that it imposes on its victims continues to be
reflected in low awards for many FHA claimants.44 Racial bias
does not suffice as the sole explanation for low and frequently une-
ven compensatory damages in all cases. For the most part, fact
finders and jurors, the majority of whom are white, view racial is-
sues no differently than the general population.45 But there are
misperceptions about race that remain prominent in American cul-
ture, which can affect numerous areas of decision-making, includ-
ing the courts, unless a conscious and consistent effort is made to
identify and remove them.46
Since 1974, with the decision of the Supreme Court in Curtis v.
Loether,47 courts have had broad equitable powers as they apply
the FHA to violations and lower courts have been awarding dam-
ages for the emotional harm suffered by victims of racial discrimi-
nation.48 The typical framework for relief in these cases is for the
plaintiff to seek an injunctive remedy, compensatory damages, pu-
theory, the "not in my backyard" phenomenon is especially strong when it comes to
sharing neighborhood living space and the subsequent potential for social interaction.
Id. at 79-82. Finally, their findings show that while this phenomenon affects white
acceptance of Asians and Latinos to varying degrees, its most persistent and stubborn
resistance is applied to the African-American. Id. at 67, 77. See Kathleen C. Engel,
Moving Up the Residential Hierarchy: A New Remedy for an Old Injury Arising From
Housing Discrimination, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1153, 1154-55 (1999).
A 1979 study funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") estimated that there were two million incidents of housing
discrimination on the basis of race each year. More recent evidence reveals
that high rates of discrimination continue. In 1989, a HUD-sponsored fair
housing study of the number of listings shown to prospective buyers and
renters found that in over forty percent of the audits, blacks were shown
fewer listings than whites. Similarly, agents showed Hispanic renters fewer
units than whites in thirty-five percent of the audits, and showed Hispanic
buyers fewer units in over forty percent of the audits. Other audits have
uncovered even higher rates of housing discrimination, including one study
that found a ninety-percent discrimination rate.
Id. at 1155.
44. See supra notes 19-22.
45. See infra Part II.
46. See Maluso, supra note 29, at 72-75 (noting various misperceptions about race
in society and some methods of changing those perceptions).
47. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
48. SCHWEMM, supra note 38, at 254.
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nitive damages, or some combination of all three.49 The principle
that underlies this remedy is that an aggrieved party should be
"made whole," through the remedial process.5 The courts have
generally adopted this "make whole" theory in housing discrimina-
tion cases.5'
In Curtis, the Supreme Court stated that emotional harm in a
housing discrimination case was similar to defamation or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in tort law. 52 Emotional harm
can be recognized in any claim for damages as long as sufficient
evidence establishing a causal link to the discriminatory act is
proven.53 The importance of this holding cannot be understated
because Title VIII, § 3613(c)(1), had no specific language to guide
courts on awarding damages. 4 The Curtis Court was unperturbed
by this omission and found an adequate rationale in tort remedies
bolstered by the general equitable powers vested in the federal
courts to hold that the legislation authorized equitable relief, in-
cluding damages similar to the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.5 5 While some states had previously enacted anti-
discrimination laws authorizing courts and administrative agencies
to offer similar relief,56 Curtis firmly established this principle in
49. Id. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 1974).
While the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. 1982 to 1988 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), does not contain specific language
authorizing the award of damages or equitable relief, the modern interpretation of the
statute has held that the full range of equitable remedies is available to a federal court
in fashioning a remedy for any violation of the statute. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 409 (1968). While Title VIII, only specifically authorizes the award
of actual damages, it has been interpreted to provide for damages for emotional harm.
Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1294 (4th Cir. 1979).
50. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 91. The concept of remedies in discrimination
cases broadly encompasses the right of a successful plaintiff to have access to the
variety of equitable relief that will provide real compensation for the injury that the
plaintiff suffered, including emotional harm. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 829
(2000). While the typical case does not usually involve considerable direct costs, the
emotional harm compensation as well as potential punitive damages can add to the
overall costs. Id. at 1053-54.
51. Slatin, 590 F.2d at 1294.
52. 415 U.S. at 195.
53. Id. at 196.
54. Id. at 197.
55. Id. at 196.
56. For a summary of state and federal cases and other resources dealing with the
emotional harm component of housing discrimination, see 1 KENTUCKY COMM'N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT 82-1, DAMAGES FOR EMBARRASSMENT AND HUMILI-
ATION IN DISCRIMINATION CASES-THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR PSYCHIC IN-
JURY RESULTING FROM HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 69-79 (1982).
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the federal enforcement arsenal of the FHA.57 While none of
these early cases relied specifically on the dicta from Brown, the
acceptance by later federal courts that emotional harm flowed
from discrimination was certainly strengthened by the Supreme
Court's acknowledgment of dignitary harm for a victim of racial
discrimination. 58  This theory of discrimination and emotional
harm alluded to in Brown,59 also echoed studies of the harm caused
57. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198 (affirming that Title VIII violations could result in dam-
ages for emotional harm and that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial).
58. It is worth noting that Justice Marshall, one of the architects of the Brown
litigation, wrote the Curtis opinion.
59. The trial court in Briggs v. Elliot, one of the four cases consolidated into the
Brown decision heard testimony from Dr. Kenneth Clark, a social psychologist who
testified as an expert witness. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL-
ITY 353 (1976). Dr. Clark used a doll preference study to demonstrate that legally
imposed segregation had a detrimental psychological impact on the African-Ameri-
can students in the segregated Claridon County schools. Id. at 353-54.
One of the controversial points of Dr. Clark's study was its focus on the self-depre-
cation or self-hatred aspects that were triggered by racial discrimination. Id. at 353.
The premise of his theory was that the victim internalizes the accusations and charac-
terizations of inferiority from the perpetrator or dominant class and begins to accept
them as true. Id. In the doll study, this phenomenon manifested as a preference by
the young black girls for white dolls and an explicit rejection of racial characteristics
associated with their own race depicted in the brown doll. Id. at 330-31, 354. This
overt rejection of aspects of one's self was presented to the Court as evidence of
emotional damage that resulted from imposed segregation. Id. at 353-54.
There were, however, problems with the Clark study from both a legal and scien-
tific perspective. Dr. Clark conceded at the time of the trial that it wasn't possible to
isolate the effects of school segregation from other influences of racial injustice and
thereby satisfy the standard of direct legal causation. Id. at 379. Later social scientists
have refuted the validity of Dr. Clark's study because of the small size of his sampling
and the somewhat ambiguous terminology that Clark used in questioning the children
about their identification with either the black or white doll. See Ernest Van Den
Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor
Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69, 74-76 (1960). But despite these weaknesses, Dr.
Clark had fashioned his study and findings on evidence from other more comprehen-
sive surveys and relied on the general belief among social scientists at that time that
segregation caused emotional harm to its victims. KLUGER, supra, at 318-19. Other
studies have verified his basic contention that, in addition to whatever material depri-
vation might characterize the conditions of the segregated school, legally imposed
segregation did cause psychological damage. Id. at 319.
While the doll study was legally problematic for establishing a clear chain of causal-
ity, pioneering work by the famed psychiatrist Dr. Frantz Fanon was also exploring
similar issues of emotional damage flowing from the skewed social relationship of one
race holding social, political, and economic dominance over another in his path break-
ing work Black Skin, White Mask. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASK 141
(1967). In her analysis of the complete body of Fanon's work, Irene L. Gendzier,
states that:
Fanon discovered that the alienated Martiniquean existed only where there
was a dominant society that had reduced him to an inferior status. What
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by discrimination that were being conducted during that same pe-
riod in the social science community.6 ° These studies explored the
idea that racial discrimination was a particularly pernicious form of
personal degradation, and one whose psychological impact is often
subtle and only fully exposed with the assistance of social science
experts.61
Courts have traditionally employed two overlapping approaches
to claims of emotional harm in fair housing cases: traditional tort
theory62 and constitutional torts.63 In traditional tort theory, the
infliction of emotional harm was initially disfavored, but was later
concerned Fanon with respect to the Martiniquean, was the gradual process
of alienation from his culture and tradition, and the fact that this was accom-
panied by self-hatred or at the least, a profoundly disturbed ambivalence.
The rejection of the self came as a result of identification with the Other and
as a result of the acceptance of the Other's image of one's "inferior" caste.
IRENE L. GENDZIER, FRANTZ FANON: A CRITICAL STUDY 50 (1973). While Fanon's
work was preoccupied with a social psychoanalytic dimension of colonialism and was,
therefore, unencumbered by legal standards of causality, it is clear that the psycholog-
ical damage that he and Dr. Clark examined stemmed from the same source-racism.
Id. at 46-47. The attendant social structures needed to enforce these beliefs, such as
school segregation in the United States, or colonialism in the case of Martinique and
the other non-white French colonies, while considerably different in form, were essen-
tially the same. Id. at 6-8. In fact, Fanon's emphasis on the gradual process of this
phenomenon might account for the varied results that Dr. Clark received when he
performed the doll test in northern integrated schools and southern segregated
schools.
In United States v. Security Management Co., an apartment manager was sued under
the Fair Housing Act. 96 F.3d 260, 260 (7th Cir. 1996). In the course of determining
the liability of the two insurers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found that although the complaint did not expressly allege emotional harm,
that "racial discrimination, when encountered, is such an affront to one's intelligence
and individuality that we may assume, for our purposes, the presence of an allegation
of psychological injury." Id. at 268. A more recent case cites Security Management
for the proposition that "one can reasonably assume that a person who is the object
unlawful discrimination will suffer emotional harm." United States v. Wapinski Real
Estate, 2000 WL 28271, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2000).
60. See, e.g., ALLPORT, supra note 36. The Nature of Prejudice, published in 1954,
the year of the Brown decision, represented a compilation of studies and theories that
Professor Allport began developing during the war years. It is a wide-ranging work
that has influenced many future works on the subject. For a retrospective on the
importance of The Nature of Prejudice, see Roy J. deCarvalho, Gordon W. Allport on
the Nature of Prejudice, 72 PSYCHOL. REP. 299, 301-05 (1993).
61. See, e.g., Jane Goodman-Delahunty & William E. Foote, Compensation for
Pain, Suffering and Other Psychological Injuries: The Impact of Daubert on Employ-
ment Discrimination Claims, 13 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 183, 187-89 (1995).
62. DOBBS, supra note 50, at 821. The most common emotional harm torts are
those based on intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 822. In the Restate-
ment Second, the three elements of this tort are: 1) severe emotional distress; 2)
caused by intentional or reckless conduct; and 3) that is extreme and outrageous. Id.
at 826. This tort is generally recognized and applies these basic requirements for re-
covery. Id.
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recognized as a legitimate claim for which damages might be
awarded. 64 The intentional infliction of emotional distress and neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress are its two variants. Despite
this history with emotional harm issues, courts have generally
taken a conservative approach toward the infliction of emotional
distress claims, and this general caution carried over into the field
of housing discrimination.6 6 There are many understandable rea-
sons for this caution. Some include the general difficulty in placing
a monetary value on emotional harm, the difficulty in determining
the actual degree of harm, especially when the same degree of of-
fense may affect people very differently, the potential for exagger-
ation, the lack of objective measures, and low award precedent.67
Courts have also commented on the difficulty in making emotional
harm fit traditional tort economic theories, and the fear that emo-
tional harm will be a corollary claim to virtually every offense, no
matter how trivial.6 8 While these concerns are understandable,
courts addressing civil rights claims have never been required to
rigidly adhere to a traditional tort framework. 69 In addition, adher-
ing too closely to this caution can mask any subtle biases that might
affect the fact-finding process, and an overly cautious approach
would stand in contrast to the recognition in the social sciences that
some degree of emotional harm will result from any act of discrimi-
nation. 70 Any difficulties in measuring its magnitude and impact in
the legal context are separate and distinct from reservations about
its basic validity.
Emotional harm has been generally classified as "humiliation,
embarrassment, emotional distress, and other such intangible
harms to the plaintiff's personality."' 7' The effects of emotional
63. Id. at 81. Constitutional torts or civil rights torts concern the intentional depri-
vation of a right protected by the Constitution, or a federal statute. Id. at 81-84. The
most common constitutional torts involve Fourth Amendment claims, Eighth Amend-
ment claims, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, including any of the procedural or
substantive protections flowing from the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 84.
64. Id. at 824-25.
65. Id. at 822-23. Negligent infliction of emotional distress has no bearing on
housing discrimination claims because once there is a finding of discrimination, the
act is considered intentional.
66. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 121.
67. Id. at 85-86.
68. See DOBBS, supra note 50, at 81-82. "Civil rights violations are torts. They
have generated an important specialty in which the courts look to common law tort
rules as models without necessarily accepting their limitations." Id.
69. Martell v. Boardwalk Enter. Inc., 748 F.2d. 740, 750 (2d Cir. 1984).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hale, 940 F.2d 1192, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1991).
71. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-21.
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harm in housing discrimination cases may also lead to increased
anger, frustration, depression, resentment, or shame.72 Fear that
the discriminatory event will reoccur may lead to withdrawal from
contact with others or diminished social involvement with friends
or family.73 Physical symptoms may also accompany the psycho-
logical trauma.7 1 These may include indigestion, ulcers, nervous-
ness, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, impotence, nausea, and
intensified allergic reactions.75
While compensation for the loss of rights that are protected by
statute or the Constitution is a well accepted legal principle, only
nominal damages are generally awarded for lost rights.76 As a re-
sult, many victims must rely on their emotional harm claim as their
primary basis for economic compensation. Two reasons immedi-
ately come to mind for taking special care to develop the emotional
damages phase of a housing discrimination case. First, in most in-
stances, the economic losses, or the out-of-pocket expenses that re-
sult from housing discrimination, are not typically extensive.77 By
the time the issues are litigated, the plaintiff will likely have found
alternative housing.78 Secondly, the emotional harm experienced is
often one of the primary motives for seeking legal redress, but that
motivation might diminish if it is not acknowledged and developed
early in a case.79
72. See Complaint No. FH5841219900 at D34 to D35, Mitchell v. DiSilva (No. 93-
130) New York City Commission of Human Rights, Recommended Decision and Or-
der, Dec. 12, 1993. In this case Dr. Hugh Butts, a psychiatrist specializing in the ef-
fects of discrimination, testified as an expert witness about the general symptoms of
victims of discrimination as including feelings of numbness, withdrawal, difficulty in
concentrating and focusing, depression, anxiety, and the diminished quality of care
given to children. Id. at D-34 to D-39.
73. Id. at D-34 to D-35.
74. Id. at D-34.
75. Alan W. Heifetz & Thomas C. Heinz, Separating the Objective, the Subjective:
Assessing Compensatory Damages In Fair Housing Cases, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 3,
20 (1992).
76. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-21 to 25-23.
77. Id. at 25-24 ("Most fair housing cases do not involve major economic loss.").
78. See id. at 25-23 (noting that many plaintiffs mitigate damages by securing alter-
native housing). While these issues certainly vary from case to case, in most markets
the difference in cost between the housing that was denied and the housing that the
victim eventually had to accept will not be great. Id. at 25-23 to 25-24. In mortgage
discrimination cases this may vary because the difference of even a point amortized
over the life of a mortgage can be considerable, but injunctive remedies would typi-
cally require the renegotiation of the mortgage before the difference in value had
accumulated to a substantial degree. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMI-
NATION: LAW AND LITIGATION 25-14 (1994).
79. See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Anti-Black Dis-
crimination in Public Places, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 101, 101 (1991) (describing the range
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Early decisions have implicitly recognized the link between dis-
crimination and emotional distress by generally allowing some
monetary recovery for intangible harm if there is credible evidence
to support it.8 Usually, these damage claims are established
through the testimony of the plaintiff about the emotional impact
of the discrimination.8' Emotional harm may even be inferred
from the circumstances of the housing transaction.82 Moreover,
there is no requirement of corroborating testimony of any kind and
no requirement for expert medical evidence to establish a claim.83
While traditional tort theory usually requires a showing of outra-
geous conduct by the defendant and severe emotional harm for re-
covery,84 this higher standard has not been applied in housing
discrimination cases. This seemingly relaxed standard, however,
may create the false impression that emotional harm damages are
relatively easy to establish and are uniformly receiving wide ac-
ceptance.86 While the approach by the courts to find emotional
harm by inference is both significant and appropriate, the related
inference, that the fact-finder can accurately assess the extent of
the trauma from the testimony of the victim alone seems less sup-
ported by a careful review of damage awards.
In fact, Professor Schwemm, in his chronicle of housing discrimi-
nation cases, has pointed out that severe and particularly outra-
geous conduct by the defendant, along with the nature of the
plaintiff's reaction, continue to be critical factors in receiving
favorable recognition of emotional harm.8 7 While this assessment
of responses to racist events by African-Americans that usually begin with an assess-
ment of the situation and include consideration of a range of responses from immedi-
ate self help/direct confrontation to challenging the act through a lawsuit).
80. Id.; SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-31 to 25-33.
81. SCHWEMM, supra note 18 at 25-31 to 25-32.
82. Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 1.983) ("damages for emo-
tional distress in cases of this type 'may be inferred from the circumstances as well as
proved by the testimony.'").
83. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-32.
84. DoBBS, supra note 50, at 81.
85. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1974); Parker v.
Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876, 880 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see also Schwemm, supra note 22, at
115.
86. See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-32 to 25-33. He comments that courts
exercise a great deal of discretion in these matters. Id. at 25-36; see Schwemm, supra
note 22, at 84-86 (describing the absence of clear standards or a predictable pattern to
predict the strength of a claim for emotional harm).
87. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-37. it is important to note, however, that the
reliance on the outrageousness of the defendants' conduct by some judges in cases
that Professor Schwemm has tracked is more similar to the requirements of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress from tort theory. Even though the courts have
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accurately reflects how courts have been leaning towards tradi-
tional tort theory in housing cases, it also points to some of the
inherent flaws in this approach. Although racial epithets or threats
of violence clearly meet the outrageous conduct requirement under
traditional tort theory and have caused some courts to award high
damage awards, the typical discrimination case today involves
more subtle forms of discrimination. 8 Even though different
forms of discrimination may vary in intensity or in relative degree
of personal threat, this fact does not automatically mean that sig-
nificantly less emotional harm has occurred.89
Plaintiffs will react differently to the same adverse stimuli.90 The
impact of racism must be understood in the context of both the
incident and the parties involved. Important contextual issues to
examine include whether this is the first time the plaintiff at-
tempted to find new housing, whether the plaintiff is seeking to
change their neighborhood circumstances, or if there is a spouse or
child depending on the plaintiff to find suitable housing. These are
only a few variables that can affect the plaintiff's emotional re-
sponse to the adverse stimulus of discrimination.
Furthermore, as Professor Schwemm has pointed out, the suc-
cess or failure of an emotional harm claim often depends on
"whether the plaintiff is believable, likeable, or vulnerable to
stress, and whether the fact-finder is receptive to this type of
never required this approach, and have regularly applied the more relaxed standard
that implicitly rejects it, there remains a tendency for some courts to view the emo-
tional harm suffered by the plaintiff as directly proportional to the defendants' con-
duct. See, e.g., id. While this may apply to some cases, the danger here is that it
should not be applied as a general rule. The reasons why this approach inevitably
fails to capture the real damages experienced by many victims of discrimination will
be discussed more fully in Part II.
88. Teresa Coleman Hunter & Gary L. Fischer, Fair Housing Testing- Uncover-
ing Discriminatory Practices, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1995) ("While cer-
tainly not universally true, the general nature of race-based housing discrimination is
covert, although overt discrimination still exists.").
89. See Ezra H. Griffith & Elwin J. Griffith, Racism, Psychological Injury and
Compensatory Damages, 37 Hosp. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 71, 72 (1994). The authors
indicate that courts tend to review these cases from the traditional intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress framework. Id. This assumes that once the act and the
proximate cause is established, the distress will be directly proportionate to the sever-
ity of the act. Id. While there may be sound public policy reasons for this approach,
such as deterrence of egregious acts, it fails as sound medical science because the
psyche of each individual is different. Id. at 74. Some members of racial minority
groups may have steeled themselves against racial slights, whereas others are far more
sensitive. Id. Overall, the authors argue "greater psychiatric input would result in a
better assessment of emotional distress so that plaintiffs can produce their evidence of
psychological damage in a more professional framework." Id. at 75.
90. Id. at 73.
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claim.9 It is unfortunate that this subjectivity of perception inher-
ent to a certain degree in all cases, that opens the "objective" fact-
finding process to the distortions of skewed racial perceptions.
This possibility is heightened when the fact finder must consider
cross-cultural empathy and how racism affects society. This is a
task for which judges and juries may not have had any special
training, but which is critical to fully evaluate the evidence of dis-
crimination and its effect on an individual plaintiff.
Regardless of the court's willingness to accept only plaintiff's tes-
timony to establish an emotional harm claim, other factors should
be considered before relying entirely on the victim to fully articu-
late the nature of the harm suffered. "Many plaintiffs will lack in-
sight into their [psychological] injuries, particularly when the harm
[from emotional stress may] develop slowly over a protracted pe-
riod [of time]."92 Secondly, they may be poorly equipped to com-
pare themselves with other healthy individuals, particularly when
discriminatory events are common in the lives of people of color.93
There may also be social disincentives or factors that discourage
plaintiffs from acknowledging and exhibiting their private senti-
ments about their injury.94 It is also not uncommon for victims of
discrimination to suppress any discussion about their injuries, espe-
cially if being open and forthcoming might cause them to reveal
issues of sexual or emotional vulnerability. 9 This is particularly
true in an environment where social norms characterize people
who display anger or pain as weak or unprofessional. 96
Each of these factors argues for two careful considerations in
presenting this phase of a discrimination case. First, the ability of
the fact-finder to fully comprehend the effects of racism should not
be assumed. It must be developed as fully as possible within the
limitations of the trial.97 Considerable social science data points to
91. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 116. This judicially preferred approach to plain-
tiff's testimony can also create a double bind. In order to establish liability and to be
seen as believable on factual issues, a client must be seen as objective, reliable, and
not susceptible to overstatement or instability. Id. But a plaintiff's success in convey-
ing these very attributes can create the impression that they were not devastated by
the defendant's conduct. Id. at 121.
92. Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra note 61, at 187.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 187-88. This not only raises issues concerning the willingness of a plain-
tiff to reveal this aspect of themselves in open court, but also their willingness or
ability to be exposed to their lawyer.
97. Compare Portee v. Hastava, 853 F. Supp. 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), with Broome v.
Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In Portee, the district court judge re-
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significant cultural and experiential differences in how whites and
people of color perceive the same information.98 Therefore, it may
be necessary to construct a "cultural bridge" as part of the trial
strategy before the cross-cultural empathy can be established. Sec-
ondly, although the focus of proof must be on the individual plain-
tiff, and not on the experience of any particular group, the
connection of the plaintiff to her group is also critical.99
Finally, feminist literature offers useful insights on how harm in a
social context gets transformed, distorted, or not recognized at all
when translated into a legal context. Several of these feminist the-
ories offer transferable lessons for race discrimination cases. In her
essay discussing the experience of women and traditional legal con-
cepts of harm, Professor Suzanne Levitt states that "the compara-
versed the jury verdict of $100,000 for each of the two adult plaintiffs and $80,000 for
their child, calling it clearly outrageous and shocking to the judicial conscience. Por-
tee, 853 F. Supp. at 613-14. On the other hand, in Biondi, the judge upheld emotional
harm damages totaling $114,000 dollars for each of the two plaintiffs in a suit against a
co-op that had discriminated against a middle class interracial couple who were both
professionals. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 215, 226. While the difference between these
two awards may correctly be attributed to the different financial capacities of the
defendants, it is also clear that Judge Carter in the Biondi case was already very famil-
iar with emotional harm issues from his own practice as a lawyer with the NAACP.
The History Makers Biography, Robert Carter, at http://www.thehistorymakers.com/
biography/biography.asp?bioindex=106&category=LawMakers (last visited Mar. 15,
2003). In Portee, the record suggests that the judge approached the case with some
degree of skepticism, despite testimony that the discrimination caused the husband to
withdraw, start drinking, have problems at work, and begin to doubt his ability to
support his family. Portee, 853 F. Supp. at 608 n.7. His wife testified that she lost
some concentration at work and was depressed. Id. at 607-08. The court seemed
particularly critical that neither party sought medical assistance, despite testimony on
how the loss of their preferred rental plunged their lives into turmoil. Id. at 608. He
also cited a string of low emotional harm awards and reduced the jury's verdict. Id. at
616. While cases with such different facts cannot form a symmetrical comparison, a
few important issues do seem relevant. The Biondi plaintiff's testimony did not char-
acterize their trauma as significantly greater than the Portees to warrant twice the
damages. See Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 223. Both cases involved discrimination of a
subtle type, and neither involved confrontations or public humiliation. It is possible
that a significant factor in the difference of the awards was the level of knowledge
about emotional trauma and discrimination possessed by the judge.
98. See infra Part II.
99. See, e.g., Landrine & Klonoff, supra note 33, at 147. The authors argue that
"Afrocentric consciousness," or a strong sense of group identity:
may be a personality factor (like hardiness for generic life events) which
moderates the negative impact of racist events. By providing a cognitive
framework for understanding and responding to racist events, an Afro-cen-
tric consciousness should decrease the perception of racist events as one's
own fault, increase adaptive coping, increase social support seeking, and
thereby decrease the negative health and psychological impact of these
events.
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tive model (of harm) begins with the assumption that what 'is,'
ordinarily, is not harm. Instead, harm is a deviation from what is
considered ordinary."' 0 She also points out that as various forms
of the oppression of women have historically been accepted as so-
cial norms, this social reality in turn influences and even dominates
our legal concepts of what constitutes harm.'0' The effect of this
social process over time is that the very pervasiveness of particular
types of harm against women renders it normative, thereby diffi-
cult to legally accept as worthy of a significant or substantial judi-
cial response.'0 2 The very pervasiveness of forms of gender
oppression (which can include racism), creates a social context that
supports the belief that some degree of this phenomenon is inevita-
ble, and therefore not within the calculus of a gross deviation from
what is expected to be the pitfalls of normal existence. Thus, when
fact-finders are asked to see the behavior of individuals who com-
mit acts that are racist or sexist, as harmful, if they have even subtly
accepted the "normativeness" of these practices either consciously
or unconsciously, they must first make a cultural and social pro-
gression beyond their own experience and beliefs before the legal
parameters of what must be done can become clear.
A parallel dilemma arises for the victims of discrimination when
subtle, yet pervasive forms of racism are accepted as social norms.
Because people of color inevitably develop the capacity to perse-
vere in spite of assaults on their dignity, this very capacity can cre-
ate the impression that the emotional harm that they experience is
not severe.' 3 Similarly, on an internal level, this coping capacity
can transform itself into a pattern of denial by victims of the sever-
ity of their trauma and become rationalized as a necessary adjust-
ment to the harsh realities of life. 04 It is important for both
advocates and fact-finders to understand this phenomenon in eval-
uating emotional harm. While society has made progress in chang-
ing old norms and valuing the experiences of people of color and
100. Suzanne J. Levitt, Rethinking Harm: A Feminist Essay, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 531,
532 (1995).
101. Id. at 532-33.
102. See id. at 537-38. Leavitt cites judicial responses to sexual harassment and
spousal abuse cases as examples of social harm. Id. at 534-38. She attributes the slow
and grudging acceptance/non-acceptance of these social harms into the traditional le-
gal framework as background radiation, potentially worthy of attention, but basically
like background noise, something that individuals are aware of, but learn to tolerate.
Id. at 532-33.
103. See, e.g., Landrine & Klonoff, supra note 33, at 146.
104. Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra note 61, at 185-87.
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women, social science studies clearly demonstrate that more work
still needs to be done.
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR BIAS BY JUDGES AND JURIES
A. Some Social Science Evidence
1. Bias as a Form of Racism
Whenever one begins a discussion of racial issues, it is critical at
the outset to clarify language and definitions. Bias, or prejudice, as
a general concept is a component of the set of beliefs or values that
form the categories in which individuals view the world and organ-
ize the information acquired.10 5 Forming these categories is a nor-
mal process and helps to psychologically process the myriad of
information received 0 6 These inputs are, for the most part, ra-
tional in that they are built upon accurate information.11 7 The as-
sociations that individuals create from these categories tend to
follow and reflect a normal pattern of logical thinking."",
On the other hand, this process of creating categories also leads
to the forming of clusters, and projecting the characteristics that
are assigned to the cluster onto individual phenomena. °9 The
most common result of this process occurs when attention is not
paid to the details or particularities of the individual phenomena,
and individuals unconsciously accept ideas based on the projection
or juxtaposition that is applied from the category to the larger clus-
ter."'0 Ordinary bias results when this process presents an oversim-
plification of the world and a distortion or inaccuracy based on
one's limited experience, inability, or aversion to see the illogic or
incompleteness of those views."' The tendency is to at least ini-
tially form ideas about the world in keeping with first-hand experi-
ence, even though this may include projections of fantasy,
105. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 6-14.
106. Id. at 27 ("[M]an has a propensity to prejudice. This propensity lies in his
normal tendency to form generalizations, concepts and categories, whose content rep-
resents an oversimplification of his world of experience.").
107. Id. at 22. ("[G]enerally a category starts to grow up from a 'kernel of truth.' A
rational category does so, and enlarges and solidifies itself through the increment of
relevant experience.").
108. Id. ("Categories may be more or less rational ... Scientific laws are examples
of rational categories. They are backed up by experience ... Even if the laws are not
100 percent perfect, we consider them rational if they have a high probability of pre-
dicting a happening.").
109. Id. at 20.
110. Id. at 21.
111. Id. ("This principle holds even though we often make mistakes in fitting events
to categories and thus get ourselves into trouble.").
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emotional issues, or information acquired and accepted through so-
cial and cultural influences.I 2
Racial bias, as the term is used here, is the extension of this pro-
cess as it is formed and shaped by the historical and cultural pat-
terns of race and racism in America." 13 This social process has
resulted in a distorted and stereotyped projection of a dominant
and normative "I" and a different and subordinate "other" onto
the categories of race." 4 More importantly, racial bias is a reflec-
tion of a failing to bridge this gap by consciously accepting accurate
information, which moves away from stereotypes and relies rigor-
ously upon logical thinking and individualization." 5
In 1954, Professor Gordon Allport, in his critical study, The Na-
ture of Prejudice, advanced the theory that logical thinking is more
often the norm for most Americans." 6 In fact, up to eighty percent
of white Americans harbored enough antagonism toward members
of racial minority groups that it would likely affect their behavior
112. Id. at 27. It should also be noted that this pattern of thinking is not limited to
whites as a dominant social group. Members of minority groups can also be biased
based on their perceptions of other groups and their misapplication of false group
characteristics to an individual. Id. at 38-39. Discrimination is distinguished here be-
tween interpersonal bias, which operates across racial, ethnic, and gender boundaries,
and institutional bias, which is socially constructed by those who control the major
social institutions in society. Bernice Lott & Diane Maluso, Introduction: Framing the
Question to THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION, supra
note 29, at 2-3.
113. See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (7th ed.
1994), for a full historical treatment of racism in America. While the literature on
race and racial discrimination in America is too voluminous to note here, one seminal
work does stand out. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern De-
mocracy has been a foundation for work by modern scholars of all disciplines on
racial discrimination. GUNNER MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962). Myrdal's study chronicled the history
and pervasiveness of discrimination and bias in American culture, and argued that
until those issues were addressed America would never attain the status of a full and
complete democracy. Id. at 1020-24.
114. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 37, 41 (describing a person in-group and a personal
reference group in contrast with "an outsider").
115. See Charles Lawrence, The Id, Ego and Racial Discrimination: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987). Lawrence's theory suggests
that individuals are infected by the biases inherent in a racist society. Id. Utilizing a
psychoanalytical model, he argues that as long as society reflects racial domination
and subordination in its social structure, individuals will be subconsciously influenced
by these stimuli, and will tend to reflect them in various ways. Id. at 322-23. When
this occurs, despite the best efforts toward objective thinking, all will subconsciously
project the emotional and experiential issues that were referred to in Allport's work
on prejudice. Id. at 337. This results in so-called "objective legal standards" actually
being constructed on flawed, unconscious foundations. Id. at 344-45.
116. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 17-27.
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in some way on a daily basis.II 7 He viewed these findings as evi-
dence supporting his theory on the social reproduction of racial
bias. 118 One significant aspect of Allport's early theories was that
he did not see these distortions as in any way inevitable or linked
to human nature.1 19 While he found evidence to explain racial bias
as mostly affected by social and cultural variables that influenced
and shaped attitudes, his theories were broad and eclectic enough
to recognize the role of cognitive influences as well.12°
The importance of his dual perspective of cognitive and social
factors is two fold. First, Allport focused on the social dimensions
of racism, particularly how the reformation of social institutions
that had been constructed along lines based on racial stereotypes
could be restructured.1 2' But he did not see this as the only ap-
proach to attacking racism. 122 He also recognized that the cogni-
tive inputs that shape belief, perception, and consciousness are not
intrinsic to human behavior. 12 3 Thus, he saw the social and cultural
variables, reflected in racist beliefs and causing racist behavior as
117. Id. at 78.
118. Id. at 79. Allport moved away from theories that characterized racism as an
aberrant individual psychosis and instead saw it as a distinctly social phenomena with
deep historical origins. Id. at 208-13.
119. Id. at 17-19.
120. Id. at 165-77. While later cognitive theorists would expand considerably on
Allport's work, his initial studies laid the framework for later experiments that
demonstrated that racially biased beliefs did not always follow Allport's continuum
and become discriminatory conduct. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Op-
portunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-88 (1995). In fact, the cognitive theorists argue
that racial biases are often a set of unconscious constructs and beliefs. Id. at 1188.
Behavior may then follow these cognitive pathways without ever manifesting as a
rational or conscious decision of choice. Id. For an excellent discussion of these theo-
ries and how they demonstrate the counter-productive aspects of anti-discrimination
law, especially the intent standard in Title VII jurisprudence, see id. at 1204-07.
121. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 504-13.
122. Id. at 469, 477, 493, 495, 510 (describing how racism can be attacked by chang-
ing laws, a greater role for social scientists in government, and appropriate use of the
mass media, particularly influential media, like film, individual therapy, and inter-
cultural education).
123. See deCarvalho, supra note 60, at 299. Allport was critical of a purely psycho-
analytic approach to prejudice because of its tendency to see discriminatory behavior
as the reflection of "infantile, repressed, defensive, and irrational" parts of the human
psyche. Id. at 303. Allport did accept some aspects of the psychoanalytic theory. Id.
at 303-04. In particular, he saw the perpetrators of discrimination as often developing
fears and aggressions that were turned against minorities, but he rejected the idea that
these were impulses that might affect individuals. Id. at 304. He strongly urged the
view that racial bias was more a situational construct, created by social forces and,
therefore, more susceptible than the psychoanalytic construct to change through
countering social forces. Id.
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being susceptible to reformation through conscious social policy.' 24
This theory, in fact, has supported the main public policy rationale
underlying civil rights laws and enforcement efforts. 25 At the
same time, while the more cognitive elements of his theory have
been the subject of numerous social science research efforts, very
little is known about how to translate those findings into broad,
meaningful social results. 126  This may account for the fact that
while beliefs about race in this country have undergone significant
positive change, many forms of racially influenced behaviors have
changed much more slowly, or in some cases very little at all. 127
The cognitive theorists who have been able to shed further insight
on why information designed to dispel stereotypes and biases is not
always reflected in a social context have drawn from and expanded
on Allport's theory. They have pointed out how the changes in
social structures, particularly those reflected in the law, are often
removed from the day-to-day experiences of most citizens and do
124. Id. at 304-06.
125. For an example of a positivist approach to anti-discrimination echoing All-
port's theory, see CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:
A LIGISLATIvI " His-'oi y OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 1 (1985) ("The legal reme-
dies [President Kennedy] have proposed are the embodiment of this nation's basic
posture of common sense and common justice."); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("we conclude that in the field of education separate but equal
has no place."). There are numerous examples of a positivist approach to anti-dis-
crimination principles that echo Allport's view that racial bias is learned behavior,
reinforced by social conditions, but behavior that can and should be changed. The
most influential is Brown, with its bold pronouncement that separate but equal was no
longer consistent with the premise of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown, 347 U.S.
at 495. Another is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2003). Each represents a sweeping view of the potential for change, albeit a vision
frequently unrealized.
126. See Krieger, supra note 120, at 1168-69 (arguing that the entire theoretical
framework for the intent standard formulated by the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). is based on a flawed understanding of how conscious deci-
sions concerning race actually occur).
127. A dramatic example of this dissonance between attitudes and behavior has
been chronicled in American Apartheid. In this extensive examination of housing pat-
terns in the post Title Vill period, these authors have reluctantly concluded that Afri-
can-Americans face high degrees of racial isolation in almost every major American
city. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 76. They also found that the vast majority
of African-Americans support the ideal of integration. Id. at 88. They reported
surveys of white Americans that revealed that by 1978, eighty-eight percent of whites
supported the basic principle of non-discrimination in the housing market. id. at 91.
But white Americans "remain uncomfortable about its implications in practice and
are reluctant to support legislation to implement it. Moreover, negative stereotypes
about black neighbors remain firmly entrenched in white psyches." Id. at 92.
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not automatically reproduce themselves as new beliefs and
behaviors. 128
2. The Impact of Cultural Bias
Researchers from the National Opinion Research Center
("NORC") have sought to explain the discrepancy between atti-
tudes about race and social behavior as the "lag effect theory."1 29
This theory contends that as civil rights laws and changing social
attitudes interact to form new social norms, there will always be a
lag time between the belief in equality as a social ideal and a corre-
sponding change in social behavior. 30 This "gap" means that while
individuals are forming new ideas and value, they may continue to
be influenced by older beliefs. 13 1
Attitudes on matters of race have changed a great deal since the
1940s.' 32 More recent studies show that on many levels whites, as a
group, are willing to reject many of the extreme stereotypes that
have historically been common components of American culture
and have strongly influenced white people's perceptions of people
of color, particularly African-Americans. 133
128. For an excellent description of cognitive theory, see Krieger, supra note 120, at
1161-66. In analyzing the basic flaws in current Title VII jurisprudence, particularly
its reliance on findings of intentional discrimination to justify a remedy, she describes
how this standard is at odds with cognitive psychological theory. Id. at 1166-68. In
summarizing cognitive theory, she points out that its key element is that people act on
Allport's categories, also referred to as schemas. Id. at 1188. But, for the most part,
individuals do so without a conscious awareness. Id. Since these behaviors lie outside
general awareness, they are also rarely the object of institutional constructs. Id. at
1213-17. In other words, institutional racism is not seen, because individuals do not
see themselves as racist. Id. In the Title VII field, this results in constructing a legal
rule about intentional conduct that is inconsistent with what is known about human
behavior. In Krieger's view, this results in a whole set of unconsciously motivated
conduct that will never meet a conscious standard for intentional behavior. Id. at
1217. This flaw is compounded because the "racial blind spot" gets transformed into a
rule supposedly designed to help find and respond to racial discrimination. Id.
129. See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS
AND INTERPRETATIONS 135-36 (1985). The lag effect represents the time it takes for
an expressed attitude to become internalized. Id. It is then that the individual's be-
havior is most likely to fall in synchronization with their expressed values. Id. The
authors caution that this is a hypothesis drawn from the data and there are some
studies that are inconsistent with this theory. Id. They point out that school integra-
tion shows an inverse relationship to the data, with the increase in implementation
resulting in a decrease in attitudinal support. Id. at 136.
130. Id. at 135.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 193-95.
133. See id. For example, in 1958, only four percent of whites surveyed supported
interracial marriage. Id. at 74-76. By 1983, that figure had increased to forty percent.
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NORC has tracked these "racial attitudes" by utilizing research
questionnaires that recorded the answers to a similar series of
questions asked repeatedly from 1942 to 1983.134 This method pro-
vided a reliable way of evaluating and comparing changes in atti-
tudes over time. In areas such as views on interracial marriage,
and willingness to accept African-Americans in neighborhoods, in
schools, or social venues, the early responses all showed the depth
of racial bias prior to the modern civil rights era. 35 They have also
tracked the steady upward acceptance trend, demonstrating the
moderation of open racial hostility and the formation of beliefs
that reflect a rejection of, or at least a meaningful distancing from,
racial stereotypes and biases. 136 In keeping with Allport's early
theories, these NORC surveys have led to the conclusion that
many older racial stereotypes have given way to more accurate,
non-stereotypical thinking about people of color. 137 More impor-
tantly for this analysis of race and emotional harm, this trend also
reflects the upward trend in the ability of most whites to perceive
African-Americans with the same degree of sympathy and empa-
thy as they with other white people. 138 The data reveals a more
Id. While this is hardly an unqualified endorsement of a fully integrated society, it
does illustrate the trend toward greater acceptance.
134. Id. at 45-46, 55.
135. Id. at 193.
136. Id. at 193-94
137. Id. at 193-95. In 1997, when asked how they felt about a relative marrying an
African-American, sixty-seven percent of whites surveyed either opposed or strongly
opposed the idea. Maria Krysan, Comments on the 2002 Data Update to Racial Atti-
tudes in America: Trends and Interpretations Revised Edition (2002), at http://tig-
ger.uic.edu/-krysan/writeup.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). The most recent data
from the 2000 survey shows opposition declining to thirty-eight percent. Id. In an-
other attitudinal question, whites were asked how they felt about living in a neighbor-
hood that was fifty percent African-American. Id. In 1990, forty-eight percent
opposed or strongly opposed the idea. Id. In 2000, that figure went down to thirty-
one percent. Id.
138. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 129, at 202. These NORC studies focused on
residential integration, school integration, job treatment, public facilities, the political
arena, personal relations, and general attitudes about African-Americans and current
events. Id. at 47-48, 53. Unfortunately, many of the questions in the NORC survey
were designed to examine the extreme forms of racism that were open, prevalent, and
reflected the social policy of the day. They are less useful in discerning the more
subtle aspects of racism. Nevertheless, their findings are a barometer of how deeply
entrenched aspects of racial antipathy are in American culture. For example, in the
housing arena, one question simply asked whether one supported the idea of a free
market seller's choice, even if that permitted racial discrimination, or a fair housing
law that prohibited discrimination. Id. at 97. In 1972, only thirty-five percent of
northerners supported fair housing, and by 1982, that number had risen to about
forty-seven percent. Id. Southern responses lagged ten points behind those modest
figures. Id. These studies also reflect the distinction in white people's belief in equal-
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complex and multi-dimensional picture about racial attitudes that
supports optimism, but also gives some credence to the argument
that perceptual bias remains strong and prevalent in our society,
and that the key players in the judicial process can hardly be ex-
pected to be fully immune to it.
In 1980, a team of psychologists conducted a review of a number
of studies on unobtrusive discrimination and prejudice. 139 The
value of their work, as it applies to the arguments in this Article,
lies in two key areas. First, they carefully reviewed a vast body of
literature in the field of racial studies generally focusing on those
that sought to measure the current level of anti-black prejudice and
discrimination among whites. 141 Second, they employed a defini-
tion of racism that is very close to the definition of racial bias extra-
polated from Allport's work and employed in this Article.141 Their
findings correlate closely with the thesis of this Article that percep-
tual bias remains strong in society and is, therefore, likely to be
present in the process of assessing how an African-American plain-
tiff may have been harmed by discrimination.1 42 In their review of
the literature on cross-cultural racial perceptions, the authors reit-
erated the findings supported by the NORC polling data that "anti-
black attitudes were prevalent and moderately strong among the
white population as a whole at least until the late 1950's and early
1960's. "143 They point out, however, that new surveys and studies
from 1963 through the 1970s generally interpreted the NORC data
ity as a principle, versus their support of concrete policies to enforce that principle.
For example, more than ninety percent of whites currently support the principle of
equal treatment in employment, jobs, schools, and public accommodations, but the
figures for support for government action to enforce that principle are considerably
lower. Id. at 135. Two other trends emerge. The more interpersonal the proposed
integration, the less support there is for government enforcement. Id. at 136. Con-
versely, there is more support for public activities, such as public accommodations.
Id.
139. Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimina-
tion and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 546 (1980).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 546.
Racism has been defined in a variety of ways. For clarity of exposition, we
follow P. Katz and define racism as the differential treatment of individuals
on the basis of their racial group membership. Racism may be examined at
two levels: One may measure discriminatory behavior, and one may infer
prejudiced attitudes. Stereotyping, which involves the presumption of cer-
tain attributes in an individual solely on the basis of racial groups, is one
form of prejudice.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 547.
143. Id. at 547-48
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as revealing a significant decrease in racist attitudes and a signifi-
cant increase in pro-integrationist and racially unbiased views.'44
This led to a number of other studies that concluded that diminish-
ing racial prejudice in society was a definite trend, and some even
to argue that "antiblack prejudice was no longer pervasive in the
American white population." 145 They also found, however, that
many of these studies relied on self-reporting, typical of question-
naire data, and were contradicted by other studies that demon-
strated a dissonance between reported attitudes about race and
actual behavior in racially integrated settings. 146 One study, for ex-
ample, showed that college-age white women registered no
prejudice on a questionnaire, but when they believed that the ques-
tionnaire would be the basis for actually assigning roommates, they
showed significantly more prejudice towards African-
Americans. 147
The unobtrusive discrimination studies that they conducted
sought to resolve these discrepancies between values and behavior
by examining experiments that fell into three categories: (1) help-
ing behavior studies; (2) aggression studies; and (3) nonverbal be-
havioral studies. 48  In addition, they reviewed a number of
laboratory experiments that were difficult to classify, but were de-
signed to measure how race affected the perceptions of white test
subjects. 149 Each of these studies would measure the level of em-
pathy white subjects exhibited toward African-Americans. In the
helping studies, staged scenarios were acted out with a white actor
in need of assistance, and the identical situation was replayed
where the actor was an African-American.1 50 Their results demon-
strated a clear preference among the white subjects for providing
more assistance to the white actor.' 51 The aggression studies in-
volved laboratory experiments where white test subjects had an op-
portunity to express aggression toward an African-American or
white participant who was the target in a setting that was designed
to allow for aggressive behavior to be socially acceptable. 5 2 These
144. Id. at 548.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 547.
149. Id. at 549-56.
150. Id. at 548.
151. Id. at 549.
152. Id. at 552. These studies involved role playing where the subject played the
role of a teacher and the student, who was really part of the experiment, could be
given a bogus electrical shock based on the number of errors they made in the
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were teacher/student scenarios where the person in the role of
teacher could mete out mild punishment if the student gave incor-
rect answers.1 53 Despite recording some discrepancies in the find-
ings, their conclusion was that "retaliation, censure and anonymity
all affect aggression against black targets, but fail to affect aggres-
sion against white targets. 154 In other words, if the behavior of the
white "teachers" was subject to censure or retaliation, they moder-
ated their response to the African-American subject, but not the
white one. These results suggest a tendency to mask one's true
feelings as long as there are likely negative consequences, but carry
out aggressive responses when there were no likely consequences.
Furthermore, "[t]he data imply that anti-black hostility was perva-
sive, but subtle... [a]ssuming that these subjects are representative
of the general population, we may conclude that whites today con-
tinue to harbor covert hostility toward blacks." 155 When the condi-
tions were safe (for example, anonymous), with no censure from
peers or authority figures, and no possibility for retaliation by the
subject, the hostility was more overt and showed as a tendency to
increase the level of direct aggression. 156 When safe conditions
were not present, the hostility was more indirect. 57
The conclusions from these and other findings provide further
support for the thesis of this Article, that clearly documented and
measured bias in the general population must, to some degree, find
a corresponding reflection in the judicial process that may have an
impact on how the harm caused by discrimination is perceived and
valued.
Another key factor derived from these studies is not simply that
whites tend to perceive African-Americans as different from them-
selves, but that the difference becomes an internalized rationale
and justification for different and often harsher treatment.1 5 8
While the courtroom setting of a discrimination case does not in-
teacher/learner scenario. Id. at 552-53. In certain cases, the student role was played
by a white person and in others by an African-American. Id. The intensity of the
shock was a measure of direct aggression, and the duration was a measure of indirect
aggression. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 554.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. This Article is merging the theories of Allport on the formation of categories
and stereotyped labeling and the studies of Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe that support
Allport's theory of the social and historical influences of racial bias on the formation
of those categories. See Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 548-56.
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volve the anonymity of some of the experiments, the social dis-
tances among the players in the judicial process and the rigidity of
the roles and lines of authority are analogous in many ways to the
test conditions where white test subjects were in positions of au-
thority over an African-American, and their actions were not sub-
ject to supervision or sanction.
Other findings demonstrate additional support that the con-
scious and unconscious perceptions of white fact-finders are liter-
ally and figuratively colored by biases derived from social and
cultural institutions.159 These perceptions are inevitably brought
into the courtroom process and may easily become manifest during
the trial, including the damages phase of the case, when empathy
towards the victim is so crucial to their assessment of the degree of
harm suffered. 160
Evidence from other studies found that in a teacher/student role-
play, whites expected to be treated more harshly by African-Amer-
icans who assumed the teaching (authority) role than by whites in a
similar role.' 61 In a shoplifting study, where an African-American
person and a white person acted out an identical shoplifting scene,
the whites who observed the encounter were more likely to sponta-
neously report and confirm the crime when the actor was an Afri-
can-American than when they observed the white actor in the
identical behavior. 62 Another study measured friendliness toward
a subject in an intercom experiment. 163 When the test subject
159. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 120, at 1188.
The second claim posited in social cognition theory is that, once in place,
stereotypes bias intergroup judgment and decisionmaking. According to this
view, stereotypes operate as "person prototypes" or "social schemas." As
such, they function as implicit theories, biasing in predictable ways the per-
ception, interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of information about
other people. These biases are cognitive rather than motivational. They op-
erate absent intent to favor or disfavor members of a particular social group.
And, perhaps most significant for present purposes, they bias a deci-
sionmaker's judgment long before the "moment of decision," as a deci-
sionmaker attends to relevant data and interprets, encodes, stores, and
retrieves it from memory. These biases "sneak up on" the decisionmaker,
distorting bit by bit the data upon which his decision is eventually based.
Id. She further indicates that empirical evidence shows that people's access to their
own cognitive processes is poor. Id. Accordingly, cognitive bias may well be both
unintentional and unconscious. Id.
160. See Schwemm, supra note 22, at 107.
161. Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 554. This perception is important because it
suggests a deeply rooted psychological rationale for their own bias, for example, my
treatment of "them" cannnot be so bad because they would do the same to me. Id.
162. Id. at 554-55.
163. Id. at 555.
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thought the intercom partner was white, the verbal friendliness rat-
ing was positive.' 64 When they thought the partner was African-
American, the friendliness rating was negative. 165 In an interview
study, similar results were recorded. 166 If the interviewee was per-
ceived as African-American, the subjects sat further away from the
interviewee, made more verbal errors, and terminated the inter-
view sooner than if the same scenario was acted out with a white
interviewee. 167 Finally, an experiment utilized a videotape that
contained African-American and white actors playing out identical
scripts that depicted two males in an interaction that culminated in
one shoving the other. 168 The African-American harm-doer was
perceived by white subjects as violent, but when the roles were re-
versed, the white harm-doer was perceived as "playing around.'
' 69
In this study, the white subjects also assigned personality attribu-
tions to the African-American harm-doers, but described identical
behavior by the white actor as situational. 7° Each of these studies,
except the shoplifting experiment, were conducted in laboratory
settings and the subjects all reported themselves on questionnaire
surveys to be liberal.' 71 The shoplifting study, however, carried the
added value of closely duplicating a typical life event without the
artificial qualities of a lab and its findings were consistent with the
lab studies. 72
There are three inescapable conclusions to be drawn from these
studies. First, non-verbal behavior generally lies outside conscious
awareness and therefore control is driven by perceptions and bi-
ases that each individual brings to a situation. 173 This partially ex-
plains the difference between the liberal self-identification of the
test subjects, the positive diminishing bias trend in racial attitudes
164. Id. (noting that friendliness was measured by a scientifically accepted voice
interpretation test).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 556.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 555.
173. See Krieger, supra note 120, at 1190. She notes that:
categorical structures-whether prototypes, stereotypes, or schemas-bias
what we see, how we interpret it, how we encode and store it in memory,
and what we remember about it later. In intergroup relations, these biases,
mediated through perception, inference, and judgment, can result in discrim-
ination, whether we intend it or not, whether we know it or not.
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reflected in questionnaire surveys, and the behavior results re-
corded in the unobtrusive bias studies. Secondly, whites still struc-
ture many aspects of their behavior on the basis of psychologically
rooted biases against African-Americans, and do so in ways that
are beyond their awareness. 174 Finally, although there has been a
marked improvement in the social compliance with the new social
norms of non-discrimination depicted in our laws, many whites
have not internalized these values and made them part of their
conscious behavior patterns. 75 As a result, many whites are still
overly dependent on external control inputs to achieve truly non-
biased conduct.'76 While social control is one of the functions of
our civil rights laws, the conduct of judges and juries do not oper-
ate for the most part, as subjects of those controls. 77 The person-
nel within our judicial system are much more dependent on the
guidance of their own consciousness, or the limited influence of
plaintiffs attorneys in awakening that consciousness as they try and
grapple with the complexities of a trial, including the unknown per-
ceptions of white decision-makers.
There are several possible mitigating factors that should be con-
sidered in examining the degree that perpetual biases can poten-
tially infect the judicial process. Many of the studies cited above
were conducted in the 1970s. If the survey data is accepted as ac-
curate, it means that the NORC trends toward greater racial
awareness and liberalization will have continued for the last
twenty-five years, and the process of white internalization of non-
racist views will have continued to move in a positive direction.
Some of the same studies that measured covert white hostility to-
ward African-Americans also documented how this learned behav-
174. Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 556-57.
175. Id. at 557-59.
176. Id. at 556-57. The Crosby study draws three useful conclusions. First, despite
the differences between attitudes and behavior about race, positive changing attitudes
project a progressive, though not always consistent trend. Id. at 560. Secondly, whites
are not the only group in society affected by bias. Id. Nevertheless, white institu-
tional authority remains stronger than institutions controlled by African-Americans.
See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS, BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UN-
EQUAL 22-23 (1995). Third, change from overt racism to subtle racism is a positive
change. Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 560. "[W]hites have begun to comply with
an egalitarian and non-racist ideology." Id. One can be hopeful "that internalization
follows." Id.
177. See generally Krieger, supra note 120, at 1186-88. Her thesis is that our em-
ployment discrimination laws, with their requirement that the victim of discrimination
prove that the employer acted intentionally, assumes that we are always aware of the
motivation that causes our behavior. Id. at 1185. This, she points out, is contrary to
the theories and findings from numerous cognitive psychological studies. Id. at 1187.
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ior reflecting bias could very rapidly be unlearned, or at least
controlled, at a behavioral level. 178 When non-racist behavior was
modeled under the same conditions as the aggressive behavior
teacher/learner tests, the white subjects not only moderated their
overt discrimination, but there was no discernable shift to more
covert behavior. 79 In other words, the principles and practices of
equality can be learned and internalized into new behavior pat-
terns with consistent institutional oversight and support. Another
test showed that when there was open censure of discriminatory
behavior, or the potential for that censure on the white test subject,
both overt and indirect aggression was moderated. 180 These find-
ings suggest that even reluctant whites can be brought around to
non-racist behavior through an institutional approach that vigor-
ously and actively promotes those values and carefully monitors
transgressions. Judicial studies on the status of minorities and wo-
men in the courts are positive examples of such an effort. 8 ' While
it may still be too soon to determine the degree of change that has
been brought about by those efforts, they represent an awareness
that eliminating bias requires a conscious and consistent effort. As
laudable as these efforts are, it is not at all clear whether they have
had sufficient reach into the profession and the judiciary to miti-
gate broader social trends from the nation's deeply rooted racial
past.
B. Evidence of Racial Bias in Tort Litigation
Since the Supreme Court formally linked recovery for emotional
harm in housing discrimination cases to the dignitary tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, the field of tort law is a likely
source for insights into the presence of racial bias in the judicial
process. This is a particularly salient field since both discrimination
cases and tort litigation focus on the degree and value of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff. Two recent commentators have offered
evidence of two forms of racial bias in the field of tort law. One is
structural, where the preference for formal economic determinants
translates the reality of lower earnings for African-Americans into
a projection of future potential worth.'82 The other is a more sys-
178. Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 552.
179. Id. at 554.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MI-
NORITIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-9 (1991).
182. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 480-89 (1998) (arguing that the basic categories of physical
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
temic bias that supports this Article's thesis of racial mispercep-
tions leading to a chronic undervaluing of African-American
suffering.' 8 3 The structural bias in the process of valuing African-
American claims is depicted in the process of utilizing economic
data to extrapolate an "objective" measure of the worth of an in-
jury.'84 This process inevitably captures the lower earnings of Afri-
can-Americans, which at a societal level is directly linked to
discrimination, and projects that figure into potential future earn-
ings as if all the discriminatory disabilities of the past and present
must inevitably continue into the future. '85 The racial blind spot,
represented by the inability of many white jurists to see this as a
perpetuation of past discrimination and to take steps to eliminate
it, is another example of how the African-American plaintiff is per-
ceived through a racially skewed reality.'86 The available data con-
firms the detrimental economic effects of the continued use of this
standard. In one study, even after adjustments to account for dif-
ferent diseases, general occupation, and age, awards for African-
American plaintiffs were significantly lower than for similarly situ-
ated whites, and in another, averaged only seventy-four percent of
the average white award.' 87
The systemic bias in the field of tort litigation raises different
issues than those confronted in most housing discrimination cases.
In some key aspects, however, they are related. In the typical FHA
case, the plaintiff will only receive compensation if she proves that
she suffered harm, and that it was caused by the conduct of the
injury, property damage, emotional harm, and related harm all reflect deep gender
and racial biases that tend to go unnoticed and unchallenged because they are based
on traditional white middle class male norms ranging from the reasonable man to
comparative actuarial tables).
183. See Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial
Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 774-77 (1996) (offering data and examples of racial
bias in the courts, the personal injury bar, and the law itself, all of which operate to
the disadvantage of African-American plaintiffs and frequently result in the devalua-
tion of their claims).
184. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race Specific and Gender Spe-
cific Economic Data In Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 73, 75 (1994) (arguing that the persistent use of economic data that explicitly
utilizes gender and racial classifications is an unjustifiable racial classification, and is
therefore unconstitutional). She further points out the failure of the law to address
the discriminatory effects of job bias, and the continuation of those disabilities into so
called objective measures of lost future earning potential, reflecting not only a racial
bias in the legal process itself, but continuing support for that bias by judges who
refuse to be receptive to alternative formulations. Id. at 75-77.
185. Id. at 75.
186. Chamallas, supra note 182, at 489.
187. Chamallas, supra note 184, at 87.
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defendant.188 As in the typical tort case, some elements of harm
are relatively straightforward. 18 9 But proving the elements of emo-
tional harm in the damages phase of a housing discrimination case,
as in its tort counterpart, involves more than just presenting factual
evidence. It also involves getting judges to understand the case
from the perspective of the plaintiff even though emotional harm
from discrimination is probably far removed from both their expe-
rience and their knowledge. 19° While both civil tort and Title VIII
litigation require direct evidence that emotional harm occurred,
the evaluation of that evidence and the assignment of a monetary
value to it require some understanding and insight into the manner
in which racial discrimination operates.1 91 The fact-finders must
develop a degree of empathy that permits them to evaluate the
experience of discrimination from the perspective of a person of
color. This does not mean uncritically accepting each of the plain-
tiff's assertions as true, but neither can it begin with extreme skep-
ticism about whether discrimination is little more than mildly
embarrassing or inconvenient.1 92 When these cases are viewed in
context, a fuller sense of the real extent of the harm that results
from discrimination can emerge, and a more accurate and mean-
ingful value can be assigned to the harm. Getting fact-finders to
reach that point brings into question issues of perspective, experi-
ence, comprehension, and empathy, as well as all the traditional
legal skills that plaintiff's attorneys must employ to present their
evidence.193 Unfortunately, what the data from a critical race per-
spective on tort litigation reveals is that far too often the depth of
understanding for full fairness for persons of color in the process is
lacking, and the steps necessary to achieve a better understanding
are not being taken.1 94 Other studies of tort litigation have found
188. DOBBS, supra note 50, at 1047-53.
189. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, 25-32.
190. McClellan, supra note 183, at 794.
191. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 121 ("intangible factors will often influence the
judge or jury").
192. While considerable progress has been made, skepticism as well as possible bias
still may influence low jury awards. See Schwemm, supra note 22, at 106-07.
193. See Arlene Sheskin, Trial Courts on Trial: Examining Dominant Assumptions,
in COURTS AND JUDGES 77, 79-82 (James A. Cramer ed., 1981) (describing courtroom
hierarchy affecting decision-making).
194. McClellan, supra note 183, at 771. He points out that "[t]he widely shared
perception of people of color regarding the pervasiveness of the color line issue are
sufficient grounds for discussion of the issue," and he calls for racial orientation and
sensitivity training for judges. Id. at 771, 794. Professor McClellan calls for systematic
empirical studies to examine issues of differential treatment of African-Americans,
particularly in the tort system. Id. at 772-73.
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systemic gender bias in the judicial process as well.1 95 As Professor
McClellan points out, "unfortunately, race often precludes close
empathy with members of other races in tort cases. Race also in-
fluences one's view of what is 'outrageous conduct."" 96
C. The Institutional Devaluation of African-American Life:
Death Penalty Examples
One of the most dramatic examples of how facts can be distorted
when they are examined through a racial prism, occurred with the
Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp. 197 In analyzing
the claim of systematic racial discrimination in capital sentencing,
the Court's decision turned in significant part on their review of a
statistical analysis of the impact of race on the likelihood of capital
punishment, later to be known as the Baldus study.198 This statisti-
cal analysis demonstrated that when capital sentencing is evaluated
even from the perspective of the criminal law's goal of retribution,
the practices of Georgia prosecutors demonstrated that the value
to society of the loss of a white life was four times that of the loss
of an African-American life. 199 A fuller review of race discrimina-
tion in the criminal justice system is beyond the scope of this Arti-
195. In summarizing this finding from a number of judicial commissions, Professor
Judith Resnick quotes from a report by one such body in New York. "The perception
is that minorities are stripped of their human dignity, their individuality and their
identity in their encounters with the court system[.]" Judith Resnick, Ambivalence:
The Resiliency of Culture in the United States, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525, 1534. She adds
that "[p]hrases like 'there is evidence that bias occurs with disturbing frequency at
every level of the legal profession and court system' are uttered, repeated, printed,
pronounced, but without much in terrorem effect." Id. She also notes that
"[u]nexplained disparities in treatment correlate with membership in minority groups
and even with gender." Id. at 1533.
196. McClellan, supra note 183, at 786.
197. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
198. See id. at 286; Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle:
Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing,
1998 Sup. Cr. REV. 145,146 (1998). "McCleskey's primary evidence in support of this
claim was the so-called Baldus study, a sophisticated statistical analysis performed by
Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth of the role
played by race in capital sentencing proceedings in Georgia in the 1970s." Id. "The
results of the Baldus study are striking. The race of the victim was an overwhelmingly
important indicator of the likelihood that a capital sentence would be imposed." Id.
at 147. "After controlling for the thirty-nine most relevant nonracial variables, mur-
derers of whites were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as murderers of
blacks." Id. While this data was used to demonstrate the discriminatory application of
capital sentencing, it also underscores the diminished value of the African-American
victim. Id. at 148.
199. See id. at 149. "[W]e claim that the statistics create a strong suspicion of race
discrimination-specifically, an overvaluation of the white victim's life." Id. at 168.
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cle. Yet, it is difficult to imagine how judges and juries in the civil
system can fully comprehend the reasonable measure of the harm
caused by discrimination when they are surrounded by daily exam-
ples of racism reinforced by the institutionally accepted diminished
value of an African-American's life represented by the McCleskey
example.2 °° The skewed social perspectives that are exhibited in
countless criminal cases because of race suggest that seeing an Af-
rican-American in a whole, complete, human dimension, consider-
ing only that individual's faults and virtues, is truly one of the
casualties of racial discrimination in our society.0 1
D. Evidence of Unconscious Bias by Judges
In 1968, a group of Mexican-American activists were charged
with violating the California Criminal Code.20 2 As part of their de-
fense strategy they challenged the composition of the grand jury
that had issued the indictments, alleging that there was racial bias
in the selection of the grand jury in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.203 During the subsequent trial, an unusual event oc-
curred.2 4 At that time, the California court system allowed judges
to select from the grand jury pool those who would actually serve
as grand jurors.20 5 In the suit brought on behalf of the Mexican-
American activists, the judges who had participated in that selec-
tion process had to respond to the allegations that they had com-
mitted acts of discrimination.2 °6 There was no factual dispute that
almost all the Mexican-Americans in the pool were passed over. °1
The critical issue was whether the conduct of the judges demon-
strated the required discriminatory intent to meet the standard es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis.2 8
200. The term institutional racism is used in a sociological sense, which is obviously
different from the accepted legal rules that define "discrimination" in their various
judicial contexts. See Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 554.
201. For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of race on the criminal justice pro-
cess, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997).
202. Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory
of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721 (2000).
203. Id. at 1722.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1832. In Washington v. Davis, the Court distinguished between laws that
had a discriminatory impact on a protected class and those that had an adverse impact
on a protected class but were formulated with a discriminatory motive. 426 U.S. 229
(1976); Lopez, supra note 202, at 1832. It held that motive, or intent was a necessary
element in order to make out a prima facie case of an Equal Protection Clause viola-
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During the trial, more than one hundred judges testified under
oath about the criteria that they used in their selection process.2"9
While the equal protection claim was ultimately and predictably
unsuccessful, the testimony of the judges provided a unique picture
of the operation of racial bias in the judicial process. The tran-
scripts of thirty-three of the judges were reviewed by Professor Lo-
pez and revealed that when each judge was asked if their actions
were motivated by any intent to discriminate against the potential
Mexican American grand jurors, they each denied any discrimina-
tory motive.210 In stating this emphatic denial, they were probably
all aware that for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, she had to show that the discrimination was inten-
tional and not the result of non-racially motivated influences. 21' In
fact, many of the judges may have honesty believed themselves and
their process to be completely unbiased. 1 2
But despite their testimony, it is difficult to reconcile the contra-
diction between their behavior, its results, and their perception of
their conduct. Professor Lopez saw in this transcript a rare oppor-
tunity to examine the behavior of an aggregate of judges who influ-
ence the operation of the criminal justice system throughout a
county.21 3 He argued that to understand their conduct more fully,
the inherently rationalizing "intent" standard has to be ex-
amined.214 In critiquing the manner in which courts have em-
braced this rule, he explained the inherent deficiency in the
standard through a theory from the field of social psychology
called institutional analysis. 215 It:
reveals that racism occurs through the purposeful embrace of
racial institutions, but also through the non-conscious subscrip-
tion to racial background understandings and practices. In the
latter instances, explicit references to race occur infrequently; to
tion. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
209. Lopez, supra note 202, at 1722.
210. Id. at 1730-47, 1757-61, 1845-76.
211. Id. at 1786.
212. More recently, an article directed to defendants in Title VII cases advised that
since the law itself focuses only on behavior, that white defendants should not be
concerned about any "private" attitudes or feelings that they have about race. Stan-
ley L. Brodsky et al., Racial Inquiries in Depositions and Trials, 26 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 533, 536 (1998). In fact, white defendants are advised by some authors that "one
can hold a variety of private racial attitudes and not act in a discriminatory manner."
Id.
213. Lopez, supra note 202, at 1722.
214. Id. at 1833.
215. Id. at 1723-28, 1825-44.
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the contrary, emphatic, heartfelt denials of racist motives often
accompany institutional racism. Moreover, institutional analysis
shows that remedying nonintentional racism requires openly ad-
dressing the role of racial institutions in human cognition. To
end non-conscious reliance on racial institutions requires frank
references to race; without such attention, racial institutions will
persist, unrecognized but prevalent.2 16
He further argues that some of the fault for the continuation of
this type of discrimination lies in the structure of the anti-discrimi-
nation laws themselves.217 For example, the intent standard reveals
a striking contradiction between the law's definition of discrimina-
tion as a consciously motivated act, and the well-documented so-
cial/psychological studies that reveal subtle, but significant biases
more often lie beneath the surface of these conscious acts, but are
no less determinative of behavior than if they were based on obvi-
ous logical choices. 218 The thirty-three judges in the Lopez study
were first blinded by the unconscious nature of their views on Mex-
ican-Americans, but this denial was further legitimized and rein-
forced by a legal standard that explicitly excluded any deeper
analysis. It is precisely this deeper inquiry that is essential to equip
fact-finders with the ability to see the full impact of emotional
harm that results from discrimination.
Psychological theories of cognition and behavior support the ar-
gument that as long as the culture contains innumerable elements
of racism and they are not met with a consistent and evolving
counterforce, those factors will continue to be reflected in cogni-
tive functions. 219 Until recently, there has been a distinctive disso-
216. Id. at 1838.
217. Id. at 1757-64. Professor Lopez's article is a cogent critique of the contradic-
tion between the legal standard of intent in Equal Protection cases and the uncon-
scious behavior patterns that have been documented in institutional theory. Id.
218. Id.; see Krieger, supra note 120, at 1167.
[D]isparate treatment jurisprudence-indeed the entire normative structure
of anti-discrimination law-is based on an assumption that decisionmakers
possess "transparency of mind," that they can accurately identify why they
are about to make, or have already made, a particular decision. According
to this view, if an employee's protected group status is playing a role in an
employer's decisionmaking process, the employer will be aware of that role,
even if he is not honest (or careless) enough to admit it. Equipped with
conscious self-awareness, well-intentioned employers become capable of
complying with the law's proscriptive injunction not to discriminate. They
will monitor their decisionmaking processes and prevent prohibited factors
from affecting their judgments.
Id.
219. Krieger, supra note 120, at 1174-77.
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nance between the legal structures and institutions and what is
known about human cognition, decision-making, and behavior.220
Legal rules, like the intent standard, have been premised on the
belief of a rational, knowledgeable decision-maker. In fact, this
premise of rationality is central to the operation of our legal sys-
tem. Whether one functions as judge or member of a jury, she is
assumed to be able to carefully review evidence, filter out extrane-
ous signals, including any biases, and reach rational conclusions.22'
What social science studies have demonstrated, and what many
people of color involved in the legal system have been arguing for
years, is that the filtering out of racial stereotypes and biases is
seldom as simple, logical, and direct, as a voir dire instruction to be
fair and open-minded.222 Whether this process is analyzed through
the behaviorist theories of bias,223 or more recent cognitive theo-
ries,224 or institutional analysis, 225 the results for victims of housing
discrimination and other forms of bias are the same. Without a
more open awareness and willingness to accept the passive nature
of racial bias, their actual experience and the real effects of dis-
crimination on persons of color cannot be fully accepted, under-
stood, appreciated, or valued though monitory compensation.
III. ADDRESSING EMOTIONAL HARM THROUGH LITIGATION
A. Cycles: The Persistence of Discrimination in the
Housing Market
In many ways, this Article has been discussing the effects of a
series of cycles. On a macro level, there is a cycle that begins with
segregated living patterns and the natural tendency to stereotype,
which in turn fosters prejudice, leading to discrimination and a per-
petuation of segregated living. Left unabated, the cycle is self-per-
petuating, deeply troubling, and at the root of many of society's
most persistent problems.226 At its core, this cycle is based on
ignorance.
220. Lopez, supra note 202, at 1757-64.
221. Krieger, supra note 120, at 1167.
222. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED 3-10 (1979); DERRICK
BELL, FACES AT THE Bol-roM OF THE WELL 1-14, 111.-14 (1992). Both these volumes
offer an extensive critique of the alleged racial neutrality of the law and the amelio-
rating effects of the application of the last forty years of our civil rights laws.
223. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 206-18.
224. Krieger, supra note 120, at 1186-1211.
225. Lopez, supra note 202, at 1785-1806.
226. For an interesting social science overview of the impact of housing discrimina-
tion on education, employment, and poverty, see JoHiN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OP-
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Figure 1
Cycle of Ignorance
Discrimination Segregated
Living
Tendency to
Prejudice Stereotype
To be sure, there are many forms of ignorance, including that
peculiar variety that is racial bias. Regrettably, there are some in
society whose fear and even loathing of those different from them-
selves may never be ameliorated with more accurate information
or sustained, diverse personal contacts. It is possible, however,
that education and an awareness of important, reliable information
can cultivate understanding for a meaningful number of those who
grapple in one way or another, with the vestiges of racism. 227 That
belief leads to this inquiry and an attempt to unpack the cycles of
PORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 135-58
(1995); see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 1-16 (noting the importance of
location in residential real estate as affecting prospects for property value apprecia-
tion, access to quality education and municipal services, as well as other measures of
upward mobility that are often the reward, at least for whites, for financial success).
227. See Gordon Allport's conception of racist behavior as being susceptible to
reformation through conscious social policy. See supra notes 117-125; see also Jack
Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and
Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 562 (2002). Professor Greenberg compares intermar-
riage rates between whites and African-Americans in the general population with the
rate among those who have served in "the armed forces, the most thoroughly inte-
grated institution in the United States." Id. The comparison is one measure of the
extent to which diverse personal contacts and more integrated living patterns lead to
significant changes in race-related behavior. Greenberg cites to a study by the noted
University of Michigan demographer, Reynolds Farley, who "found that white men
who have served in the military were three times more likely to marry black women
as white men who never served. White women who served in the military were seven
times as likely to marry black men as white women who were lifelong civilians." Id.
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ignorance that have manifested in an inability for many, to receive
full and fair compensation for the emotional injuries that flow from
housing discrimination.
The widespread persistence of segregated living patterns in our
society is self-evident to most casual observers. The work of Mas-
sey and Denton confirms in empirical terms what most objective
observers can easily gather from a drive through their
hometown.228 In an environment where one rarely has any sus-
tained contact with the "other," racial bias, drawn from the preva-
lence of negative stereotypes, often takes a strong hold.229
Prejudice in white communities and the housing discrimination
upon which it is based remains commonplace.23 ° Social science
survey evidence indicates that neighborhood preferences among
whites present a significant barrier to stable integration. A 1992
Detroit survey provides a useful illustration. The Detroit survey
found that four percent of whites would leave a neighborhood that
became seven percent African-American, fifteen percent of whites
would move if the percentage of African-American residents rose
to twenty percent, and twenty-eight percent would flee if African-
American integration reached one third.2 31 A survey performed by
NORC in 1990, indicates that the Detroit survey is representative
of national norms.232
These figures stand in sharp contrast to the survey evidence re-
garding the residential preferences of African-Americans which in-
dicates a willingness to live in multi-cultural settings. 233 The same
Detroit survey found that while most African-American respon-
dents prefer to live in a neighborhood that was at least fifty percent
African-American, nearly all would be willing to live in an inte-
grated neighborhood where the African-American population was
as low as one third.234 Perhaps even more important is evidence
from the same survey that twenty-eight percent of African-Ameri-
228. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 86, 89, 93.
229. See Maluso, supra note 29, at 72-75 (analyzing the studies on reducing bias that
have shown positive results, including cross racial interactions of persons of equal
status, the importance that the interactions be sustained, the exposure of whites to
high status African-Americans, and the addition of interracial classrooms and interra-
cial learning teams).
230. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 92.
231. Reynolds Farley, Neighborhood Preferences and Aspirations Among Blacks
and Whites, in HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 168 (G. Thomas
Kingsley & Margery Turner eds., 1993).
232. Id. at 162.
233. Id. at 169-73.
234. Id. at 169-71.
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cans are willing to be the first to integrate a white neighborhood.235
Again, the 1990 NORC survey reflects similar results nationally. 236
Racial bias provides key players in the real estate industry such
as landlords, brokers, and lenders with an economic incentive to
discriminate. For example, typically, agents who operate in white
neighborhoods depend on white clients for business. As such, the
agent is likely to cater to the preferences of her clientele in order to
protect and promote her reputation within her client base.237 That
reputation may be significantly damaged if an agent introduces Af-
rican-American or Latino home seekers into white enclaves. Simi-
larly, such an agent's reputation could be damaged among other
brokers, potentially reducing the cooperation that is critical in the
real estate sales industry. This is a particularly powerful dynamic
in a market where increasingly, homes are sold through multiple
listing services which rely on cooperation among agents.238 Given
the ease with which housing discrimination can be disguised, strong
economic incentives often prevail over anti-discrimination statutes.
For more than forty-five years, "testing" or "auditing" has been
used as a reliable measure of discrimination. 39 Through testing,
researchers obtain direct comparisons between the treatment re-
ceived by white housing applicants as compared with the treatment
accorded to equally qualified minority applicants. 24' Testing on a
235. Id. at 171.
236. Id.
237. In the Columbia Fair Housing Clinic, clients are often unsure of where to place
responsibility for the discrimination they have suffered. Frequently, the clients' at-
tempts to secure housing brings them into contact with a wide range of actors, includ-
ing employees of the owners, brokers, and sometimes the owners themselves. In
investigating these cases as part of the litigation process, there is a great deal of fin-
ger-pointing on the part of agents who claim that they were only following the direc-
tives of their principals. The application of a strict vicarious liability standard by the
courts is, in part, a response to this phenomenon. In the ordinary course, principals
are not allowed to hide behind the actions of their agents. SCHWEMM, supra note 18,
at 12-31 to 12-32. Similarly, agents are not allowed to escape liability by claiming that
their actions were taken at the behest of their principals. Id. at 12-39; see, e.g., Jan-
kowski Lee & Assoc. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 896-97 (7th Cir. 1996); Cabrera v.
Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 385-89 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 876 (1994);
Green v. Century 21, 740 F.2d. 460, 462, 465 (6th Cir. 1984); Hobson v. George Hum-
phreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344, 352 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
238. See YINGER, supra note 226, at 180-81.
239. John Yinger, Testing for Discrimination in Housing and Related Markets, in A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING
27, 28 (Michael Fix & Margory Austin Turner eds., 1999), available at http://
www.urban.org/civi/report-card.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
240. Id. In a typical fair housing test, equally qualified housing applicants, one
white and one African-American, seek the same housing accommodation at closely
timed intervals and record the results of their encounters. Id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
broad scale in discrete housing markets can reveal the extent to
which discrimination occurs within that market. In 1977, the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"),
funded the Housing Market Practices Survey ("HMPS"), the first
national study of housing discrimination against African-Ameri-
cans.24" ' Through HMPS, 3,264 tests were conducted in forty met-
ropolitan areas revealing evidence of significant discrimination
against African-Americans in both the sales and rental markets.242
Moreover, the HMPS report is credited with playing a "major role"
in the eventual passage of the 1988 amendments to the FHA.243
In the years since the HMPS report, an impressive number of
additional studies have been performed. In the period between
1977 and 1990, at least seventy-two other testing studies were con-
ducted.244 Evidence of housing discrimination was found in all of
these studies.245
In 1989, HUD sponsored a second national testing study, the
Housing Discrimination Study ("HDS"). Through the HDS, 3,745
tests were conducted in twenty-five metropolitan areas to track the
frequency of discrimination experienced by African-Americans
and Latinos in the sales and rental markets in 1989.246 The HDS
measured a wide range of discriminatory behavior and found that
there was a fifty percent probability that both African-American
and Latino applicants would encounter some form of discrimina-
tion in both the sales and rental markets. 247 The figures indicate
that fifty-three percent of African-American renters and fifty-nine
percent of African-American home buyers will experience one or
more incidents of discrimination while looking for a home.248 Five
similar studies conducted in individual cities in the 1990s found
that, "the gross measure of discrimination in rental housing is at
least fifty percent (and as high as seventy-seven percent) against
both Blacks and Hispanics" in some areas.249 In analyzing the
HDS report, Professor John Yinger applied a form of index that
resulted in a "net measure of the average number of acts of dis-
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 32-33.
247. Id. at 34.
248. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., Hous-
ING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS 42 (1991).
249. Yinger, supra note 239, at 34.
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crimination a black or Hispanic customer can expect to encounter
during each visit to a housing agent. ' 25 ° Using this method, the
HDS report demonstrated that African-American and Latino
home buyers could expect on average, "to encounter about one act
of discrimination each time they visit a real estate broker. '251
In sum, the available evidence shows that the frequency of hous-
ing discrimination, from the HMPS report in 1977 to more recent
studies in the 1990s, has remained constant.252 The inexorable con-
clusion drawn from the available statistical evidence was stated in
A National Report Card on Discrimination in America: The Role of
Testing, issued by the Urban Institute:
Overall, this research demonstrates that black and Hispanic
home seekers continue to encounter discrimination in many as-
pects of a housing transaction. They are told about fewer availa-
ble units and must put forth considerably more effort to obtain
information and to complete a transaction. These barriers are
not absolute, but they impose significant costs on black and His-
panic home seekers relative to comparable whites in the form of
higher search costs, poorer housing outcomes, or both.25 3
This macro cycle of segregation, ignorance, and persistent dis-
crimination spins off many micro cycles of harm. As discussed ear-
lier, in one such "micro cycle" segregation leads to a lack of contact
between whites and African-Americans, which in turn spawns an
inability to see the "other" free from assumptions and negative ste-
reotypes. 25 4 This devaluation of the individual permits for some,
the rationale that allows for discriminatory treatment and a disre-
gard for the emotional harm that is its natural consequence.
Where a class of people are seen as undesirable for association or
even inferior, it is likely that they will not be treated with the same
250. Id. at 36.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 34.
253. Id. at 36. Note also that there is a growing and compelling body of evidence
that indicates widespread discrimination against minorities in mortgage approvals,
lender advertising and outreach, pre-loan application procedures and loan terms, as
well as in the provision of private mortgage insurance. YINGER, supra note 226, at 63-
85. This might lead one to assume that the courts are inundated with housing discrim-
ination cases. For a variety of reasons, however, housing discrimination is not liti-
gated at nearly the rate at which it occurs. One important factor is the ability of
perpetrators to mask their illegal acts. Many victims of differential treatment never
realize that their membership in a protected class has just barred them from securing
housing accommodations.
254. See supra note 29. For an interesting discussion of the extent to which residen-
tial segregation has resulted in a profound lack of contact between African-Ameri-
cans and whites, see Greenberg, supra note 227, at 557-59.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
respect accorded to an equal.255 This psycho-social rationale for
discriminatory conduct contributes to the persistence of illegal
behavior.
B. The Importance of Diversity in the Bench, Bar, and
Professional Support Systems: Developing the Context
for Racial Empathy
Another micro cycle that is observed is rooted in history and
demographics of the legal system. One vestige of this country's
history of legalized discrimination in housing, employment, and ed-
ucation can be seen in the demographics of fact-finders: judges and
juries. Despite some positive movement towards a more represen-
tative bench, the judiciary remains overwhelmingly white. 256 For
example, the 1991 Report of the New York State Judicial Commis-
sion on Minorities found that of the 1,129 judges sitting in the
courts of the New York, all but ninety-three are white 7.2 5  The re-
port goes on to conclude that, "[F]or nearly three hundred years,
New York State has had little or no minority representation on the
bench. 258
The dissonance between legal standards, the presumed ability of
fact-finders to filter out bias and an emerging understanding of
human cognition, behavior, and decision-making, lies at the heart
of the undervaluation of emotional harm claims. 9 While there has
been a reluctance to challenge the impartiality of judges on the
basis of race, the need to do just that is imperative to ensure the
proper functioning and integrity of the legal system. 260 Advances
in the understanding of the cognitive and behavioral underpinnings
of decision-making and a growing body of empirical study on how
race can produce differences in perceptions on a wide range of is-
255. See, e.g., Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 546; Peggy C. Davis, Law As
Microagression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1561-69 (1989).
256. Demographics gathered with respect to the federal judiciary, for example, re-
veal the following statistics as of July 13, 2000. Of the 792 active judges: "82.7% white
(655), 10.7% African-American (85), 5.2% Hispanic (41), 0.9% Asian-American (7),
0.3% Native-American (2), and .1% Arab-American (1)." Alliance for Justice, Demo-
graphic Portrait of the Federal Judiciary (2000), at http://web.archive.org/web/
20010208193600/http://www.afj.org/jsp/pfjjan.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
257. 4 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES,
LEGAL PROFESSION, NONJUDICIAL OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES AND MINORITY CONTRAC-
TORS 94 (1991). Of the ninety-three "non-white" judges, only seventy-one are Afri-
can-American. Id.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 219-225.
260. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Pub-
lic Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 405 (2000).
1188
2003] EMOTIONAL HARM: LINGERING PROBLEM 1189
sues can foster an ability to approach the issue in a less judgmental
fashion.2 1 As one commentator observed:
The existence of a persistent racial divide between the response
of African Americans and whites to important social, economic,
political, and cultural issues evidences the enduring power of ra-
cial constructs. In countless surveys, African Americans and
whites reveal sharply different perspectives, particularly in re-
sponse to issues that explicitly refer to race. For example, blacks
and whites disagree about the meaning and power of discrimina-
tion. Because many issues not explicitly racial in nature carry a
racial sub-text, African Americans and whites also express dif-
ferent views about ostensibly nonracial issues such as increasing
aid for social programs, downsizing of the federal government,
raising taxes, and giving control of welfare to the states.2 62
These differences in perspective often play an active and varied
role in valuing emotional harm. Consider that, in New York, com-
pensation for emotional harm may be awarded upon proof of the
existence and extent of such harm, and evidence that supports a
determination that "a reasonable person of average sensibilities
could be fairly expected to suffer mental anguish from the inci-
dent.' '263 In bench trials, that can occur in trial courts and in all
hearings before administrative agencies, who is the "reasonable
person of average sensibilities?" Given the demographics of the
judiciary, far more often than not, that "reasonable person" is
someone whose sensibilities have not been affected by experiences
of discrimination and the trauma that is the norm, by medical stan-
dards. This does not make fair valuation impossible, but cannot be
seen as enhancing the possibility of a knowledgeable assessment.264
The "reasonable person" standard, in this context, is an attempt
to impose an "objective" perspective on what should be a fact-spe-
cific evaluation of harm as it is experienced by each plaintiff within
the context of that plaintiff's life. 265 Even when "objective" stan-
dards are not formally employed, the very nature of the legal doc-
261. Id. at 424-31.
262. Id. at 424-25. It is, of course, important to disclaim any suggestion that all
members of any group share the same opinions. The point, however, is that because
of the history and continuing power of racism in the United States, the experiences of
whites and African-Americans are often quite different and those experiences can
affect perceptions.
263. Batavia Lodge No. 196 v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 350 N.Y.S. 273,
278 (App. Div. 1973), modified on other grounds, 316 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1974).
264. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 93.
265. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-37 to 25-40; see Heifetz & Heinz, supra note
75. at 18-21.
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trine that applies to evaluations of emotional harm leaves ample
room for judicial miscalculation regarding the proper weight that
should be accorded to the evidence. This can occur through a lack
of sensitivity, inexperience, bias (unconscious or not), or through a
substitution, however subtle, of the judge's reaction to the discrimi-
natory behavior for the actual proof adduced at trial regarding the
plaintiff's reaction.266
Generally, judges in bench trials and at administrative agencies,
like juries, have enormous discretion in determining the size of
damage awards for intangible injuries such as emotional harm. 267
As a matter of course, the fact-finder's decision regarding the
amount of the award will survive appellate review unless it is
clearly erroneous.268
Trial judges have been repeatedly admonished to articulate the
bases for the awards they make.269  Adherence to this practice,
however, seems more the exception than the rule. 270 This, in part,
has led to great uncertainty in predicting the valuation of emo-
tional harm and to wide variations in precedent.27'
266. Ifill, supra note 260, at 417. In the words of Professor Ifill:
The intuitive sense that minority judges can bring traditionally excluded per-
spectives to the process of legal decision-making is consistent with the prom-
inent role race plays in shaping the perspectives and values of blacks and
whites. I deliberately speak here of both perspectives and values. Perspec-
tives might be defined as "ways of looking at the world" or the eyes through
which blacks "see" and "interpret" events, symbols, or people. Because per-
ception is the lens through which judges make decisions, the inclusion of
multiple perspectives in judicial decision-making is a critical focus of diver-
sity. Values are also critical to judicial decision-making. Values are the rules
or standards by which a community, based on its perceptions, organizes and
assigns worth. Values reflect "an enduring belief that a specific mode of
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable." Val-
ues are the principles which undergird our laws and legal doctrine. Judges
interpret law based on their perception of our core societal values. Both
perspective and values can strongly influence legal decision-making.
Id.
267. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-43.
268. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
269. See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 577 N.E.2d 40, 47
(N.Y. 1991); see also Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 7-8 (reminding readers that
litigants before HUD have the right, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,
to "hear why the judge rendered a particular decision.").
270. See Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 7 (recalling a "history of cases (in dis-
trict courts) with no apparent nexus between evidence of actual injury and the award
of damages to the complainant, and a paucity of published opinions explaining the
basis for the awards [in housing discrimination cases].").
271. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-34 to 25-35 ("Predicting the value of an indi-
vidual case is virtually impossible.").
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In addition to assessing the nature of the plaintiff's reaction to
discrimination, there are at least two other major areas of judicial
review in housing discrimination cases that are susceptible to the
same kinds of miscalculations stemming from bias, a lack of appli-
cable life experience, training, or sensitivity. The first involves is-
sues of credibility that are so crucial in the valuation of emotional
harm injuries. In the words of Alan W. Heifetz, the Chief Admin-
istrative Law Judge ("AL") at HUD, "[w]ithout doubt, the most
important factor in determining a damage award for intangible in-
juries is the testimony of the victim. ' 272 Judges and juries are the
chief "finders of fact" in our system of justice. 273 Assessments of
credibility are at the heart of what judges do to determine what is
or is not true, what did or did not happen. Perception is the lens
through which judges make decisions.274 Judges face the same
challenges as everyone else in our society, when attempting to ap-
propriately invoke their life experience and perspective in making
decisions.275 As expressed by Judge Jerome Frank, "[m]uch harm
is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and
taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and
strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking
machine. 2 76 Race, in turn, influences perceptions and judges'
sense of justice. 7 Such racial "cognitive drifts" among judges may
affect critical decisions including the credibility of an African-
American witness or the worth of an African-American expert,
both of which can adversely affect the valuation of emotional harm
damages occasioned by African-American victims of housing
discrimination.7y
The second area of judicial fact interpretation that can greatly
influence valuation outcomes involves an assessment of the egre-
giousness of the defendant's behavior. Professor Schwemm has de-
tailed the enormous importance of a finding that the discriminatory
acts were willful and, therefore, more likely to cause more severe
emotional harm.279 Questions of intent or willfulness are also
within the purview of perceptions that can be affected by racialized
272. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 19.
273. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
274. Ifill, supra note 260, at 417.
275. Id. at 432.
276. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943)
277. Ifill, supra note 260, at 434.
278. Id. at 445; See Davis, supra note 255, at 1571.
279. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-37.
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experience.28 ° Indeed, there is support for the belief that in our
society, with its deep racial divisions, the interpretation of "narra-
tives," as may be contained in the testimony of a defendant in a
housing discrimination case for example, are suspect. The suspi-
cion stems from the reality that narratives can be adopted or re-
jected when viewed through the lens of preconceived ideas, even in
the face of evidence or logic to the contrary. 8 The skewed
demographics of the judiciary invoke concern that imbalances in
perception of the kind outlined above may play a role in the under-
valuation of damage awards.
The dissonance between racialized differences in perspective and
judicial demographics may find expression in other features of judi-
cial action that dampen the capacity to secure awards that are more
in line with the emotional distress that is credibly experienced by
many victims of housing discrimination. One such phenomenon is
the appearance of an artificial ceiling on damage awards in certain
jurisdictions. Professor Schwemm notes the emergence of a
$10,000 per plaintiff upward benchmark in emotional distress
awards in the Seventh Circuit that stands in contrast to outcomes in
other circuits. 282
Similarly, the Court of Appeals in New York, in an opinion by
the Honorable Judith Kaye, who went on to become the current
Chief Judge, found it necessary to admonish the Second Depart-
ment for arbitrarily reducing a $450,000 award for mental anguish
and aggravation in an employment discrimination suit, to
$75,000.283 In a rare display of disapproval that, by implication,
extended beyond the parameters of the case on appeal, the court
cautioned the justices serving on the Second Department bench
not to routinely substitute their own abstract notions of an upward
limit on emotional harm awards for well supported findings of trial
courts.284 More specifically, the court reversed a decision by the
280. For a useful introduction to the various critiques of the intent standard, see
Ifill, supra note 260, at 450 n.214.
281. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1085 (1991).
282. SciiwEMM, supra note 18, at 25-40 to 25-42.
283. N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 577 N.E.2d 40, 47
(N.Y. 1991).
284. Id. at 217-19. Amici, including the Women's Legal Defense Fund, argued that
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department has a practice
of substituting their own judgment for that of the trial judge. Id. at 209. A large
number of Second Department cases were cited where trial court awards were re-
duced to a top amount of $5,000. Id. at 218-19. There is little doubt that this practice
caught the attention of the Court of Appeals and precipitated reference to the conten-
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Second Department that a maximum of $75,000 would adequately
compensate the plaintiff for what the trial ALJ described as, "the
most shocking instance of abuse of an employee by an
employer. "285
Another feature of judicial action that may serve to depress
awards can be seen in the different approaches taken by various
circuit courts in the application of the "eggshell skull" or "thin
skull" doctrine in cases involving psychological trauma. In the or-
dinary course, tortfeasors, such as the defendants in a housing dis-
crimination matter, "take their victims as they find them. ' 286 This
doctrine requires defendants to compensate plaintiffs for unfore-
seeable psychic injury flowing from preexisting conditions or
heightened sensitivity to discrimination. 287 As HUD's Chief ALJ
expressed the doctrine:
Housing discriminators must take their victims as they find
them; that is, damages are measured based on the injuries actu-
ally suffered by the victim, not on the injuries that would have
been suffered by a reasonable or by an ordinary person. Put
otherwise, judges must take into consideration the susceptibility
of the victim to injury. This rule can work either to the respon-
dent's financial advantage or disadvantage.288
tions of the amici. Id. at 219. The cases submitted to support the claim of a $5,000
ceiling were: Empbanque Capital Corp. v White, 551 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div.
1990); Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 542 N.Y.S.2d
681, 682 (App. Div. 1989); Cosmos Forms, Ltd. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 541
N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (App. Div. 1989); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. N.Y. Executive Dep't,
537 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869-70 (App. Div. 1989); Arthur Kessler Realty, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Div. of Human Rights, 524 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (App. Div. 1988); State Univ. Agric. &
Technical Coll. at Farmingdale v. State Div. of Human Rights, 520 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815
(App. Div. 1987); Wantagh Union Free Sch. Dist. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human
Rights, 505 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (App. Div. 1986); Matter of Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 500 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (App. Div. 1986).
285. Id. at 210. Of significance is that the Second Department sits in judgment over
a disproportionately large portion of New York. The Historical Society of the Courts
of the State of New York, The History of the Court, Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, 100th Anniversary (1996), at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/
elecbook/2ddept/pg4.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). As of 1996, more than one-half
of the population of the State resides in the Second Department and approximately
forty-two percent of intermediate appellate cases were handled by the court. Id. The
ten counties within the Second Department are: Kings, Queens, Richmond, Nassau,
Suffolk, Westchester, Putnam, Dutchess, Rockland, and Orange Counties. Id.
286. JOHN P. RELMAN, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL 6-12 (2001).
287. Id.
288. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 21-22; In Davis v. Mansards, a married
couple had been the victim of housing discrimination. 597 F. Supp. 334, 347-48 (N.D.
Ind. 1984). The court awarded $5,000 to the wife who had been, "deci-
mated.. .emotionally," but only $2,500 to the husband who approached the situation
with a "degree of cynicism" and was consequently, "steadied for the blow" even
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This rule, which applies to both preexisting physical and psycho-
logical conditions, has been followed in the Seventh Circuit.28 9 In
the Second Circuit, however, victims of housing discrimination may
not recover for preexisting psychic trauma.290 In a culture where
racism is common, the refusal to award harm in proportion to the
actual damage inflicted, in effect, insulates discriminators from the
proper level of economic exposure for their actions. In so doing, it
flies in the face of the stated purpose of fair housing laws.
Coming at the point directly, there is one empirical study that
specifically links race to judicial outcomes in discrimination cases.
The study, The Effects of Judges' Decision Making on the U.S.
Courts of Appeal 1981-96, tracked case outcomes in the federal
court.29 ' Among its findings are the following:
(1) black federal judges regardless of political party affiliation
decide cases in favor of plaintiffs in race discrimination cases at
statistically significantly higher levels than white male and fe-
male judges; and that (2) black federal judges are more likely
than even white female judges to decide cases in favor of plain-
tiffs in sex discrimination cases.292
The data from the study further reveals that an appellate panel
of three white Republican judges is likely to find in favor of the
plaintiff in a discrimination case only ten percent of the time. 93
The likelihood of drawing an appellate panel with even one Afri-
can-American judge is only twenty-percent. 94 Based on these
findings, Professor Crowe, the study's author, concludes that if
"'the number of blacks and whites on Appellate Court[s] reflected
their proportion in the nation,' . . . it would 'make a difference in
how race discrimination cases [would] ... be decided.'" 295
The study appears to directly suggest that the lack of full racial
diversity on federal appellate courts both determines the immedi-
ate outcome of discrimination cases and, in so doing, has played a
"though he suffered through his wife's depression while sustaining his own reopened
wounds." Id.
289. See, e.g., Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1228 (7th Cir. 1995);
Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1072 (1994);
Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1987).
290. Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 908 (2d Cir. 1993).
291. Ifill, supra note 260, at 454 n.234.
292. Id. at 454.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (quoting Nancy Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Decision
Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 1981-96 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Chicago) (on file with the author)).
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role in the development of federal anti-discrimination law.296 Ac-
cording to Professor Ifill, "[t]he empirical work of Professor Crowe
supports the weight of anecdotal evidence which suggests that Afri-
can American and white judges see racial bias differently. At the
very least, Professor Crowe's work demonstrates the potential im-
portance of judicial diversity to affect judicial case outcomes. "297
As is the case with the judiciary, the juries which often sit in
judgment on housing discrimination cases are composed primarily
of whites. 298 Here again the situation in New York is instructive.
The Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minori-
ties reveals that, "[m]inorities are significantly underrepresented on
many juries in the court system. '299 The report further finds that:
while displays of blatant racism are not common in today's
courtrooms, jurors' racist attitudes, whether or not they are ac-
tually uttered aloud, frequently determine the outcome of cases
involving minority defendants. Studies also show that hidden
racial prejudices can distort a juror's perception of the evidence
and events at trial.300
Certainly, the presence of an all or predominantly white jury
does not preclude fairness or an informed evaluation of emotional
harm. The lack of racial diversity in juries, however, results in a
situation whereby those responsible for valuing the trauma exper-
ienced by victims of discrimination are often not equipped with a
knowledge base, gained through personal experience or sustained
relationships with those outside the dominant culture, sufficient to
accurately assess plaintiffs' claims.30'
296. Id.
297. Id. at 454-55.
298. See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG & MARTIN T. WELLS, TRIAL OUTCOMES AND
DEMOGRAPHICS: Is THERE A BRONX EFFECT? 12 (2002) (indicating eleven percent of
federal juries and twelve percent of state juries are comprised of African-Americans),
available at www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/clcjm/civiljustice/Eisenberg.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003). Note that the statistics are based on a sample, albeit a
large sample, of juries. Id. at I n.1.
299. 2 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, THE PUB-
LIC AND THE COURTS 58 (1991).
300. Id. at 57.
301. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the
process whereby awards for emotional harm are calculated requires "wholly specula-
tive judgments as to credibility."). Speculation of this type necessarily implicates our
internal propensity to rely on stereotypes in forming factual conclusions. See Davis,
supra note 255, at 1566-67. There is strong speculation among trial lawyers concern-
ing the relationship between juror demographics and trial outcomes. See EISENBERG
& WELLS, supra note 298, at 2. Moreover, a review of housing discrimination cases
involving claims of emotional harm reveals anecdotal evidence indicating that many
of the higher awards occur in jurisdictions with higher concentrations of people of
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History and demographics also contribute to a cycle that makes
it difficult for those who suffer from the emotional harm caused by
housing discrimination to receive assistance and support from the
two professions that are in the best position to provide relief: the
legal and medical professions. Here again, the racism that has con-
strained the life choices of people of color manifests itself in the
demographics of lawyers and doctors.
A useful landmark for a discussion about the under-representa-
tion of minorities in the both the legal and medical professions gen-
erally is the demographics of the United States population. As a
point of reference, the minority group population, according to the
1980 census, was twenty percent.30 2 By 2000, whites comprised
only 69.1 percent of the population. 30 3 This trend towards greater
color. One such example can be found by comparing the judges' responses to emo-
tional harm claims in Portee and Broome. See discussion supra note 97. There are,
however, no known surveys that claim to correlate damage awards for emotional
harm with the demographics of the fact finders. Indeed, empirical studies seeking a
correlation between trial outcomes generally and demographics are rare. The most
recent and statistically comprehensive such study, known to the Authors, Trial Out-
comes and Demographics: Is there a Bronx Effect?, concludes that in federal jury tri-
als, "We do find a significant correlation between larger black population percents
and the likelihood of a plaintiff trial win in urban job discrimination, products liabil-
ity, and torts cases." EISENBERG & WELLS, supra note 298, at 1. At the same time,
the study concludes that, "[i]n federal court trials, we find no robust evidence that
award levels in cases won by plaintiffs correlate with population demographics in the
expected direction." Id. The study concedes that:
there are limits to what the available data can reveal. The data do not in-
clude the makeup of juries in individual cases. Therefore, evidence about
demographic influences on juror behavior is indirect .... Nor can the data
test perceptions based on the interaction between plaintiff and defendant
characteristics. For example, these data cannot directly test whether white
jurors are hostile to black plaintiffs, and vice versa, because the data do not
include the parties' race.
Id. at 9.
302. KENT D. LOLLIS & ROBERT D. CARR, LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, MI-
NORITY DATABOOK t (2002).
303. U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Table, DP-l. Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics: 2000 (2000), at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?ds-
name=DEC_2000_SFIU&geo-id=0OOOUS&qr..name=DEC_2000_SF1_UDP1
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003). In 2000, there were 194,552,774 people who were identi-
fied as "white alone" and this figure represented 69.1 percent of the total population.
Id. The manner in which racial categories are defined by the Census Bureau is inter-
esting. According to the Bureau:
The data on race were derived from answers to the question on race that was
asked of all people. The concept of race, as used by the Census Bureau,
reflects self-identification by people according to the race or races with
which they most closely identify. These categories are sociopolitical con-
structs and should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in
nature. Furthermore, the race categories include both racial and national-
origin groups.
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diversity will significantly increase in the coming years.30 4 Credible
estimates project that whites will no longer be in the majority by
mid-century.30 5 It is against this backdrop, that the demographics
of lawyers and doctors should be considered.
By early 1988, the population of lawyers in the U.S. had grown
to nearly 750,000.306 At that time, when African-Americans, Lati-
nos, Native Americans, and Asian Americans accounted for nearly
twenty-five percent of the United States population, that same
group accounted for only eight percent of this country's attor-
neys.3 °7 Current statistics indicate slightly more diversity within
the legal profession, but also some disturbing omens of retrench-
ment and continued under-representation. The American Bar As-
sociation's Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the
Profession 30 concludes that as of 2000, "minority representation in
the legal profession is significantly lower than in most other profes-
sions. ' '3° The report adds that, "minority entry into the profession
U.S. Census Bureau, Census Data Information, Subject Characteristic, at http://fact
finder.census.gov/servlet/MetadataBrowserServlet?type=subject&id=RACESF1&
dsspName=DEC_2000_SF1&back=update&jlang=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
The Census Bureau used "Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal
Data on Race and Ethnicity," a Federal Register Notice, published by the Office of
Management and Budget. Id. "White" is defined as, "A person having origins in any
of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa." Id. "It includes
people who indicate their race as 'White' or report entries such as Irish, German,
Italian, Lebanese, Near Easterner, Arab, or Polish." Id.
304. LoLLIs & CARR, supra note 302, at 1.
305. U.S. Census Bureau, Projections of the Resident Population by Race, Hispanic
Origin, and Nativity: Middle Series, 2050 to 2070 (2000), at http://www.census.gov/
population/projections/nation/summary/np-t5-g.txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). The
Census Bureau provides population projections across many variants. For our pur-
poses, these projections are done based on a lowest, middle, and highest series, with
the "lowest" representing the minimum projection that can be expected using their
methodology. Using the Bureau's "Middle Series" projections, the "White, Non-His-
panic" population will fall below fifty percent, to 49.6 percent by July 1, 2060. Id. The
ABA's Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the Profession predicts that the
United States population will be "almost 60 percent 'minority' by 2050." COMM'N ON
RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS'N, EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY, MILES To Go: THE PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, at
http://www.abanet.org/minorities/publications/milesummary.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2003).
306. GEOFFREY C. HAZZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION, 48-55 (3d ed. 1994).
307. Id. at 68.
308. This body was known as the Commission on Opportunities for Minorities in
the Profession.
309. COMM'N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, supra note
305.
Combined African American and Hispanic representation among lawyers
was seven percent in 1998, compared to 14.3 percent among accountants, 9.7
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has slowed considerably since 1995. '' 3 11 Moreover, "in 1999, the
total number of minority law graduates in the United States
dropped for the first time since 1985. ' 311
It should not be surprising that it can be difficult for lawyers who
have not experienced the pain caused by discrimination to under-
stand, appreciate, value, and pursue substantial emotional harm
awards.31 2 This is particularly important in that:
Attorneys ... are frequently the first, and sometimes the only
persons to whom the victim pours out the full story of his or her
experience. The attorney's.., verbal and non-verbal responses
during the interviews with the victim can either aggravate or al-
leviate some of the pain and anguish suffered by the victim. 31 3
Many advocates who seek to properly present a record in sup-
port of a meaningful award of emotional harm damages lack the
requisite personal and professional experience. 31 4 The few scholars
and jurists who have written on this subject commonly stress the
importance of creating an extensive factual record regarding the
manifestations and extent of the harm suffered.315 This requires
the advocate to fully appreciate the varied and often subtle symp-
toms of discrimination-based trauma that the client might manifest
and to have the facility to both elicit and present what is often very
personal information in a caring and persuasive manner. Experi-
ence and training are typically required, regardless of the personal
characteristics of the advocate.3 16 Differences in race, age, and
percent among physicians, 9.4 percent among college and university teach-
ers, and 7.9 percent among engineers. The only professions with lower levels
of minority representation were dentists (4.8 percent) and natural scientists
(6.9 percent).
Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See Davis, supra note 255, at 1561-64; Lawrence, supra note 115, at 519, 525-
26.
313. Michael P. Seng et al., Counseling a Victim of Racial Discrimination in a Fair
Housing Case, 26 J. MARSHA-LL L. REv. 53, 54-55 (1992).
314. Id.
315. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 19-21.
316. Id. The authors nicely articulate the challenge as follows:
Most attorneys and advocates who counsel the victims of housing discrimi-
nation are committed to the cause of fair housing and are sensitive to their
client's injuries. Nonetheless, they may fail to pick up on the real hurt and
trauma the client experiences during the interview. Because of the necessity
to channel the client's complaint into the forms specified in the fair housing
laws, the attorney or advocate may miss developing some of the unique inju-
ries suffered by the victim. This failure may seriously affect the outcome of
the complaint and it may further scar the victim.
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gender can sometimes inhibit a candid exchange of information be-
tween attorney and client. Beyond that lies the propensity for at-
torneys to focus only on "objective" facts, or presume an
understanding by the tribunal of the inherent pain associated with
discrimination.3 17
In the medical profession, the demographics reveal even less di-
versity. The best available statistics from the American Medical
Association indicate that in 2001, there were 836,156 physicians in
the United States.318 Of that total, only 2.5 percent are African-
American.319 The American Psychiatric Association, in its Position
Statement on Diversity, acknowledged that, "despite efforts to in-
crease cultural diversity among psychiatrists, data from the AAMC
and other sources indicate the continued serious under-representa-
tion of certain ethnic minority groups among U.S. medical stu-
dents, medical school facilities and departments of psychiatry and
practicing clinicians. '3 0 As this Article shall discuss below, these
discouraging demographics, combined with inadequate training in
the housing discrimination context make it difficult to find psychi-
atric professionals who have the training and expertise necessary to
recognize the wide range of psychological and physiological symp-
toms associated with the emotional harm that flow from housing
discrimination. A review of how we became aware of this problem
is illustrative.
When the Fair Housing Clinic began operation in 1989, most of
the cases were lodged at the New York City Commission on
Human Rights ("the Commission"). At that time, the Commission
was the place where many, if not most, New Yorkers went to pur-
Id. at 55.
317. Seng et al., supra note 313, at 55.
318. AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, TOTAL PHYSICIANS By RACE/ETFNICITY-2001 (2001),
at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/168-187.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
319. Id. Note, however, that the 2001 year-end statistics gathered by the AMA
contained race/ethnicity data for about three-fourths of all physicians in the United
States. Id. The AMA does not, at this time, know the race/ethnicity of thirty-one
percent of the physicians in the United States despite efforts to obtain better statistics.
Id. The AMA estimates that this leads to some underreporting in the number of
"minority" categories. Id.
320. See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on Diversity (Sept. 12, 1998), at
http://www.psych.org/pract-of psych/diversity_98.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). In-
deed, the "Position Statement" went on to note disparities in the treatment of minor-
ity patients indicating that, "[s]ome ethnic minority clinicians have been found to treat
ethnic minority and socioeconomically impoverished population." Id.
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sue discrimination cases on a pro se basis.32' The Commission
awards for emotional harm in housing discrimination cases were
quite modest. 322 Cases lodged at the Commission were tried by a
small cadre of administrative law judges. We thought that if we
could influence that small group of judges by providing expert tes-
timony on issues related to emotional harm, then we could better
represent our clients, provide a service to the Commission, and
benefit those pro se complainants that we could not directly assist.
We set out to identify a group of psychiatrists who would serve,
for compensation, as experts on behalf of our clients. Our students
scoured the psychological literature in an attempt to discover the
names of leaders in what we naively imagined was a "field" dedi-
cated to the study of race-based trauma. In so doing, we discov-
ered a few surprising phenomena. First, there is very little
scholarly writing on the race-based harm suffered by victims of
housing discrimination.323 Second, there are very few experts on
the topic and a dearth of empirical research in this area.324 Nar-
rowing the search became less of a problem than finding profes-
sionals with adequate training or interest in the traumatic effects of
housing discrimination. In the end, only a few psychiatrists who
321. Michael H. Schill, Local Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in
Housing: The New York City Human Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991,
1020 (1996).
322. See, e.g., Holley v. Koscielna, Recommended Decision and Order, Amended
Complaint No. FN36020190DN at 17, New York City Commission of Human Rights
(1991) (awarding $2,000 to each complainant).
In instances where mental anguish has been sufficiently demonstrated by
credible evidence, this Commission will award compensation in the form of a
monetary award. See Tindull v. Ko, Rec. Decision and Order, NYCCHR
Compl. No. FH304082489-DN (February 25, 1991), affd, Decision and Or-
der (June 25, 1991) ($1,000 mental anguish award ); Carrera v. Pi, Rec. Deci-
sion and Order NYCCHR Compl. No. FN264092288-DN (February 25,
1991), affd Decision and Order (June 24, 1991) ($1,000 mental anguish).
Id. at 14.
323. See Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Relatively
little in-depth research exists concerning the personal costs of discrimination and ra-
cial exclusion."). Valuable general references have been made by Professor
Schwemm in several of his writings. See, e.g., Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights, supra note 56, at 76-79; Schwemm, supra note 22, at 91-93. Most of these
discussions concern emotional harm generally and do not focus on particular aspects
of the issue that might be unique to the experience of people of color. Id. at 93-94.
324. See, e.g., David R. Williams et al., Race, Stress, and Physical Health: The Role
of Group Identity, in SELF, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND PHYSICAL HEALTH: INTERDISCI-
PLINARY ExPLORATIONs 71, 94-96 (Richard J. Contrada & Richard D. Ashmore eds.,
1999) (noting the dearth of research on the impact of discrimination on the health of
African-Americans).
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had acquired expertise in treating victims of discrimination were
located.
Ultimately, we began working with Dr. Hugh F. Butts, a promi-
nent psychiatrist with over thirty years experience in treating vic-
tims of discrimination.325 Through our work with Dr. Butts, we
learned that there is no formal training in medical school that
would introduce medical students to an understanding of race-
based trauma.326 Indeed, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
325. After graduation from Meharry Medical College in 1953, Dr. Butts did an
internship and then a Psychiatric residency at the Bronx Veteran's Adminis-
tration Hospital. He completed his psychoanalytic training at the Columbia
University Center for Psychoanalytic training and research in 1961, and was
appointed a Supervising and training Psychoanalyst in 1967. Concurrently,
he was appointed an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the Columbia Uni-
versity College of Physicians and Surgeons. Between 1962 and 1969 he was
the Chief of the Psychiatric Inpatient service and Associate Director of Psy-
chiatry at Harlem Hospital Center. From 1974 to 1979 he was the Director
of Bronx State Hospital with a one-year interruption (1975 to 1976) to serve
as the First Deputy Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Metal Hygiene. From 1974 to 1981 he was a full Professor of Psychiatry at
the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and from 1982 to 1986 has been
Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Meharry Medical College, Nashville,
Tennessee.
BuTTs, supra note 25.
326. See States Begin to Mandate Standards For Culturally Competent Services, Psy-
CHIATRIC NEWS, Jul. 7, 2000, available at http://www.psych.org/pnews/00-07-07/
states.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); see also ELENA COHEN & TAWARA D. GOODE,
NATIONAL CTR. FOR CULTURAL COMPETENCE, POLICY BRIEF 1, RATIONALE FOR
CULTURAL COMPETENCE IN PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (1999), available at http://
www.georgetown.edu/research/gucdc/nccc/nccc6.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
Among the findings are the following:
Nationally, health care organizations and programs are struggling with the
challenges and opportunities to respond effectively to the needs of individu-
als and families from racially, ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse
groups. The incorporation of culturally competent approaches within pri-
mary health care systems remains a great challenge for many states and com-
munities. Despite similarities, fundamental differences among people arise
from nationality, ethnicity and culture, as well as from family background
and individual experience. These differences affect the health beliefs and
behaviors of both patients and providers have of each other. The delivery of
high-quality primary health care that is accessible, effective and cost efficient
requires health care practitioners to have a deeper understanding of the
socio-cultural background of patients, their families and the environments in
which they live. Culturally competent primary health services facilitate
clinical encounters with more favorable outcomes, enhance the potential for
a more rewarding interpersonal experience and increase the satisfaction the
individual receiving health care services. Critical factors in the provision of
culturally competent health care services include understanding of the:
" beliefs, values, traditions and practices of a culture;
" culturally-defined, health-related needs of individuals, families and
communities;
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Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV"), which catalogs the variety of
mental disorders, and which is the most widely used measure of
both the typology and severity of psychological injury, does not
contain any description of racism, prejudice, discrimination, or any
discussion of the impact that those forces might have on the human
psyche.327
When one considers the extent to which racism has a strong and
continuing influence on the daily lives of so many, it is remarkable
that the medical professionals who specialize in healing the human
psyche often lack the training and personal experience necessary
for proper diagnosis and treatment. 32 Dr. Butts, has described the
prescription for this diversity deficit as follows:
" culturally-based belief systems of the etiology of illness and disease and
those related to health and healing; and
* attitudes toward seeking help from health care providers.
In making a diagnosis, health care providers must understand the beliefs that
shape a person's approach to health and illness. Knowledge of customs and
healing traditions are indispensable to the design of treatment and interven-
tions. Health care services must be received and accepted to be successful.
Increasingly, cultural knowledge and understanding are important to person-
nel responsible for quality assurance programs. In addition, those who de-
sign evaluation methodologies for continual program improvement must
address hard questions about the relevance of health care interventions.
Cultural competence will have to be inextricably linked to the definition of
specific health outcomes and to an ongoing system of accountability that is
committed to reducing the current health disparities among racial, ethnic
and cultural populations.
Id.; see, e.g., James H. Carter, Racism's Impact on Mental Health, 86 J. NAT'L MEDI-
CAL Ass'N 543, 544-46 (1994). The author points out that as recently as 1969, the
American Psychiatric Association ("APA") discriminated against its African-Ameri-
can members. Id. at 544-45. In 1972, the APA acknowledged that the racial attitudes
of APA members would have to change in order for its members to adequately treat
non-white patients. Id. at 545. By 1978, the APA recognized that culture could be a
critical element in diagnosing and treating mental disorders, and that "psychiatric
literature was replete with misconceptions, inaccuracies, and stereotypes of African-
American behavior." Id. Despite this resolution from the Task Force, however, resis-
tance by many white psychiatrists continued and misdiagnosis and mistreatment con-
tinue to be issues of concern. Id. at 545-46; see Maluso, supra note 29, at 56 (citing
studies that found that African-Americans were less likely to be seen by psychologists
or psychiatrists and more likely than whites to be seen by para-professionals). Studies
also found that "Blacks were hospitalized for fewer days than Whites, had fewer inpa-
tient privileges than Whites, were less likely to receive occupational and recreational
therapy that Whites, were restrained and secluded significantly more often than were
Whites, and were medicated twice as many days as were Whites." Id.
327. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV (4th ed. 1994).
328. Hugh F. Butts, Some Expert Witnesses Are Blatantly Biased, MEDICAL HER-
ALD. Oct. 1993. at 17.
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[c]omprehensive, adequate psychiatric training should include:
courses in ethnicity, culture, and race; opportunities for con-
ducting short- and long-term psychotherapy with ethnically or
racially diverse patients; and opportunities for short- and long-
term psychotherapy supervision with ethnically or racially di-
verse supervisors. Implicit in these training experiences is the
view that cultural factors influence psychopathology, and knowl-
edge of those factors is vital to the ability to offer sensitive, com-
prehensive, psychiatric care.3 29
This is particularly important now, given the demographic trends
that point towards growing cultural diversity within the United
States population.33 °
This paucity of experts and training can lead to serious repercus-
sions. Frequently, victims of discrimination, in an effort to main-
tain some degree of social effectiveness, attempt to deny the
impact of the discrimination.33 1 As a result, some people who
might otherwise benefit from consultation with a mental health
professional will not seek help.332 Those who try to find medical
attention face the prospect of treatment by someone without the
personal experience or training necessary to provide proper diag-
nosis and treatment.333 This fundamental lack of support from the
medical profession can have an impact, not only on the quality of
direct service provided to patients, but also on the ability of legal
professionals to fully understand and present a client's case.
D. The Continued Slow Recognition of Emotional Harm
The final cycle is one in which the under-valuation of emotional
harm by advocates, fact-finders, medical professionals, and some-
times the victims themselves, leads to inappropriately small
awards, diminished client satisfaction, a dearth of counsel who are
prepared to be retained under economic terms that most victims
329. Id.
330. The American Psychiatric Association has recognized this problem. In its
"Policy Statement on Diversity," the APA announced support for "the development
of cultural diversity among its membership and within the field of psychiatry (includ-
ing in undergraduate and graduate medical education, in faculty development, in re-
search, in psychiatric administration, and in clinical practice) in order to prepare
psychiatrists to better serve a diverse U.S. Population." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
supra note 320.
331. ABRAM KARDINER & LIONEL OVESEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION: EXPLO-
RATIONS IN THE PERSONALITY OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 302-03 (1951); see ELLIS
COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 32-36 (1993).
332. Davis, supra note 255, at 1565-68; see Heinrich, supra note 35, at 51.
333. Heinrich, supra note 35, at 51-52.
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are in a position to offer, and poorer remedial processes.334 This, in
turn, makes it less likely that substantial awards will occur at a suf-
ficiently frequent rate and contributes, to the ineffectiveness of
anti-housing discrimination laws.
Despite this, there is one reason that clients repeatedly cite as
the motivation for seeking legal redress for housing discrimination.
That motivating factor is emotional harm. Experience shows that
the upset and outrage that is the natural result of being denied a
basic human need, shelter, is the single most potent motivation to
litigate. In case after case, clients speak with passion about the
hurt that they have endured, their need to force those who caused
them pain to take responsibility for breaking the law, and their de-
sire to do what can be done to prevent the repetition of
discrimination. 335
It would be naive to assert that housing discrimination will van-
ish in the face of consistently high damage awards. Conversely, it
would be unrealistic and unduly cynical to suggest that the prospect
of significant compensation would have no effect on the willingness
of victims to pursue relief or that the specter of a large judgment
would not have an impact on some number of potential perpetra-
tors.336 In any event, it is certain that high awards have a direct
impact on the immediate defendants, counsel, and plaintiffs in-
volved in housing discrimination litigation.
Moreover, the power of precedent can be significant in its effect
on subsequent awards. It is difficult to read an opinion in a case
awarding emotional harm damages that does not rely on or cite to
334. There are very few providers of free legal services to victims of housing dis-
crimination. Housing discrimination litigation is typically a very costly endeavor
when done with the assistance of counsel who are paid at an hourly rate. It is rare for
private attorneys to undertake representation of a plaintiff in a housing discrimination
dispute on a contingency fee basis. This reflects, in part, a perception within the pri-
vate bar that housing discrimination cases rarely result in the caliber of recovery that
would economically justify the investment in time and effort that is required to prop-
erly pursue such cases. As shown earlier, mental suffering is frequently the most sig-
nificant item of damage in human rights law cases. See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v.
State Div. of Human Rights, 573 N.E.2d 40, 43 (N.Y. 1991). Therefore, undervalua-
tion can significantly affect the extent to which housing discrimination cases are
litigated.
335. There can be other motivations for litigating cases of this type. For example,
some clients continue to want the housing that they were denied. To the extent that
the desire to recover money or "get rich quick" is the primary motivation, it is un-
likely to sustain the type of effort and time necessary to see litigation of this type
through to completion, much less collection. This is particularly true where the avail-
able public information reflects a paucity of significant financial recoveries.
336. See Kale Williams, Foreword: Maximizing Damages in a Fair Housing Case, 26
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 1 (1992).
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the range of awards previously made by other courts.337 Though
the resort to precedent in arriving at or evaluating suitable awards
can be troubling, there can be little doubt that this practice is, and
will continue to be, commonplace. As a general rule, awards in
other cases should be viewed by the fact finder as instructive, to be
used as a guide, but not binding.338 The Second Circuit, in Martell
v. Boardwalk Enterprises Inc.,3 observed that there are, "difficul-
ties inherent in comparing one personal injury award to another
because of the differentiating facts in each case limit the preceden-
tial value of a court's treatment of awards in other apparently simi-
lar cases.''340 This is yet another reason why it is so important for
the impact of emotional harm to be fully articulated and properly
evaluated in each case.
E. Breaking the Cycle
In the early days of the Columbia Law School Fair Housing
Clinic, we began to experience some of the same barriers that we
would later learn were common to veteran housing discrimination
litigators.34' In our efforts to secure our clients' goals, we spent the
majority of our energies attempting to establish liability. We soon
learned, that it was just as important to spend at least as much time
preparing our case on damages if we were ultimately to secure ade-
quate remedies for clients.
Over time, experience has shown that measures can be taken in
the pursuit a meaningful damage award. These measures should,
in the normal course, lead to a trial record sufficient to support
higher awards. Further, and perhaps even more importantly, we
have found that the provision of competent and caring legal ser-
vices is itself a significant part of the healing process for many cli-
ents. In short, skillful, thorough, sensitive advocacy can constitute
relief. To the extent that an attorney can assist the client in prop-
erly presenting an important and personal grievance, that attorney
can validate the client's experience, promote the societal goals ex-
337. See, e.g., Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); N.Y. City
Transit Auth., 577 N.E.2d at 45-46.
338. Martell v. Boardwalk Enter. Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 1984); cf. Senko v.
Fonda, 384 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (App. Div. 1976) (noting that prior awards "may guide
and enlighten the court[s]").
339. Martell, 748 F.2d at 750.
340. Id.
341. For an interesting discussion of the early efforts to obtain meaningful awards
of emotional harm, see 1 KENTUCKY COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 56, at
23-241.
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pressed in the statutes, and assist the client in bringing some clo-
sure to a painful and psychologically destructive episode.
Presenting full and accurate information on the issue of emo-
tional harm to the court is a first step in breaking the cycles of
ignorance and segregation and making the victims of housing dis-
crimination whole. As a way of concretizing and illustrating the
more theoretical aspects of this Article, providing practical assis-
tance to civil rights advocates and their clients, and applying what
we have learned about emotional injuries, we offer our "Emotional
Harm Checklist."
INTRODUCTION TO USING THE CHECKLIST
Interviewing a client about feelings, particularly with regard to
housing discrimination, can be difficult. Feelings are often hard to
discuss with friends, much less strangers. In addition, many clients
feel the need to deny, to themselves and others, the harm suffered.
It is important to give thought to the process of interviewing on
this topic as well as to the content of such interviews. Much can be
written about how to encourage the discussion of emotional harm.
There are no universal solutions. For now, however, here are a few
basic suggestions. First, explain why you are asking such personal
questions. Illustrate how the inquiry is connected to achieving the
client's stated goals. Second, begin with open-ended questions
such as, "how did you feel at the time of the incident?" You should
make it possible for the client to speak fully and in her own words.
This is important because there is a fine line between conducting a
thorough interview and putting words into the client's mouth.
Open questions are also good conversation starters. Once the con-
versation has begun, you can move to the more narrow questions
suggested in the Checklist. The Checklist may also be useful in the
event that the client is not responding to your open-ended
questions.
Differences in race, age, and gender between attorney and client
can inhibit the exchange of information. Generally, such differ-
ences can be overcome by demonstrating a receptivity and sensitiv-
ity to information of this type. Victims of housing discrimination
frequently experience severe, confusing, and disquieting reactions.
Lawyers can short-circuit full expression by indicating discomfort
or skepticism regarding a client's response to the discriminatory
event. Many clients look for signs (verbal and non-verbal) that it is
okay to talk candidly about such personal, emotionally charged
issues.
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Tell the client how you plan to proceed with the inquiry, explain-
ing that no detail or sentiment is unimportant or unacceptable.
The structure through which facts are gathered can affect the qual-
ity and quantity of the information revealed by the client.
Consider proceeding chronologically. For example, ask the cli-
ent to discuss why she was looking for another place to live or why
she chose the dwelling in question. Then move through the time of
the discriminatory incident, and to feelings and events thereafter.
At each point, ask the client to tell you as much as possible about
she felt.
It is also useful to elicit comparisons between the way the client
felt, reacted, or thought before the incident regarding the topics
listed below, and how she felt at the time of the illegal conduct, one
week later, a month later, or more. Feelings and reactions that oc-
cur in response to discrimination change over time-sometimes for
the better, sometimes for worse. Indeed, finding out from your cli-
ent what it will take to recover fully, often sheds light on the mag-
nitude and lasting impact of the harm suffered.
Once there is a process for interviewing the client, the attorney
will want to conduct a thorough inquiry. The checklist that follows
is derived from cases, statutes, articles, expert testimony, and expe-
rience. It is included to facilitate a full inquiry and ultimately an
adequate recovery. Certainly, no two people experience incidents
of this type in the same way. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable
similarity in the scope and extent of reactions to housing discrimi-
nation. Those similarities are reflected in the checklist that appears
below.
THE EMOTIONAL HARM CHECKLIST
1) Background:
a) Where are you from?
b) Where are you currently living?
i) How long have you lived in this area?
ii) What is your age?
iii) What is your occupation?
c) What are your interests?
d) How often have you taken primary responsibility for
finding housing?
e) Were/are there other members of your household who
were/are depending on you to find housing?
2) Have you ever been involved in a housing discrimination
lawsuit before?
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3) Have you ever been involved in any litigation before?
4) Have you experienced prior incidents of discrimination?
a) If yes, at a later point in the interview, after the client
has fully described her/his reaction to the current dis-
crimination, ask whether the client's reaction to the cur-
rent discrimination is different from reactions to prior
acts of discrimination. If so, to what does the client
attribute the differences in reaction?
5) How would you describe your identity (with which protected
class(es) does the client identify)?
6) Is the client's membership in the protected class(es) with
which she identifies apparent to you upon observation? If
not, ask the client how she believes the discriminator knew
of the client's membership in the protected class(es).
7) The housing search:
a) How long had you been searching for housing before
this incident?
b) Why were you looking for housing?
c) What were you looking for in your new home (more
room, a home in a particular neighborhood, proximity
to schools, work, recreation, relatives/friends)? What
was your price range? What features or amenities did
you hope to find?
d) What symbolic importance, if any, did this new home
hold for you? (Was this the first time you were "on
your own"? Was the move something you had been
saving for? Was it to be a symbol of independence or
financial achievement? Was it the reward for hard work
or "playing by the rules"? Was it your small piece of
the "American dream"?)
8) The "subject premises" (i.e., the dwelling that is the subject
of the present controversy) ("SP"):
a) Fully describe the SP, (if you were not allowed to see
the SP, describe the ad that attracted you to the SP). If
the client became interested in the SP as a result of an
ad, get a copy of the ad and find out how long the ad
ran.
b) What (in detail) attracted you to the SP?
c) What plans, if any, had you made for moving in, reno-
vating, etc., (how emotionally invested were you)?
d) How far along in the acquisition process had you gotten
before being rejected?
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e) What actions, if any, had you taken in reliance, or in the
belief that you would be moving into a new home?
(These can range from telling family and friends that
you were moving, to leaving your prior dwelling or, in
some cases, actually moving into the SP.)
9) The discriminatory event:
a) In complete detail, chronologically describe what hap-
pened (i.e., the sequence of events that constitutes the
violations of law). Let the client determine where the
chronology begins and ends. At each significant event,
stop and ask the client what she was thinking/feeling.
You might consider audio/video taping the interview (if
the client is amenable and if you think it won't curtail
the information flow) as a way of capturing all of the
communication from the client.
b) Did anyone witness any portion of these events?
i) Who (name, address, phone/fax etc.)?
c) What portion of the events did she witness?
d) What aspects, if any, of your reaction to the discrimina-
tory events did she witness?
e) Is the witness willing to be of assistance?
10) Aggravating circumstances:
a) Was abusive language used? (get as near a precise quo-
tation as possible)
b) Was this a "public" humiliation in any sense? Where
did the discriminatory act(s) take place? Were family
members, friends or associates present?
i) If yes, how did their presence affect you?
c) Were there any other outrageous circumstances, such as
mocking, laughter, disdain or other forms of rudeness by
the offending party(ies)?
d) Were you lied to by the discriminator(s)?
i) When/how did you find out?
1. How did you feel when you found out?
11) On how many occasions were you in contact with the perpe-
trator(s)?
a) Describe what was said or done on each occasion.
b) What was your immediate psychological reaction to the
discriminatory treatment?
12) Did you experience any of the following common symp-
toms? (provide details/examples under each applicable cate-
gory):
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a) emotional numbing, feeling stunned;
b) withdrawal (usually to the home, bed, and away from
those in the home; often the client requests that she be
left alone.);
c) helplessness;
d) anger (if yes, how intense?);
e) feelings of inadequacy;
f) anxiety;
g) panic attacks;
h) constant reliving of the incident (interference with con-
centration);
i) confusion;
j) loss of control over matters that affect you;
k) feeling unwanted, unworthy, unappealing;
1) humiliation;
m) sleep disturbance;
n) embarrassment;
o) depression;
p) lethargy, inability or unwillingness to care for self or
others, not wanting to get out of bed or leave the home;
q) staying home from work or school? (If yes, give exact
dates.) For days missed at work, was there a loss of
pay? What excuse was given to the employer? Any
negative ramifications on the job or at school for missed
days? Get copies of time/attendance records or pay
stubs for corroboration;
r) inability to face day-to-day responsibilities;
s) diminished self-esteem;
t) negative changes in appearance ("letting yourself go");
u) irritability, lack of patience;
v) feelings of shock or disbelief;
w) tension;
x) mood swings;
y) morbid sadness;
z) mirthless smiling, sighing;
aa) inability to make decisions;
bb) engaging in self-destructive acts (overeating, increased/
renewed smoking, drinking, involvement with drugs,
inappropriate use of medications);
cc) increased dependency on others;
dd) lack of humor;
ee) blaming oneself for what happened;
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ff) feeling generally discouraged;
gg) Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (see the American Psy-
chiatric Association's "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders," commonly called the "DSM IV").
13) Compare the client's feelings and behavior before the inci-
dent with the feelings and behavior described in section 5
above.
14) In what ways have the client's reactions to the incident
changed over time, for better or worse?
15) Have you experienced any physical reactions to the discrimi-
natory treatment? Provide complete details under each cate-
gory. (The physical symptoms may be new to the client or
an exacerbation of past ailments. For example, the client
may either experience a stomach ulcer for the first time or
an aggravation of an existing ulcer.)
16) Have you experienced any of the following physical symp-
toms?:
a) hypertension;
b) ulcers or upset stomach/indigestion;
c) headaches (including migraines);
d) asthma;
e) arthritis;
f) loss of sleep/insomnia;
g) easily startled (hyper-arousal);
h) crying (if yes, describe the occasions upon which you
cried before the incident and compare with the fre-
quency and extent of crying after the incident);
i) loss of appetite;
j) diminished interest in physical pleasures (sex, exercise,
eating);
k) neck/back pain.
17) In the case of both psychological and physical reactions, was
a doctor or other health care provider consulted? Whom did
you consult? For what length of time? Cost? Was medica-
tion prescribed or increased?
18) Were your interactions with friends or family affected? If so,
how? (This is a very common and often destructive result of
discrimination. Pay particular attention to this inquiry.
Methodically probe into each affected relationship. Consider
calling the affected person as a witness to corroborate
changes in your client's behavior.)
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19) Describe whether and/or how you told your wife, husband,
partner, children, or friends about the incident.
20) If you have not told people you would ordinarily confide in
about the incident, why not?
21) Has the incident affected you on the job?
22) Has your job performance been adversely affected? In what
ways? Give details.
23) Have there been any job performance evaluations since the
incident? Any changes from pre-incident evaluations?
24) Has the incident affected your relationship with peers or
superiors on the job? How so?
25) Has the incident changed the way you interact with or view
people of the same class (race, gender, national origin, etc.)
as the discriminator(s)?
26) Has the incident changed your outlook?:
a) on life;
b) on your beliefs (Do you find yourself thinking, "I
worked hard, played by the rules and still was not
treated fairly"?);
c) regarding the faith you had placed in those you had
relied on ("my parents never prepared me for this");
d) regarding current events (becoming more conscious of
racism and other forms of discriminatory behavior);
e) regarding your prospects for the future.
27) How often do you think about the incident? Has that
changed over time?
28) Have there been other stress-producing events in your life
that would account for the above-listed changes? What are
they? When did they occur? How did you react to them?
How was/is your reaction to the other stressors different
from your reaction to the discriminatory treatment? Could
these, or other stressors be the cause of any of the changes
listed above? If not, why not?
29) Who can corroborate any of the psychological and/or physi-
cal changes listed above? It is often very helpful (though
not legally necessary) to have family members, friends, work
associates, and health care professionals corroborate the
changes you experienced.
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30) Have you continued the search for housing? Have you mod-
ified the search in any way (restricted the search to neigh-
borhoods where you are not likely to encounter future
discrimination, felt it necessary to "announce" your member-
ship in the protected class over the phone or in person,
etc.)?
31) What will it take for you to feel fully recovered? Do you
think that therapy is required? If so, how long do you think
the therapy will need to continue? Would validation or vin-
dication at trial aid the healing process?
32) How long will it take you to recover fully?
LAI
HOMELESS LEGAL ADVOCACY: NEW
CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS
FOR THE FUTURE
Jonathan L. Hafetz*
When large numbers of homeless people began appearing on the
streets of American cities in the late 1970s, a sense of crisis galva-
nized advocates, the media, and policymakers. 1 Now, over two de-
cades later, there are more homeless people than ever, and
numbers are rising rapidly, particularly among families with chil-
dren.2 The economic expansion of the 1990s not only failed to end
the crisis, but also placed greater pressure on housing markets,
driving up rents and increasing the scarcity of affordable housing
for low-income individuals and families. The recent recession has
caused a sharp increase in the homeless population, once again
making homelessness front-page news.4
Yet, the sense of shock and emergency has all but vanished.
Homelessness has been studied exhaustively by social scientists
and covered extensively in the media. Programs and services for
homeless people have become permanent and institutionalized,
with a system of public and private shelters, an array of service
providers, and legal rules governing the rights of homeless people.'
What was once seen as a temporary crisis has become a fixed part
of the social and political landscape.
This Article examines the role of lawyers for homeless people.6
It argues that while even the most zealous legal advocacy cannot
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1999; M. Phil., Oxford University, 1992; B.A., Amherst
College, 1990. The Author was formerly a staff attorney at The Partnership for the
Homeless in New York City.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 18-19.
2. See infra note 40.
3. See MARTHA BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA'S HOMELESS: EMERGENCY
SHELTER OR AFFORDABLE HOUSING? 10 (2001).
4. See, e.g., Editorial, Ending Chronic Homelessness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002,
at A24; Pam Belluck, New Wave of the Homeless Floods Cities' Shelters, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2001, at A1; Leslie Kaufman & Keven Flynn, New York's Homeless, Back
Out in the Open, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, § 1, at 1; Alexandra Marks, US Shelters
Swell-With Families, CHRISTIAN SCL. MONITOR, Nov. 29, 2001, at 1.
5. See Martha R. Burt, What Will It Take To End Homelessness (describing the
substantial growth of the homeless service system in the 1990s, including an increase
in available beds from 275,000 in 1988 to 607,000 in 1996), at http://www.urban.org/
housing/homeless/endhomelessness.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
6. See infra Part 11.
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alone solve homelessness, it remains an important tool because of
the assistance it provides to individuals, its impact on broader legal
rules, and its potential role in shaping public perception and
debate.7
The Article also maintains that legal advocacy works best when
combined with a holistic approach that addresses homeless clients'
non-legal needs, such as housing placement, case management,
medical and psychiatric care, job training, and substance abuse
counseling. It further argues that, to the extent possible, lawyers
for homeless people should focus their efforts and resources
around those areas that research and experience have identified as
the leading causes of homelessness and the most open to solutions.9
Part One summarizes the growth of homelessness during the
past two decades. It then describes its most prominent features
and underlying causes.
Part Two describes the evolution of homeless legal advocacy.
First, it looks at the initial wave of litigation during the 1980s over
the right to emergency shelter for the homeless. It then examines
the second phase of litigation during the 1990s that challenged the
attempts by municipalities to reduce the visible homeless popula-
tion through various measures, such as anti-vagrancy, anti-camp-
ing, and "quality of life" ordinances. While this litigation has led to
important victories and captured the public's attention (though not
always its wholehearted support), it remains only a part of the pic-
ture. Suing over the right to emergency shelter or the right to pan-
handle on streets or sleep in parks is critical to many homeless
people, but it does not address the underlying causes of homeless-
ness, such as the crisis of affordable housing, decreasing income
and public benefit levels, and lack of access to other needed
services.
Part Three outlines the continued importance of legal advocacy
for the homeless. It addresses critiques of legal service models, and
it explains why legal representation, though inherently limited, re-
mains vital to this vulnerable and disempowered population. It
then argues that, where possible, such representation should be tai-
lored to the problems that research and experience have shown to
be the most significant causes of homelessness and that may be
addressed through legal advocacy. It also discusses the potential of
litigation to affect public debate and dispel negative stereotypes
7. See infra Part i11.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part II1.
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about homeless people. It next describes the importance of devel-
oping models of legal advocacy in holistic settings where critical
non-legal needs of homeless people may be met. While lawyers
will not solve a problem as complex and deeply rooted as home-
lessness, they still have an important role to play.
I. HOMELESSNESS AND ITS CAUSES
There have always been homeless people in America.' 0 It was
not until the nineteenth century, however, that a large group of
transient, family-less laborers became institutionalized in Ameri-
can cities.1' During the worst years of the Great Depression of the
1930s, when one-quarter of the workforce was unemployed, the
number of homeless people skyrocketed, reaching as many as 1.5
million. 12 In the 1950s and 1960s, over a million people, many with
a history of mental illness and/or chemical dependency, lived in
sub-standard housing in skid row areas that were growing closer to
expanding commercial and administrative activities. 13 What has
changed is the nature of homelessness, the public's understanding
of the term, and the perception of homeless people themselves. 4
Since the late 1970s, the number of people without a place to
sleep at night has steadily grown. 15 Even during the economic
boom of the 1990s, homelessness increased. 6 In contrast to the
1950s and 1960s, when many homeless were single male adults
sleeping in cubicle and residential, single room occupancy hotel
rooms ("SROs"), the last two decades have seen a sharp increase
in the number of homeless people living on the street, including
10. See KENNETH L. KUSMER, DOWN AND OUT, ON THE ROAD: THE HOMELESS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3-5 (2002); PETER H. Rossi, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA:
THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS 17 (1989); see also E.L. Bassuk & D. Franklin,
Homelessness Past and Present: The Case of the United States, 1890-1925, 8 NEW ENG.
J. PUB. POL'Y 67, 68 (1.992) (noting that the profile of homeless people partly reflects
the country's social history).
11. KUSMER, supra note 10, at 147-67.
12. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 22.
13. See Jim Baumohl & Kim Hopper, Redefining the Cursed Word: A Historical
Interpretation of American Homelessness, in HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 10 (Jim
Baumohl ed., 1996).
14. See, e.g., KUSMER, supra note 10, at 239-42 (describing differences between the
"old" homeless and the "new" homeless, who began to appear in the mid-1970s); cf
BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-4 (noting that, in leading studies of the 1950s and
1960s, homelessness was equated with living outside family units, whereas today its
meaning is linked more closely to lack of housing or to living in shelters specifically
provided for homeless people).
15. See Baumohl & Hopper, supra note 13, at 10.
16. See BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.
2003] 1217
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
single women and families. 7 The term "the new homeless" has
been used to describe this new, more diverse homeless popula-
tion. 18 The past two decades have seen an unprecedented expan-
sion of national media attention, legal activity, government
programs, and not-for-profit service providers.
A. Defining the Term and Estimating the Number
The term "homeless" is itself of recent origin, purportedly
coined by advocates in late 1970s to describe the troubling phe-
nomenon of countless individuals, mostly adult males, sleeping on
the streets, in parks, and in other public places.' 9 Broad definitions
of the term include not only those people living on the streets and
in shelters, but also those who, lacking a home of their own, are
doubled-up with relatives or friends z.2 1 A narrower, more com-
monly used definition limits homelessness to those individuals who
lack a fixed and regular address and whose primary night-time resi-
dence is a public or private place "not designed for, or ordinarily
used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings," or a
shelter or similar facility designed to provide "temporary living ac-
commodations" for persons with no other residence. 21 How the
term is defined has important consequences, affecting popular sen-
timent, the allocation of public resources, and the delivery of care
by service providers. 22 The term has also proven useful to advo-
cates in arousing public concern and fighting for the right to shel-
ter.23 Some commentators note, however, that it has also shifted
the focus away from those not literally "homeless," but nonetheless
17. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 34-35.
18. Gary Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to Perceptions
of the Causes of Homelessness, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 218 (2000).
19. JAMES D. WRIGHT, ADDRESS UNKNOWN: THE HOMELESS IN AMERICA 19-21
(1989).
20. Id. at 27-28; see Peter H. Rossi & James D. Wright, The Urban Homeless: A
Portrait of Dislocation, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 132, 134 (1989)
(using a definition of homelessness that included the "literally homeless" and the
"precariously, or marginally housed persons" with a tenuous or temporary claim to a
dwelling of marginal adequacy).
21. See McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, renamed, Stewart B. McKin-
ney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (1995); BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at
6 (noting that the official definition narrows the homeless to "a fairly small proportion
of the precariously housed or unhoused population").
22. See, e.g., Rossl, supra note 10, at 45; see also KUSMER, supra note 10, at 4
(noting that counting only those "without domicile" underestimates the level of
homelessness in society).
23. See Lucie E. White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271,
291-92 (1990-91).
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with significant shelter problems,24 and limited the growth of more
broadly based anti-poverty coalitions.25 The use of the term can
also obscure just how diverse the homeless population is in its dem-
ographic composition and legal needs.
Estimating the size of the homeless population has been a signif-
icant source of controversy since homelessness galvanized national
attention over two decades ago.26 Estimates vary depending on the
methodology used, including whether a particular homeless count
is measured on a given day or over a period of time.27 In the late
1970s, advocate Mitch Snyder claimed that over one million people
were homeless; in 1982, he and Mary Ellen Hombs raised their esti-
mate to between two to three million.21 Some social scientists con-
tended that those figures were exaggerated. 29 A 1984 study by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") estimated that between 250,000 to 350,000 people were
homeless;30 a 1987 study by the Urban Institute put the number at
between 500,000 and 600,000 people; 31 a 1990 national survey
based on telephone interviews of over 1,500 adults estimated that
24. See id. at 300.
25. Gary Blasi, And We Are Not Seen: Ideological and Political Barriers to Under-
standing Homelessness, 37 Am. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 563, 564 (1994) (suggesting that
advocates should have fought for the rights of all those living in extreme poverty,
rather than focusing only on those who were homeless).
26. See BURT ET AL., supra, note 3, at 24 (calling estimates of the number of
homeless people "political footballs").
27. See Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, How Many People Experience Home-
lessness?, available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/numbers.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003). In addition, studies often fail to count accurately the numerous home-
less people who are not in places researchers can easily locate. See id.; see also Rossi,
supra note 10, at 46-52 (stating that not only do census counts often miss homeless
people, but also that those attempting to count the homeless face other problems,
such as the transience of the homeless population and difficulty identifying who is
homeless).
28. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS 1-2 (1994); see VICTORIA RADER, SIG-
NAL THROUGH THE FLAMES: MITCH SNYDER AND AMERICA'S HOMELESS 144 (1986)
(describing the role of Snyder, Hombs, and others at the Center for Creative Non-
Violence in raising public awareness about homelessness).
29. See, e.g., id. at 1-2 (suggesting that Snyder knew that statement was inaccurate
when he made it).
30. See MARTHA R. BURT, OVER THE EDGE, THE GROWTH OF HOMELESSNESS IN
THE 1980s, at 211 (1992). The HUD study was not without critics of its own. See, e.g.,
Kim Hopper, Whose Lives Are These Anyway?, 17 URB. & SOC. CHANGE REV. 12,
12-13 (1984). The study also sparked litigation over its methodology. See generally
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
31. BURT, supra note 30, at 211.
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8.5 million people were homeless at some point during the period
from 1985 to 1990.32
Dennis P. Culhane's "path-breaking" study of turnover rates in
shelters in New York City and Philadelphia, which produced an
unduplicated count of the actual number of homeless people in city
shelter systems over a period of time, revealed that three percent
of Philadelphia's population used the public shelter system be-
tween 1990 and 1992, and that three percent of New York's popula-
tion received shelter during the same period.33 The work of
Culhane and others conclusively demonstrated that homelessness
was a much more widespread problem than the government had
previously acknowledged.3 4 A recent study now estimates that be-
tween 700,000 to 800,000 people are homeless each night and that
between 2.5 to 3.5 million people experience homelessness each
year.3 5 The recent economic downturn, coupled with the impact of
federal welfare reform, appears to have caused another sharp jump
in homelessness.36 Yet, debate continues over the number of
homeless people who remain outside the growing network of shel-
ter systems. 37
Even more debate rages over the causes of homelessness than
the number of homeless people. These debates are not merely aca-
demic exercises, but influence how scarce public and private re-
sources should be directed. Although the homeless population
32. Bruce G. Link et al., Lifetime and Five-Year Prevalence of Homelessness in the
United States, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 347, 353 (1995). This same study esti-
mated that approximately 13.5 million adults, or 7.4 percent of the adult population,
had at some point in their lives been "literally homeless," which was defined as "street
and shelter" homelessness. Id.
33. See Dennis Culhane et al., Public Shelter Admission Rates in Philadelphia and
New York City: Implications of Turnover for Sheltered Population Counts, 5 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 107, 107-40 (1994).
34. See Celia W. Dugger, Study Says Shelter Turnover Hides Scope of Homeless-
ness, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at Al; see also Dennis P. Culhane, Defining, Count-
ing, and Tracking the Homeless Institution, in UNDERSTANDING HOMELESSNESS: NEW
POLICY AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 5, 7 (Dennis P. Culhane & Steven P. Horn-
burg eds., 1997).
35. See NAT'L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, A PLAN: NOT A DREAM-How
TO END HOMELESSNESS IN TEN YEARS 3 (2000), available at http://www.naeh.org/
pub/tenyear/lOyearplan.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
36. See, e.g., Mirta Ojito, Advocacy Group Says Homeless Are Breaking Shelter
Records, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at D8 (noting that over 29,000 people were sleep-
ing in New York City's shelters nightly, the highest number in the city's history).
37. See Greg Retsinas, City Says 1,780 Homeless are Sleeping on Manhattan
Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at D8 (discussing controversy over recent attempt
to count the number of homeless people on New York City streets).
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defies easy generalization, 38 years of research and experience indi-
cate several patterns. Single adult men still constitute a majority of
homeless Americans, 39 although families with children represent
one of the fastest growing segments of the homeless population,4 °
making up about one-quarter of the homeless population on a
given day.41
Studies conducted by the National Institutes of Mental Health
("NIMH") during the mid-1980s estimated that twenty to twenty-
five percent of homeless single adults had lifetime histories of seri-
ous mental illness;42 more recent research places the number as
high as thirty percent. 43 Alcohol and chemical dependency are also
significant among homeless people, particularly homeless men.44
Furthermore, about half of those with serious mental illnesses also
have substance abuse disorders. 45 Yet, while rates of lifetime
mental illness among the homeless are three to five times greater
38. Robert Rosenheck et al., Special Populations of Homeless Americans, in U.S.
DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
PRACTICAL LESSONS: THE 1998 NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HOMELESSNESS RE-
SEARCH 2-1, 2-2 (Linda B. Forsburg & Deborah L. Dennis eds., 1999) [hereinafter
PRACTICAL LESSONS].
39. See U.S. Conference of Mayors, A Status Report on Hunger and Homeless-
ness in American Cities, 2000: A 25-City Survey ii (2000) ("[E]stimat[ing] that, on
average, single men constitute 44 percent of the homeless population, families with
children 36 percent, single women 13 percent and unaccompanied minors seven per-
cent."), available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/hungersurvey/2OOO/hun-
ger2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); see also BURT, supra note 30, at 13
(estimating that single men constituted seventy-three percent of the adult urban
homeless service-using population in 1987).
40. See Nina Bernstein, Use of Shelters By Families Sets Record in New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at Al; Jennifer Egan, To Be Young and Homeless, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2002, at G32; Rosenheck et al., supra note 38, at 2-10 (estimating that fami-
lies with children now comprise thirty-six percent of the total number of homeless
people); Nancy Wright, Not in Anyone's Backyard: Ending the "Contest of Nonre-
sponsibility" and Implementing Long-Term Solutions to Homelessness, 2 GEO. J.
FIGHTING POVERTY 163, 170-71 (1995).
41. See BURT, supra note 30, at 16.
42. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 146 (describing study indicating that one in four
Chicago homeless had at least one episode of hospitalization in a psychiatric institu-
tion); Rosenheck et al., supra note 38, at 2-17.
43. Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 6 (1996) (citing FED. TASK FORCE ON HOMELESSNESS &
SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS, OUTCASTS ON MAIN STREET 7-13 (1992)); see JENCKS,
supra note 28, at 24 (estimating that about one-third of all homeless people have
severe mental illnesses).
44. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 30, at 110-11; Rossl, supra note 10, at 156 (describ-
ing studies during 1980s showing prevalence of alcoholism as about one-third of the
total homeless population).
45. See Rosenheck et al., supra note 38, at 2-17.
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than rates in the general population, the majority of homeless peo-
ple do not have a serious mental illness.46
Demographic research has yielded other important findings,
identifying increasing numbers of homeless women (including
those without children), 47 youth,48 the elderly, 49 and minority
groups, particularly African-Americans and Latinos. 50 The tradi-
tional stereotype of a homeless individual was a single, white, male
adult addicted to alcohol; today, however, the homeless population
is extremely diverse. 5' On a given day, the adult population using
homeless assistance programs consists of: single men (sixty-one
percent); single women (fifteen percent); households with children
(fifteen percent); people with another adult, but not with children
(nine percent).52
The common thread connecting these demographic categories-
whether based on gender, age, family situation, mental health sta-
tus, or racial or ethnic background-is extreme poverty. 3 In 1994,
a total of 38.1 million Americans fell below the federal poverty
46. See id.
47. See id. at 2-9 (concluding that women now comprise one-fifth of the overall
homeless population).
48. See Marjorie J. Robertson & Paul A. Toro, Homeless Youth: Research, Inter-
vention, and Policy, in PRACTICAL LESSONS, supra note 38, at 3 (noting that the size of
the homeless youth population, defined as ages twelve to seventeen, is substantial and
widespread; estimating that the annual prevalence of literal homelessness among this
age group is 7.6 percent, or 1.6 million youth in a particular year).
49. See Rosenheck et al., supra note 38, at 2-7 to 2-8 (noting that while the propor-
tion of older persons in the total homeless population has declined in recent years, the
number of homeless elders, aged fifty and above, has increased and will likely in-
crease further as "increasing numbers of baby-boomers reach older adulthood."); see
also Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, Homelessness Among Elderly Persons, at http:/
/www.nationalhomeless.org/causes.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
50. See Rosenheck et al., supra note 38, at 2-13 ("Blacks and Latinos in America
are far more likely than other Americans to be poor and therefore, more likely to be
homeless."). The relatively high percentage of African-Americans who are homeless
is also a product of the gap in wealth between African-Americans and whites, the loss
of jobs in the inner city, and housing segregation. See id. at 2-14 to 2-15.
51. See generally Kim Hopper & Jill Hamburg, The Making of America's Home-
less: From Skid Row to the New Poor, 1945-1984, in CRITICAL PERSPECIIVES ON
HousING 13 (R.G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986).
52. See BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 57.
53. See Foscarinis, supra note 43, at 6; White, supra note 23, at 276; see also BURT
ET AL., supra note 5, at 55 (concluding that extreme poverty is the most important
predicator as to whether an individual is homeless); Rossi, supra note 10, at 8; cf Wes
Daniels, Symposium on Law and the Homeless: An Introduction, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 261, 262 (1990-91) ("Homelessness represents the far end of a spectrum, and the
tip of an iceberg to which people have paid more attention than to the serious under-
lying problems of which homelessness is simply one symptom.").
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line, 5.6 million more than in 1989.54 Indeed, homeless people are
poorer today than ever before.5 Although in 2000 the overall pov-
erty level dropped to record low rates, the average poor person
continued to fall further below the poverty line.56 In addition, the
income gap between high- and low-income families remained at or
near the highest levels since before World War 11. 51 The shrinkage
of government assistance programs like welfare and food stamps
partly explains these trends.58
While extreme poverty does not necessarily cause people to be-
come homeless, it makes them more vulnerable to homelessness,59
which may be triggered by what to others might seem only tempo-
rary setbacks, such as the loss of a job. Indeed, between five and
ten percent of poor people experience homelessness during a given
year.60 Thus, an understanding of the close connection between
poverty and homelessness must inform and drive homeless legal
advocacy.
B. Causes of Homelessness
Beliefs about the causes of homelessness tend to reflect funda-
mentally different attitudes towards social welfare policy and the
role of the state in society. Generally, liberals emphasize how the
shortage of affordable housing, changes in federal housing policy,
and the reduction in the purchasing power of public benefits have
all led to higher rates of homelessness. Conservatives, by contrast,
stress personal failures like mental illness, alcoholism, and drug
abuse in explaining the persistence of homelessness. Thus, while
liberals favor government intervention through expanding housing
and cash assistance programs, conservatives believe such interven-
tion cannot help and may indeed worsen the problem by inhibiting
individual initiative and responsibility.6'
54. See Foscarinis, supra note 43, at 10.
55. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 10, at 40 (noting that the new homeless in Chicago
have one-third the income level of the homeless in 1958).
56. See Press Release, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Poverty Rates Fell
in 2000 As Unemployment Reached 31-Year Low (Sept. 26, 2001), available at http://
www.centeronbudget.org/9-25-Olpov.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); see also Genaro
C. Armas, Census: Rich got Richer in the 90s, Assoc. PRESS, June 4, 2002 (noting that
the poverty rate increased in many states despite a decade of economic prosperity).
57. See Press Release, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, supra note 56.
58. See id.
59. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 77.
60. See BURT ET AL., supra note 5, at 116-17.
61. See White, supra note 23, at 279-81. The public is similarly divided over the
primary cause of poverty, with roughly half saying that a person is poor due to lack of
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In fact, there is a growing consensus that both structural and in-
dividual factors play a role in causing homelessness.6 2 While struc-
tural factors make people more vulnerable to becoming homeless,
personal factors often determine who is pushed over the edge. On
the other hand, while there are relatively higher rates of chemical
dependency and mental illness among homeless people,63 the issue
is why those problems lead to homelessness in some people, but
not others. Understanding the complex interplay of these multiple
causes should help shape future homeless legal advocacy. This Sec-
tion identifies some of these causes.
1. Structural Changes in the Economy
The growing inequality and poverty in today's global economy is
an important cause of homelessness. 64 The loss of relatively high
paying manufacturing jobs following the recession of the early
1980s, and their replacement with lower paying, less-stable service
jobs, has contributed to the spread of homelessness.6 5 Low-wage
workers have been affected dramatically; for example, the real
value of the minimum wage (adjusted for inflation) declined over
eighteen percent from 1979 to 1997,66 making housing unaffordable
individual effort, and the other half blaming poverty on external circumstances be-
yond a person's individual's control. See DEMOS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES? PUBLIC
OPINION ON POVERTY, INCOME INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY: 1996-2001, at 2
(2001), available at http://www.demos-usa.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
62. See BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 8; see also STEVEN VANDERSTAAY, STREET
LIVES: AN ORAL HISTORY OF HOMELESS AMERICANS 72-77 (1992) (noting that
homelessness often results from the interaction of economic forces and personal
factors).
63. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
64. I. Susser, The Construction of Poverty and Homelessness in U.S. Cities, 25
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 411, 412-1.3 (1996); see JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL
HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, AND WELFARE 13 (1997)
("[Tihe gap between the rich and the poor in the United States is the widest since the
end of World War II.").
65. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 30, at 78-79 (noting that half the jobs created be-
tween 1979 to 1987 were low-wage jobs); KUSMER, supra note 10, at 240 ("Deindustri-
alization and the shift to a high-tech and service economy eliminated many unskilled
or semi-skilled jobs, with disastrous effects on factory workers and young people en-
tering the labor force without adequate education.").
66. Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, Why Are People Homeless?, at http://
www.nationalhomeless.org/causes.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); see LAWRENCE
MISHEL & DAVID M. FRANKEL, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 3-4 (1991)
(describing declining incomes among low wage workers during the 1980s).
1224
HOMELESS LEGAL ADVOCACY
for many workers. Moreover, many of these low-wages jobs re-
main inaccessible to the extremely poor and homeless.6"
2. The Lack of Affordable Housing
A central cause of increased homelessness is the decline in af-
fordable housing, generally defined as a unit available for thirty
percent of a household's income.68 The period from 1973 to 1993
saw the disappearance of 2.2 million low-rent units from the mar-
ket through abandonment, conversion to more expensive apart-
ments, and rising costs.6 9 By 1995, the number of low-income
renters exceeded the number of low-cost rental units by 5.4 million
units.7 0 In total, the number of affordable housing units for fami-
lies with extremely low incomes (thirty percent of area median in-
come), has declined by over 370,000 units since 1991. 7 1 Because so
many poor families spend over thirty percent of their income on
housing, any slight downturn in their economic circumstances can
precipitate the downward spiral towards homelessness. 72
Also, only about one-third of low-income renter households re-
ceive any housing subsidies.13 The number of poor families receiv-
ing federally subsidized housing has decreased over time.7 4 The
continued spread of homelessness is hardly surprising given the ris-
ing cost of housing, the increasing rent burden of poor families,75
the overall decline of the inexpensive housing stock (particularly in
large cities)7 6 the destruction of cheap housing, including SROs
67. See Christina Victoria Tusan, Note, Homeless Families From 1980-1996: Casu-
alties of Declining Support for the War on Poverty, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1168
(1997).
68. JENNIFER DASKAL, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, IN SEARCH OF
SHELTER: THE GROWING SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING 9-12 (1998).
69. Id. at 1.
70. See id.
71. See John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV.
309, 311 (2000).
72. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 9; see also Michael H. Schill & Benjamin P.
Scafidi, Housing Conditions and Problems in New York City, in HOUSING AND COM-
MUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY: FACING THE FUTURE 11, 33 (Michael H.
Schill ed., 1999) [hereinafter HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT] (noting that
the affordability crisis is predominantly a crisis for the poor in New York City).
73. See DASKAL, supra note 68, at 4.
74. See Tusan, supra note 67, at 1176.
75. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 30, at 46-47 (noting that the proportion of poor
renters paying more than thirty percent of income is growing and that such renters
often pay over half of their income for rent alone).
76. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 182; see also Michael S. Carliner, Homelessness: A
Housing Problem?, in THE HOMELESS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 119 (Richard D.
Bingham et al. eds., 1989) (describing the shift of older urban housing stock to higher
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and rooming houses,77 the relative decline in units created by the
federal government starting in the 1980s,78 and the decline in fed-
eral subsidies such as the Section 8 Rental Assistance Program. 79
"Opt-outs" from HUD contracts continue to erode the number of
federally subsidized units.80 Meanwhile, waiting lists for HUD-as-
sisted housing grow longer.8'
Increasing numbers of people do not have the income, whether
through wages or government cash transfer programs, to secure
housing.8 2 In 1991, there were eight million very poor renters, but
only three million units were available to them; 3 a more recent
study found that the number of rental units available to extremely
low-income families dropped by five percent between 1991 and
1997, a decline of over 370,000 units. 4 While the federal govern-
ment has responded to homelessness with some emergency assis-
tance, it has failed to forge a national commitment to help establish
affordable housing for the poor.8 5 Affordable housing may not
income groups, rather than to poor people, because of gentrification and the increase
of affluent non-family households and childless couples).
77. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 182 (citing a study that found that 18,000 single-
person dwelling units in SROs and small apartment buildings disappeared between
1973 to 1984); Foscarinis, supra note 43, at 8 (finding that the number of people living
in hotels and rooming houses declined from 640,000 in 1960 to 137,000 in 1990); Bar-
rett A. Lee, The Disappearance of Skid Row: Some Ecological Evidence, 16 URB.
AFF. 0. 81, 81-107 (estimating that urban renewal in the 1960s and later conversation
of rejuvenation of neighborhoods led to the national loss of approximately 1,116,000
units in SROs and accommodations in boarding or lodging houses); cf. JENCKS, supra
note 28, at 74 (contending that the destruction of skid row neighborhoods made it
harder to create housing for the poor when their numbers and demand began to grow
again in the 1980s).
78. See BURT, supra note 30, at 32 (contrasting 1.5 million rental units added in
the 1970s through federal programs, which represents thirty-one percent of the total
growth in rental stock during that decade, with the 877,000 units added in the 1980s,
which represents fourteen percent of the rental units added in that period).
79. See Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in
Public Housing, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 35, 39 (2002).
80. See, e.g., Victor Bach, The Future of HUD-Subsidized Housing: The New York
City Case, in HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, supra note 72, at 157.
81. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN AFFAIRS, WAITING IN VAIN: AN UPDATE ON
AMERICA'S HOUSING CRISIS 7-11 (1999); Ammann, supra note 71, at 310 (noting that
a recent HUD survey of forty public housing authorities found almost one million
families on the waiting lists for public housing and Section 8 rental assistance).
82. See White, supra note 23, at 288 (describing the growth of the "shelter poor").
83. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON THE HOMELESS, PRIORITY: HOME! THE FEDERAL
PLAN TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF HOMELESSNESS 22-23 (1994).
84. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. & URBAN
DEV., RENTAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE-THE WORSENING CRISIS: A REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 22 (2000).
85. See White, supra note 23, at 296.
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alone be sufficient to end homelessness in every case (many home-
less people need services in the community as well), but it is always
a necessary part of the solution. 6
3. Increasing Restrictions on Public Assistance
Restrictions on eligibility for public assistance and the relative
decline in grant levels in the past two decades 87 have contributed to
homelessness by reducing the purchasing power of the poor.88 A
state's payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC")-the former federal welfare program-for a family of
three declined in real terms by forty-seven percent between 1970
and 1994.89 State general assistance payments for single adults
have also sharply declined, and, in a few states, have been cut alto-
gether.90 Indeed, the fact that single adults receive lower grants
under general assistance programs than families under welfare
helps explain why, traditionally, more single adults have been
homeless than families. 91 The decline in the real value of cash as-
sistance, coupled with the loss of low-paying unskilled jobs, has
made it particularly difficult for at-risk populations, such as the
mentally ill and chemically dependent, to stay housed. 92 Absent
receipt of a housing subsidy, welfare payments alone are generally
insufficient for someone to leave homelessness for permanent
housing. Indeed, even a recipient of Supplemental Security In-
86. Cf Marybeth Shinn et al., Predictors of Homelessness Among Families in New
York City: From Shelter Request to Housing Stability, 88 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1651,
1655 (1998) (showing that subsidized housing was the critical factor in families' re-
maining in permanent housing after leaving shelters).
87. This refers principally to: federal welfare, formerly Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children ("AFDC"), now Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
("TANF"); general assistance (or general relief) provided by the states to those who
do not qualify for TANF funds, such as single adult men; and Supplemental Security
Income ("SSI"), the federal program providing cash assistance to disabled, blind, or
elderly people who meet income and resource requirements.
88. Nancy Morawetz, Welfare Litigation to Prevent Homelessness, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 565, 566-67 (1987-88); Wright, supra note 40, at 176 (discussing
evidence linking cuts in public assistance to a rise in homelessness); see also BURT,
supra note 30, at 63, 84-85; Rossi, supra note 10, at 143 (noting the importance of
welfare as a guard against homelessness).
89. Mark Greenberg & Jim Baumohl, Income Maintenance: Little Help Now, Less
on the Way, in HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 68.
90. See id. at 74.
91. See BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 130.
92. See BURT, supra note 30, at 212-13; JENCKS, supra note 28, at 93 (arguing that
"the main problem facing single mothers during the 1980s was legislative stinginess,"
and noting that for single mothers with incomes below $10,000 who lived in unsub-
sidized housing, real rents rose by thirteen percent during this period, while welfare
checks rose by far less).
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come ("SSI"), whose monthly cash grant is higher than that of wel-
fare recipients, must spend, on average, almost seventy percent of
her monthly grant to rent a one-bedroom apartment. 93
The 1996 federal welfare reform act 94 has intensified the prob-
lem of inadequate income and increased the risk of homelessness
among at-risk populations. The act replaces the federal entitle-
ment to welfare benefits with block grants to the states under the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") program.95 It
also imposes a five-year lifetime cap on receipt of assistance, man-
dates strict work requirements, 96 and affords greater discretion to
states and localities in administering benefits and determining eligi-
bility rules, 97 a process generally known as "devolution." These
changes have made it more difficult for people both to obtain and
maintain welfare benefits.98 The evidence thus far indicates that
while more families are moving from welfare to work, they are not
escaping poverty because of low wages and inadequate work sup-
ports, including childcare. 99 Indeed, welfare caseloads declined
forty-two percent between 1993 and 1998, but the number of
households with incomes below fifty percent of the poverty level
has increased, notwithstanding the strong economy during that pe-
riod. 10' While the impact of the 1996 reforms on homelessness has
not yet been fully determined, existing evidence indicates that the
housing problems of families leaving welfare are growing worse.""0
93. See Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 66.
94. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
("PRWORA"), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2002).
96. See id. §§ 607-608 (detailing mandatory work requirements and sanctions for
non-compliance).
97. See id. § 617.
98. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration Rules, Discre-
tion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1126 (2000).
99. CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND & NAT'L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, WELFARE
TO WHAT: EARLY FINDINGS ON FAMILY HARDSHIP AND WELL-BEING 16-17 (1998);
Nina Bernstein, In Control Group, Most Welfare Recipients Left the Rolls Even With-
out Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2002, at B4; Peter Edelman, Reforming Welfare-
Take Two, NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, available at http://www.thenation.com/
doc.mhtml?i=20020204&s=edelman&c=l (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
100. See Diller, supra note 98, at 1.123.
101. See PAMELA LOPREST, URBAN INST., How ARE FAMILIES THAT LEFT WEL-
FARE DOING? A COMPARISON OF EARLY AND RECENT WELFARE LEAVERS 1 (2001),
available at http://newfederalism.urban.org/pdf/anf -b36.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2003). The reauthorization of TANF in 2002 has provided an opportunity for propos-
als to implement changes that makes housing assistance part of welfare policy. See
BARBARA SARD & MARGY WALLER, THE BROOKINGS INST.: CTR. ON URBAN AND
METRO. POLICY & THE CTR. ON BUDGIT & POLICY PRIOrriEs, HOUSING STRATE-
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4. Increasing Rates of Incarceration
Rapidly rising rates of incarceration over the past two decades,
coupled with the elimination of programs to prepare prisoners for
release into the community,' 1 2 such as prison-based higher educa-
tion programs, 10 3 have also contributed to homelessness. 104 Also,
the lack of discharge planning or services causes many inmates to
become homeless when they are released from prison, particularly
those inmates with a mental illness. 10 5
A criminal conviction leads to a range of collateral consequences
involving the loss of political, civil, and economic rights'016 that can
contribute to homelessness. A criminal conviction means vastly
decreased employment opportunities,"0 7 including exclusion from
jobs, many requiring a professional license.'018 Other collateral
consequences involve potential exclusion from federal housing pro-
grams, 109 especially where the offense involves drug-related activ-
GIES TO STRENGTHEN WELFARE POLICY AND SUPPORT WORKING FAMILIES 1 (2002),
available at http:/lwww.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/urban/publications/sardwallerhous-
ingwelfareexsum.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
102. See, e.g., HEATHER BARR, PRISONS AND JAILS: HOSPITALS OF LAST RESORT
49-53 (1999) (discussing the connection between the absence of discharge planning for
mentally ill prison inmates and homelessness).
103. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 20411, 108 Stat. 1796, 1828 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1070a(b)(8)
(1994)) (prohibiting Pell Grant awards to prisoners).
104. See Rosenheck et al., supra note 38, at 2-19 (noting that an estimated twenty
percent to sixty-six percent of homeless people have been arrested in the past).
105. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Back on the Streets Without a Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1999, at BI (describing release of inmates from Rikers Island jail in New
York City).
106. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154 (1999)
("Among [the consequences] are the loss of voting rights and the right to run for
office, rejection from jury service, prohibition on certain public benefits, and the ban
on select professional licenses.").
107. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 144.
108. See Demleitner, supra note 106, at 156.
109. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c) (2001) (authorizing local public housing au-
thorities to consider an applicant's prior criminal activity in determining his eligibility
for public housing).
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ity,110 and the federal welfare and food stamp programs where the
illegal activity constitutes a drug-related felony.''
5. Mental Illness
Another important cause of homelessness is mental illness.
While mental illness may be an important factor in understanding
homelessness, it must be viewed not in isolation, but in the context
of changes in mental health policy. Proportionally no more Ameri-
cans suffer from mental illness now than a generation ago; yet,
mentally ill people make up an increasing proportion of the home-
less population.' 1 2 Many mentally ill people become homeless af-
ter their discharge from health care institutions to the street or
shelters. 1 3 The McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act ("Mc-
Kinney Act") 1 4 places considerable emphasis on mental illness
through funding for supportive housing and homeless outreach
programs. 11 5
As the foregoing discussion indicates, homelessness is a complex
problem, and cannot be solved solely by lawyers; yet, legal advo-
cacy can make a difference. Both direct experience and social sci-
ence research suggest that poverty lawyers should focus on
overcoming the various barriers to obtaining permanent housing.
They also indicate that legal advocacy should, where possible, be
integrated into a more holistic approach that focuses on areas such
110. See id. § 960.204 (setting forth provisions for denying admission to public
housing based on an applicant's engagement in drug-related criminal activity); id.
§ 982.553 (setting forth provisions for denying admission or terminating assistance
under Section 8 rental assistance program to individuals or families based on drug-
related criminal activity). Illegal drug-related activity can also lead to eviction of ex-
isting tenants of federally subsidized housing, even if the tenant did not know about
or consent to such activity. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125,
127-28 (2002).
11,. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, tlo Stat. 2105 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 862a); Recent
Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (1997). States, however, may opt out or
modify the drug felon bar by passing legislation making clear they are choosing to do
so. See 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d) (1999). To date, at least thirty states have either elimi-
nated or modified the ban. See Amy E. Hirsch, U.S. Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow?:
Bringing Back Shame: Women, Welfare, and Criminal Justice, 10 TEMPLE PoL. & Civ.
RTrs. L. REV. 417, 419 (2001).
112. See BURT, supra note 30, at 119-20, 212-13.
113. See Sidney D. Watson, Discharges to the Streets: Hospitals and Homelessness,
19 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 357, 358 (2000).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (a)(1)-(b)(3) (2003).
115. See Latisha R. Brown, The McKinney Act: Revamping Programs Designed to
Assist the Mentally Ill Homeless, 33 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 235, 241-46 (2000)
(describing federal programs under the McKinney Act).
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as skills-building and job training, nutrition services, substance
abuse counseling, and medical and mental health treatment.
The following part provides an overview of previous trends in
homeless legal advocacy. It then suggests the continuing value of
such advocacy as well as the need for new approaches.
II. OVERVIEW OF PRIOR LEGAL ADVOCACY
Prior homeless legal advocacy may be divided into two main pe-
riods: the efforts during the 1980s to establish a "right to shelter"
and other basic needs; and the growing challenges since the 1.990s
to efforts to criminalize activities associated with homelessness.' l 6
While responses to criminalization measures still remain a major
focus of homeless rights advocacy," 17 current efforts should also fo-
cus on long-term solutions, such as increasing access to affordable
housing and topoverty and social service programs." 8
A. Right to Shelter
The "right to shelter" cases of the late 1970s and early 1980s
were brought at a time when homelessness was becoming increas-
ingly visible in cities, including downtown areas. The growing
numbers of people living on the streets was attracting significant
media attention. 1 9 For a generation unaccustomed to seeing such
extreme poverty amid affluence, the sight of homeless people liv-
ing on the streets provoked outrage at the situation and sympathy
for the victims. Advocates sought to parlay these sentiments into
concrete constitutional and statutory rights in cities across the
country.
The landmark decision of a New York trial court in Callahan v.
Carey,120 represented the first significant legal recognition of a
right to emergency shelter. After the trial court ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs on a motion for a preliminary injunction based on a
provision in the state constitution guaranteeing the aid, care, and
116. See Foscarinis, supra note 43, at 3.
117. See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, In Famous Tolerant City, Impatience with Homeless,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A14.
118. See Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness and Human Rights: Towards An Integrated
Strategy, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 329 (2000).
119. See Geoffrey Mort, Note, Establishing A Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50
BROOK. L. REV. 939, 941 n.4 (1984) (describing the media attention devoted to home-
lessness during the early 1980s).
120. No. 79-42582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979), reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11,
1979, at 10.
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support of the needy, 121 the plaintiffs and New York City entered
into a consent decree requiring the city to provide overnight food
and shelter to needy homeless men and to set forth basic standards
for the shelters.1 22 In New York, the right to shelter was later ex-
tended to women123 and families. 24  Advocates succeeded else-
where in winning similar legal victories. 125  Advocates also
successfully brought litigation in several states to increase the
amount of housing assistance provided through state welfare
grants. 26 The specter of increasing homelessness played a signifi-
cant role in these cases.12 7 In addition, advocates won other impor-
tant legal victories including the right of homeless people to
121. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
122. Carey, No. 79-42582, reprinted in N.Y. L.J., supra note 120, at 10.
123. Eldredge v. Koch, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960, 961 (Sup. Ct.) (extending principles of the
Callahan decree to homeless women on equal protection grounds), rev'd on other
grounds, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1983) .
124. McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 63-67 (N.Y. 1987) (requiring that emergency
shelter be provided and affirming the court order to permit placement in mass
shelters).
125. See, e.g., Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 247-50 (W. Va. 1983) (upholding
right to emergency shelter, food, and medical care under adult protective services
statute); Wes Daniels, "Derelicts," Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Ties and
Lifestyle Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal
Advocates, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 687, 691-93 (1997) (describing successful challenges to
bureaucratic obstacles to access to public emergency shelter in a series of cases in
California); id. at 692-93 (discussing the right to shelter in Philadelphia under local
law); see also Mort, supra note 119, at 940 (noting that "[Ijitigation has become the
preferred tool of advocacy groups working to improve conditions for the homeless").
The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that the Constitution does not
require the federal government to provide shelter for those citizens in need. See
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("We are unable to perceive ... any consti-
tutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.").
126. See, e.g., Mass. Coalition for Homeless v. Sec'y of Human Servs., 511 N.E.2d
603, 608-15 (Mass. 1.987) (holding that the state welfare agency was required under
state law to provide additional benefits to welfare recipients who could not otherwise
afford housing with their welfare benefits); Jiggetts v. Grinker, 533 N.E.2d 570, 575
(N.Y. 1990) (holding that the social services commissioner must provide "adequate"
shelter allowance for families on welfare that reflect housing costs in the city); see also
Norma Rotunno, Note, State Constitutional Social Welfare Provisions and the Right to
Housing, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 111, 123 (1996) (describing the successful use
of social welfare provisions in state constitutions to combat homelessness and pov-
erty). But see Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d 696, 712 (Conn. 1990) (holding that the
reduction of emergency housing assistance did not violate the state constitution, even
if individuals had no other permanent housing).
127. See Mass. Coalition for Homeless, 511 N.E.2d at 605 ("At the heart of the
plaintiffs' grievance is the argument that many families receiving AFDC assistance
are or may become homeless because AFDC grants are insufficient to permit them to
afford adequate housing."); Jiggetts, 533 N.E.2d at 573 ("A schedule establishing as-
sistance levels so low that it forces large numbers of families with dependent children
into homelessness does not meet the statutory standard.").
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vote, 128 and the right of families not to be separated and children
placed in foster care on account of their homeless status. 129
While right to shelter litigation achieved some notable judicial
victories and helped prompt policies creating and expanding emer-
gency services, it did not carry the day. 130 Legal victories have
since been narrowed 13 1 and, in some places, eliminated. 132 In New
York City, where right to shelter litigation has had the greatest im-
pact, a settlement was recently reached creating an independent
special master panel with extensive powers including oversight and
regular evaluation of the city's shelter system, decreasing court in-
volvement, and authorizing the city to expel families from the shel-
ter system if they refuse to accept suitable housing. 133  Moreover,
the strategy of achieving a right to shelter through the courts has
been criticized for failing to address the root causes of homeless-
ness 134 and for tilting policy away from permanent housing and
homeless prevention and towards ad hoc crisis intervention. 135
128. See Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (ordering New York
City to allow homeless individuals without a fixed address to vote as long as they had
a place they considered their "home base"); K. Scott Mathews, Rights of the Homeless
in the 1990s: What Role Will the Courts Play, 60 UMKC L. REV. 343, 353-54 (1991)
(describing litigation regarding residence requirements).
129. See Martin v. Gross, 524 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
130. See EUGENE T. LOWE ET AL., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS RE-
PORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES 2001: A 27-CITY SUR-
VEY ii, 11 (2001) (noting that more than thirty-seven percent of those people seeking
shelter are unable to access it).
131. See McCain v. Giuliani, 676 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (App. Div. 1998) (imposing
restrictions on the right to shelter).
132. Foscarinis, supra note 118, at 332 (noting that in Washington, D.C., the right to
shelter was eliminated by legislation after city officials facing contempt orders sought
changes in the law).
133. See Leslie Kaufman, New York Reaches Deal to End 20-Year Legal Fight on
Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at Al. The city is also attempting to weaken the
Callahan decree by granting shelters the right to evict single adults who fail to observe
rules of conduct or comply with social service plans. See Susan Saulny, City Pursuing
Right to Evict From Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at Bi.
134. See Daniels, supra note 125, at 728-29; Ronald Slye, Community Institution
Building: A Response to the Limits of Litigation in Addressing the Problems of Home-
lessness, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (1991); White, supra note 23, at 296 (contrasting
federal housing policy's goal of building homes and communities with federal home-
less legislation's goal of crisis assistance and short-term emergency relief); see also
BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 242 (noting the findings of a HUD study that most
shelters provided few services). Robert Hayes, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in
Callahan, believes that the litigation achieved only minor victories at significant ex-
pense, though he does note that it helped pressure New York City into transforming
formerly abandoned buildings into permanent housing. See Robert M. Hayes, Home-
lessness & The Legal Profession, 35 Loy. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989).
135. See N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL BRIEF, GIVE 'EM SHELTER:
VARIOUS CITY AGENCIES SPEND OVER $900 MILLION ON HOMELESS SERVICES 1
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Also, advocates in right to shelter litigation have tended to portray
their homeless clients as helpless victims of larger structural forces,
a stereotype that helped win early victories, but has since proven
less successful. 136
On the other hand, right to shelter advocacy once seemed a
promising option and reflected an attempt to force the government
to deal with a worsening social problem. 37 Moreover, the victories
were not hollow: shelter, food, and other emergency services were
provided to innumerable homeless people through litigation; 138 in
remaining right to shelter jurisdictions such as New York City, they
helped force the government to deal humanely with the homeless
population and prevent abuses. 139 Ultimately, however, a right to
emergency shelter can only be part of a broader solution.
(2002); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Homelessness at the Millennium: Is the Past Prologue?, 23
STETSON L. REV. 331, 333 (1994) (noting that the shelter system has "raised fears
among homeless advocates that the shelter network would create a permanent cycle
of dependency"); White, supra note 23, at 296; see also Tusan, supra note 67, at 1210-
11 (arguing that shelters provide only emergency services and that more must be done
to assist families to regain permanent housing); cf. KUSMER, supra note 10, at 245
(describing the focus during the 1980s and 1990s on emergency provision of shelter
and food, rather than the kind of structural reforms necessary to lift people out of
poverty). Criticisms have been aimed not merely at the right to shelter litigation, but
more broadly at the expansion of shelters and accompanying services nationwide.
See, e.g., Nan Roman, Why America Can End Homelessness in Ten Years, 4 HOUSING
FACTS & FIGURES, 2002, at 3.
Over the past 15 years we have developed a national infrastructure of shel-
ters, soup kitchens, health clinics, and transitional housing that can largely
manage people while they are homeless. But this system is unlikely to end
homelessness because it does not address the front-end causes or the back-
end solutions to the problem.
Id.
136. See Daniels, supra note 125, at 708 ("Although lawyers were able to win some
significant litigation victories by portraying their homeless clients as unfortunate vic-
tims of forces beyond their control, this approach had significant risks, and carried the
seeds of its own destruction."); White, supra note 23, at 292; see also MICHAEL B.
KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 192-94 (1986) (describing how early, idealized views
of the homeless favored volunteerism over broad, sustained policy development).
137. See, e.g., Melannie B. Abbott, Seeking Shelter Under a Deconstructed Roof:
Homelessness and Critical Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. REV. 269, 304-05 (1997). But see
JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 22-25 (1978) (dis-
cussing limits of lawyers' efforts to seek social change through litigation in various
areas).
138. See Stephen Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 387, 391 (1991) (arguing that the job of advocates for the homeless is to
respond to their clients' present housing needs, not devise long-term solutions to a
broader problem).
139. See Leslie Kaufman, City Is Told To Rethink Shelter At Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2002, at B3 (discussing state court judge's ruling that city could not convert a
former jail into homeless shelter to deal with the overflow at the city's family shelter
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B. Criminalization of Homelessness
If early efforts to establish an affirmative right to shelter reflect
the expansive hopes of advocates, subsequent challenges to at-
tempts to criminalize behavior associated with homeless people
suggest a defensive response to an angry backlash. 140 Local gov-
ernments have turned increasingly to law enforcement and the
criminal justice system to address homelessness, rather than ad-
dressing the underlying problems, such as the lack of affordable
housing or social services. 4 ' This shift reflects decreased sympathy
for homeless people generally and outright hostility towards more
visible activities like aggressive panhandling and sleeping in public
parks. The reliance on law enforcement as a substitute for social
welfare and housing policy'4 2 is more prevalent in those localities
that do not provide sufficient shelter space for their homeless pop-
ulation,' 43 though it also exists in localities where there is a right to
shelter. "
Attempts to regulate the movement and behavior of the poor
through threat of imprisonment have a long history. The Elizabe-
than Poor Law of 1601, which dramatically influenced social wel-
fare policy in America, authorized the imprisonment of able-
intake center, where children must sleep on the floor, but had to find an alternative
solution).
140. See, e.g., Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are
the Homeless Constitutional Castaways, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 264 (1994); see
also KATZ, supra note 136, at .192 (describing the general trend).
141. See generally NAT'L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS & NAT'L LAW CTR. ON
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, ILLEGAL TO BE HOMELESS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) [hereinafter ILLEGAL TO BE HOME-
LESS]; Maria Foscarinis et al., Out of Sight-Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend
Toward the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 145,
149 (1999). The trend is not entirely new: cities previously used law enforcement to
address homelessness, such as in "clean-up" campaigns in skid row districts during the
1950s and 1960s. See Jason Leckerman, City of Brotherly Love?: Using the Fourteenth
Amendment to Strike Down an Anti-Homeless Ordinance in Philadelphia, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 540, 548 (2001) (noting the passage of the Philadelphia "Sidewalk Behavior
Ordinance" in 1999); see also KUSMER, supra note 10, at 234-35.
142. Lorne Sossin, The Criminalization and Administration of the Homeless: Notes
on the Possibilities and Limits of Bureaucratic Engagement, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 623, 638-39, 647 (1996).
143. See Foscarinis, supra note 43, at 25; see also Leckerman, supra note 141, at 545
(noting that, in twenty-nine major cities, the homeless population exceeds the number
of shelter beds provided to them).
144. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574-76
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that policy sweeps of homeless people sleeping on the steps of
a church violated the church's First Amendment rights).
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bodied adults who refused to work. 145 During the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, police in American cities relied on va-
grancy and loitering statutes to help ensure that homeless people
remained in skid row areas. These practices were eventually lim-
ited by Supreme Court decisions invalidating local vagrancy 146 and
loitering 147 statutes. The most recent wave of anti-homeless crimi-
nal sanctions, however, seeks to return to an approach of combat-
ing the social problems of poverty through criminal sanctions and
to increase the discretion given to local law enforcement officials
while trying to avoid potential constitutional problems of vague-
ness and overbreadth.148
Cities claim they are merely protecting residents against crime,
controlling threats to public health and sanitation, and trying to
attract business and tourism. 149 New York City and San Fran-
cisco-municipalities with disproportionately large homeless popu-
lations-have lately taken particularly tough stances, seeking to rid
their streets of homeless people through aggressive enforcement of
"quality of life" measures. 5 ' Some localities, however, have pur-
sued more constructive alternatives that seek to facilitate the inter-
vention of social service providers on behalf of homeless people,
rather than simply sweeping them from public view. 15 '
Criminal sanctions against homeless people typically restrict
their right to use certain public spaces or to solicit money. Public
145. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL His-
TORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 14 (10th ed. 1996).
146. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (finding that an
overbroad vagrancy ordinance violates the Due Process Clause).
147. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983) (holding a California law requir-
ing people who loiter or wander the streets to provide "a credible and reliable" identi-
fication and to account for their presence when asked by a police officer void for
vagueness and in violation of due process).
148. See Sossin, supra note 142, at 638-39, 642-43; see also Robert C. Ellickson,
Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Pub-
lic Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1209 (1996) (criticizing Supreme Court deci-
sions that "swept away the pre-existing legal code of the streets," including the power
of law enforcement to control the residents of skid row). But see Sossin, supra note
142, at 646 ("The criminalization of homelessness serves essentially cosmetic functions
for municipalities.").
149. Foscarinis, supra note 43, at 23-24; see Steven R. Paisner, Compassion, Politics,
and the Problems Lying on Our Sidewalks: A Legislative Approach for Cities to Ad-
dress Homelessness, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1259, 1271-73 (1994) (summarizing the interests
and concerns of a city and its inhabitants in the context of homelessness).
150. See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, In Famously Tolerant City, Impatience with Homeless,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A14 (describing the hard line approaches of New York,
San Francisco, and other cities).
151. Foscarinis et al., supra note 141, at 17 (reviewing local legislation).
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space restrictions include broad bans on sleeping in all public
spaces or narrower prohibitions on sleeping in certain public areas
at certain times.'5 2 Some cities have focused on specific locations,
like transportation systems. 53 In addition to passing new laws, cit-
ies have selectively enforced existing laws against loitering, litter-
ing, jaywalking, and similar offenses.154
Cities have also tried to restrict the ability of homeless people to
solicit funds from others in public. 155 Some cities have imposed
broad bans on begging. 156 Others have adopted narrower time,
place, and manner restrictions, such as prohibitions on subways,
near automated teller machines, or at night.1 57
Challenges to the law enforcement model have dominated much
of homeless legal advocacy for over a decade. 158 Homeless people
have attacked the constitutionality of these restrictions under the
First Amendment,159  the Fourth Amendment, 60  the Eighth
152. See, e.g., Davison v. Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 991 (D. Ariz. 1.996) (denying
motion to enjoin a local ordinance outlawing sleeping in public); Roulette v. City of
Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (denying challenge to an ordi-
nance prohibiting sitting or lying on a public sidewalk in certain parts of the city at
certain times of day); City of Pompano Beach v. Copalbo, 455 So. 2d 468, 468-69 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding a prohibition against sleeping in automobile or other
vehicle as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); Pollard v. State, 687 S.W.2d 373,
373-74 (Tex. Ct. App. 1.985) (holding defective a complaint based on a local prohibi-
tion against sleeping in a public .space); see also Sossin, supra note 142, at 643.
153. See, e.g., Streetwatch v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055, 1064-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting preliminary injunction to prevent Amtrak from enforcing
its policy of evicting homeless people from Penn Station without a justifiable basis);
see also Ellickson, supra note 148, at 1198.
154. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 346 (N.D. Tex. 1994); see
also Foscarinis, supra note 43, at 17-19 (summarizing the bans).
155. See Foscarinis, supra note 43, at 20-21 (summarizing the restrictions).
156. See, e.g., Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cincinnati,
56 F.3d 710, 713 (6th Cir. 1995) (challenging a local anti-begging ordinance); Loper v.
N.Y. City Transit Auth., 999 F.2d 699, 702-06 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's
order striking down an anti-begging statute under the First Amendment); L.A. Alli-
ance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, 987 F. Supp. 819, 821 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(granting preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of local ordinance prohibit-
ing aggressive solicitations by prohibiting solicitations in specified locations).
157. See, e.g., Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 147 (2d Cir. 1993)
(challenging regulations prohibiting begging and panhandling in transit facilities);
Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1442 (ordinance prohibiting aggressive begging).
158. See Foscarinis, supra note 118, at 339; Wright, supra note 40, at 182-98.
159. See, e.g., Loper, 999 F.2d at 704 (holding that begging on public streets is pro-
tected expression); Young, 903 F.2d at 146-47 (holding that begging on subways, un-
like solicitation by organized charities, is not protected solicitation); Blair v.
Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1317-18 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (granting declaratory judg-
ment against anti-begging statute); see also Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City
of New York, 293 F.3d. 570, 572 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding injunction against city's
attempt to prevent homeless people from sleeping on a church's steps as violation of
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Amendment, 61 and the right to travel. 62 For example, in Pottinger
v. City of Miami,6 3 the district court in the Southern District of
Florida concluded that Miami's policy of arresting homeless people
for engaging in essential daily activities, like eating and sleeping in
public, violated the Eighth Amendment because homelessness is
not a "choice," but rather is caused by a person's economic situa-
tion and/or physical or mental condition. 6 4 Other challenges, how-
ever, have proven less successful, 6 ' and the fact that the courts
have uniformly rejected arguments that the homeless constitute a
"suspect class" for equal protection purposes has blunted the po-
tential strength of challenges to various measures targeting home-
less people. 166
Critics complain that such rights-based litigation ignores a city's
legitimate interest in keeping its public sidewalks spaces safe and
Free Exercise Clause); Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Commentary, Begging to
Differ. The First Amendment Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 897 (1994) (argu-
ing that begging is protected by the First Amendment).
160. See, e.g., Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1386,
"1-'2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 1998) (denying motion for a preliminary injunction challenging
city practice of seizure and destruction of homeless people's property); Pottinger v.
City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1570 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that Miami's policy of
seizing and destroying homeless people's property or forcing them to abandon it at
arrest sites violates the Fourth Amendment); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 154
(Conn. 1991) (holding that a homeless individual had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of his closed containers left under a bridge underpass).
161. See, e.g., Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1561-65 (concluding that it constituted cruel
and unusual punishment to punish people for being homeless since homelessness is an
involuntary status); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
(holding that punishing homeless people for sleeping in public when they had no-
where else to go punished involuntary status in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
162. See, e.g., Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 353-55 (ordinance allegedly deterring people
from moving to Dallas did not violate the right to travel); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana,
892 P.2d 1145, 1164-66 (Cal. 1995) (reversing decision that anti-homeless ordinance
prohibiting camping in public impermissibly restricted the right to travel).
163. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1551.
164. See id. at 1565.
165. See Joyce v. San Francisco, 87 F.3d 1320, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996); Young, 903 F.2d
at 164 (upholding transit authority's rules restricting begging on subway trains against
a First Amendment challenge); Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir.
1987) (upholding ordinance prohibiting sleeping outdoors in public or in a motor ve-
hicle in public); see also Daniels, supra note 125, at 709-15 (discussing cases showing
courts "transition from sympathy to skepticism" of such arguments). But see Blasi,
supra note 18, at 224 (rejecting the argument that by emphasizing external causes of
homelessness and portraying homeless people as victims of larger structural forces,
litigators adopted a self-destructive approach).
166. See Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless
Deserve Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 502-03, 511 (2003).
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clean. 167 Others say it diverts attention from more substantial
long-term issues like affordable housing and declining relative in-
come levels among the poor. Fighting to allow homeless people to
camp in a public park or beg on a subway, they argue, does nothing
to address the root causes of homelessness, but rather establishes,
at best, only negative rights that prevent the government from pun-
ishing people for certain behavior without imposing any affirma-
tive duties. 16
8
Moreover, while high-profile cases challenging restrictions on
sleeping in a city's parks or begging on its streets certainly attract
attention, not all the sentiments it generates are positive. The pub-
lic's frustration-or "compassion fatigue"-with homeless people
occupying public spaces has also gained respectability and force
among commentators who approach the issue from a land manage-
ment perspective and emphasize a city's need for orderly, aestheti-
cally pleasing public spaces. 169
Yet, it is unfair to blame advocates for misdirecting efforts away
from long-term solutions. Indeed, leading homeless civil rights
groups themselves recognize that anti-criminalization lawsuits,
while invaluable, do not create affordable housing or accessible
services. 170 Litigation is initiated in response to the real and imme-
diate needs of homeless clients and to the government's failure to
implement and sustain an effective anti-poverty policy. When a
homeless person is arrested for sleeping on a park bench, her law-
yer's first response is not to address the underlying causes of home-
lessness, but to respond to a concrete injustice. Indeed,
prohibitions on begging or sleeping in the park do not threaten
some abstract notion of liberty, but rather strike at the ability of
men and women to survive.' 7'
167. See Ellickson, supra note 148, at 1227; Rob Teir, Restoring Order in Urban
Public Spaces, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 255, 257 (1998) (arguing that the claims of
homeless rights advocates "invite the judiciary to usurp power from city councils and
communities and, if successful, withdraw the vitality of residential and commercial
areas").
168. See Daniels, supra note 125, at 729.
169. See Ellickson, supra note 148, at 1222-23 (arguing for the establishment of an
informal zoning system that grants police officers significant discretion to preserve
order on the streets and other public areas); see also Paisner, supra note 149, at 1304
(noting the problems homelessness creates for all residents of a city, not merely
homeless people themselves).
170. ILLEGAL TO BE HOMELESS, supra note 141, at 73.
171. See Jeremy Waldron, Homeless and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv.
295, 303, 320 (1991).
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In short, litigation has played an important part in challenging
aggressive, anti-homeless law enforcement policies. Decisions like
Pottinger have helped overcome-or at least mitigate the effects
of-attempts to use criminal law to deny society's poorest and
most vulnerable members the basic means of survival. 7 2 Legal ad-
vocacy also has fostered effective organizing approaches, raising
awareness of and sympathy for homeless people (and helping mo-
bilize public sentiment against anti-homeless ordinances). 173 While
such litigation may establish only negative rights, 74 it has helped
lead some governments to initiate programs designed to assist
homeless people. 7 5 Thus, while resisting attempts to criminalize
homelessness represents an integral part of homeless legal advo-
cacy, it must be part of a broader strategy that attempts to address
homelessness' root causes. The following Part outlines some ele-
ments of this broader strategy.
III. FUTURE DIRECTION OF HOMELESS LEGAL ADVOCACY
In light of the strengths and limitations of previous homeless le-
gal advocacy, the question arises as to what role advocates can and
should play in the future. This Part will outline possible new direc-
tions for homeless legal advocacy by building on past experiences
and our current understanding of homelessness. First, it will con-
sider the implications of the new poverty law scholarship of the last
two decades for the development of legal advocacy models focused
on homelessness. It will then describe the importance of tying
homeless advocacy to more general anti-poverty efforts. It will
next discuss the need to develop advocacy in more holistic settings
where lawyers can work in tandem with other professionals, such
as social workers, medical doctors, mental health professionals, and
substance abuse counselors, to address homeless clients' various
non-legal needs. While legal advocacy alone will never solve a
problem as complex and deeply rooted as homelessness, it still has
an important role to play.
172. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1580 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see
supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
173. ILLEGAL TO BE HOMELESS, supra note 141, at 75, 83.
174. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
175. See Daniels, supra note 125, at 729-31.
1240
HOMELESS LEGAL ADVOCACY
A. The New Poverty Law Scholarship and the Value of
Homeless Legal Advocacy
The new poverty law scholarship that emerged in the wake of the
Critical Legal Studies movement prompted a reexamination of the
role lawyers play in addressing problems like homelessness.176 This
Section explores the central ideas of this movement and its rele-
vance to homeless legal advocacy today. It then explains the con-
tinuing value of legal services to deliver tangible benefits that help
people to escape homelessness and build public support for critical
issues like affordable housing.
1. Critical Legal Studies and the New Poverty Law Scholarship
Traditional models of poverty lawyering have been challenged in
the past two decades by the growth of the Critical Legal Studies
("CLS") movement, 7 7 and the new poverty law scholarship it
helped engender.17 8 CLS focused attention on the way in which
law both reflects the interests of society's most powerful members
and legitimates the subordination of less powerful groups. CLS at-
tempted to expose the inherent indeterminacy of standards and
values underpinning legal thought. 179 This delegitimization of
traditional values and structures, characteristic of much
postmodern thought,18 carried significant implications for poverty
lawyers, who were no longer seen as fighting a worthy battle to
reform a redeemable system, but as somehow perpetuating inher-
ent forms of domination and inequality. Some commentators con-
tended that in establishing "rights" for their clients, public interest
lawyers were winning only pyrrhic victories because the system it-
176. See infra notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
177. See generally Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983); see also Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Con-
tinuity, and Difference in Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1024-25
(1994) (noting the presence of critical perspectives in the "old" poverty lawyering of
the 1960s, including an emphasis on client empowerment, a critique of lawyer-driven
advocacy, and an emphasis on developing a community base).
178. For a description of the origins and development of the new poverty law schol-
arship, see Louise G. Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People: Revisionist Scholarship and
Practice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 983, 984-86 (1994) (describing, inter alia, the founda-
tion of the Interuniversity Consortium on Poverty Law).
179. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective
on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 722 (1992).
180. See generally Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social
Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'y REV. 697 (1992).
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self ultimately reinforced alienation and powerlessness among the
poor. 181
CLS's basic principles have spawned several smaller, more-fo-
cused critical studies movements. 8 2 Critical race theorists empha-
size the way in which formal legal structures and norms perpetuate
racial oppression and inequality. 8 3 Feminist legal theorists de-
scribe how law embodies a male perspective that suppresses the
concerns of women, and advance a women's perspective on legal
issues that is distinct from men's. 184 The new poverty law scholar-
ship, or "critical lawyering" as it is sometimes known, 85 applies the
principles of CLS to the practice of public interest law. The grow-
ing body of new poverty law scholarship contains significant chal-
lenges to and lessons for the future direction of homeless legal
advocacy.
Proponents of critical lawyering challenge the traditional view of
the attorney-client relationship. In the traditional conception of
the relationship, the client's identity consists of a bundle of inter-
ests, and it is the lawyer's duty to manipulate the outside world to
serve those interests, without ever substituting her own judgment
as to what those interests are or should be.'86 Critical legal schol-
ars argue instead that a client's interests are indeterminate and that
the process of representation itself affects a client's understanding
of those interests. 8 7 The lawyer, not unlike the scientist in quan-
tum physics, does not remain a neutral, detached observer; just as
the scientist alters the object of the experiment by observation, a
lawyer alters a client's conception of her interests through the rep-
resentation process.
181. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Le-
gal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 369, 375
(1982-83).
182. See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIo ST. L.J.
599, 617 (1989).
183. See, e.g., Greta McMorris, Critical Race Theory, Cognitive Psychology, and the
Social Meaning of Race: Why Individualism Will Not Solve Racism, 67 UMKC L.
REV. 695, 696-97 (1999).
184. See, e.g., Nancy Isenberg, Laissez-Unfaire: Gender and the Political Manipula-
tion of the Common Law in Antebellum America, 37 TULSA L. REV. 929, 929-30
(2002).
185. See Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistance and Possibilities: A Criti-
cal and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 687, 687 n.1 (1992) (describing the origins of the term "critical lawyering").
186. See William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV.
469, 470 (1984).
187. Id. at 470-71.
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More radical critiques of conventional lawyering call for an en-
tire restructuring of the attorney-client relationship.IS8 Anthony V.
Alfieri describes the attorney-client model of representation as a
form of domination that inhibits the growth of genuine class-con-
sciousness among poor people and blunts fertile possibilities for
social change.189 Others adopt a more moderate approach that
seeks to incorporate progressive reforms into existing models of
representation, emphasizing the need for greater dialogue between
attorneys and their clients and for the establishment of a collabora-
tive environment that empowers the client. 19°t
A focus on the primacy of a client's voice, rather than on the
formal legal process, is central to much revisionist poverty law
scholarship.' 9 ' In an influential article, Lucie E. White describes
her relationship with her client, Mrs. G., who was challenging an
alleged overpayment from welfare. Instead of following the attor-
ney's advice to beg for mercy and say she spent the money on "ne-
cessities," thus excusing her for liability for the overpayment, Mrs.
G. defiantly told the hearing officer that she had spent the money
on Sunday shoes so her children could attend church. 192
White and others believe that formal legal rules, instead of em-
powering poor people, may help keep them silent. 93 Barbara
Bedzek explains how poor, predominantly African-American de-
fendants in Baltimore's housing court have been effectively si-
lenced and excluded from meaningful participation in the process,
188. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of
Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659, 701 (1987-88).
189. See id. at 697-700.
190. See Buchanan & Trubek, supra note 185, at 703-04; Lucie E. White, Collabora-
tive Lawyering in the Field?: On Mapping the Paths front Rhetoric to Practice, I
CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 158 (1994).
191. See, e.g., GERALD P. LoPEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VI-
SION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 48-51 (1992); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the
Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 600 (1992) (stating "rights are not rights where they cannot be
spoken or heard"); William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A
Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Regan Era, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1101 (1994) ("The new scholarship insists that overcoming the
cultural distance that obscures the political sophistication and coping skills of poor
clients is the first duty of the poverty lawyer."); Trubek, supra note 178, at 987; see
generally Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
192. See White, supra note 191, at 21-32 (describing the story of Mrs. G.). Al-
though Mrs. G. lost the hearing, the county withdrew its overpayment claim shortly
after Mrs. G. had filed her appeal. Id. at 32.
193. See, e.g., id. at 35-37.
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despite the existence of formal legal rights. 194 Bezdek describes
the existence of two worlds in a single courtroom where poor, less
well-educated tenants try to express themselves in the language of
human decency-assuming they speak at all-while the court and
landlords' agents communicate, with great effect, in the formal lan-
guage of the law. 9 '
Traditional lawyering methods, these commentators argue, must
be revised to take account of the client's voice in the course of
representation; similarly, the attorney-client relationship must be
infused with a spirit of mutual understanding and collaboration. 96
For example, welfare "fair hearings," which are generally provided
by state statute and guaranteed by the federal Constitution, 97 can
be viewed less as a forum for zealous advocacy than an opportunity
for a client to tell her story' 98-a privilege historically denied or
limited for women and people of color.1 99
Critical lawyering, however, is not without its detractors.2 °° Per-
haps the most serious charge is that the movement provides little, if
any, practical guidance to attorneys,20 ' a similar criticism of CLS
generally.2°12 The vision of transforming and empowering poor
people by altering the traditional dynamic of the attorney-client re-
lationship may seem persuasive in an academic context, but, as crit-
ics point out, it ultimately has little relevance for the demands and
realities of poverty law practice.2"3 Poverty lawyers not only have
194. See Bezdek, supra note 191, at 583-90.
195. See id. at 586-90. This difference can also be described as a clash between rule-
oriented and relation-oriented accounts. See id. at 586-87.
196. See Buchanan & Trubek, supra note 185, at 703.
197. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
198. Cf. Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelley: On The Paradox of Lawyering for the
Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 862-63 (1990) (arguing that the spirit of landmark wel-
fare rights decisions like Goldberg v. Kelley is for the fair hearing to be a genuinely
participatory legal institution). Some commentators question whether fair hearings
have led to more accurate decisions or increased the power of the poor, as Goldberg
had intended. See, e.g., White, supra note 190, at 3 n.6.
199. See White, supra note 190, at 9-13.
200. See, e.g., Gary L. Blasi, What's a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty
Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1087-89 (1994); Simon, supra note 191,
at 1101 (criticizing "the preoccupation of the new poverty law scholars with profes-
sional domination and their premises about the nature of domination").
201. See White, supra note 190, at 159 (recognizing that advocates of collaborative
lawyering "have offered little guidance about the day-to-day practices that their vision
implies.").
202. See, e.g., Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the
Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 SrAN.
L. REV. 509, 554-55 (1984).
203. See Blasi, supra note 200, at 1087 ("Never has so much theory rested on so
little practice.").
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limited time and resources, but also are obliged-by professional
ethics, if not, moral imperatives-to assist clients who, understand-
ably, demand concrete results, such as immediate help maintaining
public assistance benefits or avoiding eviction. If nothing else, the
new poverty law scholarship has widened the gulf between theore-
ticians in academia and practitioners in legal services offices.
While critical theorists rightly call attention to the danger of law-
yers' excessive influence over poor clients, the idea that a lawyer
would exercise no such influence and yet fulfill even the barest no-
tions of professional competency, let alone true service to the cli-
ent, is unrealistic.
2°4
2. Continuing Value of Homeless Legal Advocacy
The needs of homeless individuals reveal the limitations of the
new poverty law scholarship. Most people do not become home-
less without at least some interaction with legal-bureaucratic insti-
tutions, and generally do not escape homelessness without
successfully navigating those institutions, whether it be by ob-
taining housing assistance, public benefits, medical treatment, or
counseling. The idea of some critical theorists, that lawyers exer-
cise hegemony through the process of "asking" 205 the client about
her problem, does not accurately reflect the experience of provid-
ing legal representation to homeless individuals.
Homeless men and women generally do not walk into legal ser-
vices offices and present a single, concrete issue around which to
frame the first conversation. In fact, many homeless people are
initially reached through outreach programs or walk-in clinics at
places such as soup kitchens and food banks.20 6 A homeless client
may present a range of legal issues (some of which may not be
remediable), and a lawyer must engage in a process of "asking" to
find out precisely what those issues are. Moreover, the idea of
204. See Simon, supra note 191, at 1102-03; cf. White, supra note 198, at 861-62
(describing, in the welfare fair hearing context, the tension advocates face between
their duty of speaking for client and the value of their client being heard).
205. Cf. Simon, supra note 186, at 486-87.
206. See Susan M. Barrow et al., Evaluating Outreach Services: Lessons from a
Study of Five Programs, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, Winter
1999, at 29 ("In a short time, outreach has moved from the periphery of the mental
health services system to a prominent position as one of the essential elements of
adequate community-based care."); Sally Erickson & Jamie Page, To Dance with
Grace: Outreach and Engagement to Persons on the Street, in PRACTICAL LESSONS,
supra note 38, at 6-7 to 6-8.
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lawyering to raise political consciousness 2 7 is problematic given
the pressing material needs of homeless people. Community-based
advocacy models 2118 may likewise prove more difficult to implement
given homeless people's geographic dispersal and diversity. 20 9 To
the extent such advocacy proves feasible, the assertion of legal
rights can interact with and complement attempts to develop a
broader social movement.210
Some principles of critical lawyering nevertheless provide fruit-
ful avenues for future homeless advocacy. While the idea of re-
orienting attorney-client relations along an axis of client
empowerment presents certain challenges,2 11 it is important that at-
torneys pay close attention to what their homeless clients are say-
ing and not simply assume what their interests are-an easy
mistake to make when working with individuals as disempowered
and socially stigmatized as homeless people. At an institutional
level, lawyer-dominated agendas can be avoided by taking account
of what studies show homeless people have defined as their more
pressing needs in developing pragmatic priorities and
approaches.2 12
Ultimately, however, a lawyer must transform the narrative of a
case into something the legal system can process, while making the
system understandable to the client.21 3 The challenge is to remain
207. See, e.g., Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law For Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049,
1053 (1970) ("Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor.... The lawyer
who wants to serve poor people must put his skills to the task of helping poor people
organize themselves."); cf. Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An Introduction, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 287, 289 (1996) (describing the broad mobilization in the
labor and civil rights movements).
208. Raymond H. Brescia et al., Who's in Charge, Anyway? A Proposal for Com-
munity-Based Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. 831, 846-48 (1998); Comment,
The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L. 1069, 1133 (1970).
209. See Robert A. Solomon, Representing the Poor and Homeless: A Community-
Based Approach, 19 S-T. Louis U. PuB3. L. RiEV. 475, 480 (2000). Community-based
efforts may, however, play an important role in addressing housing and other issues
that prevent homelessness, even though conflicts may arise between individual advo-
cacy and the interests of the community. See id. at 481.
210. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
from the Womens Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 610-12 (1986).
211. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
212. Cf Dennis P. Culhane et al., Making Homelessness Programs Accountable to
Consumers, Funders, and the Public, in PRACTICAL LESSONS, supra note 38, at 4-4.
213. See Loi'elz, supra note 191, at 43 (suggesting that lawyers must be bicultural,
"creating both a meaning for the legal culture out of the situation people are living,
and a meaning for people's practices out of the legal culture"); cf Robert W. Gordon,
The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 73 (1988) (suggesting that deciding
how and to what extent she should conform to the will of the client to fit the relevant
legal processes).
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true to the client's narrative while providing a high caliber of legal
services. If a client wants to stand up at a hearing to tell her story
and will feel more empowered as a result,214 the lawyer must recog-
nize and honor that wish. On the other hand, the lawyer must
counsel the client about the possible consequences and be careful
not to foist her own theories about empowerment upon a client
who may ultimately be less interested in telling her story than in
gaining a tangible benefit. At the same time, even in ordinary
cases, a client's story has an inherent political message-for exam-
ple, the state's failure to provide sufficient child care assistance
while imposing strict work requirements on single mothers receiv-
ing welfare benefits-that can be drawn out and amplified through
the process of individual representation.215
B. Strengthening Links between Homelessness and
Poverty Law Advocacy
A frequent tactic of homeless rights lawyers has been to define
homeless people as a separate, unique class that deserves society's
utmost sympathy and support. While millions of other Americans
may be poor, the argument goes, only homeless people are so des-
titute they must live on the streets. This approach helped bring
important benefits, such as the creation of a vast network of shelter
systems, the establishment of homeless assistance programs in wel-
fare bureaucracies that provide emergency housing grants, and in-
creased public recognition of the overall problem. It has, however,
also contributed to a degree of separation between homeless rights
advocacy and poverty law practice. While the two are closely re-
lated -many public benefits or housing court cases are potentially
homeless prevention cases-there tends to be a conceptual split
between the poor or working poor and the homeless. In fact, many
legal issues confronting homeless people overlap with those con-
fronting other poor people. It is important that, where appropri-
ate, homeless rights advocates strengthen these connections
because it will help homeless clients and, more broadly, because it
will reinforce that homelessness is-ultimately-a problem of ex-
214. See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
215. Cf Gabel & Harris, supra note 181, at 396 (suggesting ways for lawyers to
politicize typically non-political cases). For an extreme expression of this view, see,
for example, Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2429 (1989), describing the power of stories as
superior to that of litigation in producing social change. For a much more limited
view of the power of stories, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories
Out of Schoolk An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 826 (1993).
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treme poverty. Strengthening this connection is particularly impor-
tant in the wake of welfare reform and other changes adversely
affecting poor people's legal rights and the social safety net in
general.
This Section explores the possibility of linking homelessness to
more general anti-poverty advocacy. The discussion below is not
intended to be exhaustive, but rather represents some important
themes around which advocates can organize and direct future
efforts.
1. Public Benefits Advocacy
Studies have documented the connection between increases in
homelessness and the decline in the availability and relative
amount of public assistance.21 6 Lawyers have previously targeted
systemic problems of welfare administration in cities with large
homeless populations such as New York and Los Angeles. They
have also helped win greater shelter or housing supplements to
welfare grants.217
Yet, there remain significant obstacles for homeless people in
gaining access to benefit programs such as welfare, SSI, and food
stamps. Welfare reform created strict work requirements and
caseload reduction incentives that make it more difficult for home-
less people to obtain benefits. Despite the fact that many homeless
people remain eligible for SSI and food stamps, participation rates
in these programs remain relatively low.218 In addition to issues of
substantive eligibility, homeless people confront residency, ad-
dress, and documentation requirements that may preclude them
from obtaining benefits.21 9
a. Welfare
The 1996 welfare reform act has adversely impacted homeless
people and increased the need for legal advocacy. In general, the
act has limited eligibility, imposed strict work requirements, and
216. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text; see also BURT ET AL., supra note
3, at 232.
217. See Gary L. Blasi, Litigation Strategies for Addressing Bureaucratic Disentitle-
ment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 591, 598-99 (1987-88).
218. See Jeremy Rosen et al., Food Stamp and SSI Benefits: Removing Access Barri-
ers for Homeless People, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 679, 679 (2001) (citing survey that
only eleven percent of homeless persons received SSI benefits and only thirty-seven
percent received food stamps).
219. See id.
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placed a mandatory five-year lifetime cap on receipt of benefits.22 °
It has also increased the danger of "bureaucratic disentitle-
ment" 2 2'-the various extralegal administrative hurdles that dis-
courage people from applying for or that delay receipt of
benefits 222 -by allowing states and localities (and thus front-line
caseworkers) greater discretion to promote employment over fi-
nancial assistance or to discourage people from even applying for
benefits.223 Stricter work requirements,224 time limits on receipt of
benefits,225 and the ability to sanction recipients226 have dramati-
cally expanded the power of caseworkers and decreased the power
of recipients in dealing with welfare bureaucracies.227
Homeless people have traditionally been underrepresented
among the pool of welfare recipients despite their unquestioned
financial eligibility, 228 and are particularly vulnerable to bureau-
cratic disentitlement and "churning," the practice of rapid adminis-
trative closure of welfare cases for reasons such as the recipient's
failure to comply with a request for verification of eligibility or to
220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 607-608 (2001).
221. See Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs,
58 Soc. SERV. REV. 3, 3 (1984) ("In bureaucratic disentitlement, obligations to social
welfare beneficiaries are reduced and circumscribed through largely obscure 'bureau-
cratic' actions and inactions of public authorities .... ").
222. See Blasi, supra note 217, at 594-95 (describing the devastating impact of bu-
reaucratic disentitlement on homeless applicants in Los Angeles County); see also
Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
223. See Alice Bers, Recent Development, Reforming Welfare After Welfare Re-
form: Reynolds v. Giuliani, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571, 599 (2001) ("With
PRWORA's encouragement of discretionary welfare administration, the potential for
abuse of that discretion is concomitantly higher; this warrants courts scrutinizing the
actions of local government institutions more closely to ensure that poor people's
rights are not violated."); Diller, supra note 98, at 1150-52.
224. See Diller, supra note 98, at 1148-49 ("Work requirements call for judgments
about whether the client can work, what activities should be required, whether the
client has access to suitable child care, whether a recipient was justified in quitting a
job, and whether the client has good excuses for missing appointments or
assignments.").
225. See id. at 1150-51 (noting that while time limits themselves may be fixed,
caseworkers exercise discretion in manipulating information about time limits and in
deciding which recipients may qualify for the limited exceptions from those limits).
226. See id. at 1157-60 (discussing the power of states to administer a growing array
of sanctions, including those for violations of work requirements).
227. See id. at 1152-56 (citing, for example, the role of caseworkers in carrying out
"diversion" policies that attempt to dissuade potentially eligible individuals from ap-
plying for benefits, such as requirements that applicants engage in job search pro-
grams before receiving benefits).
228. See Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief But Upon the Terms of Coming into the
House, "-Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban
Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2180-82 (1995).
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make a scheduled appointment with her caseworker. 229 The fact
that many homeless people suffer from disabilities often creates
further obstacles to obtaining and maintaining welfare benefits. 230
The restrictions imposed by the 1996 act have increased the need
for advocates to challenge abuses,23' as many have already done.232
b. SSI
Because federal welfare programs have traditionally been lim-
ited to families with children, single adults have been forced to rely
on state general assistance programs that provide significantly
lower benefit rates, if they exist at all. Single adults still make up a
majority of the homeless population, though the proportion of
families with children has been rising steadily.233 Many homeless
single adults suffer from mental illness. For this population, it is
important, where possible, to obtain benefits under the SSI pro-
gram, 234 the federal means-tested program for low-income persons
who are elderly (sixty-five and older), blind, or disabled.235 Indeed,
229. See id. at 2181 (describing a study in New York City finding that seventy-five
percent of the clients studied had benefits terminated within the first six months they
had received them).
230. New York City's failure to provide reasonable mental accomodations to its
welfare program for people with disabilities is now the subject of a pending complaint
filed by several legal service organizations with the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Office of Civil Rights. See Nina Bernstein, Complaint
Accuses New York City of Bias Against Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at B2.
231. See, e.g., Peter Edelman, Responding to the Wake-Up Call: A New Agenda for
Poverty Lawyers, 24 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 547, 551-54 (1998) (discussing
the "cornucopia of advocacy challenges and opportunities" including the availability
of child care, health coverage, and transportation).
232. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507-08 (1999) (holding that the
PRWORA's authorization of a durational residency requuirment for the receipt of
welfare benefits did not resuscitate the constitutionality of a state statue allowing for
such a requirement); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(enjoining New York City from deterring plaintiffs from applying for emergency food
stamps, Medicaid, and cash assistance at job centers); Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of
Human Servs., 794 A.2d 822, 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certification granted by,
803 A.2d 1165 (N.J. 2002) (challenging the constitutionality of a state statute capping
welfare benefits for women who have additional children); Davila v. Turner, No. 96-
407163 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 15, 1999), reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16, 1999, at 26
(holding that the city violated the law by assigning virtually all welfare recipients to
workfare without consideration of other qualifying activities such as education and
training); see also Bers, supra note 223, at 606 (noting that litigation can still achieve
important institutional changes even in the current discretionary welfare regime). For
a more complete description of the Reynolds litigation, see id.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
234. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(A) (2002).
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for non-elderly, mentally ill single adults-who are ineligible for
TANF funds and unable to work-accessing SSI represents per-
haps the best chance to gain the financial means to escape home-
lessness. Many homeless people meet the Social Security disability
standard 236 because they have chronic health problems, which be-
ing homeless often exacerbates.237 Yet, many eligible homeless
people are not receiving SSI benefits,238 as the Social Security Ad-
ministration ("SSA") itself has recognized.239 The problem may
partly be explained by the lack of information about SSI, the lack
of assistance in filing for benefits, and the length and complexity of
the application process itself.240 The SSA, however, has made
some attempt to increase outreach efforts aimed at homeless
people.241
Given the often inappropriate denial of disability claims by
homeless people,242 and the high rates of reversal at the adminis-
trative hearing level where such denials are challenged,243 legal ad-
vocacy can make a significant difference.244 This is particularly
true for individuals who suffer from alcohol or substance abuse in
light of a 1997 change to eligibility criteria that prevents receipt of
SSI benefits if drug or alcohol "is a contributing factor material to
236. An adult is disabled for purposes of SSI if she cannot "engage in any substan-
tial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental im-
pairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." Id.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).
237. See, e.g., Leonard Adler, Student Research, SOS for SSI: The Unfulfilled
Promise to Homeless Americans, I GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 304, 308-09 (1994).
Homeless individuals with a sufficient and recent enough history of employment may
be eligible for Social Security disability benefits ("SSD"), a non-means tested employ-
ment insurance program that can pay significantly higher benefit rates than SSI, de-
pending on the individual's employment history. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401(b), 423.
238. See id. at 307 ("Homeless people are more likely than average Americans to
have characteristics that allow them to qualify for SSI, yet they are vastly under-
represented in the program."); Michael Diehl, Screening Out Worthy Social Security
Disability Claimants and its Effect on Homelessness, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617, 617-48
(1990-91).
239. See Social Security Administration Supplemental Security Income Moderniza-
tion Project, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,732, 40,779 (Sept. 4, 1992), cited in Adler, supra note 237,
at 309.
240. See Adler, supra note 237, at 311-13.
241. See id. at 312.
242. See id. at 313.
243. See id. (citing a sixty percent reversal rate by administrative law judges).
244. See, e.g., Richard Cullison, SSI Applicants Shouldn't Have to Seek Lawyers'
Help, LEXINGTON-HERALD LEADER, Sept. 23, 2002, at A8 (stressing the importance
of advocacy because the Social Security Administration frequently wrongfully denies
benefits).
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the determination of disability, ' 245 and thus face greater difficulty
establishing disability.
Further advocacy is also needed around regulations that directly
impact homeless people, such as those governing residence in pub-
lic institutions such as homeless shelters, jails, and hospitals. 24 6
Regulations preclude receipt of SSI benefits by individuals who re-
main in public homeless shelters for six months within a nine-
month period. 247 Even though the regulations require that an indi-
vidual remain in the shelter for the entire month for that month to
count in terms of the restriction,248 SSA often incorrectly counts
months against recipients in which they were absent for part of that
month. Also, SSI benefits are suspended when an individual enters
other public institutions, such as jails. Under the pre-release pro-
gram, individuals in such public institutions may either file new SSI
applications or seek to reactivate previously open cases prior to
their release so that, if approved, they will receive benefits upon
release.249 Many public institutions, however, have not complied
with the pre-release program.
While SSI benefit rates may, in many cases, still be insufficient
for homeless people to obtain permanent housing at market
rates,251 they provide a critical source of income, particularly for
single adults252 who must otherwise rely solely on meager state
general assistance funds to survive. Indeed, obtaining SSI benefits
may open the door to new housing opportunities, including subsi-
dized housing programs run by not-for-profit organizations in the
community.
c. Food Stamps
Hunger and malnutrition are important problems confronting
homeless people, particularly those who do not eat at shelters or
soup kitchens.253 Participation rates for the homeless population in
245. Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.214 (2000); Rosen et al., supra note 218, at 680 (noting views of advocates that
this change has decreased the number of homeless SSI recipients); Watson, supra note
113, at 375.
246. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 416.211.
247. Id. §§ 416.201,416.211.
248. Id. § 416.211(a)(2).
249. Id. § 416.211(a).
250. See Rosen et al., supra note 218, at 687.
251. See Adler, supra note 237, at 311.
252. See BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 119.
253. See id. at 80 (noting that homeless people are more likely to experience hun-
ger and good insecurity than any other group); Monica A. Fennell, Hunger and
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the federal food stamp program is even lower than that for low-
income people generally, even though almost all homeless people
are eligible 4.2 5  The barriers to homeless people's participation in
the food stamp program include the lack of information about the
program and its procedures and the lack of enforcement of
favorable statutory and regulatory measures. 5  Homeless people
often do not have the documents necessary to verify eligibility for
food stamps and have difficulty obtaining or replacing docu-
ments.256 Meanwhile, agencies frequently fail to adhere to require-
ments that they assist individuals in obtaining the necessary
documents rather than simply denying their claim. 257
While the entitlement to food stamps survived the 1996 welfare
reform act, 258 eligibility issues have grown more thorny in places
where food stamps are administered through local welfare centers
because the act has increased the discretion of caseworkers and the
use of diversionary practices.259 One local practice, for example,
has allegedly misinformed people that they are no longer entitled
to food stamps once they receive SSI benefits.260 In addition, able-
bodied food stamps recipients between the ages of eighteen and
sixty, and without dependent children, must comply with strict
work requirements to receive benefits.2 6' Furthermore, the 1996
welfare reform act eliminated automatic eligibility for expedited
Homelessness: Why the Homeless Need Food Stamp Advocacy and How to Pay for It,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 127, 131-32 (1993).
254. Fennell, supra note 253, at 132-33; see Florence Wagman Roisman, The Law-
yer as Abolitionist: Ending Homelessness and Poverty in Our Time, 19 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 237, 248 n.53 (2000) (citing a recent study reporting that only thirty-
seven percent of the people who use homeless assistance programs receive food
stamps); Tusan, supra note 67, at 1196 (noting that a majority of eligible homeless
families did not receive food stamps or supplemental benefits offered to parents with
infants).
255. See Fennell, supra note 253, at 139; see also Bennett, supra note 228, at 2176
(describing the obstacles homeless families faced in applying for food stamps and
other benefits in Washington, D.C.).
256. See Rosen et al., supra note 218, at 689.
257. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(c)(5) (2003).
258. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (2003) (setting forth the aims, provisions, and eligi-
bility requirements of the federal food stamp program).
259. See Roberson v. Giuliani, 99 Civ. 10900, 2000 WL 760300, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June
12, 2000) (addressing the issue of whether joint applicants for food stamps and public
assistance may be denied food stamps for failure to comply with heightened public
assistance verification rules requiring multiple interviews and a mandatory home visit
in most cases). See generally supra notes 220-227 and accompanying text.
260. See Nina Bernstein, Suit to Seek Food Stamps for Thousands Wrongly Denied
Them, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, at A29 (describing class action suit against New
York City to challenge this practice).
261. See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(1)(A).
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food stamps-an important provision to assist individuals waiting
for their applications to be processed. 262
Lawyers, therefore, can play a critical role in assisting homeless
people enforce their rights under the food stamp program and nav-
igate additional barriers imposed by the 1996 welfare reform act.
They can, for example, help homeless clients prevent unlawful de-
nials of food stamp applications for failure to provide verifying
documentation, 263 assist them on budgeting issues to maximize
their food stamp award,2 64 and help them demonstrate eligibility
for the exemptions from the work requirements for single able-
bodied adults. 2
65
2. Eviction Defense
Another critical part of combating homelessness is eviction pre-
vention advocacy in specialized housing (or landlord-tenant) courts
in cities across the country. These specialized housing courts han-
dle a high volume of cases.266 The role of eviction prevention pro-
grams has become even more important given the shortage of
affordable housing, which reduces the possibility that a tenant
evicted from her home can find another place to live other than a
shelter or the street.2 67 While almost all landlords have legal repre-
sentation in housing court, the vast majority of tenants do not.268
Absent representation, the various procedural protections in urban
housing codes often hinder tenants, trapping them in a web of com-
plex rules, rather than safeguarding their rights. 269 Represented te-
nants are much less likely to be evicted than those without
counsel.270 Projects to increase access to legal representation have
262. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a) (setting forth criteria households must meet to be enti-
tled to expedited food stamps, which require the agency to process the application
"promptly" and provide expedited food stamps "to households in immediate need").
263. See supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
264. See Rosen et al., supra note 218, at 690-91 (summarizing regulations regarding
shelter allowances).
265. Id. at 693-94 (discussing various exemptions).
266. See, e.g., Paula Galowitz, The Housing Court's Role in Maintaining Affordable
Housing, in HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, supra note 72, at 180
(describing the New York City Housing Court).
267. Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter. The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel
for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 557, 562
(1988); see Tusan, supra note 67, at 1214 (noting that evictions represent the central
immediate cause of homelessness).
268. See Galowitz, supra note 266, at 184.
269. See Scherer, supra note 267, at 558-59.
270. See Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor
Tenants in New York City's Housing Court: Resuhis of a Randomized Experiment, 35
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proven extremely effective in reducing eviction rates and under-
score the importance of a level playing field in housing court.27'
Unfortunately, funding to legal services organizations for eviction
prevention continues to decline.272 While legal advocacy cannot
remedy the declining income levels and rising housing costs that
underlie many evictions, it can still help prevent many low-income
people from becoming homeless.
273
3. Minimizing the Negative Effects of Incarceration
It is also important for lawyers to focus advocacy efforts on de-
veloping trends such as the link between homelessness and incar-
ceration. A recent federal study determined that over ten percent
of inmates in state prisons in the country (almost 200,000 people)
had been homeless in the year before their arrest.274 Homeless ser-
vice providers generally agree that the number of homeless single
adults who were previously incarcerated rose significantly during
the 1990s. 275 Individuals with criminal records confront additional
obstacles in obtaining housing, employment, and public benefits.
The criminal justice system thus pushes homeless people further
outside mainstream society, often for low-level drug crimes or
quality-of-life offenses.276
Some innovative programs seek to address this problem by facili-
tating connections between external community providers and the
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 419, 419 (2001) (noting that a study of the New York City Hous-
ing Court revealed that "only twenty-two percent of represented tenants had final
judgments against them, compared with fifty-one percent of tenants without legal rep-
resentation"). New York City's Housing Court handles approximately 300,000 cases
per year and issues almost 100,000 warrants of eviction. Id.
271. See, e.g., Galowitz, supra note 266, at 189.
272. See Scherer, supra note 267, at 560.
273. In addition to eviction prevention, advocates should continue to attempt to
work on larger efforts to preserve affordable housing. See, e.g., Ammann, supra note
71, at 314-15 (describing efforts of advocates on a range of efforts to preserve afforda-
ble housing).
274. COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS: HOUSING A GROWING CITY: NEW YORK'S
BUST IN BOOM TIMES 90 [hereinafter HOUSING A GROWING CITY] (citing a 1.998 U.S.
Department of Justice report); see also BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 220, 231.
275. See HOUSING A GROWING CITY, supra note 274, at 91.
276. See Stephen R. Binder, The Homeless Court Program: Taking the Court to the
Streets, 65 FED. PROBATION, June 2001, at 15; see also KUSMER, supra note 10, at 246
(noting that, during the 1990s, cities began passing "quality of life" ordinances that
permitted police to arrest homeless people for minor misdemeanors such as sleeping
or sitting on a sidewalks).
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criminal justice system.2 77 These programs are an important step
given the relatively high percentage of substance abuse and mental
illness among this segment of the homeless population 8.2 7  Also,
litigation has challenged the adequacy of discharge planning for
mentally ill inmates released from hospitals 279 and prisons.28° Evi-
dence suggests that linking these inmates with social services and
housing assistance upon release is cost-effective.281 Other possible
targets for legal advocacy are the lengthy disqualifications for fed-
eral housing programs 28 2 that ensnare not only those convicted of
serious crimes, but also those convicted of minor offenses.283 In
addition, advocates should focus more on increasing soon-to-be re-
leased inmates' access to public benefit programs.284 Finally, there
should be an expansion of programs that seek to help homeless
people resolve outstanding criminal court cases for less serious of-
277. Alissa Riker & Ursula Castellano, The Homeless Pretrial Release Project: An
Innovative Pretrial Release Option, FED. PROB., June 2001, at 12 (describing the
Homeless Release Project in San Francisco).
278. See id. at 10 (noting that approximately eighty-five percent of the homeless
release project's clients have substance abuse issues and that about fifty percent have
been diagnosed with a co-occurring mental illness).
279. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 113, at 377-82 (discussing litigation to enforce
adequate discharge planning from hospitals and psychiatric institutions).
280. See Brad H. v. City of New York, 712 N.Y.S.2d 336, 336, 341 (Sup. Ct. 2000)
(granting preliminary injunction to a class of prisoners who contended that they were
not provided with discharge plans for mental health treatment upon their release in
violation of state law).
281. See Robert Kolker, Quality-of-Life Control, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 14, 2002, availa-
ble at http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/politics/newyork/features/5581
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
282. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. At the same time, federal law
authorizes local public housing authorities to consider a range of mitigating evidence
showing a tenant's suitability for federally subsidized housing notwithstanding a prior
conviction. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(d) ("In the event of the receipt of unfavora-
ble information with respect to the applicant, consideration shall be given to the time,
nature, and extent of the applicant's conduct (including the seriousness of the of-
fense)."); id. § 960.203(d)(1) (authorizing local public housing authorities to consider
"factors which might indicate a reasonable probability of favorable future conduct").
Furthermore, determinations of ineligibility by a housing authority may be challenged
by requesting an administrative hearing. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(2); 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.554.
283. See Ammann, supra note 71, at 240.
284. See, e.g., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATION MANUAL SYSTEM
SI 00520.900 et seq. (describing prerelease procedures to provide a way for potentially
eligible individuals to apply for disability benefits under the Social Security Adminis-
tration's Supplemental Security Income program prior to their release from public
institutions such as prisons), available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/poms (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2003).
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fenses, in order to avoid civil disqualifications for critical needs like
housing and employment.285
C. Targeting Specific Homeless Populations
Another effective approach to homeless advocacy focuses on
specific homeless populations. While poverty is the underlying
cause of homelessness among all groups, different populations
have different needs and would benefit from more targeted types
of advocacy. This Section focuses on two postential gorups: fami-
lies; and the elderly.286
1. Homeless Families
More programs should focus on homeless families-the fastest
growing segment of the homeless population. Domestic violence is
an underlying cause of homelessness among many families, forcing
women to leave their homes even though they may have no place
else to go. Approximately one-half of homeless women and chil-
dren are victims of domestic violence.287 Advocacy may involve
obtaining orders of protection and helping domestic violence vic-
tims navigate legal barriers to affordable housing. Homeless fami-
lies also face family law issues, including the potential loss of
children to foster care.2 8
Education represents another important issue for homeless fami-
lies. Most homeless children do not attend school regularly, are
forced to shuttle between different schools in a given academic
year, attain lower education achievement standards, and have
more emotional and behavior problems than other school chil-
dren.289 As a result, a right to education for homeless children and
youth was incorporated into the McKinney-Vento Homeless Edu-
cation Assistance Improvement Act, guaranteeing homeless chil-
dren and youth equal access to the same free, appropriate public
education as other children and youth.29 ° The act orders that state
285. See Binder, supra note 276, at 15 (describing a homeless court program run
outside the courthouse).
286. Other target homeless populations might include, for example, people with
HIV/AIDS. See, e.g., Patti Phillips, Adding Insult to Injury: The Lack of Medically-
Appropriate Housing for the Homeless HIV-Ill, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 571 (1990-
91) (describing the importance of legal advocacy for homeless people with HIV).
287. See Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J.L. &
POL'Y 237, 244 (1994); Tusan, supra note 67, at 1187.
288. Rosenheck et al., supra note 38, at 2-11.
289. See Shelia O'Leary, Student Research: Hot Topics in Education, Educating
Homeless Children, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 513, 513-14 (2001).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 11431 (2002).
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educational agencies ensure that homeless children have the same
right to public education as other children, and explicitly requires
states to review and, if necessary, revise any laws or rules that may
act as a barrier to the educational success of homeless children,29'
such as residency and school records requirements and lack of
transportation. 292 The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001293
reauthorized the Mckinney-Vento Act and strengthened various
provisions, for example, by requiring school districts to keep chil-
dren who are homeless in the same school they attended when per-
manently housed or the school they last attended, if that is the
choice of the parent or guardian, for the duration of their home-
lessness or until the end of the academic year, if they become
housed.2 94 Inadequate funding and noncompliance with statutory
requirements, however, have previously undercut the McKinney-
Vento Act's goals.29 5 Lawyers can seek greater enforcement of the
McKinney-Vento Act through public education to educate home-
less parents and children about their rights,296 direct legal services
providing advocacy at the local school level, 97 litigation challeng-
ing broader policies,29- and legislative advocacy to promote statu-
tory and regulatory laws at the state and local level to help
guarantee the rights of homeless children and youth.299
2. Elderly Homeless
The elderly represent another growing segment of the homeless
population,30 0 one that does not generally receive much publicity
but would greatly benefit from increased advocacy. Although the
291. Id.
292. Deborah M. Thompson, Breaking the Cycle of Poverty: Models of Legal Advo-
cacy to Implement the Educational Promise of the McKinney Act for Homeless Chil-
dren and Youth, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1209, 1222-24 (1998).
293. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 etseq.
(2003)).
294. See 42 U.S.C. § I 1432(g)(3); see also Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, Presi-
dent Bush Signs Education Reform Bill (Jan. 8, 2002) (describing improvements to
the McKinney-Vento Act with the most recent amendments), at http://
www.nationalhomeless.org/edannouncement.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
295. Thompson, supra note 292, at 1213-14.
296. Id. at 1234-35.
297. Id. at 1235-36.
298. See, e.g., Joe Surkiewicz, Public Justice Center Sues Montgomery County, Md.,
Over Homeless Students' Rights, DAILY REC., May 20, 2002, at B1 (challenging
county's policy refusing to permit students to attend their school of origin when they
temporarily move outside their school district due to homelessness).
299. Thompson, supra note 292, at 1236-38.
300. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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definition of "elderly" varies, there is a growing consensus that in-
dividuals fifty years of age and older should be included in the pop-
ulation of elderly homeless individuals. Homeless persons aged
fifty to sixty-five may resemble older individuals due to their physi-
cal health, which is exacerbated by poor nutrition and severe living
conditions.3 °'
The increase in homelessness among elderly persons is primarily
due to the declining availability of affordable housing and growing
poverty among certain segments of this age group." 2 A 1998 HUD
study found that, of the 12.5 million persons in households identi-
fied as having "worst case housing needs," 1.5 million were elderly
people.30 3 Although Social Security benefits have significantly re-
duced poverty among the elderly,3"4 elderly persons are more likely
than nonelderly persons to have incomes just over the poverty line,
leaving them less money to spend on basic necessities, including
housing.30 5
Also, elderly people generally are entitled to receive Social Se-
curity retirement benefits only if they (or their spouses) have
worked the required forty quarters. 6 While those sixty-five and
over who do not qualify for Social Security because they lack the
necessary work credits are eligible for SSI benefits (assuming they
meet the income, resource, and other eligibility requirements),
those under sixty-five only receive SSI if they prove they are dis-
abled or blind.30 7 Moreover, SSI benefits, which primarily consist
of a federal portion and in some states, a supplement, 3118 can be
insufficient to find housing. °9 Poor elderly persons between fifty
301. See Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 49.
302. See id.; see also Saul Friedman, Family & Relationships; Gray Matters; Census
Bureau Counts More Seniors in Poverty, NEWSDAY, Oct. 15, 2002, at B18.
303. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., RENTAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE-THE
CRISIS CONTINUES: 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS
(1998), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/affhsg/worstcase/find-
ing6.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
304. See, e.g., KATHRYN H. PORTER ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES,
SOCIAL SECURITY AND POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY: A NATIONAL AND STATE
PERSPECTIVE ix (1998) (citing census data demonstrating that, in 1997, Social Security
lifted 11.4 million elderly people out of poverty and reduced the poverty rate among
the elderly by three-quarters), available at http://www.cbpp.org/4-8-99socsec.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2003).
305. See Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 49.
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (1991).
307. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381-1382c.
308. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.401-416.586 (2003) (discussing the amount of SSI grants).
309. See ANN O'HARA & EMILY MILLER, TECHNICAL HoUs. COLLABORATIVE &
CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES HoUs. TASK FORCE, PRICED OUT IN
2000: THE TREND CONTINUES (2001) (finding that in 2000, people with disabilities
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and sixty-five who are not disabled, and thus not eligible for SSI,
are in a particularly precarious position. They must instead rely on
state welfare payments, which vary by state and do not exist in all
states, because they also do not qualify for federal welfare benefits
unless they have dependent children.
In addition, the 1996 welfare reform act bars many immigrants,
including immigrants lawfully in the United States, from receiving
many federal benefits including food stamps and SSI.31 ° These re-
strictions disproportionately impact elderly homeless immigrants,
many of whom may have lived in the United States for years, be-
cause working can become more difficult with age, particularly for
those whose prior work has been in unskilled, labor-intensive jobs.
Elderly homeless people are also particularly vulnerable to
crime, abuse, and disease. Studies have demonstrated they are fre-
quently robbed or assaulted at higher rates than other age
groups.31l As a result, many avoid homeless shelters, where they
feel especially vulnerable, and instead sleep on the street. Elderly
homeless individuals are also more prone to both medical and psy-
chiatric problems, which may endanger their health and safety.
While government programs to provide more affordable housing
and increase income levels represent the most effective way to re-
duce homelessness among the elderly, advocates can still play an
important role in addressing the needs of the elderly poor. For
example, advocates can assist older individuals under the age of
sixty-five in obtaining SSI benefits based on disability after their
claims are denied. While many meritorious claims are initially de-
nied, success rates are high on appeal,3 12 particularly when the
claimant receives legal advice or representation. Advocates can
also help elderly persons with other issues, such as public assistance
and food stamps, eviction prevention (for those not yet homeless),
immigration issues, and access to health care.
receiving SSI benefits needed to pay-on a national average-ninety-eight percent of
their SSI benefits in order to be able to rent a modest one-bedroom unit at Fair Mar-
ket Rent), available at http://www.c-c-d.org/POin2000.html#e (last visited Mar. 15,
2003).
310. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2002) (barring any and all aliens except "qualified aliens"
for most federal benefits); id. § 1612(a) (barring some groups of "qualified aliens" for
various federal benefits, including SSI and food stamps).
311. See, e.g., Nat'l Coalition for the Homeless, supra note 49.
312. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. In fact, the older a person is, the
more favorable the standard for establishing disability, at least insofar as it impacts
exertional activities. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404(P), app. 2, §§ 200-204 (setting forth guide-
lines to determine disability for individuals who have an exertional impairment and
whose condition prevents them from returning to their past employment).
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D. Defining Issues and Shaping Perceptions Through Advocacy
Legal advocacy also can play an important role in shaping the
public's attitudes about homelessness and deepening its under-
standing of this complex problem.1 3 It can foster political change
by pressuring policymakers to act.314 Certainly, lawyers have
helped focus public attention on the issues, including by opposing
efforts by cities to criminalize homelessness. 15 By framing home-
lessness in structural rather than personal terms, lawyers have
helped cause the public to blame homelessness-at least to some
extent-on the economy and housing market rather than individ-
ual "failings" like mental illness or chemical dependency.316 This is
important because much of the social science research on home-
lessness tends to focus not on housing or poverty issues, but on the
differential diagnosis of mental illness among the homeless
themselves. 317
Still, negative stereotypes of homeless people remain. Advo-
cates should continue to counter the mistaken view, based in part
on common observations of the more visible street homeless popu-
lation,318 that homelessness is more about mental illness and sub-
313. See generally Minow, supra note 207, at 294 ("Because lawyers work with
words, they can tell stories not only to courts and legislatures, but also to broader
publics.").
314. See generally Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Politi-
cal Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 300 (1996).
315. See Benjamin S. Waxman, Fighting the Criminalization of Homelessness: Anat-
omy of an Institutional Anti-Homeless Lawsuit, 23 STETSON L. REV. 467, 491 (1994)
(describing the importance of having an effective public relations strategy when com-
mencing homeless rights lawsuits).
316. See Blasi, supra note 18, at 221.
317. See BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 98 (noting strong bias of social science data
towards long-term homeless who tend to have more alcohol, drug, and mental health
problems); Blasi, supra note 18, at 228 (noting that while negative perceptions of wel-
fare recipients are influenced by beliefs about poverty and race, negative perceptions
of homelessness tend to be based on associations between personal "failures" like
mental illness and substance abuse that divert attention from structural forces like the
affordable housing crisis and inadequate income supports); KUSMER, supra note 10, at
230 (noting the sociological studies of the homeless population in skid rows during the
1950s and 1960s emphasized deviant personal habits, such as drinking habits); Tusan,
supra note 67, at 1147 (citing Marybeth Shinn & Beth C. Weitzman, Research on
Homelessness, 46 J. Soc. IssuEs 1, 3 (1990)).
318. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Bloomberg and the Man on the Street: Reaching Out
to the Homeless, Mayor Finds No Easy Answer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 1, at 31.
(describing studies about "the chronically homeless-deranged, debilitated people
who dominate the public image of the problem."); see also KUSMER, supra note 10, at
242 ("Because many homeless do not act or look 'normal,' people readily jump to the
conclusion that the homeless population is composed primarily of potential criminals,
psychotics, or drug addicts.").
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stance abuse than poverty. It is not that mental illness and
chemical dependency are unimportant factors in explaining home-
lessness, but rather that these factors alone generally do not ex-
plain why someone becomes or remains homeless. Advocates
should find (and, to the extent possible, publicize) cases that show
how easy it is for people to fall through the cracks and become
homeless due to extreme poverty. They should pursue litigation
that exposes the socio-economic forces beneath individual hard-
ships, putting homelessness in the context of larger policy issues
and encouraging long-term solutions by decision-makers in the po-
litical arena.
E. Lawyering in Holistic Settings
In recent years, there has been an increase in interdisciplinary or
holistic approaches to address the range of needs-legal and non-
legal-of low-income clients.3" 9 Some models involve increased
cooperation between lawyers and social workers, 2 while others
employ a broader multidisciplinary framework involving not only
law and social work, but also medical and psychiatric treatment,
nutrition, counseling, job training, and other services.'
A multidisciplinary model in which layers work alongside other
professionals represents an effective way to address the range of
needs confronting homeless individuals and families. Unfortu-
nately, legal services organizations generally do not or, more likely,
cannot provide the case management, social work, medical and
psychiatric treatment, job training, and substance abuse counseling
that many homeless people need. Conversely, social services agen-
cies and community based organizations assisting homeless people
tend not to provide legal assistance even though their clients often
319. See, e.g., Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multidisciplinary
Practice: Encouraging Holistic Advocacy While Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 787, 799 (2002) (outlining ethical issues in multidisciplinary practice in
not-for-profit service organizations); Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers
and Social Workers: Re-examining the Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67
FORDIAM L. R-v. 2123, 2126 (1999) (describing ways in which social workers can
assist in the delivery of legal services by helping lawyers in understanding and relating
to clients); Christina T. Pierce et al., Social Work and Law: A Model for Implementing
Social Services in a Law Office, NAT'L ASS'N ELDF-R L. A'l"y Q., Spring 2003, at 3
(2000) (describing advantages of a holistic approach in addressing financial, legal, and
psychosocial issues confronting elderly clients); Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Farn-
ham. Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary Practices for People, 7 CLINICAL
L. RiEv. 227, 231-33 (2000) (surveying different "social justice collaboratives").
320. Galowitz, supra note 319, at 2124-26.
321. See Brustin, supra note 319, at 792-95.
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confront issues involving public benefits, housing, immigration,
family law, consumer law, and other matters that could best be ad-
dressed by legal advice or actual representation in administrative
agencies or courts.
Existing evidence suggests the value of interdisciplinary ap-
proaches that provide outreach services to homeless people, partic-
ularly those who are mentally ill.322  It also indicates the
importance of integrating the allocation and delivery of services for
homeless people through continuum of care models that seek to
provide services from the time people are on the street or in shel-
ters until they find permanent housing. 323 Yet, the existing contin-
uum of care models generally do not include legal services on
various issues. Incorporating legal advocacy into existing social
service models would provide better and more comprehensive ser-
vices and, in turn, improve the quality of the legal advocacy by
linking it to services addressing other, non-legal issues confronting
homeless clients. Collaboration between lawyers and other profes-
sionals like social workers will also make lawyers more aware of
the psychological aspects of their clients' legal problems. 324
Incorporating legal advocacy into programs that provide stabiliz-
ing after-care to formerly homeless people represents another ef-
fective way of combating homelessness. Many homeless
individuals and families who have obtained permanent housing are
generally vulnerable to becoming homeless again. Often, a glitch
with their welfare benefits, a problem with their landlord, or a set-
back at work is all that it takes to start the downward spiral to-
wards homelessness. While social service professionals can address
issues like medical and psychiatric treatment or substance abuse
counseling, lawyers can provide the critically needed assistance in
322. See, e.g., Erickson & Page, supra note 206, at 6-7 to 6-8; Gary A. Morse et al.,
Outreach to Homeless Mentally Ill People: Conceptual and Clinical Considerations, 32
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 261, 265-68 (1996); Marcus Plescia et al., A Mul-
tidisciplinary Health Care Outreach Team to the Homeless: The 10-year Experience of
the Montefiore Care for the Homeless Team, 20 COMMUNITY HEALTH 58, 60-61 (1997).
323. See, e.g., BURT ET AL., supra note 3, at 269 (describing HUD's efforts to make
continuums of care the norm); Stanley S. Herr & Stephen M.B. Pincus, A Way To Go
Home: Supportive Housing and Housing Assistance Preferences for the Homeless, 23
STETSON L. REV. 345, 399 (1994) ("To break the cycle of homelessness in each com-
munity, local governments will need to build a continuum of services to assist people
at each stage of homelessness.").
324. See Galowitz, supra note 319, at 2128-30 (discussing the importance of social
work principles of empathy when providing assistance to low-income individuals).
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matters like public benefits or eviction defense to prevent future
homelessness.2 5
Legal advice or representation could also be added to existing
social services for homeless people who have been placed in sup-
portive housing programs to help prevent their becoming homeless
again.326 These programs, which provide subsidized permanent
housing and accompanying social services to homeless people,
mainly to single adults with mental disabilities, have proven re-
markably successful in preventing future homelessness.327 They
could, however, further benefit from legal assistance in helping cli-
ents deal with issues like access to health care, public benefits, and
barriers to employment.
Of course, lawyers practicing in such multidisciplinary settings
will need to balance a program's goal of addressing clients' social,
psychological, and medical needs while retaining principles of zeal-
ous advocacy that govern the legal profession.328 Tension may
arise, for example, between lawyers and social workers on how to
best handle an issue based on the different principles and rules
governing their respective professions. Programs utilizing a holistic
approach will need to develop a system to address ethical issues
like confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and independence of pro-
fessional judgment.329
An ideal model would thus integrate legal advocacy with other
services to address the myriad of problems confronting homeless
people. The wide range of issues 330 and the current patchwork na-
325. See supra Part IlI.B.
326. Cf. Dennis P. Culhane et al., Public Service Reductions Associated with Place-
ment of Homeless Persons with Severe Mental Illness in Supportive Housing, 13 Hous-
ING PoL'Y DEBATE 107, 111 (2002) (describing success and cost-effectiveness of
supportive housing programs); see Barrow et al., supra note 206, at 41-42 (noting the
importance of access to public benefits and housing-related services in preventing the
formerly homeless from becoming homeless again); Watson, supra note 113, at 361-
62.
327. See Martha R. Burt, Demographics and Geography: Estimating Needs, in
PRACTICAL LESSONS, supra note 38, at 1-19 (noting that many programs have been
able to retain about eighty percent of the previously homeless people they serve in
decent, stable housing arrangements); Dennis P. Culhane, New Strategies and Collab-
orations Target Homelessness, 4 HOUSING FACTS & FIGURES, 2002, at 1, 4 (describing
the potential value of supportive housing in addressing the needs of the approxi-
mately 200,000 to 300,000 chronically homeless individuals in the United States).
328. See Brustin, supra note 319, at 827.
329. See generally id. at 837-64; Galowitz, supra note 319, at 21.34-47 (describing
tension between "advocacy" model of lawyers and "best interests" model of social
workers).
330. See, e.g., Karen Houppert, For Her Own Good, NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, at 21
(describing how the intersection of low-wage employment, restrictions on welfare, the
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ture of social welfare protections 331 underscore the value of more
holistic approaches to homelessness.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers have played an important role in addressing homeless-
ness over the past two decades. They helped win an expansion of
emergency shelter services during the 1980s and mitigate the ef-
fects of the increasing criminalization of homelessness since the
1990s. In addition, litigation has helped raise awareness about and
shape public attitudes towards homelessness.
Yet, existing strategies have proven limited in addressing the un-
derlying causes of homelessness. Legal advocacy cannot, of course,
"solve" a problem like homelessness, which ultimately derives
from the basic structure of our political, economic, and social sys-
tem. Absent a strong political commitment to creating more af-
fordable housing and addressing other aspects of poverty, many
people will continue to be homeless. Yet, lawyers can make an
important difference both in the lives of individual clients and on
larger policies. This Article has attempted to point out some possi-
ble future directions of homeless legal advocacy that build on past
approaches and concentrate on other areas that offer a promising
way to address the problem.
costs of quality child care, and the lack of affordable housing all contributed to the
periodic homelessness of a single mother and her daughters).
331. See Edelman, supra note 231, at 548.
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CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS: EMERGENCE OF
A PUBLIC POLICY
Martha R. Burt*
INTRODUCTION
The past two years have witnessed a major shift in public com-
mitment to end chronic homelessness within the next decade. This
Article examines the phenomenon of chronic homelessness and its
emergence as the focus of a significant policy transformation. It
first sets the scene with a brief review of why homelessness remains
a significant social problem after twenty years of public and private
investment in homeless assistance networks. It then looks at defi-
nitions of homelessness in general, and chronic homelessness in
particular. With respect to policy, it traces a story that starts with
research. Initial research showed that even the most chronic, dis-
abled, street-dwelling homeless people will accept and remain in
housing, given the right configuration and the right supportive ser-
vices. Research on program effectiveness was followed by analyses
showing near break-even public costs for providing the housing.
The story continues with evidence that the numbers of chronically
homeless people who would need housing are within a manageable
range. The Article concludes by examining what advocates have
done and are still doing with the research evidence, and an over-
view of public commitments and the effort it will take to assure
that they are fulfilled.
I. CAUSES OF HOMELESSNESS
Two types of factors are generally acknowledged as causing
homelessness in the sense that they create the conditions under
which people are more or less likely to find themselves homeless.!
Factors of the first type are structural-they are larger societal
trends and changes that affect broad segments of a population.2
These include changes in housing markets and land use, employ-
ment opportunities, the quality and relevance of public education,
* Ph.D., Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.
1. MARTHA BURT ET AL., HELPING AMERICA'S HOMELESS: EMERGENCY SHEL-
TER OR AFFORDABLE HOUSING? 7 (2001); Paul Koegel et al., The Causes of Home-
lessness, in HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 25 (Jim Baumohl ed., 1996).
2. BURT ET AL., supra note 1, at 7; Koegel et al., supra note 1, at 26-27.
1267
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
institutional supports for people with disabilities, and discrimina-
tory policies of several varieties.3 If housing prices go up, all other
things being equal, fewer people can afford housing.4 If unemploy-
ment rises, or if pay levels of the most available jobs remain too
low relative to the price of housing, fewer people can afford hous-
ing.5 If public education and other institutions do not prepare most
people to obtain jobs that pay a living wage, more people will be at
risk of homelessness.6 And so on. Structural factors determine
why levels of homelessness rise or fall in this place, at this time,
rather than in some other place or at some other time.'
Factors of the second type are individual-they are the condi-
tions and circumstances that make particular people particularly
vulnerable to homelessness.' These include various disabilities (for
example, mental illness, developmental disabilities, and physical
disabilities), illnesses, illiteracy, and addictions.9 They may also in-
clude personal circumstances such as domestic violence, too many
to support on one income, having no family to rely on (for exam-
ple, because one has been in foster care, or because of familial
abuse), apartment condemnation, or fire, flood, hurricane, or
war.
10
A third factor, public policies, may mitigate structural and indi-
vidual factors that determine the ultimate level of "literal" home-
lessness in a particular time and place." Emergency relief often
can provide this for victims of natural disasters or war. A guaran-
tee of housing may afford this for citizens of several European
countries. Income and other support for people with disabilities
severe enough to prevent their working might prevent their becom-
ing homeless.' 2 There will always be some people without roofs,
communities, or families. The sheer number of people experienc-
ing literal homelessness in the United States during the past two
decades, however, indicates a very unfortunate convergence of
3. BURT ET AL., supra note 1, at 7; Koegel et al., supra note 1, at 26-29.
4. Koegel et al., supra note 1, at 26-29.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. BURT ET AL., supra note 1, at 8-10.
8. BURT ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; Koegel et al., supra note 1, at 25, 29-33.
9. BURT ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; Koegel et al., supra note 1, at 25, 29-33.
10. BURr ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; Koegel et al., supra note 1, at 25, 29-33.
11. BURT ET AL., supra note 1, at 6 ("'Literal' homelessness is defined on a day-
by-day basis, and involves sleeping either in a facility serving homeless people, in
accommodations paid for by a voucher from a program serving homeless people, or in
places not meant for human habitation.").
12. Id. at 327-28.
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structural and individual factors that, to date, have not been coun-
tered with public policies adequate to reduce their ability to gener-
ate homelessness. The campaign to end chronic homelessness
during the coming decades will arise from recognizing that public
policy changes could make a substantial difference.
II. DEFINING HOMELESSNESS AND CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS
Homelessness has been defined in various ways in different eras,
countries, and circumstances. Historically, ideas of homelessness
have usually incorporated one or more of the concepts of being
without place (not being "from here"), without family, or without
housing.13 In the United States during the last two decades, federal
policy has been governed by the definition articulated in the princi-
pal federal legislation related to homelessness-the McKinney-
Vento Homeless Assistance Act, subsequently renamed the Stew-
art B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act ("McKinney Act") 4
and subsequent reauthorizations and expansions.' 5 The Act de-
fines a person as homeless if the "individual lacks a fixed, regular,
and adequate nighttime residence."' 6 People sleeping in "a public
or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular
sleeping accommodation for human beings," as well as those stay-
ing in shelters for homeless people, are part of the definition.1 7
To operationalize the public policy of the Act's definition, at a
practical level it is often translated into the narrowest of working
definitions-having been without housing last night, or expecting
to be without housing tonight. Thus, people in precarious circum-
stances who still manage to stay in conventional dwellings by mov-
ing every few days or weeks from one relative's house to another
13. See BURT ET AL., supra note 1, at 2-5; KIM HOPPER, RECKONING WITH HOME-
LESSNESS (THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY ISSUES) 16-17 (2003); Kim Hop-
per & Jim Baumohl, Held in Abeyance: Rethinking Homelessness and Advocacy, 37
AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 522, 522-25 (1994); Kim Hopper, Homelessness Old and
New: The Matter of Definition, 2 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 757, 757-814 (1991); Kim
Hopper & Jim Baumohl, Redefining the Cursed Word: A Historical Interpretation of
American Homelessness, in HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 3-6.
14. The McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, renamed, Stewart B. McKin-
ney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq. (1995)).
15. For a description of subsequent reauthorizations and expansions of the Mc-
Kinney Act, see the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development website, at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/homeless/mckin/intro.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2003).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a)(1).
17. Id. § 11302(a)(2)(C).
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would not be considered homeless until they reached the situation
of having nowhere to go but the streets or a shelter.
Similarly, someone whose pension or disability check provides
enough money to afford a cheap hotel room for three weeks out of
every month, but who resorts to the streets until the next check
arrives would only be considered homeless at the end of the
month, even if this pattern has lasted for years. The consequence
of this policy-driven working definition has been the development
of an extensive network of homeless assistance programs that help
to ameliorate the realities of homelessness for those already with-
out housing. 8 But most existing homeless-specific programs can
do little to prevent homelessness or change the forces that continue
to generate homelessness.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHRONICALLY HOMELESS PEOPLE
Regardless of how "chronic" is defined, the population is largely
male (seventy-seven to eighty-six percent), about sixty percent are
middle-aged (between thirty-five and fifty-four years old), and
most are very disabled.' 9 Between eighty-three and eighty-seven
percent, again depending on definitions of chronic, have mental
health, alcohol, and/or drug problems.2" Thus, ending chronic
homelessness means assisting people who have one or more severe
disabilities, and often have a history of resisting efforts to help
them address those disabilities.
IV. PROGRAM SUCCESS: EVIDENCE THAT SOMETHING WORKS
To make a new policy, one must know what will work and how
much will be needed, after which advocacy focuses on the appro-
priateness of acting on this knowledge. In the 1980s, there was no
evidence of what would work to bring chronically homeless people
into housing and induce them to stay there. An early contribution
of public policy to the knowledge base of what works were the re-
18. BURT ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
19. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOMELESSNESS: PROGRAMS AND THE
PEOPLE THEY SERVE-HIGHLIGHTS REPORT: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY
OF HOMELESS ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter 1999
HIGHLIGHTS REPORT], available at www.huduser.org/publications/homeless/home-
lessness/highrpt.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); Martha R. Burt, Homeless Families,
Singles, and Others: Findings from the 1996 National Survey of Homeless Assistance
Providers and Clients, 12 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 737, 741-47, 763-68 (2001), availa-
ble at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/HPD-1204_burt.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
20. 1999 HIGHLIGHTS REPORT, supra note 19; Burt, supra note 19, at 763-68.
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search-demonstration programs authorized by the McKinney Act
to see what would work to end homelessness among chronically
homeless persons with severe mental illness and/or chronic sub-
stance abuse.21 Starting in the early 1990s, with results appearing
during the middle and end of that decade, these studies consist-
ently found that if housing was supplied, people would come in
from the streets and remain stably housed. Without the housing
component, however, no amount of other services affected levels
of homelessness. 22 The approach that worked was permanent sup-
portive housing.23 The housing could take any one of many con-
figurations-apartments, houses, group houses, single room
occupancy hotel rooms ("SROs"); the supports could be offered
through many mechanisms-on site staff, drop-in, community-
based teams.24 But the housing component was essential; services
alone were not enough. Practitioners and advocates quickly got
the message-this can be done, but it takes housing!
V. NUMERIC ESTIMATES: EVIDENCE OF REASONABLE SCOPE
The next question for policy makers and advocates was: how
much is needed? Some local communities have estimates or counts
of homeless populations, and even of chronically homeless or
street-dwelling homeless people. Some of these communities
have already used their estimates as the basis for local campaigns
to end chronic homelessness. 26 In order to stimulate national pol-
21. 42 U.S.C. § 11302.
22. Deirde Oakley & Deborah L. Dennis, Responding to the Needs of Homeless
People with Alcohol, Drug, and/or Mental Health Disorders, in HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA, supra note 1, at 179-80; David L. Shern et al., Housing Outcomes for
Homeless Adults with Mental Illness: Results from the Second-Round McKinney Pro-
gram, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 239, 239-41 (1997); Marybeth Shinn & Jim Baumohl,
Rethinking the Prevention of Homelessness, in U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.
& U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRACTICAL LESSONS: THE 1998 NA-
TIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HOMELESSNESS RESEARCH 13-1 (Linda B. Fosburg &
Deborah L. Dennis eds., 1999).
23. NAT'L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, A PLAN: NOT A DREAM-HOW TO
END HOMELESSNESS IN TEN YEARS 10 (2000), available at http://www.naeh.org/pub/
tenyear/10yearplan.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
24. See id. at 11.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Nat'l Alliance to End Homlessness, State and Local Plans to End Homeless-
ness, at http://www.naeh.org/localplans (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). In Ohio, Colum-
bus and Franklin Counties have relied upon gathered estimates, as has the city of
Philadelphia. CONTINUUM OF CARE STEERING COMM., COLUMBUS & FRANKLIN
COUNTY, 10-YEAR PLAN TO END CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS: COLUMBUS AND FRANK-
LIN COUNTY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN JULY 2002-DECEMBER 2003 (2002), available at
http://www.csb.org/What-s_New/Ending%20Chronic%20Homelessness%20Cover.htm
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icy, however, national data is needed. The only source for national
estimates on the homeless population is the National Survey of
Homeless Assistance Providers and Clients ("NSHAPC"), con-
ducted in 1996, with point-in-time and annual estimates of the
homeless population published in early 2000.27
As illustrated in Table 1, subsequent analyses of the same data,
published here for the first time, have utilized combinations of
"spell length" and "number of times homeless" to create different
definitions of "chronic" homelessness. These analyses then esti-
mated how many single adults might fit each category. Using only
information about the length of a person's current homeless spell, a
definition requiring two years of homelessness to qualify as chronic
includes 28.8 percent of all single homeless adults. Reducing the
required time to one year increases the proportion considered
chronic to 42.7 percent. The pattern examined for multiple epi-
sodes (four or more within the past five years) captures the small-
est proportion of single homeless adults (16.4 percent). Combining
the two criteria (length of current spell and multiple episodes) in-
creases the proportion of single homeless adults who would be de-
fined as chronic, and also illustrates that some people qualify under
both criteria-they have had several homeless spells and their cur-
rent spell has lasted at least one or two years.
Table I
Estimates of the Number of Chronically Homeless Single Adults'
Alternative Definitions of "Chronic" Homelessness
l year+OR 2years+OR
Numbers and Character- 4+ episodes 4+ episodes 4+ episodes
istics I year + 2 years + in 5 years in 5 years in 5 years
Percent of All Single 42.7 28.8 16.4 50.7 40.2
Homeless Adults
Estimates of Numbers'
Based on October 1996 126,000 85,000 48,000 149,000 118,000
Estimate
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003); GREATER PHIL. URBAN AFFAIRS COALITION, OUR WAY
HOME: A BLUEPRINT TO END HOMELESSNESS IN PHILADELPHIA 8-9 (1998), available
at http://www.homelessphila.org/gpuac.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). The National
Alliance to End Homelessness provides links to the plans for thirteen states and local-
ities on its website. Nat'l Alliance to End Homlessness, supra.
27. MARTHA R. BURT & LAUDON Y. ARON, URBAN INST., AMERICA'S HOMELESS
II-PPULATIONS AND SERVICES (Feb. 1, 2000), available at http://www.urban.org/
url.cfm?ID=900344 (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). This work was later published in de-
tail in BURT ET AL., supra note 1.
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Based on February 1996 228,000 154,000 87,000 270,000 214,000
Estimate I
Characteristics-Percentages:
Male 82 79 87 82 81
Aged 35 to 54 64 63 67 63 63
Past Year Substance 68 63 80 69 67
Abuse Problem
Past Year Mental Health 54 58 45 54 55
Problem
Past Year either Sub- 84 82 87 84 83
stance Abuse or Mental
Health Problem or Both
Characteristics-Estimates of Numbers:i1
2
Past Year Substance 86/166 53/96 38/70 104/188 79/144
Abuse Problem
Past Year Mental Health 68/124 49/89 22/39 80/145 84/117
Problem
Past Year either Sub- 106/192 70/126 42/76 t25/227 98/178
stance Abuse or Mental
Health Problem or Both
Source: Urban Institute analysis of weighted 1996 NSHAPC data for currently homeless sin-
gle adults; n = 2473.
Numerical estimates are for a single point in time, either October or February 1996.
2 Estimates are in 1,000s; first and second numbers are based on October and February esti-
mates, respectively.
In terms of numbers, estimates for a single point in time range
from a low of 48,000 (based on October estimates and a definition
using multiple episodes-column 3) to a high of 270,000 (using
February estimates and a definition of "at least one year or four or
more episodes within the last five years"-column 4). Numbers for
longer lengths of time such as a year might be as much as twice as
large, as people with past homeless episodes come back into home-
lessness or already homeless people's spells lengthen. But because
the estimates are for a chronic population, far less in-and-out
movement is expected during a year than would be true for the
homeless population as a whole, which may, in the course of a year,
see.as many as six times as many people experience homelessness
as would be true at a single point in time. Roughly speaking, there-
fore, we could assume that over the course of a year between
150,000 and 250,000 single adults experience chronic homelessness.
In the eyes of many people, providing housing and supportive ser-
vices for a population of this size is manageable.
Most chronically homeless people have significant personal vul-
nerabilities, such as severe mental illness, substance abuse, or
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
both. 8 These problems often lead the public and policy makers to
believe that chronically homeless people will resist housing and
services. 29 But, as the evidence cited earlier shows, most will ac-
cept housing and services if they are structured appropriately, and
most will stay in that housing rather than return to the streets.3 °
VI. MONEY: EVIDENCE OF REASONABLE COSTS
Providing housing and supportive services to chronically home-
less people costs a lot of money, which is one reason why commu-
nities do not do more of it.31 Chronically homeless people,
however, also cost communities a lot of money when they are not
housed, as well as reducing the quality of life for homeless and
non-homeless alike. 32 Databases showing shelter use by individu-
als allow us to see that relatively few (about ten to fifteen percent)
of the people homeless at any given time are continuously home-
less, or return to homelessness regularly and never establish stable
residence.3 3 Further, these few take up at least half of the re-
sources available in the system of emergency response to homeless-
ness-using fifty percent or more of the available shelter bed
nights, in quite a number of cities capable of providing this infor-
mation.34 So they are being housed (in shelters), just badly housed,
and expensively housed. Moreover, in shelters they do not get
much help to leave homelessness.
In addition to shelter and other resources of the homeless assis-
tance system, chronically homeless people drain the resources of
hospital emergency rooms and inpatient services, psychiatric out-
patient and inpatient services, substance abuse services, jails and
prisons, veterans' services, and other public agencies. 36 Dennis
Culhane and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania have
recently completed works on supported housing programs in New
28. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
29. Koegel et al., supra note 1, at 146.
30. See supra Part IV.
31. NAT'L ALLIANCE To END HOMELESSNESS, supra note 23, at 10-11.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Dennis P. Culhane et al., Public Shelter Admission Rates In Philadelphia and
New York City: Implications for Sheltered Population Counts, 5 HOUSING POL'Y DE-
BATE 107, 109-10, 121 (1994).
35. Id. at 132-37.
36. Dennis P. Culhane et al., Public Service Reductions Associated with Placement
of Homeless Persons with Severe Mental Illness in Supportive Housing, 13 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 107, 111, 116, 120-35 (2002), available at www.fanniemaefoundation.
org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1301_culhane.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
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York City and Connecticut, documenting the extensive public costs
incurred by these systems in caring for chronically homeless
adults. 37 Results reveal that the cost of not offering housing and
supportive services is nearly equal to the cost of providing them.
This cost analysis was the final piece of the puzzle that has stimu-
lated recent commitments to ending chronic homelessness.
VII. DEVELOPING A PUBLIC POLICY
Research provided the first step toward developing today's em-
phasis on ending chronic homelessness. Early federally funded
demonstrations showed that very long-term homeless people with
many disabilities and problems come directly into housing and stay
there, with appropriate services and supports. Subsequent studies
and evaluations have demonstrated the same thing. National sur-
vey data provided evidence that the chronically homeless popula-
tion was of reasonable size. Finally, financial analyses showed that
the public costs of not providing housing and supportive services
for this population came very close to equaling the costs of making
housing available.
Advocacy followed the research. Armed with the evidence that
it was possible to get chronically homeless people off the streets,
that the numbers were not that large, that the people affected have
many vulnerabilities, and that it does not even cost very much, ad-
vocates prepared the case. Some organizations and communities
had already been working to develop permanent supportive hous-
ing, including the Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance in
partnership with the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health,
Columbus/Franklin County, Ohio's Community Shelter Board in
its Rebuilding Lives initiative, and the Corporation for Supportive
Housing in projects in eight states. What advocates began to pro-
mote was national commitment.
Advocacy was an early step, undertaken to convince Congress to
make permanent supportive housing a priority within federal
homeless funding streams. Such housing is an essential element in
any plan to end homelessness among chronically homeless individ-
uals. For the first time, for federal fiscal year 1999, the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
37. Id. at 108-09 (discussing supported housing programs in New York City); see
ARTHUR ANDERSON LLP ET AL., THE CORP. FOR SUPPORTIVE Hous., CONNECTICUT
SUPPORTIVE HOUSING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM EVALUATION: REPORT HIGH-
LIGHTS 1-2 (2002) (discussing supported housing programs in Connecticut), available
at http://documents.csh.org/pdfs/EvalHighlights.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
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appropriation bill carried the stipulation that thirty percent of
HUD's funding for the supported housing program be set aside for
permanent supportive housing. Advocacy and bipartisan Congres-
sional support has seen to it that the thirty percent set-aside has
been maintained; additional funds have also been made available
to assure renewals of permanent supportive housing programs
whose initial grants were expiring.
The National Alliance to End Homelessness kicked off a cam-
paign during its 2000 annual conference, unveiling its "Ten Year
Plan to End Homelessness."38 The part of the plan pertaining to
ending chronic homelessness marshaled the evidence reviewed
above, then laid out steps that will be necessary to achieve the goal,
including the now oft-repeated phrases of:
" "Opening the Back Door"-providing housing to help people
leave homelessness.39
" "Closing the Front Door"-assuring that people leaving insti-
tutions such as mental hospitals, substance abuse treatment
facilities, and the foster care system do not leave into
homelessness.4"
" "Building Infrastructure"-creating more housing, more
earning capacity, and better preventive services.4'
The National Alliance worked to build partnerships and get
commitments from federal agencies, and eventually also from the
White House.42 Early in his tenure, National Alliance members
visited HUD Secretary Mel Martinez and convinced him that end-
ing chronic homelessness was something that could be done, and
should be done.4 3 The fact that there was strong Congressional
backing for providing federal funds to the effort also helped move
HUD toward a commitment to work on ending chronic homeless-
ness.44 By the National Alliance's 2001 annual conference the
38. NAT'L ALLIANCE TO ENID HOMELESSNESS, supra note 23, at 1.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id. at 9.
41. Id. at 13.
42. See L.A. Homeless Servs. Auth., Strategic Plan to End Homelessness, at http://
www.lahsa.org/strategicplan.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
43. NAT'L ALLIANCE TO EN!) HOMELESSNESS, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 15
(2001), available at http://www.naeh.org/pub/anreport200l.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2003).
44. See Congress Nearing Adjournment, Crucial Issues Still Unresolved, ALLI-
ANCE, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 1, 3, at http://www.naeh.org/pub/newslet/165issue.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2003).
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HUD Secretary was a featured speaker, discussing the need to end
chronic homelessness in the United States.4 5
By July 2002, the Federal Interagency Council on Homelessness
was revived (it had been moribund for six years), and a staunch
advocate from Massachusetts, Philip F. Mangano, was appointed as
its executive director.46 His portfolio includes working to end
chronic homelessness and increasing cooperation and coordination
among the major federal agencies to bring this about.47 In July
2002, the Council was able to announce a new federal strategy to
end chronic homelessness, including a substantial commitment to
work on prevention (closing the front door) as well as helping peo-
ple once they become homeless.4 8 That commitment involved di-
rectives to three federal agencies (the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, and the Department of Veteran Affairs) to develop working
relationships around ending homelessness.
As part of this rapid increase in emphasis on ending chronic
homelessness (two years from announcement to federal commit-
ment is very fast in the world of politics), national commitment
appears to be growing. Editorials have appeared in major newspa-
pers calling for the end of chronic homelessness and declaring it
possible to accomplish. 49 A national conference in May 2002 spon-
sored by the Corporation for Supportive Housing began a national
campaign to get local and state jurisdictions to agree to a "com-
pact" to end chronic homelessness by developing 150,000 units of
permanent supportive housing in the next ten years. The momen-
tum can be seen in the number of communities that are starting to
think of developing their own plans to end chronic homelessness
(or all homelessness) in ten years, and a number that have already
developed such plans and are acting on them.
45. See Secretary Mel Martinez, Taking on the Problem that "Cannot Be Solved,"
Remarks at the National Alliance to End Homelessness National Conference (July
20, 2001), at www.hud.gov/news/speeches/homelessness.cfm (last visited Mar. 15,
2003).
46. Interagency Council on Homelessness, Biography-Philip F. Mangano, at
www.ich.gov/library/pr02-078.html (last updated Apr. 1, 2003).
47. Id.
48. Press Release, Interagency Council on Homelessness, White House Inter-
agency Council Announces New Strategy to Combat Chronic Homelessness (July 18,
2002), at www.ich.gov/library/pr02-078.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
49. See, e.g., Editorial, Ending Chronic Homelessness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002,
at A24.
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CONCLUSION
The question is, will the momentum of new policies and commit-
ments carry through to actual changes in levels of chronic home-
lessness? Ending chronic homelessness will not be cheap, and
although costs are near to break-even with current practices that
leave vulnerable people on the streets, the costs come out of differ-
ent agencies' pockets. It will take political will in local communi-
ties and at the federal level to capture the savings from various
departments and invest them in the activities and programs that
will end chronic homelessness. Further, the effort must be sus-
tained over a decade and beyond. Columbus, Ohio, for instance,
began its Rebuilding Lives campaign and its commitment to create
800 units of permanent supportive housing for street homeless peo-
ple almost five years ago, and it is now less than halfway to its
goal." In this effort, political will is everything, but political will is
usually very hard to sustain as years go by and administrations
change.
The larger question also, of course, remains-what will it take to
end homelessness altogether. In a recent brief, the Author dis-
cussed several steps that are widely regarded as essential if we are
to see the end of all types of homelessness in this country.5I These
steps are quite similar to the "building infrastructure" component
of the National Alliance's plan to end homelessness. First, housing
has to become more affordable. The simplest way to do this is to
subsidize housing; research indicates that the public policy that
would do the most to reduce the risk of homelessness is subsidizing
housing.52 This involves no need to build new units, no struggles
with project siting or zoning or "not in my back yard" behavior.
All it takes is providing those people with the most disparate hous-
ing costs in relation to their income the financial resources to re-
main in place. In addition, new housing needs to be created that is
affordable by people earning relatively little despite working regu-
larly-renewed incentives for producing affordable rental housing
50. MARTHA R. BURT ET AL., URBAN INST., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN
DEV., EVALUATION OF CONTINUUMS OF CARE FOR HOMELESS PEOPLE: FINAL RE-
PORT 23 (2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/continuums of_
care.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003)
51. MARTHA R. BURT, URBAN INST., WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO END HOMELESS-
NESS? 5 (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/endhomelessness.
pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003)
52. JOHN M. QUIGLEY ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CA., HOMELESSNESS IN CAIJ-
FORNIA iii-xi (2001), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/R-OOJQR.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
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would greatly help the current situation of inadequate housing
supply.
It is also essential that people who are poor today, and their chil-
dren, have the educational and training opportunities to assure that
they are not poor tomorrow. That is, we have to increase the abil-
ity of the poorest people in this country to be able to afford hous-
ing without requiring subsidies in the future. The problem is, these
steps are not in political favor at this time, being seen as the old
anti-poverty agenda. Instead, present federal budget proposals ac-
tually offer significant cuts in public and subsidized housing-ac-
tions that in the long run will work against the federal commitment
to end chronic homelessness. Ultimately, the solution to chronic
homelessness will rest on the solution to homelessness in general;
the latter begets the former. Only a few communities so far have
committed themselves to this larger goal.
t I
